ThomasTheIdealist

Human males have both evolutionary instinct and social expectation to instigate when seeking a mate, while women take passive measures to be sought after. It's primarily jealous factions of people that have twisted their reasoning to justify bashing males as being sexual predators and objectifying women, and shaming women for making themselves sexually desirable. Two sides of the same coin. These social influences pale in comparison to the religious sexual suppression. From childhood we're taught that sex is something that should not be mentioned in casual company, something to hide, something to not experience without strict conditions, something dirty, and some of us are taught in religion that it's sinful and damning even if thought about.

There is some sort of deranged sentiment that is prevalent; that non-human animals are somehow innocent and virtuous while humans are a disease to the world. This is a placing of high value on impotence, extolling the virtue of being primitive and simple, condemning power and influence and change. People have similar sentiment in regards to human children.

Public nudity should be legal. I would think that to be non-controversial among individualist libertarians. Of course, I would bash and shame people for doing anything I consider gross/undesirable. This include even just shaming gross fat people for their nudity or just attention whores. This is also why the liberty of shaming is important and the movements against it should largely be ignored. Many liberties only operate well with other liberties, libertarian goals are often a package deal.

Who's to say they were given and not loaned? This parent clearly did not give them to their child, but merely let them use it. There was no explicit arrangement otherwise. Then this is the real problem. isn't it?

I don't see anyone claiming to own the child. The child is theirs in the sense of legal guardianship, not ownership. If a landlord takes the washing machine from a house someone is renting, without any formal agreement to leave the landlord's washing machine for tenants' usage, then is that stealing?

The people who don't find the said argument compelling. I think hygiene is enough for most males and females. But if someone doesn't agree, I'm not sure why it would be moral for them to not circumcise their children while they're convinced it would be the best for them. So it's not a parent's job to make decisions on their children's healthcare?

Yeah. Assuming there are no significant disabilities as a result that aren't properly offset by the benefits. For instance, replacing limbs with artificial ones will eventually be preferred, I imagine, so most that damage can be offset with many more benefits. Claiming that the risk of infection is worth having more nerves is not compelling to a lot of people, and I wouldn't give them any moral blame.

Some limbs and body tissue is more important than others. I certainly hope you're not trying to deny that. People with their fingertips cut off are much more handicapped than people with their foreskin cut off. Would you also think it fair for me to imply that cutting off he foreskin was like cutting off the eyelids of babies because the nerve loss is comparable? This is the SJW mindset, one of extreme victimhood where everything becomes traumatic and stress-inducing, a state where offense is given and not merely taken. Next you'll be buying into the idea that giving your daughter a barbie is infringing on the autonomy of their gender identity and psychologically damaging them and inevitably assaulting their self-esteem. I now it's very convenient for the anti-circumcision narrative to attribute all this additional psychological harm, but it's unnecessary and largely unfounded. You can oppose circumcision on the known merits alone (or lack thereof). I don't think anyone is morally culpable for doing that they think is moral (or amoral). No, just makes them more ignorant perhaps. If someone believes their doing the right thing, I'm not sure how you can consider them morally culpable, whether it be a medically "right" things or socially "right" things. Doctors weren't morally culpable for attempting to use leeches to cure illnesses centuries ago, not unless they knew the leeches were pointless as they do today. And if it was widely considered good parenting to spank your children, in the absence of opposing evidence, I'm not sure why it would be considered good/moral parenting to abstain from spanking. If you think something will benefit your child, and you intentionally abstain, is that good parenting?

And if everyone did it, there would be no social embarrassment, just like circumcision. Everyone having false teeth would be fairly convenient for most people besides dentists. I think everyone already knows about the nerve loss. That point doesn't convince anyone of anything. It only serves as a disingenuous comparison, as if the nerves in your penis are just as important as the nerves in your fingers. You should just stick to dispelling the false notions that it's necessary to prevent infection, because basic hygiene is a perfectly fine alternative for that. Doctors could stop merely because it's unnecessary, there's no reason to think they were moral monsters. There are plenty of contemporary medical practices that will eventually be determined to be improper or unnecessary, that has always been the history of medicine.

Wrong. Injury and damage are not objective. If everyone in the country got a tattoo of the US flag on their forehead at birth, you could easily argue that it would be much more damaging to deprive them of the tattoo than have them be a social pariah and outcast for most their childhood until they decided for themselves to get the tattoo. Saying genital mutilation or infant ear mutilation "sound off" just like SJWs calling sex rape if there is no explicit consent made throughout sex or libertarians calling taxation slavery. It defies both social norms in practice and traditional vernacular. You have no excuse for not understanding why people think you're "off". This means it was not malicious. If it was a social standard to beat your wife, then it's expected of both parties to either beat or be beaten. If you think there is something inherently wrong with beating someone, then it would make sense to say that social factors don't change the nature of the act. But I would say moral value are directly linked to social norms. If everyone hated apples, you can bet it would change the message if you gifted your spouse a bunch of apples, regardless of the "identity of the apple".

