bugzysegal

"I was aggravated and going to assault Janice, but after hearing the eloquence of Shopan I had a moment of catharsis." While highly unlikely, this is not impossible. The idea that music soothes the savage soul is not new. Even If it's effect is minor, this is not impossible. The way they would frame it legally would be, would some result (or lack there of) not have happened but for some cause.

Actually the only laws of classical physics that seem to be without exception are those of gravitation, if I remember correctly that is. Even the speed of light changes with enough gravity. If we are talking about fundamental forces acting uniformly, most have exceptions under extreme circumstances (problems that some scientists postulate may never be solvable). I think one example is what happens to information that goes into a black hole. Funny that you should mention this. When I was scrounging for applications of paraconsistent logic, apparently some philosophers of science think it may be useful to explain wave-particle duality. The idea that physics wont break down in the future is as inductive as any other. There are no self-evident axioms of science, just axioms science elects not to challenge.

But the list is so long! Or at least it was last time I checked.y

"music saved my life" If there is no two way link between goodness and consequences whatsoever(not an argument for full utilitarian thinking, just that there is some interplay), consider how strange it would be im moral actions necessarily led to unfavorable consequences. Viewed in different lights I would say nearly any individual action can be shown to be good. Killing, music, eating, feeding, sleeping, running, etc.

I could easily argue that he owes the parties family financial restitution. Just because UPB gives you an answer doesn't mean its a good one. Remember, the whole point is that some given system of ethics is useful. That doesn't require that, that usefulness be unbound. Furthermore there is another alternate case that comes up very frequently: A doctor treats an unconscious without the request of anyone from the surviving estate. Voluntarism requires that a conscious actor give assent to a contract, therefore the doctor should not be able to recover money for materials and services rendered. However we grant medical professionals restitution, realizing that anyone would assent if you had told them about the medical emergency ahead of time. Human life is so precious that in such circumstances quasi-contracts are formed where the element of mutual assent is not present. This is the only other reasonable exception to the rule that I know of, but it is reasonable none-the-less. that's not a solution to the proscribed action for the owner. It's a practical way out and the one any sane person would take if they could...but let's easily amend the hypothetical: the owner doesn't want the person to trespass, but the window could open if he wants it. Glass is quite strong and would not break from the dangling persons kicks.

The doctor example I gave is a real life example. It was a case presented to U.S. courts. The cases are analogous in that both involve an individual who faces immanent harm, persons who are uniquely qualified to intervene, and further that the individual in danger is prepared to supply standard adequate value. It's also noteworthy that there is little to no physical danger for the person who it's felt should act.

I would completely agree with this sentiment! Just as you would not try and use quantum mechanics to solve problems at a classical mechanics level or vice versa. Note that these models are also seemingly incompatible! I would say I couldn't think of a better analogy for the approach to morality I'm describing.

I pointed to two such occasions. One was where Stefan was having a discussion with a Libertarian professor from some southern state. The flagpole example and one where he steps in and pulls his kid back from putting his penis on a filthy urinal. Another one was the contract example. Most people would say there is a freedom to contract that the doctor should be allowed to have, but also it seems like the doctor should be compelled to take the contract that would otherwise be considered fair. If you don't think this is a common intuition, note that it stems from one of the most notorious cases in U.S. legal contract history.

I've listened to UPB through twice. There was nothing baffling. The "shared meaning" more closely represents what I was getting at than "agreement" in that agreement could simply hinge on similar evaluations of some fact or another, whereas "shared meaning" ties into how words are commonly used, shared experience, context, etc.

I edited my post and added on a bit about what I think are genuine morally neutral statements. I actually didn't read your run away vs. intervene hypothetical.... I was referring to just the music playing.

Ok I thought you meant otherwise with the taxi example. What you think of and what I think of are irrelevant. It's the shared practice of linguistic acts that makes them meaningful. I've taken plenty intro philosophy classes, so I'll probably pass for now. Thinking of meaning as stemming from a definition at all is not quite right. Obeying a rule, or using a word correctly, is viewed in light of generally shared practices. When you are cut and exhibit pain behavior and say you are in pain....I don't reference some internal approximation of a definition. We look at what we would generally call "pain" and say yes your are using this word correctly. Wittgenstein abandoned his picture theory of meaning. Typically the tractatus and Philosophical Investigations are viewed as entirely distinct (and sometimes contradictory) works. I'm running with the late Wittgenstein. Good pull though.

