Kevin Beal

No, not necessitated. I believe that I have more than covered in detail why I do not think every event is necessitated. I'm actually confused as to how we got here again. What did I say that suggested my approval of this position? I believe that propositions are either true or false, yes. I believe that the acceptance of both these points is actually the determinist position rather than the compatibilist one. Like how you can be an agnostic theist or an agnostic atheist, you can be a determinist compatibilist or not a determinist and a compatibilist. The way that I have defined determinism and free will, they are absolutely incompatible. I could have a mistaken definition or I'm confusing a paradox for a contradiction, but no, I do not consider the compatibilist position to be logically tenable. That experience of free will that we have is either illusory, or it isn't. These two things are not compatible. If there's anything I'm saying, it's that. If I could get anything across, it would be that I intend to represent the side of the argument that says that our experience of our own free will is not illusory. You claim to want to know the definitions of these terms and the free will position, but you don't seem to understand, at least how I'm using these terms, still. Is that right? It's been a few hundred posts now in this thread and it doesn't appear as if you've made any progress toward your goal. I've offered a dozen or so definitions to related terms and a dozen or so arguments, admittedly in a manner which was rude and unproductive, and I apologize for that. What would you like me to do differently to help you understand the position? Because whatever we're doing now is not working. I really do want to help people to understand the position and I feel a bit silly trying to beat people over the head with the truth. That was a dumb thing to try to do. Telling myself that "determinists just don't listen" was just an excuse I was telling myself to act badly. I don't know that. I was a determinist before too. Help me out a little here.

I prefer Cthulhu. The gods from the Lord of the Rings series were kinda cool too.

This is a reflection on you, not the boards.

Inner Work by Robert A Johnson is the book I read to get better at it. It also has some mecosystem type stuff in there as well. I found it helpful, but I haven't read any others to compare it to. I know that Stef has recommended Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams. Inner Work was recommended to me by my therapist, and it applies the same principles beyond the realm of dreams into waking fantasy and inner work generally. The approach is to write down the elements of your dream and make associations with those elements and let those interpretations (especially the ones that resonate with you) tell a broader story that may apply to your life. The author is a Jungian psychologist and so they tend to see significance in sets of 2's, 3's and 4's. If there are two birds in your dream, that's a clue that the bird symbol is significant. They also seem to focus a lot on shapes like squares and circles. I'm not familiar enough with the Jungian perspective on these things and why they are important, but I tend to trust that when I look at my own dreams. Some tips that (maybe) aren't in the book, but that I found useful are: if something is impossible in real life, like humans flying, or falling upward, or something like that, this is probably important consider the dream in the context of recent events in your life if somebody else's association doesn't fit, then feel free to disregard it (dream dictionaries can lead you in the wrong direction) And I would say to just practice. I've found that simply sticking with my dreams, reflecting on them generally causes me to make lots of interesting and helpful associations that might have nothing to do with the actual meaning of the dream, but that metaphor generation machine in your head works in the same way, I believe. So it's all a kind of self work when you think about your dreams. Here are some podcasts on dreams that you may find helpful in looking at your own: FDR#307 A Holey Vision http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_307_A_Holey_Vision.mp3 FDR#354 Junkyard Dreams - An Deep Analysis http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_354_Junkyard_Dreams.mp3 FDR#359 Holy Bat-Dream! http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_359_Holy_BatDream.mp3 FDR#413 Two Dreams Part 1: The Jesus Bunny http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_413_Two_Dreams_Part_1.mp3 FDR#414 Two Dreams Part 2: Ice Flying http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_414_Two_Dreams_Part_2.mp3 FDR#456 Dream Analysis - The Heart Is An Organ Of Fire http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_456_The_Heart_Is_An_Organ_Of_Fire.mp3 FDR#488 Paralysis in Flames - A Dream Sequence Analysis http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_488_Paralysis_In_Flames.mp3 FDR#581 Tornado Dreams http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_581_Tornado_Dreams.mp3 And there is a really great conversation between Daniel Mackler and Stef in this call in show: FDR#1572 Sunday Show 31 January 2010 - Guest Psychotherapist Daniel Mackler - Freedomain Radio http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_1572_Sunday_Show_31_Jan_2010.mp3 And there are a ton more that would make this post very long. I'll probably link a playlist soon, once I figure that out.

Defending abuse is against the forum guidelines.

