mkaru

i'm leaving, this is absurdely irrational and arrogant here.

I do exactly that, I "admit" that this cannot be "measured" AND I put it forward as an objective claim. The error in your thinking lies in the tacit assumption that "objective" and "measurable" are synonyms. They aren't. Another error you commit is claiming I said anything in the sense "above reproach".

Why so aggressive? I clearly didn't imply that in my post .. Talking about consequences - so you're a determinist yourself.. Mind you, either you are talking off causalities and consequences, and then you're a determinist consequently; or you don't, and you aren't.. Of course it is an objective claim. What else should it be? I don't even know what you would mean by something being a "subjective" claim. And of course it is "subjective valuation". I don't even know what you would bean by "non-subjective" ("objective"?) valuation. Maybe you think that values (original, good, beautiful, etc.) can be empirically measured. I don't. Apart from that, I also don't know what the problem would be with making a statement about certain men being great, original, productive etc. Anyone can contest that valuation, and as long as he is willing to give reasons for his differing valuation, people can enter into a debate about it. Or is your problem my claim that some great thinkers were actually determinists? I see no need to play the role of being your dictionary of philosophical terms, or to spare you from doing the work of looking up things yourself. Wasn't it enough that I pointed you to the fact that you might want to do that?

I doubt that. Look at history and you will find that some of the greatest, most original and productive thinkers were determinists. Were they resigning? (I intend to mean only philosophers here but the same case could surely be said about great men in other fields of human endeavour..) It seems to me that in this discussion here there are very different understandings of what "determinism" (as a technical term in philosophy) means.

I don't think consequences need to be "objectively predictable", it's enough that they are rationally predictable, i.e. subjectively predictable (probability, not objective certainty). To be more precise: I think an actor indeed needs to be able to form an opinion about the future, for him to be able to act (or even to have intentions). But the morality/immorality itself of his actions does not stem from his opinion about the future. I am not sure if morality is only about the intentions/will (as Kant says) but there is at least one type of action that can be classified as immoral by only talking about the intention: treating the other not as an end in itself but only as a means to my own ends. That is, intending to use persons as objects/instruments. Apart from their consequences, "Theft, assault, fraud and murder" can probably all be shown to fall under that type of actions: the acting person is not respecting the other as an end in itself ("person", "rational being" in the sense of kant), but is only concerned with his own ends, using the other as a means only.

Yes, I wouldn't argue against that for some (not all) of the examples I listed. But that something depends on something material does not mean that this something is itself material. (And again and aswell, "dependence" itself is clearly not something material (how could one explain "dependence" in strictly material or physical terms/concepts? it is a logical relation); same of course for "existence", which, according to Kant, can not be a "real predicate"). The examples were to show that your not believing in "immaterial things" is not philosophically reasonable. I would also point out that the thought that a law "depends" on that which is governed by it, can be plausible only in a very narrow sense. In the cases that are relevant here, "depending" on something material does not mean that the "existence" depends, but only the instantiation. Natural laws (or philosophically more abstract: "form") are a good example here: They exist not because of matter but a natural law of course "depends" on matter insofar it is to be instantiated or to be actualized.

"I do not believe in immaterial things" – well, you probably should. Here's a list of things that you do believe in and that are immaterial (I'd argue): - The laws of nature, that is the laws governing the behaviour of matter (you articulate a "disbelief of anything outside the laws of physics". but the laws of physics themselves must obviously lie outside the laws of physics) - relations/configurations of matter (a relation between material thinks can not itself be a material thing) - The laws of reason, that is the laws governing rational thought - beliefs - concepts and senses (in Frege's sense) - intentionality - dispositions/potentialities I don't think this list is complete.

