Trane

Stef showed on that call-in show that he couldn't characterise utilitarianism accurately. Anarchopac corrected him at the time, but it didn't seem like Stefan understood it. I've never heard him quote any modern consequentalist theorists such as Philip Pettit.Whether Stefan has credentials in philosophy is relevant because if you are seeking an education, by definition you are uneducated and so will not be able to tell whether your teacher is knowledgeable or ignorant. That's why you go for a teacher with proper credentials. Stefan uncontroversially has no formal credentials in philosophy other than running his own internet call-in show. He doesn't have a degree in philosophy (well, a basic credential in the real world would be a doctorate from a major institution under a major theorist like Singer or Pettit.)When I say Stefan is an example of Dunning Kruger syndrome I believe I have given good evidence for that (his basic errors, lack of knowledge of concepts, and lack of education in philosophy, and inability to correct mistakes.) Also some of his claims are so obviously false that it is charitable of me to suggest Dunning Kruger - some would say that a claim this brazenly false would have to be intentionally misleading - I think that Stefan is just exhibiting astonishing confirmation bias. He probably actually believes there were no wars in Europe in the 100 years before WW1! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3T-SMoqc_MI'm not sure what Lians means.

To be fair I was pointing out that the only 'credential' vaguely related to philosophy was in fact worthless. I find that to be relevant in this context.

It is childish to downvote my above comment, which showed Stefan had been misleading in using his 'A' in his master's thesis as a credential whilst elsewhere admitting that his adviser never even READ it (!!) without offering any response, especially considering that my statement that Stefan had no formal credentials in philosophy was ridiculed. " I received an 'A' for my Master's Thesis analyzing the political implications of the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. "It took me months to find a thesis adviser, who then gave me an ‘A’ without reading my thesis, mostly to stop me from pestering him. I would argue for particular positions in class, and over and over receive a shrug and ‘well, that’s just your opinion.’ I was aghast at the idea that modern academics was all opinion, but of course I shouldn’t have been." http://freedomain.bl...ting-elegy.html "You say he only has degrees in history but as stated, the graduate degree focused on the history of philosophy." It was a history degree. This is uncontroversial. Even without his admission that the adviser didn't read his thesis, it is STILL not a credential in philosophy, which explains why Stef is unfamiliar with basic concepts such as utilitarianism which he is unable to accurately characterise (e.g. in his debate with anarchopac.) He has never debated any serious analytic philosopher, even a libertarian like Matt Zwolinski. Using terms such as 'retarded' shows your immaturity. I have not used such epithets to insult others. How juvenile and anti-intellectual. I know you are emotionally invested in Stefan but please, try and be more objective.

That 'A' He received for his master's thesis? "It took me months to find a thesis adviser, who then gave me an ‘A’ without reading my thesis, mostly to stop me from pestering him. I would argue for particular positions in class, and over and over receive a shrug and ‘well, that’s just your opinion.’ I was aghast at the idea that modern academics was all opinion, but of course I shouldn’t have been." http://freedomain.blogspot.co.uk/2005/01/morality-and-society-liberating-elegy.html His adviser didn't even READ it! So he really shouldn't use it as a credential. Don't you think this is rather dishonest and misleading? What do you make of it? As you showed, Kevin, he has no philosophical education. He has two degrees in history (his master's was a history degree also "He also holds an undergraduate degree in History from McGill University, as well as a Masters Degree in History from the University of Toronto."). He is an amateur as far as philosophy goes. Teabagger, my 'intention' was accuracy. He listed no credentials in philosophy whatsoever. Downvoted - but you have no response?

@Kevin, I don't believe your statement here is coherent. For instance -"It is actually consistent to say that positive obligations are invalid and have the moral good described in "thou shalt nots" (or "negations")."You suggest that 'thou shalt nots' are 'negations' - you apparently do not understand what 'negation' means. Also you say I confuse virtues and positive obligations. All that is relevant is whether something is normatively prescribed, i.e. one ought to do so. Stefan, being an amateur untrained in philosophy, does not use the terminology of modern ethics, and so it is very hard to discuss his works, there being no reference points in the literature.