I also explained why it's not simply a matter of complexity. I showed that the standards we use to determine if it's a valid causal description in no way requires determinism. The requirement that it's deterministic can only be sustained if we already assume determinism is true, thus begging the question that determinism is true. The proposition is "determinism is true and free will is illusory" that I'm looking at. In accepting this propositions, several logical problems come up, several presuppositions and a whole lot of question begging in the arguments that have been put forward. The presuppositions are that causality is synonymous with determinism (which has been repeatedly demonstrated to be false), that any effect's cause must be blind and dumb and necessarily determined (which results in a circular argument), that any physical phenomena can be fully accounted for in terms of particle physics and chemical phenomena (also not true as I think I've shown). And probably a lot more that I'm too lazy right now to pull out. This idea that there are no facts to support free will beyond an intuition is false, first of all, but even if it were true, it's a misleading standard to appeal to here. First, the fact that there is a performative contradiction is evidence, it doesn't constitute proof, but so what? The fact that determinism as a theory has some irreconcilable logical problems when it is applied is evidence again. My actual experience is evidence. It's not an intuition. You can disregard an intuition, you cannot shake this one off, not as long as you appeal to reason or assume any responsibility in any capacity. If you argue for free will, you absolutely have to beg the question that it exists. There is no logical escape from this dilemma. But determinists aren't bound by this same problem. Determinists don't have to assume determinism in order to argue for it, and yet as I've argued, that's been happening left and right in the determinist arguments that I've responded to. In order to argue for the existence of reality and the validity of the senses, you must also beg the question that reality is real and the senses valid. That's not just my "intuition", is it? The same principle goes for the fact that things are causal. If it really is a matter of complexity that childhood trauma results in adult dysfunction, then explain to me the deterministic physics that fully account for this phenomena. Let's do away with all the soft sciences and replace them all with a physics of psychology, etc. The behaviorists attempted to do that already. Are you familiar with them and the inevitable failure of their new science of psychology? The existence of human minds makes things harder because now, not all objectively true statements are ontological in nature. Accepting the existence of human consciousness presents a lot of problems for materialists and determinists. Problems they cannot reconcile. And the reason they cannot, and why progress in this area is held back is because of these mistaken presuppositions (I would argue).

But the condition "I chose to lift my arm" is a condition that results in (I would argue) an event for which there were not sufficient conditions necessary to determine it, that is beyond my decision to do it. When you say that determinism is only some action from necessary conditions, non deterministic events can be included under this definition. It's just like saying that causality is the same thing as determinism again. It begs the question that determinism is true in order for your argument to work.

I am so sorry It's terrible that you were made to live with that as a child and it's only made worse by these accusations of heartlessness. I don't know, right? But I wonder if actually that guilt and self loathing for being "heartless" is actually not yours at all. Because, just reading what you've written, it sounds like there is absolutely nothing for you to feel guilty about, and I can't see how anything you did was heartless. Who that sounds like is your mother in that instance. The place where people are most likely to project their own shit onto other people is when they are most guilty of hypocrisy. It doesn't sound like your mother cares about what you went through when she talks at you like that. Instead, it sounds like she's being heartless and i would hope that she feels guilty, because her actions (in combination with your father) resulted in your trauma. I don't quite get the psychological mechanism, but it would sort of make sense to me that those feelings are hers (and probably also your fathers), and not yours. You are just contaminated with her guilt and shame. Stef talks about this sort of thing in this listener convo: You Are Not Conflicted - A Listener Conversation http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_1596_you_are_not_conflicted_convo.mp3 Sorry again Hopefully this is of some help. I've found it very helpful myself.

You seem to be asking two different things when you say "understanding free will". What it actually is, and how it works. I would say that you already understand what it is just as we all have to in order to debate. Hopefully, I'm offering some idea of where to look for how it works by distinguishing between causality and determined, and by pointing out how intentionality is causally self referential. That is my intention anyway. To address your specific questions, I would have to rephrase it, since this subjective experience of our own consciousness is absolutely part of the "objective universe". These are not separate realms. Things either exist, or they do not. The way that I would phrase it is to say that the subjective mode of the existence of our own consciousness enables certain features such as rationality, goal setting, comparing things to ideals, etc, that through our own capacity for intentionality, we can cause our own behavior independent of a set of conditions that make it necessary. That I could have done something different, but I did what I did and not something else. A rock's behavior is all determined by it's composition and outside forces. A rabbit is the same, except it can behave in ways that are volitional. A human is like the rabbit, except it's own capacity for volitional action can be reasoned through. A causal account of each of these entities must take into consideration the features of these entities. The causal nature of a rock is different from a rabbit, which is different from a human. A rabbit is different from a rock in that it has a central nervous system, motor neurons and a set of conscious desires, therefor it can move around of it's own volition. A human is different from a rabbit because it's desires do not necessarily determine its behavior, the way a rabbit or a heroin addict would be determined. This is out of a necessary lack of causal conditions determining the behavior. As a child is growing up, they very likely lack any significant rationality or free will, but as we grow older and grow in our capacity to reason, to measure things against a standard or ideal, the more that intentionalistic gap grows and the freedom of the will be present. You can see this pretty clearly in the case of children who have a very hard time deferring gratification and eating anything sugary they can find, or as an adult when we're overwhelmed by powerful emotions, or obsessions. The distinctions I offer above should reveal the places to look for this gap and why it's connected with a capacity to reason.