I think you got this very well, this is what Schopenhauer meant. I would not go so far to reduce this only to physical or material things/substances like DNA, hormones etc. - since those are only "phaenomena", while Schopenhauer (if I recall correctly) uses the term "noumenon" to characterize what he names "the will". (Schopenhauer is coming from Kant here, he says the Will is what Kant thought to be the thing in itself.). How did you come up with the term "noumenon"? Anyways, those are some quite deep metaphysical thoughts you are having there. I'm surprised to read that you are only 15 or 16 years old, one wouldn't expect that, really. Particularly: I hope you don't fall for the philosophically superficial arguments some tried to give you here (trying to make the points that e. g. "there is a free will", "determinism is lunatic" etc.; I say: to understand, accept and settle with the thought of an unfree will is not "weak" or "depressing", it is calming and shows a strong intellect.). But your intellect seems to be set up for metaphysically deeper thoughts, really, and I think that you've already left those common sense standpoints and reasonings behind you. Yes, well, maybe not rebut but expand or overcome (überwinden). I wouldn't stop at Schopenhauer. I know German philosophy very well (I am a philosopher from Germany) and I would point you to Nietzsche as a next step. Nietzsche is the antidote to Schopenhauerian pessimism. Do you speak German? Your translation of that passage is perfect (and your Schopenhauer meme is quite witty, by the way.)

Again, I agree. I'm not sure of what the cultural connotations of "worthwhileness" are (as said, no native speaker etc.), but maybe this can conclude with a quote from Aristoteles, Metaphysics: And from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason:

Maybe so, but there are at least some interesting (to me) attempts to resolve this problem. For example, what some might call "transcendental arguments", which reason not by analyzing perceptions but analyzing the conditions of possibility of perceiving as such. Putnam tries to refute the brain in a vat scenario, not successfully I think, but why shouldn't one try. Yes, I guess the point I wanted to make was that when using the conept of "flawedness", i.e. when judging something as flawed or not, one needs (invokes, presupposes) certain criteria, some kinde of measure. Anyways, I think this point can be settled here.. absolutely, I agree here.

I did never said that one "cannot trust the senses and reason". My own philosophical position is exactly the opposite. But I said that one has to rationall show this trustworthiness because there are some serious sceptical arguments. Anyways, this discussion must end here. I respect your position, but we clearly have to fundamentally different understandings of rationality and philosophy. I understand your position of pragmatism and common sense-philosophy here. But I want to think about and discuss those questions that lie way down inside the "rabbit hole", as you called it (correctly). That's what - for me - is a very important and indispensable part of philosophy. If I understand you correctly (maybe not), you see one point of philosophy in preventing us falling into that hole..

Yes, but this consequence would not be my fault, it could not be attributable to me, it wasn't my intention. It would be a case of bad luck (for you). Bad luck is something that happens all the time, it's a necessary (and sad) feature of the world. The point you are raising is exactly what Kant discusses in his short text "On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns". Maybe this is of interest for you.. I don't think that stealing would be legitimate in cases where I steal something that would otherwise cause the death of the person I steal it from. Taking away something from someone that would (against his own will) cause his death, i. e. saving someones life, is of course a good thing. But we shouldn't call that "stealing". Stealing is morally bad because it is a violation of a right (the name of this right is "property"). I need not predict anything about the future outcome (which I can not do, because humans can not predict the future; they can only expect possible outcomes to a certain degree of probability). When it comes to moral questions I need not predict the future because I do exactly know at the present what I am intending to do. I know what type of action I am planning to do - is it stealing? is it saving someone's life? I can now that for sure, because my intention (or "my will") is something that I definitely know. Deontologists say that we can define Types of Action that are absolutely immoral and forbidden. Again, see Kant. I do not want to claim that Kant's position is the right one. It just seems that you didn't see that there are alternative conceptions of morality that do not focus on the consequences of actions, and that e.g. Kant has some strong arguments Again, I would say that it is immoral because it is immoral to intend to kill someone. Or cause him pain against his will, etc. How should I know whether an action is allowed if I can not know the consequences with certainty? If instead of talking about certainty we switch to talking about probabilites, the problem only occurs again: How can I know with certainty that my calculation of the probabilities is correct? We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not. I understand your point. Yes, it would definitely be unrealistic if the morality of an act (or actor) depended on the consequences of the act (or him forseeing those consequences). But we need not give up certainty in ethics. We also have the other option of giving up that specific understanding of ethics (called "consequentialism"). That's the point I wanted to make here..