Kevin (and darkskyabove), the relevant problem with 'arguing against UPB proves UPB' is that it only applies to a subset of the book 'UPB'. I.e. you might try and use the performative contradiction argument to show that I cannot consistently claim that objective moral facts don't exist whilst engaged in rational argument. But it would make no sense to use that argument to argue that positive obligations don't exist - since I could consistently claim 'objective moral facts do exist AND positive moral obligations do exist'. Quite obviously there's no contradiction there. The 'you're using UPB to deny UPB' argument can't just be wheeled out to defend anything Stefan ever writes. E.g. responding to an empirical claim regarding the effectiveness of the minimum wage - 'it can't have improved welfare for the poor because you're using UPB to deny UPB!' It just isn't remotely relevant in this case. Given that, the other option available is to claim that negation is identical to opposite. In the thread so far, this has clearly been shown to be false, with a multitude of examples. Therefore, if you really are committed to the growth of FDR and Stefan's ideas, I suggest you encourage him to correct this error (which I don't claim it is impossible for him to do) seeing as it makes the book 'UPB' less credible and so less likely to win favour.

Quite. The funny thing is that UPB is basically just a rehashing of Hoppe's argumentation ethics which has been 'thoroughly refuted' by Robert Murphy and Gene Callahan. http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html Definitely worth reading. @Dave Bockman, you're confusing objective standards for FACTS and objective standards for VALUES. You can refer to the first (e.g. it is objectively true that WW1 began in 1914) seperate from the second (e.g. it is objectively true that one ought not to lie.) If the objective standard you speak of is the first, then UPB is not assumed within a debate, since the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Similarly, if you mean the second, then the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Thus you can have a debate without UPB, because both myself and the person I am arguing with have a subjective preference for beliefs based on sound arguments, and I don't claim that they objectively ought to have that preference.Edit: downvoting without responding is not an argument, it just reveals that you were emotionally upset by my arguments but cannot effectively respond.Edit 2: Looks like I won! Nobody can refute the arguments against UPB I made. That is very satisfying to me, I must say!

@FiddlerRe: universality - I'm sure that certain moral rules which make reference to groups may be undesirable. But this wasn't exactly the point. Rather Stefan claims (e.g. in his statements on gun control) that making reference to groups AT ALL violates universality and so is illogical in terms of morality - these CANNOT be moral rules. As the self defense example shows, this is not the case - rules which make reference to classes may be universalized and so are candidates for moral rules."but i do feel that it should be avoided within any framework for an objective morale theory, for the reason i stated above, it's the fact that two groups of humans can have different (in fact opposite) rules to be moral that has created horrid things like Government, but while my observation is objective, my preference is subjective." But with the self-defense example you don't have this problem. This suggests that it isn't really the feature of seperate classes that worries you, but rather certain particular cases where you feel the distinction is arbitrary and unjustified. (E.g. it is wrong to rape unless you have ginger hair.) David Gordon in 'Mr Molyneux Responds' says just this, that we need to critique rules on a case by case basis - but Stefan's sweeping proclamations that making reference to classes violates universality is false and should be retracted."I also personally do not like the idea of positive obligations within morality, morality then becomes a controlling system like it is now, a framework that does not include qualifications or classifications (or at the very least avoids them wherever possible) seems to me to be far superior. But this is, as far as i know, all my subjective preference. To me, adding these kinds of qualifying classes runs the risk of the old child's book "If you give a mouse a cookie" scenario."Morality in Stefan's sense is also a 'controlling system' - for example, it is just to be able to remove somebody who is on your property. Of course you would consider this just control, but it is control none the less, and left-anarchists (I'm not one) would consider it oppressive. So you can't just appeal to positive obligations being 'controlling' as a reason to reject them, since Stefan's moral system similarly restricts movement (e.g. to the property-less) and any moral system will similarly seek to prohibit actions it deems unjust.Finally, notice that you are arguing against positive obligations being part of a moral system based on their consequences particuarly the risk of abuse. This is an argument we could have - but its assumptions are consequentialist (which Stefan would denounce.) UPB doesn't say that positive obligations have bad consequences and so are immoral, it says that they are IMPOSSIBLE because they violate universality. That is false.(Btw, note that all this is seperate from the discussion regarding objectivity of preferences. I could believe that some preferences were objectively good to hold but still recognise that Stefan is erring in claiming that positive obligations necessarily violate universality.)