Yes, because a condition is a consideration. If a condition is satisfied, the way that it is satisfied can be considered. I'm absolutely convinced that we can have a science of free will, and in many ways we already do, and that is what is meant by rationality. There are irreducible aspects like where neurology meets consciousness, but certainly we can systematically make considerations the way we do in the soft sciences like psychology, praxeology, etc. Free will requires unconscious material and neurological activity, and so certain considerations aren't subjectively experienced, but those that are, are what it means to decide something of your own free will. Here's a relevant quote from John Searle:

Speaking purely philosophically: In order to account for any effect (like gratitude) there must be some causal description. Anything can't cause anything. There must be something specifically about a cause that produces an effect. For example, if I work really hard at something, achieve a goal I set for myself, the effect is pride. It would make no sense if I felt instead shame. Or if I did, that would be of some real concern. What it would mean to force an effect is to have at least some reference to the specific causes that produce that effect, and if that process doesn't involve the relevant specific causes whatsoever, then to "force it" means absolutely nothing. It would be like trying to lift a boulder without doing anything to push or pull it upward. If a person tells you to lift a boulder without pushing or pulling it upward, then they've put you in an impossible situation and your success or failure is not a reflection on you. Sorry about your dad To answer your specific questions: 1. I don't know what the answer is, but if I were the parent, there would have to be some understanding that my child and I agreed on, and something that my child could reasonably agree to and have a good handle on. I would probably ask them work to earn it if it were me, but if I got it for them prior to having any kind of reasonable implicit contract, then I couldn't justify that they hold their end up of a contract we never negotiated. It's another impossible situation. 2. I don't think forcing yourself is going to do anything as I explained above. At the very least, you could tell him what you said there about wanting him to feel appreciated and knowing that it must suck for him, but also that you don't feel gratitude as readily as you might without your past. Ideally, you two would be helping each other to work through just these kinds of issues, by being vulnerable with each other and being honest about having both parts, your conflicts and all. By being willing to be wrong despite the conviction that you aren't and exploring that conflict with your boyfriend. But also, what do I know? I don't know you or your boyfriend, and I'm certainly not any kind of expert on dating or psychology. These are just my thoughts reading your post. Hopefully they are of at least some help. Good luck!

You seem to be asking if we can know what a person will decide before they do. I think the answer is that it depends. Even without any special time freezing powers we can do this sometimes. If I have known somebody for a long time and they are hemming and hawing between two different choices, I often have the experience of quietly grinning inside myself knowing that they are going to pick the one they always do. Or some other similar scenario. But to answer this in a hopefully more satisfying way, consider what goes into the decisions that we make. We have outcomes that we are familiar with, outcomes we desire, are anxious of, think would be funny and all sorts of motivations that inform the decisions we ultimately pick. If you imagine reading someone's mind in frozen time, these are the considerations that I would make, anyway. If I know that a person is made anxious by X and they have no goals of overcoming their anxiety about X, then I'm inclined to imagine that they are going to act to avoid X. If we try and imagine what is that point where the avoidance of X is going to be chosen as their next move, that point is self referential. That is, that these motivations of desires, pains, anxieties, excitements, etc, are relative to the content of the desires, pains, anxieties, etc. If I have a desire to drink water, then the conditions of satisfying my desire include drinking the water. If I drank water but did not have the desire to drink water, then it's something else: I'm not satisfying my desire to drink water. It can only be satisfied if the desire itself is what causes the drinking of the water, and the only way to satisfy that desire is to drink the water. This is pretty confusing stuff. At least it was/is for me. But in talking about the desire itself and its conditions of satisfaction, it must be causally self referential (as John Searle would put it). So here are a couple more examples to hopefully help get the idea across. Similarly, memories are also causally self referential in that if I remember watching the movie Ender's Game, in order for me to have that memory, not only must I have seen the movie, but seeing the movie must cause my memory of it. If I really see a tree, then it must not only be that I have a visual experience whose conditions of satisfaction are that a tree is there, but the fact that there is a tree there must cause the very visual experience that has those conditions of satisfaction. The idea here as it pertains to free will is that knowing what conditions of satisfaction result in my decisions is what it means to make a decision. So to answer your question, if we knew enough about what the conditions of satisfaction are in making that frozen person's decision, that person would be at some point in making that decision. The actual neurological mechanisms that allow for this self generating cause, this intentional causality, are unknown at this time. Actual work in cognitive science surrounding this issue are very new and far from conclusive from what I understand. Stef mentioned in a recent call-in show that he was working on getting a neuroscientist on the show to talk about research in this area. Not all neuroscientists are determinists. Baroness Susan Greenfield talks about some of the latest in this area that is worth a listen:

