sdavio

There is an important different between claiming "Language has no capacity for meaning" while using language, and claiming "Government regulation is the best solution to poverty" while engaging in a voluntary conversation. The fact that I'm engaging in a voluntary interaction means that I believe it is the preferable solution to the problem I'm currently solving, so the positions do not logically contradict like the former ones about language do. Even the fact that I assume that you have the same preference for truth over falsehood in this instance doesn't in itself create the kind of universal that UPB involves. "Government should be used to solve poverty" and "voluntary association is the best solution to this current debate" are not logically / by definition contradictory positions.

I think our fundamental difference here is that I view the fact that there is some logically coherent counter-example to the universal claim as the demonstration. If we really started going through all different examples, and evaluating whether the supposedly 'universal' example actually applies, then that method in itself is admitting that the question is a pragmatic one rather than the purely philosophical, demonstrative deduction from first principles that UPB claims to be. Really, I think that the focus on "coulds" which you are rejecting here lies in UPB itself rather than my critique of it. I can empathize, to some degree, with your feeling that I am being overly critical without seeming to offer anything in return. However, I think this point does need to be pressed, because to make the kind of claims that are involved in UPB is to take on a gigantic burden of proof. For UPB as I understand it to function, it needs to be absolutely universal, such that there is no counter-example which is at all coherent or intelligible. To ask that I explain 'why' the values are reversed in any given counter-example is to go beyond the scope of UPB, since the original value which is universalized within UPB is not established; Stefan is clear about the fact that, for instance, the universal preference for truth over falsehood depends on a subjective assent to that value in the first place (for example this was his argument in the nihilism debate video). Thus, to demand that only opposing values need a thorough, 'objective' justification would be to unfairly tip the balance in favor of UPB. So UPB doesn't deal in justifications for subjective preferences, it is entirely concerned with universality, which is why that's where I'm directing my criticism.

The "it could be otherwise" argument carries more weight here, since the main point, which UPB hinges upon, is its 'universality'. If just disagreeing with UPB doesn't directly, logically imply UPB, then it isn't axiomatic or universal. The focus on such fundamental and logical (rather than pragmatic) issues is not because of some pedantic argumentativeness or trolling on my part, it's a principle within the theory itself. If I focused the debate on anything other than "coulds," a proper UPBian would direct the debate straight back to the first principles, which state that I "could" not possibly reject UPB without also implicitly accepting it. Since it is this kind of logical entailment of universality which is just what is at issue here, it's very important not to sneak in any universality where it isn't necessarily there. To say that both people agree that voluntary dialogue is the best solution, is only accurate with regard to the conversation they are engaged in at that exact moment; any universalisation beyond that requires further justification. In other words, just because voluntary conversation is the best solution to our current disagreement, at this very moment, that doesn't mean that voluntary conversation is the best solution to some other disagreement or problem. To put this simply, if I believed, say, that government redistribution (by force) is the best solution to poverty (which I don't), this would not necessarily, by definition, contradict my position that a voluntary discussion is the best way to solve our current disagreement on this forum. My engaging in some action in response to some particular problem, doesn't in any way contain the implicit assertion that this particular kind of action is absolutely, in principle, the best solution for all similar problems.

So, to paraphrase your claim, it is that when someone states that they "have a problem with" an argument for the position that "initiation of force is universally morally wrong", they are necessarily contradicting themselves because, by engaging in a debate in which both people are voluntarily interacting, they are implying by that very act that initiating force is universally morally wrong; is that correct? The problem is that I don't see how the act of voluntarily engaging in a debate could directly imply that I believe that initiating force is, in all cases and at all times, morally wrong. It doesn't even imply that it's morally wrong between you and I at this moment - it could just be my own 'subjective preference' for debate over fighting, or that I'm not strong enough to win, or many other reasons. In order for the argument to work, it would have to be absolutely certain that a belief in the NAP must be the only possible reason I'm engaging in debate.