@FiddlertheLeperMan, I responded to you at length! Maybe you missed it, here it is again. I made a point of how polite and friendly you were so it is a shame you got the wrong end of the stick!"@FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible. Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!""your not at all interested in either UPB or the premises involved, nor providing any sort of objective feedback/criticism." I hope you see that this was incorrect! @DaveThanks for the link, but you can debate without UPB. We may both have subjective preferences for having beliefs based on sound arguments. In that context, we can argue and debate things which we believe without positing UPB. If we told all others that they OUGHT to base their beliefs on sound arguments, then THAT would be invoking UPB (objective moral facts). However, in discussing, we are not necessarily doing that, since we may just share subjective preferences for truth over falsehood and beliefs based on sound argumentation.Thanks for posting the link!

@KevinBeal'Nope' as in you don't value basing your beliefs on reason and evidence? If not, please let me know as this is quite relevant!Can you explain exactly where the contradiction is? There's a hidden ought-statement there which is that 'you ought (or have reason) to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences', I don't claim that myself, but I expect you would claim that you are taking the relevant action to base your beliefs on reason and evidence. Once again, given your presence on a forum valuing reason and evidence as a method for coming to true beliefs I think it is reasonable for me to assume that you have that preference.I would not claim it to be objectively true regardless of your preferences that you ought to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences, so we disagree there. That itself is a subjective preference you may or may not hold.

@ProTeabagger"As for the other thing- YES it could just be true that you have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you I do too (which my presence on the forum suggests) and so correct me because you believe that it satisfies my subjective preferences. So what? What the hell has that got to do with it? I said that once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. If you correct me then logically it must be according to an objective standard, right? Otherwise it's not a correction. That standard must be universal, right? Being in accord with it must be a preferred state, right? Otherwise it cannot be wrong; just different. If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "The arguments Stefan makes that are erroneous are objectively unsound. That standard is universal - whether a conclusion follows from its premises/whether the premises are true are factual is-statements. That isn't the same as appealing to a universal MORAL standard, positing universal values."If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "I understood that YOU held it subjectively that you prefer to have your propositions conform to reason and evidence/truth? I do also. I'm not claiming that it is objectively moral or universally preferable that you OUGHT to have that preference. However, you do (don't you?) so I am operating on that basis. If you were to say that you do not value reason and evidence whatsoever then I wouldn't correct you as you would be beyond reason, and I wouldn't claim that you objectively should value those things. The concept of correction is not a logical non-starter in this sense - if an argument is unsound, it may be improved and perhaps become valid, sound, or maybe just dispensed with. In the same say, I might say that it is not universally preferable to use accurate dates, whilst still (considering that me and you both have subjective preferences for using the same dates) correcting your ascription of the beginning of WW1 to 1722.Teabagger - re: 'those in need', for argument's sake, let's just make it 'if you are extraordinarily wealthy and others are starving to death due to poverty, you ought to give them just enough to survive'. That is a universalizable moral rule in the sense that it can be applied to all moral agents. Stefan claims such positive obligations are not universalizable. That is false.

@WesleyI wouldn't feel like continuing either if the guy supposedly on your side just agreed with me that you were wrong!!"While i personally disagree with your arguments against the coma test, i do agree that the lack of proof for subjective preferances does not equate to them not existing, or for them to "ought" not to exist." - FiddlertheLeper

Whether *what* is? That people can prefer things? Yes, that is objectively true, e.g. I prefer apples to watermelons. It's a question of psychology.(Edit - lol, who voted down? What is there here to disagree with?!) @FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible. Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!

It's not a question of whether you can prove it or not, it's a question of whether it is objectively true or not. Is there a fact either way as to whether one has a preference for x or y? Certainly Stefan's theory demands it. He claims people have preferences for certain things. This is essential to UPB, read appendix a: upb in a nutshell. Whether some preferences are objectively right or wrong doesn't affect whether those preferences EXIST! You're confusing what can be objectively considered to exist vs. what can be objectively considered right/wrong. Nothing I've said entails that it isn't the case that people can prefer certain things to other things...

1. It certainly may be objectively false that you have one subjective preference and objectively true that you have another, certainly.2. But it couldn't be said that it was objectively immoral or wrong for you to hold one subjective preference as opposed to another.'This means that me having a subjective preference is not false or objectively wrong', given 1. this is not correct, since it might be false that you have a particular subjective preference.