Not anymore, to be honest. Exactly. So why do you not see that those principles need reasonable justification and that this justification can not appeal to empirical observation? Yes, and how do you think, did Hume reach this conclusion? By reason, and reason alone, right? If you were to answer „No, also by using his senses“: Then what good reason is there (or did Hume give) for trusting the senses in scientific or philosophical questions, i.e. for thinking that the senses can and do give logically reliable reasons? Now, if your answer really is (and from what you wrote it seems like it is) that it’s somehow ok to suppose that, because your senses have most of your life been reliable, and because you have successfully survived 40+ years thanks to using your senses, and (most ridiculously) because it is „self-evident“: Then be it so, believe that if you want to; but that is not philosophy. It is dogmaticism, nothing else. Do you even know what philosophy is? It is definitely not decreeing the validity of principles that have been (at least) in question for centuries now. Whenever someone claims something to be „self-evident“, you simply know he’s to lazy to really think about it, or too afraid to really investigate it critically. You’re coming up with „self-evidence“ quite often. The core and basic principle of rational philosophical and scientific thinking is: There is nothing that is "self-evident". Nothing. This is the essence of western rational thought of the last 2500 years. Why would I be speaking of anyhting „empirically existential“ here? Hume has clearly shown that you can not derive an ought from an is. If there is an objective morality then it has to be derived in a non-empirical, apriori, philosophical way. To correct this, this is what I actually meant (as I said, English is not my first language): Your argument is not strong enough to show that normativity (morality in this case; but any other forms of normativity as well) is nothing more than socially aquired beliefs (that is: no objective morality). But IF it were strong enough to show this, it would at the same time consequently show that there is no objective physical truth. I'm stopping here because in my opinion this discussion can not be continued at the moment. In your last reply to me I already felt some kind of aggressivity that I don't want to fall into as well (though I probably already did). But the main point is that you are actually not willing to discuss exactly those points that I am putting to question. You are simply brushing them aside by stating that it's "self-evident". That is exactly where rational discussion has to end then, until you are willing to critically investigate those supposed "self-evidences".

This is one way to construe the distinction, if I recall correctly, it is how WvO Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism) and many others in analytical philosophy do it. I'm not sure if it is how one could reconstruct it in Hume (I think he didn't use the analytic/synthetic terminology) but Kant (the locus classicus for this) has different definitions of analytic and synthetic judgments. Kant's distinction is made from an epistemological point of view -- I'm not sure about this, but I would say he doesn't even use the word "truth" when introducing the analytic/synthetic distinction (see chapt. IV in the Introduction-chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason). I think Quine's argument against the analytic-syntetic dichotomy is correct but it only is an argument against his understanding of the dichotomy. I think it shows nothing as regards the analytic/syntetic distinction of Kant. I think that is correct. But radical empiricsts would say that there is no 100% certainty, and that even mathematics and logic are not certain. Now I do not know what exactly Stefan's position is and how it is founded, and only had a quick look/listen into the podcast linked above. But I think two points can be made: 1. The synthetic-analytic distinction is not so important. What seems to be the real issue, is the a priori/a posteriori-distinction. Empiricists hold that there are no a priori truths. When they argue against the analytic/synthetic distinction, they actually want to say that there are not analytic truths (but strictly spoken they seem to think so because they think there are no a priori truths). 2. The position that there are no analytic or a priori truths is inconsistent. It contradicts itself because when this theoretic position wants to articulate itself (that is, formulate the theory, make an argument, give reasons for it, try to convince others etc.) it already has to PRESUPPOSE that there are analytic and/or apriori truths. It necessarily invokes exactly those types of truths that it claims don't exist. The laws of reasoning and argumentation are not syntethic a posteriori, they CAN NOT be that. (Same for the method of induction. Relying on induction presupposes that the validity and reliability of the method of induction has not been proven only inductively. And for Deduction: The forms/laws of correct deduction (or abstraction etc.) can not themselves be derived/deduced (abstracted) from observatoin.). The epistemology put forward in this podcast sounds very inconsistent and circular to me. The premise seems to be that the world consists of atoms, concepts refer to configurations of atoms etc. This statement/knowledge (the world consists of atoms etc.) can not be itself synthetic/aposteriori. If it were not a priori (be it analytic or synthetic apriori), it couldn't function to explain how our cognition relates to the world. Even if this position were consistent (which I doubt), it would at least be circular and I think this would be a bad circle.