Now that you've made the distinction between "self ownership" (as one's control over their own body) and "consent" (as a moral claim with political / ethical implications) clear, I'd like to make sure that the two aren't confused. My question was not just about "self ownership" in the narrow sense which we have established - it's about consent. What still needs to be established is how, in simply engaging in a discussion or debate, a person necessarily implies the system of consent, over and above simple causation. Please outline how the tu quoque argument applies specifically to consent as you've defined it.

So how is a system of consent, such as you've outlined above, substantiated by the tu quoque fallacy which Stefan uses to justify self-ownership as a right, which must necessarily involve the kind of "consent" you're talking about here? What I mean is, just by saying "I have a problem with your argument" I have only implied self-control in the narrow sense of attributing a person's argument to them, so would you agree that the argument which implies that this statement implies a system of consent is flawed?

But if I can never lose ownership of myself, then what moral force could a concept of self-ownership have? Even by stabbing me, you could not be meaningfully "violating my self-ownership" since according to you it cannot be violated. Therefore self-ownership is reduced to the insubstantial claim that a person happens to have control over their own body. You could deduce no ethics from that, and it is a misleading use of the term since when most people use the phrase 'self-ownership' they're talking about a moral concept which can be violated.

Sorry but I'm lost here. I don't know where you got the idea that I ever asserted that property rights somehow used to exist, and then decayed and went out of existence? I was presenting a much more straightforward criticism of UPB's claim to prove the objectivity of property ownership, by making a distinction between descriptive 'properties' and political or moral 'property', where one is simply to state that one thing is caused by, or attributed to, something else, and the other is the statement that someone objectively has the right to exclusive use of something.

I don't see how I shifted the goalposts, since all I did was make a comparison which seemingly could not be more directly analogous to what we're talking about. The only difference in the "sandcastle" example is that it involves the moral element which is absent from simply attributing someone's argument to their name. Nobody is arguing against the idea that an argument can be attributed to the person making it, or that the castle was built. In all cases I've been strictly distinguishing that fact, from the normative sense of property which states that people 'should' be allowed continued control over what they already control, or what they've built. So when you say that I'm contradicting the argument "against (self) ownership" by attributing something to someone, this is a bait and switch in the sense that you're using the word "property" in order to conflate something nobody is trying to argue against, with another very controversial and difficult to establish claim.

But there's no objective reality that I'm necessarily ignoring in violating your property. I could fully acknowledge that you built a sandcastle, and still topple it. There's nothing in my act of toppling your sandcastle that implies that I think you didn't build it.

But how could I ever "violate a fact"? I can ignore a fact, or state that it isn't true, but when I say "I don't believe in you continuing to hold exclusive control over X, even though you caused it to come into its current state", I am not 'violating' the fact that you caused it to come into its current state. The idea that you should be able to continue controlling X exclusively, and the fact that you caused X to be as it is, are two separable statements, and I can deny one without dissolving the other. If I take away your control over an object, that doesn't retroactively change the fact that you built or paid for it. I may be a jerk for doing it, but that is irrelevant to the kind of purely logical relations between statements we're talking about here.

Not an argument! Also, if your point is that to "have" a problem with an argument equates to private property, then I think the point I've been making in this thread applies: The "having" involved there is only a very meager concept of property (eg, it's a 'property' in the sense that a wall has the 'property' of being a certain colour) which seems to be miles from what an ancap philosophy needs to do with the concept of property. Property in the sense of a right attributed to someone which cannot be violated is not established simply by attributing something as being caused by the person. "I caused X to come about, therefore, if you attempt interfere with X I'm justified in using force to stop you." -- The part after 'therefore' is not simply a paraphrasing of the first part. There's something new there which needs to be established. The only way such a statement would properly contradict the ancap concept of property would be if the person said, "I have a problem with your argument, and if you try to stop me from having a problem with it I'll cut you... and I'll be objectively justified in doing it!" It's a different claim.

I'd still be genuinely interested if someone could clarify for me the relationship between 'truth' and UPB. This seems to be one of the main things holding me from understanding the philosophy properly.