Yes I agree...? But it doesn't mean MORALLY wrong! It is an is-claim, not an ought-claim (value judgment)! Don't get mixed up between 1. being wrong and 2. doing wrong. 1 = is-claim, 2 = ought claim.

@Wesley"You cannot correct me even if you think we share subjective preferences. You have not been able to prove that a subjective preference can be wrong."I haven't stated that a subjective preference is wrong. I have suggested that certain arguments are unsound. Given that you have a preference for believing those things backed by reason and evidence, I am making it clear to you that those arguments are unsound, and so if you continue to accept them, you will not be believing based on reason and evidence. "No matter how much i say I like vanilla or you know my preference for vanilla, I still can like chocolate and I am not wrong."You would be wrong in the sense that what you said was false in the same way that if I claimed that WW1 started in 1983 that would be wrong. But it wouldn't follow in either case that you were DOING WRONG which is the point here."You claim that I have a subjective preference to "believe" in objective morality. If it is a subjective preference than it is not wrong for me to say that objective morality exists any more than for me to say that chocolate ice cream is my favorite flavor. I can still like chocolate ice cream even if you think that I like vanilla. I am not wrong in liking chocolate."That's true that it wouldn't be objectively wrong for you to say objective morality exists, however it would reveal that you were not bothered by reason and evidence at all. I'm not suggesting that is objectively wrong but personally I have a preference for it, I don't claim that you objectively should though. I agree that you wouldn't be doing anything objectively wrong. If you are willing to concede that you are not concerned with reason and evidence, I will accept that. "Either I am wrong (or right), in which case it is not entirely subjective and some objectivity is present, in which case it verifies my claim. Or else it is subjective and you cannot tell me I am wrong (or right) and debate will cease. There is no other avenue."Given a shared preference for reason and evidence, I can then tell you that you are wrong to state that a particular argument is valid or invalid in the sense that it is FALSE, not that you are doing anything objectively wrong. @KevinBeal"It's not the statement "I have not stated that you ought to believe anything" that contains an ought. It's the actual act of telling me this which is necessarily prescriptive (at least in part). You are appealing to the truth, which means you are appealing to a standard outside of yourself that I ought to abide to. It could be described like this: "you ought to believe things that are true, and here is that true thing you ought to believe"."I understand that we both have subjective preferences for basing our beliefs on reason and evidence. The fact that you are on FDR is good evidence of that (giving the focus on reason and evidence). I will point out to you when an argument you support is invalid (an is-claim, just like I might point out that it would be incorrect to state that the U.S. has 68 states) because we both hold a subjective preference for rational arguments.I don't make the claim that you objectively ought to believe things that are based on reason and evidence. I have a subjective preference for basing beliefs on reason and evidence and I assume that you have this preference also based on your presence here. If you said to me 'I do not care about reason and evidence, I just want to believe what Stefan says because it has good consequences' then I would not claim you were doing anything objectively wrong and obviously wouldn't continue to argue with you, since you would be beyond reason.You need to distinguish between appealing to objective standards in terms of facts vs. values. I am claiming objectivity only in terms of matter of fact, not matters of value. So it may be objectively true that Stefan makes an unsound argument, or that WW1 began in 1914, but it would not be objectively true that Stefan should not make unsound arguments, or that one should not start world wars. There's quite a massive distinction there!

If you state clearly that you have a desire to keep this particular delusion then that makes more sense - though it would be inconsistent with your more general claimed subjective preference to only rely on sound arguments and have true beliefs. It is logical for me to assume you hold this given the huge focus on FDR on reason and evidence. The whole point is that I believe we share subjective preferences for holding beliefs based on rationality and sound arguments. If you conceded that in fact you simply wanted to hold certain conclusions and were not interested in sound argumentation then I couldn't claim you were doing anything objectively morally wrong but I wouldn't bother arguing with you and you would be beyond reason.I am claiming objectivity only in terms of matter of fact, not matters of value. So it may be objectively true that Stefan makes an unsound argument, or that WW1 began in 1914, but it would not be objectively true that Stefan should not make unsound arguments, or that one should not start world wars. There's quite a massive distinction there!