Yes. This seems reasonable. The only thing I'd say is that when we look at the saxophone player, we can also say he's doing good right? His actions when it come's to fighting crime are neutral, but the fact that he's acquiring some skill and using self discipline, makes him/her a better person and brings value into the world. I suppose that's a re-framing of the moral stakes. Also, note that when Stefan give's example of morally neutral propositions, he gives individual tastes or preferences as these examples. I think that's a safe move.

"trivial" in the propositional logic sense. It's been a few years, but I think it has to do with the fact that you have not actually derived anything, either inductively or deductively.

"rudeness" in your alternate definition bit seems inappropriate. When I call someone "rude" I mean that they are being unnecessarily hostile or intentionally ignoring social norms i.e. Looking right at someone and laughing as the elevator door shuts before they can get on, instead of holding the elevator. Maybe "ignorant" is better suited for your example? What I mean when I say its not agreement like a contractual agreement is we don't both go "Lets take "pain" to mean this ouchy feeling" "yeah that sounds good to me" Specifically its not that we are agreeing to some laundry list of propositions. Why? because language can be infinitely reassembled for infinitely numbered sentences and meanings. We use words in the same way because those are the customary ways in which these words are used. Dictionaries are shorthand guides for the customs of a given language, but they fall far short of capturing the extent of meaning.

Actually it's pluralist. So if you had x which was a situation that had relevant moral elements A, B, and C, and moral theory 1 applied, every time some situation arose that had those elements (no more or less), moral theory 1 applies. It is universal. The tricky part is deciding which moral theory applies. I'm sure you are still unconvinced that this is not relativism but follow this link and click around. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_universalism. I think the main contention is that action A given circumstance B, is right for me and everyone else as long as it comports with a reasonable and relatively consistent moral theory. So let's say the value that your moral theory emphasizes is autonomy, whereas the fundamental value of utilitarian thought is maximization of well-being. The pluralist looks at these and says that while both often compete, they both do have real value. Which is appropriate for a given situation depends on the situation itself. So John Stuart Mill admitted that there is intrinsic value in human life such that human life should always be treated as an end in and of itself. This is a constraint on his moral theory that limits its applicability. Robert Nozick, the great Libertarian theorist acknowledged "side constraints" to his theories that limited it as well. No matter your moral outlook, there are always walls you will run into. These paradoxes and problematic possibilities are where the pluralism comes in.

Agreement... well I would agree that language must be shared. If you are thinking of it in terms of giving assent to something I would disagree.

Oh. I'm actually going to change the word I used here when I called this relativism...that opens up the wrong can of worms. So I would prescribe moral universalism like "that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals",[1] regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, or any other distinguishing feature" (Thanks wikipedia) but a pluralist version where many universal ethical standards may apply to the depending on the idiosyncrasies of the problem. Imagine the Utilitarian who comes across the mere addition paradox: "For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living" There are visual demonstrations of this on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Wikipedia. The pluralist can say "no problem Mr. Utilitarian, appeal to UPB or virtue ethics." That is, when you approach the limits of any moral theory, where another theory better fits that situation, you use that to solve your moral dilemma.

That was a bit meandering sorry. Ok so your objective standard is that of UPB correct? I want to highlight the fact that your pointing to the importance of practice and pragmatism. UPB outlines moral prescriptions about murder, property, aggression, etc. Great, but there are cases where UPB doesn't necessarily get the job done. So for example, should a doctor, who is offered her standard rate of pay for service by someone who requires immediate medical attention and has no other viable options at this time, be obligated to take this contract(this does happen). I believe a professor when having a discussion with Stefan brought up the example of a man hanging from a flagpole, who asks the Libertarian if he can break the window to save his own life.Stefan acknowledged that this was problematic though he dismissed it as not a general concern of everyday ethical reasoning. Many would argue that Libertarian theories suffer kinds of problems like these in not proscribing positive(meaning must act to do x) behavior. I would argue that the correct moral theory must be one that uses some shared point of reference, but that which moral theory (Libertarianism, Utilitarianism, etc.) applies is dictated by the situation. While it's not evidence that this ought to be the way we behave, many people in fact do behave this way and I find that interesting. This is not a subjective approach but a relative one. Great. So like, where I said you were right for criticizing me and that the onus was on the person introducing the foreign concept....that counted for jack? Because I did and then you amended your comment to dismiss me. Here! Here!

