Trane

Stef showed on that call-in show that he couldn't characterise utilitarianism accurately. Anarchopac corrected him at the time, but it didn't seem like Stefan understood it. I've never heard him quote any modern consequentalist theorists such as Philip Pettit.Whether Stefan has credentials in philosophy is relevant because if you are seeking an education, by definition you are uneducated and so will not be able to tell whether your teacher is knowledgeable or ignorant. That's why you go for a teacher with proper credentials. Stefan uncontroversially has no formal credentials in philosophy other than running his own internet call-in show. He doesn't have a degree in philosophy (well, a basic credential in the real world would be a doctorate from a major institution under a major theorist like Singer or Pettit.)When I say Stefan is an example of Dunning Kruger syndrome I believe I have given good evidence for that (his basic errors, lack of knowledge of concepts, and lack of education in philosophy, and inability to correct mistakes.) Also some of his claims are so obviously false that it is charitable of me to suggest Dunning Kruger - some would say that a claim this brazenly false would have to be intentionally misleading - I think that Stefan is just exhibiting astonishing confirmation bias. He probably actually believes there were no wars in Europe in the 100 years before WW1! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3T-SMoqc_MI'm not sure what Lians means.

To be fair I was pointing out that the only 'credential' vaguely related to philosophy was in fact worthless. I find that to be relevant in this context.

It is childish to downvote my above comment, which showed Stefan had been misleading in using his 'A' in his master's thesis as a credential whilst elsewhere admitting that his adviser never even READ it (!!) without offering any response, especially considering that my statement that Stefan had no formal credentials in philosophy was ridiculed. " I received an 'A' for my Master's Thesis analyzing the political implications of the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. "It took me months to find a thesis adviser, who then gave me an ‘A’ without reading my thesis, mostly to stop me from pestering him. I would argue for particular positions in class, and over and over receive a shrug and ‘well, that’s just your opinion.’ I was aghast at the idea that modern academics was all opinion, but of course I shouldn’t have been." http://freedomain.bl...ting-elegy.html "You say he only has degrees in history but as stated, the graduate degree focused on the history of philosophy." It was a history degree. This is uncontroversial. Even without his admission that the adviser didn't read his thesis, it is STILL not a credential in philosophy, which explains why Stef is unfamiliar with basic concepts such as utilitarianism which he is unable to accurately characterise (e.g. in his debate with anarchopac.) He has never debated any serious analytic philosopher, even a libertarian like Matt Zwolinski. Using terms such as 'retarded' shows your immaturity. I have not used such epithets to insult others. How juvenile and anti-intellectual. I know you are emotionally invested in Stefan but please, try and be more objective.

That 'A' He received for his master's thesis? "It took me months to find a thesis adviser, who then gave me an ‘A’ without reading my thesis, mostly to stop me from pestering him. I would argue for particular positions in class, and over and over receive a shrug and ‘well, that’s just your opinion.’ I was aghast at the idea that modern academics was all opinion, but of course I shouldn’t have been." http://freedomain.blogspot.co.uk/2005/01/morality-and-society-liberating-elegy.html His adviser didn't even READ it! So he really shouldn't use it as a credential. Don't you think this is rather dishonest and misleading? What do you make of it? As you showed, Kevin, he has no philosophical education. He has two degrees in history (his master's was a history degree also "He also holds an undergraduate degree in History from McGill University, as well as a Masters Degree in History from the University of Toronto."). He is an amateur as far as philosophy goes. Teabagger, my 'intention' was accuracy. He listed no credentials in philosophy whatsoever. Downvoted - but you have no response?

@Kevin, I don't believe your statement here is coherent. For instance -"It is actually consistent to say that positive obligations are invalid and have the moral good described in "thou shalt nots" (or "negations")."You suggest that 'thou shalt nots' are 'negations' - you apparently do not understand what 'negation' means. Also you say I confuse virtues and positive obligations. All that is relevant is whether something is normatively prescribed, i.e. one ought to do so. Stefan, being an amateur untrained in philosophy, does not use the terminology of modern ethics, and so it is very hard to discuss his works, there being no reference points in the literature.