He uses opposite (of let's say x) one time it is 'not-x' and the other it is 'y, which is diametrically opposed to x' is not rigorous or clear in the manner that we would expect from a philosopher in his magnum opus. He should define 'opposite' before using it (he often correctly stresses the import of defining terms.) I cannot respond directly unless you make it clearer what you mean, i just cannot understand what you previously wrote.On the second point - not necessarily. In correcting you I may have a subjective preference for accuracy, know that you do also (which you have suggested) and so am helping you out given that your subjective preference will be satisfied if you are corrected. But someone else mght not have this subjective preference for accuracy or sound arguments and I would never claim that he was in an objectively wrong state. It might be my subjective opinion that a certain state is preferable, and I may have my own subjective preferences, but I make no claim to objectivity. I'm not saying it is universally preferable. I don't believe that! If one of you said to me 'I have no interest in reason or evidence' I wouldn't claim it is objectively true that you should. However it wouldn't reflect on you well as FDR listeners!

@KevinBeal'I have not stated that you ought to believe anything' does not contain any ought-statements. It doesn't entail that you ought not to believe that I have stated you ought to believe anything, since I could consistently state 'I have not stated that you ought to believe anything, but you should believe that I have.' I am genuinely interested in how you would disagree with me here, I am asking for your explanation, thank you.@ProfessionalTeabagger I'm afraid I just cannot follow you, to me it appears quite clear that two seperate concepts are being used. In any case, Flake is correct that this section could be tightened up. Just the way that when he uses opposite (of let's say x) one time it is 'not-x' and the other it is 'y, which is diametrically opposed to x' is not rigorous or clear in the manner that we would expect from a philosopher in his magnum opus. He should define 'opposite' before using it (he often correctly stresses the import of defining terms.)"Once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. "Couldn't it just be that I have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you do too (which your presence on the forum suggests) and so correct you because I believe that it satisfies your subjective preferences?

@ProfessionalTeabagger"There are two valid interpretations of "not stealing" here. There's "not stealing" as in the negation of stealing. That would be everything other than stealing. Then there's "not stealing" as in the opposite of stealing. That would be "refraining from theft" or "respecting property rights"." - ProfessionalTeabaggerThe negation of stealing isn't everything other than stealing, it a lack of theft. Just like negation of 2 is 0. It is the null hypothesis. Not-stealing. The opposite of stealing (taking what is not yours without the propert holder's permission) would be giving what is yours with the propert holder's permission, not 'respecting property rights'.And regarding your other proposed definition, 'respecting property rights' is not the negation of theft - I could not steal but kill someone instead. Unless this would be counted as stealing by UPB advocates, but the definition of theft seems way too broad here.So Stefan is equivocating between different usage of terms and his argument fails. The point is that in saying 'UPB is false' that is not a value statement. Or 'this argument in UPB is invalid' doesn't entail 'you ought not to believe in UPB'. This is what Stefan claimed in his discussion with anarchopac (that 'this argument is false' is a value statement) and it is utterly erroneous as I explain above.

@KevinI haven't stated that you OUGHT to believe anything. However, it is the case that UPB is false and contains errors. That is an descriptive claim, not a value judgment. If you value reason and logic, then I would expect you to not believe in UPB, but it is up to you whether you value those things. I wouldn't claim that it is objectively the case that you should. I am in fact an error theorist. But if you value reason and evidence, then you have reason to reject UPB. I am not implying or asserting in my statement that UPB contains errors that others ought to share in that belief. It cannot be, if rules are objectively true, that "theft is wrong" is a claim that I ought to recognize as true but you ought to think is false.But even if I DID state that you ought to cease to believe in UPB, it could just be my opinion. I might say 'given the argument we've had about UPB, I believe you ought to cease to believe in UPB. You are free to do as you want, and this isn't a categorical reason, I don't claim it to be objective, not a universal statement, just what I personally believe. If you care about rationality and philosophy then you will cease to believe in UPB but if you don't care then by all means don't.' At no point there would I have made a universal claim - rather a claim about a particular human being which was my opinion.

