Thank you for elaborating, TheRobin.
Regarding free will, nothing in the document you mention refutes the regress argument for free will impossibilism in my document.
Regarding negative hedonism and moral skepticism, you claim that ""IF you want your behaviour to be rational you SHOULD aim toward peace of mind" is an objective moral fact. But your statement is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical imperative. And only categorical imperatives qualify as objective moral facts.
You claim that emotions are all linked to "one master-dial". So I take it that you are saying that you cannot reduce (or eliminate) one emotion without reducing (or eliminating) them all. What is your basis for this statement? Can you provide backup for it in the psychology literature?
You claim that "emotions that make you feel uncomfortable are the best guide to get out of unhappy situations and are not something to ignore or try to will away, as that causes just more problems in the long run (even though it might save you some discomfort in the short run)." But in fact, one does not need to feel uncomfortable in order to act prudently (in one's long-term interest).
You claim "if there's no free will, there's no control at all anyway. and if there's no moral stance, then there are no "shoulds"." But free will impossibilism (lack of ultimate responsibility) is perfectly compatible with controlling one's behavior in a proximate sense. And moral skepticism is perfectly compatible with rational "shoulds" or hypothetical imperatives (as opposed to moral "shoulds" or categorical imperatives), as discussed above.
Thank you for the reading suggestions. I'll take a look.