To anybody: I would also like to hear from you and please let me know if what I'm saying is comprehensible and reasonable enough to earn your tentative agreement. I'm trying a new approach and would love your feedback I'm sorry, but this is not helping me to understand how this justifies the claims you made above. I believe the problem I outlined is still an issue, that is that you are still begging the question. Consider the following: Let's say we freeze time and we can walk around and read people's current thoughts, desires, goals, etc that they have. If we have free will, we will know what we will do next because we chose it. So if you know the current state, that I have just decided to do X, then you know that what I will do next is X. There's no determinism necessary here. What do we know? We know that we experience free will for much of the day and yet what we know about physics seems to suggest that everything is determined like particles are (which humans are made out of), which would necessarily make our experience of free will illusory. How do we resolve this apparent contradiction? What do we know about the causal nature of the reality we live in, generally? And how does it relate to the physical determinacy we observe in physics, chemistry and the other hard sciences? How does a physical, chemical and biological human system work causally? And which features of this human system work deterministically the way our physics models do, and which, if any, do not? That's the form the conversation ought to take, I believe. To take a programming metaphor, it means that if I have conditional statements in my code to validate the input or direct the direction of the program so that our desired result results. if($rainbowDash == right) { concedeArgument(this);} else { pointOutError($logic);}exit;

The definition you offer for "perfect information" is: All I know as the reader is that perfect information both allows us to know what will happen in the future, and that it is incompatible with true randomness for reasons that are unstated. There is no way for me to know why it's a dichotomy beyond you telling me it is so. The definition of true random I gave is: ...and so if you get the opposite of this, you get something that is knowable given some consideration. But this can include things that don't assume (or require I would argue) determinism, such as an account like "if my buddy asks me to go to batting practice with him this weekend, then I will agree and meet him at the cages". I know what will happen, and yet it's not determined. If you accept my definition of true random, then you cannot conclude that the dichotomy you presented is a true one without begging the question that determinism is true because what you are essentially saying is that I'm physically determined to go to the batting cages this weekend when my buddy asks if I'll go with him. The way that you do this is by use of the term "perfect information" which is too vague, and is just a magical term that means anything we want for all I know. First of all, I know why you took the approach you did. greekredemption and Mike Fleming already took that approach. I even mentioned that I suspected I knew where you were going with it when I said: I'm on to you! How does a being who knows everything not know something? How could that work? It seems to me that even if something were truly random, a magical being with the ability to see the future would still know the outcome. What would stop them? Reason? Haha. And I don't know what "if the universe had some way of determining the future state from current state, which would be an example of determinism" means. The universe isn't a thing in itself. It's a concept encompassing the entirety of existing entities. And I noticed you pretty much copied and pasted what you already wrote. Was that really necessary? I promise I did read it, haha

input in and output out is not determinism. I just spent a lot of time explaining why this is question begging. Please address that, and then we can continue. I know that's what you're saying, but what's your argument? You are just asserting this without backing it up. Why is determinism / randomness a valid dichotomy? Maybe it's a failure of my imagination, but I can't see why this supposed dilemma is necessary. Explain it to me in detail please.