I'm aware of this difficulty, but let's take 'truth itself'. Could denying truth itself be considered a contradiction to UPB in the strict sense? Molyneux makes it very explicit in the book that the only thing that UPB as a moral principle is concerned with is actions which violate the NAP. So, if we're talking about 'truth' not as an action, but as an idea, then okay, but then I don't see how that does anything but make it even more irrelevant from UPB. "It is not true that violent actions are universally immoral." "That is self-contradictory because you implied the validity of truth." Is this rebuttal not a non-sequitur? Unless you are prepared to argue that denying objective truth is a directly violent action, then denying the immorality of violence does not seem the same as denying the objectivity of truth. If the distinction between 'speaking truth as an action' and 'truth as truth' is important with regard to my OP, it must be that while 'truth as an action' is APA, 'truth as truth' is UPB. That implies that denying truth is violent, which it isn't. So my OP still applies regardless of the distinction. After all, it's "Universally Preferable Behavior", so the distinction seems to solidify my point. If anything, I think my interpretation of truth in terms of an action was a charitable reading.

Part of my confusion seems to be coming from the fact that the term "UPB" is used in two different ways: "UPB" as the general term which embraces the scientific method, APA, and so on. And then "UPB" as the specific standard within the book which applies only to actions involving violence. I would agree that if I argue, we could assume I'm asserting UPB in the first, broad sense. However, I can't see how it implies the second version. So, it seems like what appears to be a contradiction between asserting and denying UPB, is really asserting UPB1 while denying UPB2, which would not be a fallacy. If I say "I cannot make a statement", this would contradict itself because it's a statement. On the other hand, if I say "There is no moral principle about violence", I am not asserting a moral principle about violence, so I can't see any contradiction.

So you're just spamming my thread or what? I'm really interested if there's an answer to what I said.

I'm glad you agree. So, when I argue (which implies that I prefer truth over falsehood) this doesn't imply 'preferring truth' as UPB, because that isn't a negative behavior, and because preferring falsehood isn't violent, right? If that's the case, then I'm not contradicting UPB by arguing against it.

But truth isn't a universal behavior, right? I thought UPB only applies to behaviors. Also, doesn't UPB only apply to refraining from initiating force? I don't think falsity could be seen as initiating force.

In the video "Ethics Redux!", Molyneux states that truth is an APA (Aesthetically Preferrable Action) and not a UPB (Universally Preferable Behavior). This is in the context of an example where someone is being threatened by someone with a gun, and lies to save the potential victim. Since "UPB trumps APA", the value of nonaggression trumps the value of truth. As I understand it, one of Molyneux's main arguments is that, since any theory claims itself as true, it therefore makes a UPB claim and thus contradicts itself if it contradicts UPB. For instance, "UPB doesn't exist" is said to mean, "It is UPB not to believe in UPB." However, if truth is an APA (which would make sense to me since the difference is defined as APA being preferable but not inflicted, while UPB is initiation of force, and lying isn't initiating force,) (..also because "You must tell the truth" or "You must hold true beliefs" would not pass the coma test,) then could not the Is/Ought problem ("You can't get an ought from an is") be restated as an APA/UPB problem? ("You can't get a UPB from an APA.") In other words, when someone denies UPB, why does it necessarily follow that they're saying that "It's UPB to deny UPB" rather than that "It's APA to deny UPB"? And if it's the latter, where is the contradiction?

My understanding of the whole premise / conclusion system would be, that it assumes that we both agree on the premises, then that the conclusions follow from the premises, thereby convincing the person of of the conclusions. So whatever premises something relies upon would simply depend on what the person you are debating is willing to accept. Perhaps the phrase "first principle" would mean, a premise which every possible debater would necessarily accept. However, I do not need to accept "A is A" necessarily; I can call into question how we know that it is true, what it actually describes about the world, and so on; and this would bring us into metaphysics, epistemology, etc. Of course, we might say it is true regardless of whether anyone questions it, just as you said that "A is A" is true regardless of language or grammar. But, I would posit that this should be equally so for any given proposition. Therefore, if this were the criteria, then every "true proposition" would equally be a "first principle". Wouldn't all reasoning be reasoning from first principles, then?

