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  1. In FDR358 (Stef's wager) Stefan argued that it is better to believe in free will when lacking information to its existence. He calls this argument Stef’s wager. If you believe in free will but determinism is true then you were determined to believe in free will so you lost nothing. If you believe in determinism but free will is true then you lost your ability for personal responsibility which is worse. In this post, I will argue against the wager and utilise my argument against the wager to provide a case for, and to defend determinism. I will not cite all my paraphrases of Stefan for obvious reasons, but that is not a problem given that others may correct me if they believe I have misrepresented Stefan. Also, phrases with single quotation marks are quoting Stefan. Free will is defined as that which any person who possesses it could have chosen differently in a circumstance given that the circumstance is unchanged, hence choices being uncaused by any physical effect. Decisions may be caused by something non-material like a soul. Or they may be self-caused, as Stefan has favoured. This definition of free will is the same definition Stefan has used. No sane determinist truly believes that beliefs cannot be changed or that choice does not exist. No sane determinist truly believes people cannot be rational or cannot debate. So naturally, a determinist will probably not find Stef’s wager convincing given that the determinist had probably considered the ability to choose when they adopted their belief in determinism. A determinist will not believe that beliefs cannot be influenced. Therefore, I argue that a better wager would be to show the pragmatic consequences of a determinist morality vs. a free will morality. This is more in line with the original Descartes wager. Descartes did not argue that if you believe in God but God does not exist then you cannot have lost anything because then morality does not exist anyway and so free will doesn't exist and you could not have changed your mind. Rather, he weighed up the consequences of the belief without changing epistemological postulates. He said if you believe in God but there is no God then you have not changed much in your life. If you believe in no God but there is a God then you will go to hell. Nowhere in this argument are one’s epistemological beliefs challenged. The wager is a pragmatic rather than a philosophical argument. Speaking in pragmatic terms, the wager favours neither position particularly strongly. There are many changes that a person makes if they are committed to determinism, for which it would be costly if they didn't make if determinism is true. Firstly, you stop evaluating people based on the decisions they make and start evaluating them on their behaviour. This makes life much simpler because you stop judging your own desires about people. You don't try to convince yourself someone is worth your time because they are trying their best to be a good person. You don't feel guilty for being selfish with regards to your relationships. According to a study, 44% of trait conscientiousness is heritable. This study supports the claim that virtue is predetermined. Secondly, you become compassionate towards others. You understand anger does not appeal to their rationality. Given that you evaluate them on their behaviour, you can infer that they are not worthy of your time if they don't change their behaviour. You may call them stubborn without any need to grant them free will. Thirdly, you have a richer understanding of human nature. How anger could change someone even if free will is true is difficult to imagine. A much simpler approach is to understand our emotions do not necessarily have any moral content. Anger may be a fight or flight mechanism. Shame may be a way of keeping the integrity of a tribe. Hatred depends on subjective values. There is not necessarily an unconscious 'true self' that 'knows everything' and then the extra component of free will. Rather, we can understand how people think by analysing their biology and experiences. According to free will, brain damage may affect a person’s emotions or unconscious motives, but it should not be able to affect a person’s virtue or moral worth, which should be solely determined by free will, and free will not being determined by physical effect. However, a study found that brain damage can casually make changes in the way that people reason which can causally change moral beliefs. Fourthly, you become compassionate towards yourself. A meta-analysis found a large effect size for the negative relationship between self-compassion and psychopathology, r = − 0.54 (95% CI = − 0.57 to − 0.51; Z = − 34.02; p < .0001). We can come to understand that when we say ‘sorry’, we don’t really mean we are worthy of shame, but rather that we understand that we should change how we behave in the future compared to the past. We also stop comparing ourselves to others. Under the dictum that reason equals virtue equals happiness, we may feel compelled to compare our levels of happiness to others, or to compare our virtue to that of others. This is not a good approach. We can accept that we are not all dealt the same hand, and there may as well be things that determine our virtue for which are difficult to control. It is not to say that we ought not to strive for virtue, but that virtue should not necessarily be the determinant of self-esteem. What is more appropriate is to compare oneself in the present to oneself in the past. Stefan has argued that determinism is paradoxical because it presupposes that a person is capable of choice, that is, changing their beliefs, while at the same time asserting that choice is impossible. Determinism is the opposite of free will. So, determinism is defined as not being able to have chosen differently in a circumstance given that the circumstance is unchanged, hence choices being caused by physical effects. According to this definition, whether a person has actually made a choice remains untouched. So, the ability to choose and the fact that a person could not have chosen differently are compatible. Choice itself does not require free will. Choice is the ability to change behaviour in virtue of being rational. Rationality is simply conceptual ‘fidelity to reality’. This does not entail free will. Rationality distinguishes us from animals. Animals cannot think conceptually, and we can. Free will then is not required to distinguish human and animal thought. Stefan has argued that if a determinist attempts