Kevin (and darkskyabove), the relevant problem with 'arguing against UPB proves UPB' is that it only applies to a subset of the book 'UPB'. I.e. you might try and use the performative contradiction argument to show that I cannot consistently claim that objective moral facts don't exist whilst engaged in rational argument. But it would make no sense to use that argument to argue that positive obligations don't exist - since I could consistently claim 'objective moral facts do exist AND positive moral obligations do exist'. Quite obviously there's no contradiction there. The 'you're using UPB to deny UPB' argument can't just be wheeled out to defend anything Stefan ever writes. E.g. responding to an empirical claim regarding the effectiveness of the minimum wage - 'it can't have improved welfare for the poor because you're using UPB to deny UPB!' It just isn't remotely relevant in this case. Given that, the other option available is to claim that negation is identical to opposite. In the thread so far, this has clearly been shown to be false, with a multitude of examples. Therefore, if you really are committed to the growth of FDR and Stefan's ideas, I suggest you encourage him to correct this error (which I don't claim it is impossible for him to do) seeing as it makes the book 'UPB' less credible and so less likely to win favour.

Quite. The funny thing is that UPB is basically just a rehashing of Hoppe's argumentation ethics which has been 'thoroughly refuted' by Robert Murphy and Gene Callahan. http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html Definitely worth reading. @Dave Bockman, you're confusing objective standards for FACTS and objective standards for VALUES. You can refer to the first (e.g. it is objectively true that WW1 began in 1914) seperate from the second (e.g. it is objectively true that one ought not to lie.) If the objective standard you speak of is the first, then UPB is not assumed within a debate, since the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Similarly, if you mean the second, then the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Thus you can have a debate without UPB, because both myself and the person I am arguing with have a subjective preference for beliefs based on sound arguments, and I don't claim that they objectively ought to have that preference.Edit: downvoting without responding is not an argument, it just reveals that you were emotionally upset by my arguments but cannot effectively respond.Edit 2: Looks like I won! Nobody can refute the arguments against UPB I made. That is very satisfying to me, I must say!

@FiddlerRe: universality - I'm sure that certain moral rules which make reference to groups may be undesirable. But this wasn't exactly the point. Rather Stefan claims (e.g. in his statements on gun control) that making reference to groups AT ALL violates universality and so is illogical in terms of morality - these CANNOT be moral rules. As the self defense example shows, this is not the case - rules which make reference to classes may be universalized and so are candidates for moral rules."but i do feel that it should be avoided within any framework for an objective morale theory, for the reason i stated above, it's the fact that two groups of humans can have different (in fact opposite) rules to be moral that has created horrid things like Government, but while my observation is objective, my preference is subjective." But with the self-defense example you don't have this problem. This suggests that it isn't really the feature of seperate classes that worries you, but rather certain particular cases where you feel the distinction is arbitrary and unjustified. (E.g. it is wrong to rape unless you have ginger hair.) David Gordon in 'Mr Molyneux Responds' says just this, that we need to critique rules on a case by case basis - but Stefan's sweeping proclamations that making reference to classes violates universality is false and should be retracted."I also personally do not like the idea of positive obligations within morality, morality then becomes a controlling system like it is now, a framework that does not include qualifications or classifications (or at the very least avoids them wherever possible) seems to me to be far superior. But this is, as far as i know, all my subjective preference. To me, adding these kinds of qualifying classes runs the risk of the old child's book "If you give a mouse a cookie" scenario."Morality in Stefan's sense is also a 'controlling system' - for example, it is just to be able to remove somebody who is on your property. Of course you would consider this just control, but it is control none the less, and left-anarchists (I'm not one) would consider it oppressive. So you can't just appeal to positive obligations being 'controlling' as a reason to reject them, since Stefan's moral system similarly restricts movement (e.g. to the property-less) and any moral system will similarly seek to prohibit actions it deems unjust.Finally, notice that you are arguing against positive obligations being part of a moral system based on their consequences particuarly the risk of abuse. This is an argument we could have - but its assumptions are consequentialist (which Stefan would denounce.) UPB doesn't say that positive obligations have bad consequences and so are immoral, it says that they are IMPOSSIBLE because they violate universality. That is false.(Btw, note that all this is seperate from the discussion regarding objectivity of preferences. I could believe that some preferences were objectively good to hold but still recognise that Stefan is erring in claiming that positive obligations necessarily violate universality.)