It is not an unrealistic standard for moral questions; at least that is what deontologists say. It is, of course, unrealistic for everyday action in a pragmatic or technical sense (for example, if I follow this recipe for baking a cake, I do not know for sure if I achieve something edible, something tasting well etc.; or if I take the car to drive somewhere, I do not know for sure what will happen, if I reach my destination etc.). We act anyways, because we believe that the possibly worst outcomes are not really that bad (or chances for them to happen not very high; e.g. dying in a car crash). When the possible outcome is very bad and/or chances for it to happen are very high, we probably wouldn't act (e.g. playing russian roulette). We do not know for sure what will happen when we act. That is because there are many contingent factors that we do not control but that strongly influence the output. We do not know for sure what will turn out. We only know it AFTER we have acted. That is, we have to ACT to know it. But this makes no sense as regards ethical questions. Because in ethics we want to know whether we are morally ALLOWED to act (or not). If someone says: Just act and you will see whether the consequences of your actions are good, then he didn't even understand the ethical question. Ethics is not about experimenting. I would have to commit a morally bad action just to know that it is morally bad. That is the reason why many ethical theories say that the (possible) consequences of an action are not relevant for deciding whether an action is morally good or not.

I wonder why you think you can simply suppose that your senses give you any information about the physical world? Is there an argument for that or do you think that is „self-evident“ again? To me this looks like pure dogmatism, or so called „naive realism“, but in this case dogmatism because you seem not to see that those same arguments that you want to invoke against a position of moral objectivism, also speak against your epistemological empiricism. Those „abstractions“ should in my opinion not called „philosophical truths“ but general empirical laws. Philosophical truths can not be gained by abstracting or inducing from sense data („observations“). Even the most radical empiricists say this (which is why they often say there is no philosophy). Isn’t that how you learn mathematics and rational thinking as well? It is, and for me, this does not show that mathematics is not objective but that your argument does not work against objectivism. Again, isn’t this the case with mathematics? Don’t we look at 1+1 = 2 and „feel“ that this is a correct equation? Both of these options are not viable as basis for morality. You left out a third option, which would actually be the only correct answer to the question: Reason (Vernunft). It is exactly what you rely on when putting forwar arguments in a debate or deciding whether an argument is sound or not. Because, if this also were only a matter of what you learned from your elders or your peers, or what you „feel“ to be a good argument - then it would make probably no sense at all to get into an exchange of arugments with other people. In this case we should stop right here. This only makes sense if we both ultimately appeal to a common source of rationality/reason, which means a source of some objective normativity which allows us to decide what is objectively a valid argument vs. an invalid argument (or fallacy etc.). This is a kind of objective normativity which is not the same as normativity of objective morality but probably something analogous in many aspect. You seem to be confusing jurisprudential reasoning with philosophical/scientific reasoning. It is true that in court when you have no evidence for something you have to treat it as if it doesn’t exist/didn’t happen („we must conclude…“). But not so in scientific/philosophical matters, not at all… Exactly. That is why there either is no true morality at all or there is some other, non-empirical source of morality. Of course it is, because you can not even prove the non-existence of anything empirical (except for some logical inconsistences like threesided square etc.). I myself am not in the position to prove the existence of anything like that (although I believe it can be proved). I do not want to claim here that there is an objective morality. My point is that your arguments against an objective morality are weak. They do not show what you want them to show. And if they did, you would be commited to also stop believing in the existence of objective empirical/physical facts, for the same reasons that you want to believe in the nonexistence of objective morality. This is not the question. Anyone knows this, it is not even a philosophical point. You can read that observation („different cultures have different ethics“) in texts that are 2500 years old. Let sociology, ethnology etc. make those observations and categorize the various cultural systems of norms. We are asking whether it is possible to decide whether any one and which of those culturally shaped normative systems is true, or right etc. The fact that people learn what is right and wrong from their culture says nothing about whether one can evaluate whether their beliefs are correct or not. You seem to want to give a psychological answer to a philosophical question. That does not work. I do have this burden, yes. That is why I do not want to make this strong claim here. Maybe I made it in an earlier post. But right now my point is, that your argument against is simply not strong enough. Or too strong because, as said above, it destroys even your physical truths (if it were a sound argument). And you actually need those physical truths to tell your story about moral judgments are shaped by the social context of individuals. So your argument is self-defeating, I think. I understand very well your concerns with simply supposing some metaphysical mystical objective source of morality. True, one can not simply claim that there is „something“ objective but not give any further description or plausible argument for it. So I do not want to make this claim here now. But I think you are a bit too quick on this..