It relies, for instance, on the act of recognizing two things and judging them similar enough to be categorized under the same unit. This would rely on principles like, "things can be similar or different", "things can be equivalent", etc. Perhaps not any specific language such as english, spanish, and so on, but it certainly relies on certain abstracting processes which form the basis of language. And my point is that it is not basic; it is reducible into parts. And therefore - if I'm right in saying so - then it is no more a "first principle" than any other statement. So, what about "I think therefore I am"? In fact, in my opinion this principle rests on another principle, which is that every thought must correspond to an object; and this principle itself can be questioned. And I could continue doing this with that one, and any other given principle, breaking it into its component parts and questioning them. So where do we come to a first principle, which is irreducible? It seems to me impossible.

I was thinking on the phrase "first principles", and realized that I've never really understood it. I mean, in my understanding, any principle would in some sense rely on some other knowledge as its foundation; in other words, any knowledge is in some way "complex". A sentence is itself a complex of elements and relationships between them. For instance, take A = A. Even this relies on other principles regarding the ways that symbols and language work, equivalence, etc etc. This, I think, is simply to say that no proposition is completely self-contained. It always relies on some kind of prior understanding. How do we establish what are or are not "first principles"? Is there a list of the "absolute first principles", which we deduce the rest from?

I was reading through "Human, All Too Human" and found a passage which seems to speak quite specifically about the idea of anarcho-capitalism, as well as predicting something paralleling Stefan's idea about there being a relationship between athiesm and statism, and religion and anti-statism. Sorry about the long quote - I tried to condense it a little - but it all seems very 'Freedomain-relevant', and I'm pretty interested if you have any reactions to it... “As a rule the State will know how to win over the priests, because it needs their most private and secret system for educating souls, and knows how to value servants who apparently, and outwardly, represent quite other interests. Even at present no power can become "legitimate" without the assistance of the priests; a fact which Napoleon understood. Thus, absolutely paternal government and the careful preservation of religion necessarily go hand in hand.” […] “But how will it be when the totally different interpretation of the idea of Government, such as is taught in democratic States, begins to prevail? When one sees in it nothing but the instrument of the popular will, no "upper" in contrast to an "under” but merely a function of the sole sovereign, the people? Here also only the same attitude which the people assume towards religion can be assumed by the Government; every diffusion of enlightenment will have to find an echo even in the representatives, and the utilising and exploiting of religious impulses and consolations for State purposes will not be so easy (unless powerful party leaders occasionally exercise an influence resembling that of enlightened despotism). When, however, the State is not permitted to derive any further advantage from religion, or when people think far too variously on religious matters to allow the State to adopt a consistent and uniform procedure with respect to them, the way out of the difficulty will necessarily present itself, namely to treat religion as a private affair and leave it to the conscience and custom of each single individual. The first result of all is that religious feeling seems to be strengthened, inasmuch as hidden and suppressed impulses thereof, which the State had unintentionally or intentionally stifled, now break forth and rush to extremes; later on, however, it is found that religion is overgrown with sects, and that an abundance of dragon's teeth were sown as soon as religion was made a private affair. The spectacle of strife, and the hostile laying bare of all the weaknesses of religious confessions, admit finally of no other expedient except that every better and more talented person should make irreligiousness his private affair, a sentiment which now obtains the upper hand even in the minds of the governing classes, and, almost against their will, gives an anti religious character to their measures. As soon as this happens, the sentiment of persons still religiously disposed, who formerly adored the State as something half sacred or wholly sacred, changes into decided hostility to the State; they lie in wait for governmental measures, seeking to hinder, thwart, and disturb as much as they can, and, by the fury of their contradiction, drive the opposing parties, the irreligious ones, into an almost fanatical enthusiasm for the State; in connection with which there is also the silently Co operating influence, that since their separation from religion the hearts of persons in these circles are conscious of a void, and seek by devotion to the State to provide themselves provisionally with a substitute for religion, a kind of stuffing for the void. After these perhaps lengthy transitional struggles, it is finally decided