@FiddlertheLeperMan, I responded to you at length! Maybe you missed it, here it is again. I made a point of how polite and friendly you were so it is a shame you got the wrong end of the stick!"@FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible. Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!""your not at all interested in either UPB or the premises involved, nor providing any sort of objective feedback/criticism." I hope you see that this was incorrect! @DaveThanks for the link, but you can debate without UPB. We may both have subjective preferences for having beliefs based on sound arguments. In that context, we can argue and debate things which we believe without positing UPB. If we told all others that they OUGHT to base their beliefs on sound arguments, then THAT would be invoking UPB (objective moral facts). However, in discussing, we are not necessarily doing that, since we may just share subjective preferences for truth over falsehood and beliefs based on sound argumentation.Thanks for posting the link!

@KevinBeal'Nope' as in you don't value basing your beliefs on reason and evidence? If not, please let me know as this is quite relevant!Can you explain exactly where the contradiction is? There's a hidden ought-statement there which is that 'you ought (or have reason) to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences', I don't claim that myself, but I expect you would claim that you are taking the relevant action to base your beliefs on reason and evidence. Once again, given your presence on a forum valuing reason and evidence as a method for coming to true beliefs I think it is reasonable for me to assume that you have that preference.I would not claim it to be objectively true regardless of your preferences that you ought to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences, so we disagree there. That itself is a subjective preference you may or may not hold.

@ProTeabagger"As for the other thing- YES it could just be true that you have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you I do too (which my presence on the forum suggests) and so correct me because you believe that it satisfies my subjective preferences. So what? What the hell has that got to do with it? I said that once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. If you correct me then logically it must be according to an objective standard, right? Otherwise it's not a correction. That standard must be universal, right? Being in accord with it must be a preferred state, right? Otherwise it cannot be wrong; just different. If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "The arguments Stefan makes that are erroneous are objectively unsound. That standard is universal - whether a conclusion follows from its premises/whether the premises are true are factual is-statements. That isn't the same as appealing to a universal MORAL standard, positing universal values."If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "I understood that YOU held it subjectively that you prefer to have your propositions conform to reason and evidence/truth? I do also. I'm not claiming that it is objectively moral or universally preferable that you OUGHT to have that preference. However, you do (don't you?) so I am operating on that basis. If you were to say that you do not value reason and evidence whatsoever then I wouldn't correct you as you would be beyond reason, and I wouldn't claim that you objectively should value those things. The concept of correction is not a logical non-starter in this sense - if an argument is unsound, it may be improved and perhaps become valid, sound, or maybe just dispensed with. In the same say, I might say that it is not universally preferable to use accurate dates, whilst still (considering that me and you both have subjective preferences for using the same dates) correcting your ascription of the beginning of WW1 to 1722.Teabagger - re: 'those in need', for argument's sake, let's just make it 'if you are extraordinarily wealthy and others are starving to death due to poverty, you ought to give them just enough to survive'. That is a universalizable moral rule in the sense that it can be applied to all moral agents. Stefan claims such positive obligations are not universalizable. That is false.

@WesleyI wouldn't feel like continuing either if the guy supposedly on your side just agreed with me that you were wrong!!"While i personally disagree with your arguments against the coma test, i do agree that the lack of proof for subjective preferances does not equate to them not existing, or for them to "ought" not to exist." - FiddlertheLeper

Whether *what* is? That people can prefer things? Yes, that is objectively true, e.g. I prefer apples to watermelons. It's a question of psychology.(Edit - lol, who voted down? What is there here to disagree with?!) @FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible. Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!

It's not a question of whether you can prove it or not, it's a question of whether it is objectively true or not. Is there a fact either way as to whether one has a preference for x or y? Certainly Stefan's theory demands it. He claims people have preferences for certain things. This is essential to UPB, read appendix a: upb in a nutshell. Whether some preferences are objectively right or wrong doesn't affect whether those preferences EXIST! You're confusing what can be objectively considered to exist vs. what can be objectively considered right/wrong. Nothing I've said entails that it isn't the case that people can prefer certain things to other things...

1. It certainly may be objectively false that you have one subjective preference and objectively true that you have another, certainly.2. But it couldn't be said that it was objectively immoral or wrong for you to hold one subjective preference as opposed to another.'This means that me having a subjective preference is not false or objectively wrong', given 1. this is not correct, since it might be false that you have a particular subjective preference.