to debate because they believe others are 'inputs and outputs', then it explains why other people debate, but it would also mean the determinist is also an input-output machine. And therefore, a determinist has not chosen to debate with others and cannot attempt to debate in the first place which is a performative contradiction. To this argument I rebut. If free will does exist and we are watching two others debate, we can explain their behaviour without appealing to free will by labelling them as inputs and outputs much like philosophical zombies. A determinist simply takes that further to say that this is also a characteristic of the observer. We can still choose to debate even if it was determined. I am yet to have heard a philosophical argument from Stefan against determinism without him appealing to the argument of performative contradiction. If there is no contradiction with the belief of free will, we should look at the evidence and the simplest explanation. Stefan has acknowledged that determinism should be accepted only if it is non-contradictory given that it is simpler. The evidence overwhelmingly supports that determinism is simpler to free will for the following reasons. Firstly, everything else seems to be determined by all effects acting as also as all causes. Stefan has argued that we should not be surprised to find that the human mind possesses free will given that it is only the brain that possesses consciousness. However, I am not sure whether it's correct to assume that only the brain possesses consciousness. Consciousness cannot be objectively observed. If it were not for what we have observed in the physical human body and comparing it to our subjective experience, there would have been no way to know that consciousness resides in the brain. In fact, we still don't really know whether animals are conscious. In that regard, a rock could even be conscious in some manner, a position known as panpsychism. If a computer was capable of conceptual processing, it is likely that the computer would be conscious at a level similar to our own. Consciousness may have to do more with complexity and feedback loops than it has to do with the brain. I had a dream a while ago in which I saw consciousness and life itself arising from feedback loops, weird dream. Secondly, I do not know what it means to feel free. At least from my perspective, I see my thoughts as constant dialectics. I have said sorry enough times to my girlfriend where I really feel like I don't have much control as I thought I had. Do any men concur? Split-brain patients will often have opposing preferences in separate hemispheres. For example, one hemisphere may have atheistic leanings while the other has theistic leanings. Whether the person is actually theistic may have to do with what ever preference dominates consciousness as a unitary experience, but it does go to show the power of causality in the brain. Also, in my experience the biggest changes in my behaviour have arisen from changes in my environment rather than changes in my attitude. Thirdly, morality requires rationality but it does not require free will. Nowhere in the UPB framework is there a requirement for free will. If a person is rational, they will be moral by adopting universal preferences. Whether a person is rational may be predetermined. Fourthly, it is difficult to articulate what free will actually is. If you were asked to pick a random grass leaf from a field, it is difficult to claim you could have chosen differently. Every choice must depend on knowledge. Picking a grass leaf from a field is not an informative decision. You cannot for example say to have free will about whether to steer a ship east or west while in the middle of an unknown ocean at least without some scientific acuity. Likely, you will pick based solely upon gut feelings, or some kind of patterns of thinking or heuristics. Indeed, this is why neuroscientists can predict such behaviour before the person is aware of their decision. But even if a decision were to be more informative, like for example whether to watch this movie or that movie, there is nothing in your environment which informs you about what you ought to do. It is not intrinsically more rational to watch either movie. There is no ought from an is. Now, we can still say that morality exists. We can say it’s rational to be moral, for your behaviour to be universally preferable. However, choosing to watch a movie is not a moral decision. Subjective taste would largely determine which movie to watch, which arises from unconscious processes. If you are rational, unconscious motives will drive your specific behaviours. If you are irrational, unconscious motives will still drive your specific behaviours. Then, free will might not exist in the behavioural decisions per se, but rather in the choice about whether one acts rationally or irrationally regardless of what behaviour that entails. This is certainly what Ayn Rand believed. The point here is that free will how it is typically conceptualised as existing in every choice we make is unnecessary, and creates the problem of supposing some open system where we get inspiration or information from something that is neither in our environment or biology. To conclude, whether or not a person believes in determinism has significant effects on their life regardless of whether determinism is true. Determinism is not incompatible with the ability to choose. Therefore, it does not contradict how we act. Given that determinism is the simplest explanation, determinism is true. Determinism is defined as a lack of the ability have chosen differently. Free willers would argue the corollary to determinism is that choice does not exist. Conventionally then, determinism is also defined as the lack of choice. But I would argue that this belief is the idea of fatalism and not determinism. Given that morality exists and free will is an important concept in moral reasoning, I am in favour of compatibilism which states that free will does not contradict determinism if we define free will conventionally as the ability to choose and determinism as not having been able to have chosen differently. A person who is a compatibilist is still a determinist. I also wish not to do a disservice to free willers by abandoning the term known as free will used to describe the position of believing in the ability to have chosen differently, so I think it is appropriate to call that position free will while separating it from conventional free will.
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