whether the religious parties are still strong enough to revive an old condition of things, and turn the wheel backwards: in which case enlightened despotism (perhaps less enlightened and more timorous than formerly), inevitably gets the State into its hands, or whether the non religious parties achieve their purpose, and, possibly through schools and education, check the increase of their opponents during several generations, and finally make them no longer possible. Then, however, their enthusiasm for the State also abates: it always becomes more obvious that along, with the religious adoration which regards the State as a mystery and a supernatural institution, the reverent and pious relation to it has also been convulsed. Henceforth individuals see only that side of the State which may be useful or injurious to them, and press forward by all means to obtain an influence over it. But this rivalry soon becomes too great; men and parties change too rapidly, and throw each other down again too furiously from the mountain when they have only just succeeded in getting aloft. All the measures which such a Government carries out lack the guarantee of permanence; people then fight shy of undertakings which would require the silent growth of future decades or centuries to produce ripe fruit. Nobody henceforth feels any other obligation to a law than to submit for the moment to the power which introduced the law; people immediately set to work, however, to undermine it by a new power, a newly formed majority. Finally it may be confidently asserted the distrust of all government, the insight into the useless and harassing nature of these short winded struggles, must drive men to an entirely new resolution: to the abrogation of the conception of the State and the abolition of the contrast of "private and public”. Private concerns gradually absorb the business of the State; even the toughest residue which is left over from the old work of governing (the business, for instance, which is meant to protect private persons from private persons) will at last someday be managed by private enterprise. The neglect, decline, and death of the State, the liberation of the private person (I am careful not to say the individual), are the consequences of the democratic conception of the State; that is its mission. When it has accomplished its task, which, like everything human, involves much rationality and irrationality, and when all relapses into the old malady have been overcome, then a new leaf in the story book of humanity will be unrolled, on which readers will find all kinds of strange tales and perhaps also some amount of good.” […] “The sovereignty of the people, looked at closely, serves also to dispel the final fascination and superstition in the realm of these sentiments; modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the State. The outlook which results from this certain decay is not, however, unfortunate in every respect; the wisdom and the selfishness of men are the best developed of all their qualities; when the State no longer meets the demands of these impulses, chaos will least of all result, but a still more appropriate expedient than the State will get the mastery over the State. How many organising forces have already been seen to die out! For example, that of the gens or clan which for millennia was far mightier than the power of the family, and indeed already ruled and regulated long before the latter existed. We ourselves see the important notions of the right and might of the family, which once possessed the supremacy as far as the Roman system extended, always becoming paler and feebler. In the same way a later generation will also see the State become meaningless in certain parts of the world, an idea which many contemporaries can hardly contemplate without alarm and horror. To labour for the propagation and realisation of this idea is, certainly, another thing; one must think very presumptuously of one's reason, and only half understand history, to set one's hand to the plough at present when as yet no one can show us the seeds that are afterwards to be sown upon the broken soil. Let us, therefore, trust to the "wisdom and selfishness of men" that the State may yet exist a good while longer, and that the destructive attempts of over-zealous, too hasty socialists may be in vain!” http://www.lexido.com/EBOOK_TEXTS/HUMAN_ALL_TOO_HUMAN_BOOK_ONE_.aspx?S=472

You say it's easy to get from 'is' to 'ought', but your post - as far as I can tell - did no such thing. Instead you justify the 'ought' based on the same Tu Quoque fallacy citing the fact that it is common for people to assign responsibility for each others actions. In fact at some points you seem to imply that such an 'is-ought' leap is indeed impossible:"There are no ontologically objective "ought"s.""Likewise, there is no self ownership stamp in your body put there by Yahweh [...] You've practiced self ownership consistently and repeatedly in this thread"I've already explained my issue with this line of argument; barring the fact that it's a fallacy and assumes the very thing it purports to justify, the fact that I assign a person's statements to themselves as an abstracted entity doesn't in itself imply that I accept any moral rule whatever. Even if it did, it would imply it as a social construct, not as an intrinsic 'right' - the notion of which you yourself seem to reject.

A logical link from 'is' to 'ought'?