Did you know that we agree in a very relevant sense? So, when I speak, I commit myself to certain beliefs. Among those beliefs is that I am using my words to share experience with other minds. The very act of speaking declares that Cartesian certainty "I think, therefore I am" to be way less than what we can be certain of by linguistic acts. I think you would go further in saying that it requires that I use objective standards(but let's not go there quite yet).The very exercise of Descartes' Meditations becomes ludicrous when viewed from the standpoint that meaning only exists in use and this use necessitates context. Descartes starts by doubting everything. The only problem is this is unintelligible. Can you doubt that everything exists? No of course not. You can't even begin to imagine a concept of "nothing" that makes any sense outside of some material context. "Doubt" is not something that can exist in a vacuum. It needs context, as does math or any other language. So there is some obvious initial evidence for the usefulness of contextual thinking. However, what about those pesky "objective standards" required to judge things by. Well there are ways to play different language games so that we say you are in fact playing that game. Some language games are similar to one another. Others barely resemble each other. "Going" and "leaving" have strong resemblances to each other, but it would seem like "brick" and "beautiful" are quite dissimilar. Each game plays by certain rules. If someone stepped up to a baseball home plate and after the pitch, they ran counter-clockwise around the bases, we wouldn't say they are objectively wrong. They simply aren't playing baseball. I'm not trying to save face. After surveying my own beleifs I've had to abandon many a notion that had previously provided the comfort of certainty. Giving up convenient and comforting beliefs is difficult. Therefore I respect it. It's not indiscriminate, but I hardly was implying anything like that. Just name one alternate philosophy you have devoted time to surveying in a rigorous mannner. Anything...Platonism, Aristotelian thought, Rationalism, Empiricism, Rational Empiricism, skepticism, Idealism, Deontology, Utilitarianism. When's the last time you put the effort into building you opponents view as strongly as you could before attacking it? Do you even see the value in such a practice?

Part 1. Well not really. It eliminates a lot of epistemology problems like "what is truth?", but it also leads us away from philosophy in general. Part 2. No, but certainty is comforting, therefore allowing for uncertainty is brave.

I said words lose meaning viewed in isolation. That they themselves are meaningless without context. If I was saying that there is no such thing as meaning, you would have a point, but I'm not, so you don't. To your second point, I concede that I have no clue how paraconsistent logic might apply to ethical decisions. I don't know for certain that it could. What I do know is that counterintuitve notions have supplanted mainstream ideas in the past and that common sense intuitions can be useful but aren't necessarily so. If it doesn't at least make you scratch your chin, I'm sorry. Penn Gillette said that "I know in my heart I could be wrong about Libertarianism." It's that kind of brazen uncertainty that I respect. "Antiphilosophy is anti-theoretical, critical of a priori justifications, and sees philosophical problems as misconceptions that are to be therapeutically dissolved." This is a good summation of Wittgenstein and is a direct quote from wikipedia. Also if this is your pronouncement that you have given up on the discussion and that it has been wasted effort and time, two things: 1. You're being a snob in that you assume that something which seems so unreasonable to you, could only be uttered by an idiot. 2. I use to be a lot like you and I assure you I'm not an idiot. (also if that is not what you meant not only will I edit in an apology, but I'll announce to the world that I was being an oversensitive dick)