Okay, here's my response. I think there are a couple of errors you are making here. But first, I want to point out that the intention behind posting the videos was not to prove free will, but rather to introduce people to John Searle since the guy has a ton of very smart things to add to discussions like this. And even if you are a determinist, he can still teach you a hell of a lot about metaphysics (like he did me the past month or two). The definition of random The first error I believe you are making is a factual one about what randomness means. There is often a distinction made between "random" and "true random". In talking about metaphysics, I believe the relevant and accurate meaning is the "true random" one. In programming every language (pretty much) has some kind of random function in it's native library that mixes things up so well that it may as well be random, but is not actually random. Usually they use the timestamp as a base and mix from there since the time is different every time you call the function. Likewise, and as you suggested, flipping a coin might as well be random, but is physically determined. Determinism precludes true randomness. True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make. An example of this is in quantum physics which you or someone else pointed out earlier. Predictability as a standard The second error I think you are making is in making personal predictability the standard for how we determine whether something is determined or free will. This has problems both ways. The first is that if our prediction does not come true in a deterministic model, then surely, we know that some consideration was not made, some variable unaccounted for. Also, we can predict what decisions people will come to for lots of reasons with differing degrees of certainty. If their decision is a delicious meal over a pile of manure, then that's pretty obvious, or if we neuro-linguistically program someone to eat the manure then we can predict that they will. Maybe it's just the best manure on the planet in some culture where they do that sort of thing, or the person is not as susceptible to NLP or something, in which case we were wrong. Randomness is not free will The third error would be (if you were making this argument) in saying that randomness allows for free will, but actually it doesn't. I suspect that you know the reason already, and is why you asked the question, but just in case: if someone acts randomly, obviously we can't consider them to be acting of their own free will. There is no difference to a determined human robot whether or not the effect of their actions had a determined antecedent cause or if the effect is random, neither allows for the freedom of the will to come in and do its self referential, self generating causal "magic", so to speak. Free will is causal The reason that randomness is brought up by people is, I believe, because there is a confusion between their conception of "causal" and their conception of "determined". This actually presents a big problem for determinists that I will try to highlight again. There is a form of causal description which goes something like: given X input, we should expect Y output in the system C. The input of trajectory and force applied from the input a pool stick (X) to the billiard ball ( C) should result in it ending up in the corner pocket (Y). This is a determined process and the determinacy is pretty easy to see if we think about it. The billiard ball isn't going to suddenly decide to turn back and fight the pool stick or run away in some seemingly random direction or whatever absurd scenario you can think of. This same causal form, however, also applies to other things. Given a traumatic childhood (X) we should expect the child ( C) to grow up to have issues with depression and anxiety and possibly drug addiction (Y). At no point is any physical determinacy referred to in this causal description. And further, it may turn out that the child gets help somehow and grows up to not have these problems. The causal description is a valid one even if it's not necessarily going to lead to the expected result. As far as the causal description goes, or the science of psychology for that matter, determinism has absolutely no relevance. The sense in which we think of the billiard ball example can be a valid causal description must result in the expected outcome, but this same requirement isn't in the traumatic childhood causal description in order for it to be valid. I can already hear the determinist in my own head telling me "well it's only because we don't have all the variables and we treat the second as 'good enough' that makes it valid". And maybe this is true, but it's not something that can be taken for granted. This must be demonstrated by the determinist that it must be a lack of accounting, and what is a principle "traumatic childhood produce dysfunctional adulthoods" will be replaced by a superior physics of psychology. Conclusion When you jump from the first type of causal description right to the second without pointing out that there is only an assumed determinism from X to Y in C, then we have to stop the discussion at that point and make that case, or else we are begged the question of determinism and it's a circular argument. Free will, however it works, it must be causal and not random. It's just that causal is word with a distinct meaning from determined. Conflating the two terms leads to this question begging, circular silliness of assuming determinism before actually making the case for determinism.

