sdavio

There is an important different between claiming "Language has no capacity for meaning" while using language, and claiming "Government regulation is the best solution to poverty" while engaging in a voluntary conversation. The fact that I'm engaging in a voluntary interaction means that I believe it is the preferable solution to the problem I'm currently solving, so the positions do not logically contradict like the former ones about language do. Even the fact that I assume that you have the same preference for truth over falsehood in this instance doesn't in itself create the kind of universal that UPB involves. "Government should be used to solve poverty" and "voluntary association is the best solution to this current debate" are not logically / by definition contradictory positions.

I think our fundamental difference here is that I view the fact that there is some logically coherent counter-example to the universal claim as the demonstration. If we really started going through all different examples, and evaluating whether the supposedly 'universal' example actually applies, then that method in itself is admitting that the question is a pragmatic one rather than the purely philosophical, demonstrative deduction from first principles that UPB claims to be. Really, I think that the focus on "coulds" which you are rejecting here lies in UPB itself rather than my critique of it. I can empathize, to some degree, with your feeling that I am being overly critical without seeming to offer anything in return. However, I think this point does need to be pressed, because to make the kind of claims that are involved in UPB is to take on a gigantic burden of proof. For UPB as I understand it to function, it needs to be absolutely universal, such that there is no counter-example which is at all coherent or intelligible. To ask that I explain 'why' the values are reversed in any given counter-example is to go beyond the scope of UPB, since the original value which is universalized within UPB is not established; Stefan is clear about the fact that, for instance, the universal preference for truth over falsehood depends on a subjective assent to that value in the first place (for example this was his argument in the nihilism debate video). Thus, to demand that only opposing values need a thorough, 'objective' justification would be to unfairly tip the balance in favor of UPB. So UPB doesn't deal in justifications for subjective preferences, it is entirely concerned with universality, which is why that's where I'm directing my criticism.

The "it could be otherwise" argument carries more weight here, since the main point, which UPB hinges upon, is its 'universality'. If just disagreeing with UPB doesn't directly, logically imply UPB, then it isn't axiomatic or universal. The focus on such fundamental and logical (rather than pragmatic) issues is not because of some pedantic argumentativeness or trolling on my part, it's a principle within the theory itself. If I focused the debate on anything other than "coulds," a proper UPBian would direct the debate straight back to the first principles, which state that I "could" not possibly reject UPB without also implicitly accepting it. Since it is this kind of logical entailment of universality which is just what is at issue here, it's very important not to sneak in any universality where it isn't necessarily there. To say that both people agree that voluntary dialogue is the best solution, is only accurate with regard to the conversation they are engaged in at that exact moment; any universalisation beyond that requires further justification. In other words, just because voluntary conversation is the best solution to our current disagreement, at this very moment, that doesn't mean that voluntary conversation is the best solution to some other disagreement or problem. To put this simply, if I believed, say, that government redistribution (by force) is the best solution to poverty (which I don't), this would not necessarily, by definition, contradict my position that a voluntary discussion is the best way to solve our current disagreement on this forum. My engaging in some action in response to some particular problem, doesn't in any way contain the implicit assertion that this particular kind of action is absolutely, in principle, the best solution for all similar problems.

So, to paraphrase your claim, it is that when someone states that they "have a problem with" an argument for the position that "initiation of force is universally morally wrong", they are necessarily contradicting themselves because, by engaging in a debate in which both people are voluntarily interacting, they are implying by that very act that initiating force is universally morally wrong; is that correct? The problem is that I don't see how the act of voluntarily engaging in a debate could directly imply that I believe that initiating force is, in all cases and at all times, morally wrong. It doesn't even imply that it's morally wrong between you and I at this moment - it could just be my own 'subjective preference' for debate over fighting, or that I'm not strong enough to win, or many other reasons. In order for the argument to work, it would have to be absolutely certain that a belief in the NAP must be the only possible reason I'm engaging in debate.

Now that you've made the distinction between "self ownership" (as one's control over their own body) and "consent" (as a moral claim with political / ethical implications) clear, I'd like to make sure that the two aren't confused. My question was not just about "self ownership" in the narrow sense which we have established - it's about consent. What still needs to be established is how, in simply engaging in a discussion or debate, a person necessarily implies the system of consent, over and above simple causation. Please outline how the tu quoque argument applies specifically to consent as you've defined it.

So how is a system of consent, such as you've outlined above, substantiated by the tu quoque fallacy which Stefan uses to justify self-ownership as a right, which must necessarily involve the kind of "consent" you're talking about here? What I mean is, just by saying "I have a problem with your argument" I have only implied self-control in the narrow sense of attributing a person's argument to them, so would you agree that the argument which implies that this statement implies a system of consent is flawed?