Please expand the last component of your statement. I am a bit overtired at this point, so I apologize for sluggishness. Christopher Hitchens said that burning the candle at both ends produces a beautiful glow. I like that sentiment. Hmm. Let me be explicit. If I use a word, it's not because I'm trying to be misleading or obtuse. I actually prefer discussion that is plain language and not even syllogistic. I was name dropping and quoting Wittgenstein, because it is my understanding of his philosophy that I am trying to defend and this is the plane and simple truth. If you wish, we can hash out the meaning of each word. I thought in the age of google, we can come to an understanding of terms we don't know quickly. I actually had to look up "pretentious" because I sometimes use this word wrong. I wasn't trying to impress anyone. You weren't entirely wrong when you said I was talking around philosophy. Wittgenstein's position in his Philosophical Investigations was that (literally it doesn't matter what I say here scholars will furiously debate, but I'm giving you my best conjecture given the circumstances) philosophy is itself a mistake, a sort of defective method of thinking or problem solving; that language, when taken out of context and held to scrutiny, brakes down and loses meaning. Meaning is derived from our shared use of language. I was a philosophy major and when I heard this as the introduction to the class, I scoffed thinking that this was not rigorous philosophy. This was not the product of a keen analytical mind. The longer you grapple with Wittgenstein, the more elegant and pervasive his ideas become, however. All that being said, I get that I am doing a poor job of convincing you. For that I am eternally sorry. Otherwise I thought that Godel's theorem would be a good parallel to our discussion, but again I was apparently wrong. After a few minutes of walking to get the first meal I've had in 18 hours, I think your criticisms are more on point than I initially let on. As someone trying to explain a foreign notion, it's my job to unpack and simplify to the best of my ability. To not do so is lazy.

Love the RATM/Bob Dylan quote, by the way. Umm, yes if some system of ethics, let's say UPB, should be touted and spread to the masses, if that overlooks a major hurdle in thinking and is unknowingly and fundamentally flawed, then it is important.

Specifically principles are fundamental to their respective fields. If some principle is of the field of ethics, then it can't be incompatible with the field in part or in whole. You don't start with a foundation of potassium and build upwards with water. Paraconsistency allows for the violation of the law of non contradiction, this law which is built into UPB. You could open the door and say maybe there are separate principles for paraconsistent ethics that UPB would entail, but that's a whole other argument and one that would necessitate the understanding of the implications of paraconsistency. This is not about exceptions and its not about universality per se. "A superset of objective ethics" means nothing by itself. Any proposition, stand point, term, idea, notion, experience, or any definition or principle only has meaning within a larger context. How does this apply to formal theories? When regarding Godel's incompleteness theorem Wittgenstein had this to say, I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says: ‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. Must I not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that it is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.” Just as we ask: “‘provable’ in what system?”, so we must also ask: “‘true’ in what system?” ‘True in Russell’s system’ means, as was said: proved in Russell’s system; and ‘false in Russell’s system’ means: the opposite has been proved in Russell’s system. —Now what does your “suppose it is false” mean? In the Russell sense it means ‘suppose the opposite is proved in Russell’s system’; if that is your assumption, you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. And by ‘this interpretation’ I understand the translation into this English sentence. —If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is true in the Russell sense, and the interpretation “P is not provable” again has to be given up. If you assume that the proposition is true in the Russell sense, the same thing follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false in some other than the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to be proved in Russell’s system. (What is called “losing” in chess may constitute winning in another game.) I should not have said metaphysics when we were in the realm of ethics, meta ethics would have sufficed. That is neither here nor there though. Yes I've listened to the book twice and not once did Stefan address Wittgenstein's philosophy. He sidestepped Hume by constructing his arguments pragmatically, but nowhere did he address who is widely considered the greatest thinker of the 20th century. It seems like he at least deserves a footnote. Logic can be very useful.

This is nice and close to what I was getting at. Notice that I have avoided formal arguments of the sort that are quaintly dealt with. Just as you are claiming this is meta-ethical argument, I'm saying metaethics are only are intelligible contextually, if at all. MY position is distinctly anti-foundational. Numbers themselves simply are not examples of things that must be true about the world in a relevant sense. Mathematical truth fall under the category of analytic apriori truths, meaning they are true by meaning alone. It is no more significant to say 2+2=4 than bachelors are unmarried men, unless there is a dissimilarity that math is embedded metaphysics somehow. I contend that regardless of what definitions you personally hold as relevant, they only make sense in a larger context, not in a vacuum.