You said this was a "quest to find a unicorn". Being that unicorns don't exist, you must be referring to OP searching for something that doesn't exist. Being that the whole discussion is about "finding a virtuous woman," what else were you referring to exactly?

That's very much a consequentialist dilemma. If you knew for certain that permitting some child rape would decrease the statistical average of child rapes (for whatever reason), would it be desirable to permit those rapes as opposed to doing nothing and maintaining the status quo? A small problem here is the premise of "having certainty", which is usually unrealistic especially in the face of unintended additional consequences. But assuming you do that have certainty with sufficient studies, the primary problem would be determining if you have exhausted all other (potentially better) options. But I'm not sure if the consideration of the latter should really prevent you from enabling relatively better policy. Otherwise it's a case of making the good the enemy of the perfect. Just because a solution has holes, doens't mean it shouldn't be preferred if the consequences are better.

I have some problems with the concepts of self-ownership, but I'll assume that it's valid to assume a property relationship with your body and your labor. Assuming that you own your labor, how do people deduce that they therefore own everything their labor interacts with, and subsequently own everything that that property interacts with, and so on? Or is this concept an axiom not necessarily derived from self-ownership?

This originally was shared a lot from Youtube. Then it was removed because of Youtube's shitty policies. Original title was something like "Disturbing: Muslim migrant mom hitting her infant baby for crying" for those that want to google it and see discussions. Because God told you to get married and have sex only for procreation. Can't confirm the woman was actually muslim, but I wouldn't doubt it. I'm starting to own up to the title of islamophobic. I've never seen anything desirable from the muslim community/culture. Individual muslims are free to prove me wrong, but most of them have to explicitly violate tenets of Islam to be a decent person.

Yes, but that wouldn't change the alleged fact that you "ought" to do it. Whether you have a reason to do what you ought is a different question. Explain how you can prove that a prime virtue exists without proving you ought to live by it? It's inherent to what you meant by "prime virtue," is it not? I can't think of any reason I would be against those assertions. While I'm unsure that it's axiomatic that pursuing truth is desirable, I can agree that it is desirable to me. Why does this presuppose anything is logical? Maybe I have deluded myself that a demon spirit told me to pursue my self-interest. I am my own highest value (my subjective valuation) and should therefore prioritize my own desires and well-being over others'. Where is the logical misstep? In my subjective valuation? Are there objective values for things? I understand that you just attempted to explain how it was illogical, how did you leap to the conclusion that it's arbitrary here? Not everything illogical is arbitrary. If it was derived from a specific set of rules/criteria, it's not arbitrary. This wasn't even remotely cryptic, so I'm not sure what you don't understand. My preferences are based on things that are real (e.g. neural activity and physical consequences) as opposed to non-real things (i.e. gods and natural rights). Though I misspoke, because even preferences based on non-real things like gods aren't arbitrary. For my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing. I agree. Well, I would say there are egoistic reasons to commit suicide and take on big risks, but regardless I agree with your sentiment that it is indeed possible for people to go against their instinctual urges, I didn't mean to imply otherwise. My point was that I don't think following your instincts is inherently arbitrary. I don't think it's moral to follow your instincts. I don't condemn people as immoral for not following their own instincts or self-interest. There are merely things I don't like (for varying reasons) and other things I do like. Like I already said, for my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing. But nihilists aren't acting inconsistently with any axiom you posited. They follow the axiom "thou shall act morally," but having rejected the existence of a moral category, for whatever reason, the axiom leads nowhere. If I propose that "all shiny unicorns are shiny" you would have to agree that is indeed a true tautology just like the former. But of no consequence...

Reminds me of the theists talking about atheists dragging people down to their level, clinging to their mysticism as if weren't an artifact of human primitivity.

This defies most epistemologists' analysis of knowledge. Can you explain how it's possible to know something without believing it? As I've understood it, knowledge is a subset of belief.