What you are describing here are the two types of modern ethics: Deontological Ethics and Utilitarism. I think the differences between those two are fundamental. They are opposed in philosophical ethics and this opposition is visible on many levels of comparison of those two types of ethics. For example, deontologists stress the point, that it is not possible to certainly know the possibly relevant effects of an action before the action has been done. This would make moral questions somehow undecidable, because you could never be absolutely sure if what you are planning to do is the right thing (in the sense of morality). Also, a deontologist would claim that the answer to the question "Why be moral?" is not the benefits/effects of being moral, but that being moral is to be understood as a end in itself. The answer would be "Because it's the right thing to be moral." (it looks like a circular answer; but not necessarily a bad circle..). The question "Why be moral?" is more like a meta-question. Probably even an Utilitarist would not give a utilitaristic answer. Because that would be circular as well, and maybe so in a bad way.

This looks like a petitio principii to me. Or I don't see the argument for the claim that moral judgments are nothing more than "subjective sentiments". If I understand the reasons you have for stating this correctly, then I can not see why you wouldn't say the same about statments about the physical world. Beliefs about the physical world are also "only in the head". How can you claim that there is something like physical facts out there? See Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and so many others on this. This is not self-evident at all. Au contraire. Any true moral judgment purports to be objective. You seem to be confusing two thing, namely you seem to think that statements of the following types have the same semantic contect. Which is obviously not true: a) It is morally bad to murder someone. b) I find it bad to murder someone. A standard moral judgment does not have the (implicit) logical form "I find ..." or "I feel ...", but the form "It is ...". There lies the objective purport in every moral judgment. This does not mean that there actually are objective moral facts. It only shows that it is not at all "self-evident" that there are no facts. Anyone knows that there is a dfiference between "I like this piece of art" and "This piece of art is beautiful". (By the way, I don't think that it is correct to model moral judgments in terms of aesthetic or emotional judgments. This would also be a petitio principii. You would have to show that Moral Judgments are structurally the same as Judgments about one's own feelings. You have the burden of proof here, because it is "self-evident" that "This is good" and "I like this" are clearly not the same semantic contents and therefore your identity-thesis is strongly counter-intuitive.)

I wouldn't want to say war is sane but that it is sane for people in a "state of war" to do whatever is necessary to protect themselves. Of course there are "rational" ways of ending a war. There probably are not many wars in history that wer ended (won) by "total annihilation" of the enemy. But what does "rational" mean? When wars are ended by a truce, isn't that because some of the parties have lost their "will to fight"? That is their will to fight has been broken by the enemies preceding military actions. Is a truce not the last act of a war? Or is it the first act within the state of peace following a state of war? I think rather the former. And is a truce really a state of peace (in a strong sense of "peace")? States can coexist in a state of peace. But is it wise for them to rely on the good will of other states? Or should they follow the principle "si vis pacem, para bellum"?

I am not sure if I would say "insane". "Horrible", yes, in the sense as Hobbes describes that state of war as "nasty" and "brutish". But "insane"? Not in the sense of "irrational", at least not if we follow Hobbes here, who says that it is perfectly rational (and a moral right) to do whatever is necessary to preserve your life when confronted with an enemy. War means trying to break the enemy's will (make him surrender and comply to your will) or kill him. If you don't, then he will break your will or kill you. There is, of course, no greater form of commitment, than this literal meaning of "Skin in the game", that is of your life. If it were possible to decide a war by arugmentation or by substituting a game for it (e.g. chess or two gladiators) - it wouldn't have been war in the first place.

But war is not a game or a sport or a "challenge". It is not about honor or not being a coward. War is about physical annihilation of the enemy until his will is broken. It is what Hobbes is talking about when he is talking about the "state of nature" or "state of warre". This is not something that is decided by rules like a sport or a game.