@ProfessionalTeabagger @Pepin @WesleyThink of it this way. If Stefan stated that the opposite of stealing was not stealing, then surely (to be consistent in his use of terms), he should also state that the opposite of virtue is not virtue. Stefan values consistent application of terms, so I'm sure he'd agree with this.The coma test DOES then fail, since positive obligations would only entail that the man in a coma was not being virtuous, as opposed to being evil. The coma test aims to show positive obligations to be absurd, since they entail that a man in a coma would be evil. But when the inconsistent use of terms is removed from Stefan's argument, we see that all positive obligations entail is that the man in a coma is not virtuous in respect to that obligation. This is not absurd, and so the coma test fails.@Kevin BealeI'm just discussing Stefan's supposed disproof of positive obligations here, so your point is not relevant. What makes you think I don't endorse UPB apart from this error? And why should it matter? It is striking that you don't even address the error Stefan made, confusing negation and opposite, simply trotting out a one-size-fits-all response. I'm offering Stefan an opportunity to improve his book by removing errors (though I happen to think that this argument cannot be repaired!) Therefore I don't see why you should be so hostile. Don't you want the flagship content of FDR to be as watertight as possible? It is bizarre to me that you are so consumed by my motivations (moralizing?!) rather than the content. I thought FDR was about logic and reasoning?By the way, you do not necessarily subscribe to UPB when you deny UPB. If somebody states that UPB is false, that is not a value statement. It is an 'is' claim, not an 'ought' claim. It is not entailed by that statement that all others OUGHT to cease to believe in UPB. Let's not derail the thread but this is something you should be aware of.

@Just, you shouldn't 'giggle' on seeing a major flaw in a theory you apparently endorse being exposed. You should instead seek to repair the damage or abandon the theory. Stefan's argument against positive obligations fails because of this observation, since it invalidates his 'coma test' - the person is a coma is not necessarily doing anything immoral, so Stefan's argument fails. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see that your belief in Stefan is not based on rational argument, but rather on your belief that his conclusions are just 'obvious'.@Pepin, I'm not quite sure we're on the same page. The point is, however you define 'opposite' and 'negation', you have to be consistent in their usage. Stefan hasn't been, therefore his argument fails due to equivocation. Opposite and negation are distinct terms, he must choose which one he means. At present, the proof that positive obligations do not exist in UPB fails utterly due to this equivocation.You also seem to make the unwarranted assumption that all actions are either virtuous or bad (this is what I thought you meant when you spoke about 'binary'.) But this is false - for example, eating an ice cream is not virtuous - but that does not entail that it is immoral to eat an ice cream!

From UPB:"VIRTUE AND ITS OPPOSITE The opposite of “virtue” must be “vice” – the opposite of “good” must be “evil.” If I propose the moralrule, “thou shalt not steal,” then stealing must be evil, and not stealing must be good. This does not meanthat “refraining from theft” is the sole definition of moral excellence, of course, since a man may be amurderer, but not a thief. We can think of it as a “necessary but not sufficient” requirement for virtue." (p. 65, ‘UPB: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics’)This section is the lynchpin of Stefan’s argument and is combined with the ‘coma test’ to prove that we have no positive obligations. Unfortunately it contained a blatant error, which you’ve probably noticed already. Stefan has confused ‘negation’ and ‘opposite’. The negation of giving is not-giving. The negation of black is not-black. The opposite of giving is taking. The opposite of black is white. Not-giving is not identical to taking, nor is not-black identical to white. Thus quite clearly the concepts of ‘negation’ and ‘opposite’ are distinct. Showing how Stefan is wrong here has nullified his coma test (p.67). Stefan’s argument is that if we have positive obligations (say, giving to charity), then a man in a coma must be evil, since he is performing the opposite of virtue – not-giving to charity. This is supposedly absurd, since he is unable to avoid his ‘actions’. But Stefan’s argument fails because the man is not performing the opposite of giving to charity – merely the negation. He need not be virtuous or wicked. The fact that an action is not virtuous does not prove that it is immoral. Eating ice cream may not be virtuous – does this prove that eating ice cream is immoral? This all shows that at the very least, ‘UPB’ needs to be completely rewritten to accommodate these findings. It contains overt errors. This analysis cannot be dismissed as ‘nit-picking’ unless you feel that proving positive obligations do not exist was not a major part of Stefan’s project. Feel free to proclaim yourself a supporter of ‘UPB’ ‘apart from the stuff about positive obligations not existing’, but it would be akin to a Marxist saying ‘well, you can ignore the part about abolishing private property.’ If Stefan won’t correct even this glaring flaw in his work, it raises serious questions about his rigour and credibility. If you are an honest supporter of Stefan, I suggest that you bring this to his attention so that he may revise ‘UPB’ at the earliest opportunity. It would genuinely strenghthen FDR as well as UPB.