But if I can never lose ownership of myself, then what moral force could a concept of self-ownership have? Even by stabbing me, you could not be meaningfully "violating my self-ownership" since according to you it cannot be violated. Therefore self-ownership is reduced to the insubstantial claim that a person happens to have control over their own body. You could deduce no ethics from that, and it is a misleading use of the term since when most people use the phrase 'self-ownership' they're talking about a moral concept which can be violated.

Sorry but I'm lost here. I don't know where you got the idea that I ever asserted that property rights somehow used to exist, and then decayed and went out of existence? I was presenting a much more straightforward criticism of UPB's claim to prove the objectivity of property ownership, by making a distinction between descriptive 'properties' and political or moral 'property', where one is simply to state that one thing is caused by, or attributed to, something else, and the other is the statement that someone objectively has the right to exclusive use of something.

I don't see how I shifted the goalposts, since all I did was make a comparison which seemingly could not be more directly analogous to what we're talking about. The only difference in the "sandcastle" example is that it involves the moral element which is absent from simply attributing someone's argument to their name. Nobody is arguing against the idea that an argument can be attributed to the person making it, or that the castle was built. In all cases I've been strictly distinguishing that fact, from the normative sense of property which states that people 'should' be allowed continued control over what they already control, or what they've built. So when you say that I'm contradicting the argument "against (self) ownership" by attributing something to someone, this is a bait and switch in the sense that you're using the word "property" in order to conflate something nobody is trying to argue against, with another very controversial and difficult to establish claim.

But there's no objective reality that I'm necessarily ignoring in violating your property. I could fully acknowledge that you built a sandcastle, and still topple it. There's nothing in my act of toppling your sandcastle that implies that I think you didn't build it.

But how could I ever "violate a fact"? I can ignore a fact, or state that it isn't true, but when I say "I don't believe in you continuing to hold exclusive control over X, even though you caused it to come into its current state", I am not 'violating' the fact that you caused it to come into its current state. The idea that you should be able to continue controlling X exclusively, and the fact that you caused X to be as it is, are two separable statements, and I can deny one without dissolving the other. If I take away your control over an object, that doesn't retroactively change the fact that you built or paid for it. I may be a jerk for doing it, but that is irrelevant to the kind of purely logical relations between statements we're talking about here.

Not an argument! Also, if your point is that to "have" a problem with an argument equates to private property, then I think the point I've been making in this thread applies: The "having" involved there is only a very meager concept of property (eg, it's a 'property' in the sense that a wall has the 'property' of being a certain colour) which seems to be miles from what an ancap philosophy needs to do with the concept of property. Property in the sense of a right attributed to someone which cannot be violated is not established simply by attributing something as being caused by the person. "I caused X to come about, therefore, if you attempt interfere with X I'm justified in using force to stop you." -- The part after 'therefore' is not simply a paraphrasing of the first part. There's something new there which needs to be established. The only way such a statement would properly contradict the ancap concept of property would be if the person said, "I have a problem with your argument, and if you try to stop me from having a problem with it I'll cut you... and I'll be objectively justified in doing it!" It's a different claim.

I'd still be genuinely interested if someone could clarify for me the relationship between 'truth' and UPB. This seems to be one of the main things holding me from understanding the philosophy properly.

I'm aware of this difficulty, but let's take 'truth itself'. Could denying truth itself be considered a contradiction to UPB in the strict sense? Molyneux makes it very explicit in the book that the only thing that UPB as a moral principle is concerned with is actions which violate the NAP. So, if we're talking about 'truth' not as an action, but as an idea, then okay, but then I don't see how that does anything but make it even more irrelevant from UPB. "It is not true that violent actions are universally immoral." "That is self-contradictory because you implied the validity of truth." Is this rebuttal not a non-sequitur? Unless you are prepared to argue that denying objective truth is a directly violent action, then denying the immorality of violence does not seem the same as denying the objectivity of truth. If the distinction between 'speaking truth as an action' and 'truth as truth' is important with regard to my OP, it must be that while 'truth as an action' is APA, 'truth as truth' is UPB. That implies that denying truth is violent, which it isn't. So my OP still applies regardless of the distinction. After all, it's "Universally Preferable Behavior", so the distinction seems to solidify my point. If anything, I think my interpretation of truth in terms of an action was a charitable reading.

Part of my confusion seems to be coming from the fact that the term "UPB" is used in two different ways: "UPB" as the general term which embraces the scientific method, APA, and so on. And then "UPB" as the specific standard within the book which applies only to actions involving violence. I would agree that if I argue, we could assume I'm asserting UPB in the first, broad sense. However, I can't see how it implies the second version. So, it seems like what appears to be a contradiction between asserting and denying UPB, is really asserting UPB1 while denying UPB2, which would not be a fallacy. If I say "I cannot make a statement", this would contradict itself because it's a statement. On the other hand, if I say "There is no moral principle about violence", I am not asserting a moral principle about violence, so I can't see any contradiction.