I don't see why the latter is necessary. If virtue or morality is inherently something you ought to do, then it sufficient to simply prove moral realism. In other words, A implies B. There is none, that's my whole point. Why do my actions need moral significance? I'm talking about moral nihilism, not really epistemological or ontological nihilism. I have preferences based on real things and are therefore not arbitrary. Perhaps you're using some other definition of arbitrary. By most definition, if your decision follows some sort of rules or system, it's not arbitrary. But if you want to arguing that my desire for that system (e.g. egoism) is arbitrary, or that my desire for physical and psychological wellness based on evolutionary biological instinct is arbitrary, then I suppose I can't argue against that. You would necessarily think everything is arbitrary in that case. If that's the case, why do you think it's not arbitrary to decide to pursue a "prime virtue"? Don't you still have to ask why you should want to do what you "ought" to? Why is your preference for what you ought to do less arbitrary than mine. You're arbitrarily doing what you ought to.

I'm not sure how this ended up relating to moral relativism unless we was just refuting UPB, but I think it's perhaps the phrasing that makes it nonsense. It's not the latte itself that's being valued more than the $5, it's the prospect of owning the latte. It wouldn't make much sense to value $5 (which you own) less than a latte (which someone else owns). That latte cannot be used or consumed until you own it. But you want to own that latte more than you want to own the $5. This desire never changes during the transaction. However your valuation of the $5 changes the moment you forfeit ownership over it. So when it comes to suicide bombing, you value your life. Suicide bombing wouldn't be possible without your life. The desire to commit suicide in this case doesn't conflict with your desire to live (i.e. be alive).

Nobody is saying it means consent. The argument wouldn't even make sense because that would mean the rape didn't happen to begin with, being consensual. The argument is that the victim intentionally put themselves in known danger and is therefore partially responsible. The repercussions of not putting partial blame on irresponsible parties means encouraging recklessness. And that means encouraging behavior that leads to more rapes. So I'm baffled that people wanting to reduce rape have a difficult time putting blame on irresponsible victims.

The OP is phrased pretty shitty. It's probably best to address the core implicit concern: When someone arrives (by birth or otherwise) into a nation where all the land and utilities around them are owned by others, does that individual have sufficient liberty? Or is the economic compulsion of broad property law overly restrictive of liberty? David Friedman on the problem with initial acquisition of property and moral conclusion derived from it: https://youtu.be/GuYt6X2g0cY?t=27m

It's on the page you linked. You'll want to look at the verb definitions and not the nouns: Make (someone) do something against their will Or you can google "define:force" and the same thing is right there. If you make someone do something against their will (this inherently means a lack of consent) then you are "forcing" them. Violence isn't necessary to force people to do things. I can be a business that offers extremely competitive prices and force other stores to close. How is it evident that they're being coerced? You just admitted that "they may likely eaten the food anyways." So it's not evident at all that coercion was used. Beings compelled to do something by means of a threat could be considered coercion, but not simply a coincidental threat. If I tell my mom "bye, I'm off to the dentist" and she replies with "you better go to the dentist or I'll kill you," I have not become coerced into going to the dentist. My decision was wholly unaffected by the threat as it coincided with a choice I already made.

Getting intoxicated with someone you just met and going to their house definitely does give you partial responsibility. The only exception is ignorance. If you aren't aware of the risks, you can't be said to have responsibility for subjecting yourself to them. If for example you're aware that someone is a pedophile sex offender and you leave them to babysit your kids, it's neglectful, it's called being irresponsible. If something happens, you're definitely not completely blameless. If you knowingly subject yourself to risky behavior, you're partially responsible. To promote the idea that people cannot be responsible for risky behavior is to promote recklessness. I agree. Clothing can be a risk factor, especially in some foreign cultures, but not so much in the US from what I've seen. It's mostly the drug/alcohol consumption and agreeing to go in seclusion with someone.

Also perfectly describes Lockean homesteading absent the Lockean Proviso.

I'm not really expressing an ideal. All I have said has been description, not normative. But I can agree that I think it's preferable to not coerce when possible, i.e. when a child is capable of consenting to something. But as it relates to my "moral system" so to speak, I don't exactly use coercion as any objective moral barometer, I'm more concerned with consequences. However, permitting coercion rarely has good consequences imo. Child rearing is among the exceptions to that, along with being caretaker of mentally disabled or comatose, and even raising/harvesting animals and their products (non-human animals also being among those whom cannot consent). That definition is contextually insufficient as it uses "force" ambiguously, while that was the word in contention. Now go look up "force" in any dictionary of your choice, it will include something along the lines of doing something "against someone's will" (i.e. without consent). I oversimplified the first statement. For simplicity, I was talking about infants initially, until it was commented that children ask questions. The capacity for consent is gradual, but my point is that parenting fills in the holes, doing for the child what they cannot do, without consent.