I just finished reading a fantastic little book called Mind, Language and Society by Berkeley philosopher John R Searle. It's an introductory work to philosophy focusing on epistemology and ontology. Not that I'm some great philosopher or anything, but I was super surprised by how much I learned reading a 161 page introductory work. John Searle focuses on the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language and is a controversial figure in academia (apparently). I just heard about him a few months ago. And I would say that he takes a very different, but complementary, approach to metaphysics as Stef. The value I see in this and the other material I've consumed of John's is the focus on distinguishing different senses of the word "objective", in that something can be objectively real (ontology) or can be objective knowledge (epistemology). Like how you've heard Stef talk about how the state and the collective doesn't exist, John offers an interesting framework for thinking about how something can not exist, but still be objectively true, and how, if you think about it, that's actually a pretty trippy thing to think about. How can it be the case that a collection of fibers and inks can constitute a 100 dollar bill. It's almost completely identical with a one dollar bill, or a sheet of printer paper for that matter, and yet we recognize collectively a significant amount of value that it represents, and objective ways that we know it's valuable, because counterfeits aren't and not all paper is. How can an electronic signature like a bitcoin be worth $580 to us? Money is an interesting example, but there are a ton more, like how is it that we can collectively agree that carrying a football across the opposing team's in-zone constitutes a field goal in american football, and that a field goal is worth 6 points, and that these "institutional facts" be objectively true? And how that can seem arbitrary yet objective, but math not at all arbitrary and objective in the same sense (epistemically speaking). How might we confuse this sense of the word "objective" with objective statements about the physical constitution of a dollar bill in terms of mass, and volume and chemistry, etc? It turns out that this confusion happens all the time and it gets us in trouble. The ways you are familiar already with are that we can say outrageous things like the state has opposite moral rights, or that we need to give our lives for the collective like how Stef talks about. Another way is in confusing simulations with the things they are meant to simulate. For example, we tend to think that if we can get a robot programmed well enough that it's "machine learning" causes it to gain new capabilities or accept new inputs, that this is actually real learning, real intelligence, and that the difference between ourselves and the robot is merely a difference in sophistication, that we have a better "program" in our brains. This, as it turns out, is a categorical error. The Turing test is for computer simulations of human beings, where Alan Turing says that if you can have a chat with a computer and not know that it's a computer, it's responses so well programmed, that this means that you have achieved true "artificial intelligence". And there are a lot of people who've been trying to do this and succeeding to different degrees, but even if this was accomplished, it's still worlds away from actual intelligence, and this is because the program doesn't actually understand any of the meaning of the responses it gives. Consider the following thought experiment: you are asked to go into a small room with no view or contact with the outside world except one slit in the wall where sheets of paper with questions written in chinese symbols are pushed in. You are tasked with sending out an answer sheet of paper with chinese symbols so that the person outside thinks that there is a native chinese speaker inside of this room. You have a manual that says that if you get X symbols, respond with Y symbols. The manual is very good and you succeed in getting the person outside to believe that they are communicating with a chinese speaker. This is called the "Chinese Room" argument. At no point in this process do you actually understand what the questions are or what the answers mean. A computer is the same way. A computer has no mind at all to think or know anything. It's just a very very very sophisticated symbol manipulation machine. The only meaning that is gotten out of a computer is by human observers, placed there by other users, or at a more dynamic and lower level the developers of the many symbol manipulation subsystems. John focuses a lot on consciousness, language and institutional facts like I described above, and the importance in understanding these topics seems to me now to be of massive importance. I consider finding out how much I don't know, what I just take for granted without really understanding the implications, to be an awesome opportunity, and for me, this book accomplishes that very well. And he's a really good communicator and writer and makes some seriously heavy philosophy accessible to laymen. If you buy it on amazon, make sure to use the amazon affiliate link for FDR: http://www.fdrurl.com/amazon

Are you rainbow dash under a different account? Just kidding I think I remember downvoting one because it was obvious that RD was being obtuse, ignoring the relevant part of a post I made that already addressed what RD said. I think he even quoted that part... One example is the question "is free will random?" when I had said to RD in an earlier post that, at least the way I define it, has nothing whatever to do with randomness. I remember having that experience of being annoyed by the seeming obtuseness multiple times. I'm inclined to believe that RD's an intelligent person, so that makes me think it's obtuseness. Is that alright? Can I downvote for that reason? Here's a thread about this topic generally. That's the most appropriate place to bring it up, I think. And you can always report abusive behavior to the mods if you see it.

All the cool kids are using Chrome these days. And if nothing else, IE development cycles have rapidly sped up so an auto update to IE12 should happen soon.

You're right. We are going in circles. Let me know when you have an answer to my challenges

Blah blah blah, thus free will. Sooooo laaaaazy!

No it's not. When I feel a pain, have a belief, desire etc, it causes more neuronal activity. So in that way neuronal activity is also affected by consciousness. Otherwise you need to explain away the causal effect that desires, pains etc have as illusory, that it's really something else, which doesn't work because consciousness is irreducible.

What difference does it make if consciousness is dependent on neurons? I don't see how that is any kind of counter argument.

Because it's not reasoning that's happening in that scenario, but the illusion of it. And the free will to cause the understanding to occur linearly. Consciousness causes it to occur as a phenomena, like how water molecules gather to produce liquidity.