Sorry, probably not the correct expression. As I said, English is not my first language. What I wanted to say is that I think it would be harder to prove that there are truths of type c) than to prove that there are truths of the other types. Note also, that I did not speak of proving certain specific truths of e.g. type d) but of proving that there are truths of these types. Such an argument might work without actually stating any of these truths. (Only in case d) it is clear that when you prove that there are philosophical truths then you also have shown one specific philosophical truth, namely the philosophical truth that there are philosophical truths; even if you "prove" that there are no philosophical truths, you would actually have given a specific philosophical truth, which would somehow be paradox (self contradictory). That is why I said that it is probably easiest to show in case of philosophical truths that there are some.) I think it is harder to show that there are objective moral facts than to show that there are physical, logical or philosophical facts. Maybe it only looks harder prima facie. But in the case of physical/empirical truths we at least have a strong concept of what those truths would be about. That is, we somehow seem to know what we mean by the concept of "empirical facts". True, in the case of logical truths we don't really understand what a "logical fact" might be, but there is a strong indication that there "must" somehow be logical facts because we have insight into some logical truths that we understand to be necessarily true, and those truths seem to be truths about logical facts. In the case of objective moral facts we do not have an idea what a "moral fact" would be (ontologically; that is: where would it exist? What "stuff" would it be made of? etc.). And we don't know of any moral truths that are necessarily true. We don't know if there is something like objective moral facts which would be needed to turn our moral beliefs into true or false beliefs. If there are no facts there is no measure for the truth or falsehood of our beliefs. Again, I think it can be shown that there are objective truths/facts. I think so because as far as I can see, the position that there are no such truths/facts can not even be formulated consistently. So far this shows nothing about moral truths/facts; but in my opinion: if there are any objective truths (logical, physical etc.) then it is probable that there are also objective moral truths/facts.

This is a relativistic or social contructivist position and I don't think it is consistent in the end. Yes, people have beliefs about what is right and wrong and people within a culture share values and their beliefs about what is right and wrong. But from this does not follow that those beliefs can not also be true or false. "The fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them objective." - of course not. But the fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them merely subjective either. You would need a strong argument for this "nothing but subjective"-claim. The fact that an individual's moral beliefs are shaped by education, socialisation etc. says nothing about whether there is something like objective moral facts that makes those beliefs true or false. In fact, if there are objective moral facts then those moral facts need of course be "anchored" as moral truths (or moral beliefs, conceptions) within the individual.

Let's understand "truth" to mean "true proposition". (Someone might instead mean "facts" by it. I think it makes no difference here because true propositions would be propositions about certain facts, and they would be true propositions only when those facts persist. I think it is better to take "truth" to mean "true proposition/sentence".) I think there is difference between a) truths about facts in empirical nature (e.g. "It is raining now" or "The speed of light is c. 300 000 km/s" etc.). b) truths about logical or mathematical facts (e.g. the tertium non datur c) truths about moral/ethical facts (e.g. "All men possess a right named liberty", "pacta sunt servanda") d) philosophical truths (e.g. "there are objective truths" or "there are no objective truths") That is not to say that there actually are truths of each of these classes. I believe my argument shows that there is at least truth of the type d). I think it is also possible to show that there are truths of the type b). But this does not prove that there are truths of type c). One would need an argument for that. I think it can be shown that there also are objective truths about moral facts. But it probably is harder than to show that for logical and philosophical truths. One more thought to consider when thinking about such an argument: If there are moral facts (facts about morality) then (I think) it is necessarily possible to prove that there are moral facts/truths. And it should be impossible then to prove that there are no such truths/facts. But if there are no moral facts, it should be possible to prove this and not to prove that there are.. (I hope this is understandable, English is not my first language.)

I think one can reason like this: If there are any objective truths then it might be plausible that there could also be objective moral truths. Which would of course have to be shown. But one could start with the question about objective truths in general. So, are there objective truths in philosophy, logic, mathematics, physics etc.? Yes, there must be at least one objective truth. Take the following to claims: a) There are objective truths. b) There are no objective truths. Now, a) and b) can obviously not both be true. But one of them must be true (tertium non datur). What is important here is that a) and b) both are objective truths (or necessarily claim to be objective). So even the one who denies that there are objective truths (one who claims that b) is true) actually asserts a proposition that claims objectivity. If there were no objectivity, you couldn't even assert that there isn't.