Joachim

I understand the point. But all experience is subjective--all "knowledge" of "truth" comes through personal subjective experience. We just call some subjective experiences objective--when we conclude that an experience has some sufficient level of repeatability/reliability from person to person, place to place, and/or time to time. (Hence my discussion questions (somewhere upthread) on whether sanity and truth/knowledge are always social determinations.) Hypothetically, yes, anyone can find a living example of an extinct species. But not everyone does. Sightings are often made infrequently and/or in remote areas and/or by specialists. Collecting more or better evidence after a first sighting may require mounting a difficult expedition to a remote environment (if the species is found in areas remote from most human settlement) or may require waiting for additional chance sightings over time (if the species is rare or otherwise difficult to detect but not geographically remote). Short of delivery of a live or a provably recently deceased specimen for examination (or maybe a really convincing and tamper-proof sound or video recording) (which things can be seen/examined by many people, over time), the larger scientific community typically awaits additional evidence beyond the first several reports before full acceptance. But the individual explorers or the experts or the "chance sighters" who have personally experienced one or more sightings might be reasonable in holding, individually or as a group, an opinion differing from the generally accepted one.

Thanks. I have already watched--and very much enjoyed--several of Stefan's youtubes, both call-in and non- call-in, but I would very much appreciate any pointers to videos (or podcasts) that are particularly relevant. +All: I guess I was looking to get a feel for whether non-replicable personal experience might ever be considered, in Stefan's philosophy, as sufficient for reasonably adopting a personal working theory of the existence of a material (i.e., actually existing) higher power of some sort. As I have read a bit more in the online versions of the books, I think I may have come to see what the answer(s) would be from Stefan's point of view--based on the book on UPB in particular, the basic answer seems (fairly clearly) to be no. FYI, The recounted experience was intended as a hypothetical for purposes of present discussion, but apparently is "real" also--not my experience, but that of a friend, as related to me just after. I have also had (infrequent) experiences of my own of the category described in the OP. I do not make this assertion as an intended point of proof of anything, however. Relative to the realm of scientific experience, these types of (unusual) experiences might be analogized to the sighting of a previously unknown (or a previously "extinct") species. Living examples of the new (or the "extinct") species either exist or not, but enough repetition of--or enough physical evidence from--the sightings to assure general scientific acceptance can often require significant effort or significant passage of time or both. (And if significant effort is required, there is admittedly a heightened risk of confirmation bias.) My proposition in the context of the analogy was/is that those who have personally made the sightings in the time before general acceptance may (nonetheless) rationally hold an opinion contrary to the scientific establishment. The generalized proposition might be this: not all facts (truths) about the world can be demonstrated by readily replicable evidence. Thanks to all for the time and consideration shown in your comments/suggestions/perspectives/questions. Joachim

Thank you also for taking the time and trouble to read and discuss. I do accept that humans are fallible and can "experience" things that are not "real." So any given experience needs to be processed, considered, compared, weighed, and integrated with other experience in some consistent frame--and absent unusual reasons, no one experience would adequately serve as the basis for any significant conclusions. I acknowledge also that the question immediately below can be considered as moving the goalposts--but one could also call it sharpening or focusing the issue (and the title of the thread did not ask whether a single experience alone can make it reasonable . . . .) Is there any conceivable accumulation of "real" personal experiences--private or shared in common with other persons (as in the case of multiple witnesses of an event), but not replicable on demand, which accumulation you would consider sufficient to meet a personal but nonetheless reasonable "superguy" burden of proof? (Superguy meaning a being with superior power/technology but without all of the theological/metaphysical encumbrances of the concept "God', such as immateriality.) I would guess your answer would be no, on the ground that truth can only be established by experiences replicable upon demand--experiences which are thus with the purview of science. (Cross posting--sorry missed your latest--this one was just to confirm whether your view is essentially that replication on demand is a requirement for the type of experience that counts as evidence.)

I acknowledge you never labeled my motivation (or me) bad. I apologize for the straw man. Here is probably the most relevant part of the text you did not read, in case of interest: Put another way, maybe what I am trying to do is to ask whether there exists, from the point of view of commenters here such as yourself, any hypothetically conceivable accumulation of "real" personal experiences--private or shared in common with other persons, but not replicable on demand and therefore outside the bounds of science (and therefore not useful to "produce" the "superguy")--which accumulation could be considered sufficient to meet a personal but nonetheless reasonable "superguy" burden of proof. <New text:> I am guessing the answer is no. Since last visiting this thread, I have read a few of Stefan's books (admittedly rather quickly), so I am maybe a little better grounded on his point of view (at the time of his writing(s), at least). From what he has written, his answer would also be no--his position would seem to be that no reasonable (or no "valid") conclusions can ever (even tentatively) be drawn on the basis of any experience or accumulation of experiences which is/are not replicable on demand. Put another way, as an approximate equivalent: there is no truth (outside conceptual and semantic tautologies and the like) except that which is demonstrated by the scientific method (and maybe, in addition, by its ethical equivalent).

The following two statements included in the 7:51 AM post were intended to be at least partially responsive to your statement that "[t]here are a lot of ways that we can experience something that isn't there." (1) If you were person A, you might conclude that a random hallucination seems unlikely to produce the correspondence of this content [of the message from the "voice"] with later events. (2) If person A has more than one experience over time of the category described roughly in the original post, it might be reasonable for person A to assume the existence of a "higher" or at least "unseen" "power" of some kind--or this is the proposition anyway. In other words, yes, there are a lot of ways for humans to error, and for humans to experience "something that isn't there". I accept the premise. But an experience, before one categorizes it, is just an experience. If the experience connects with and relates to the rest of one's experience in some coherent and beneficial way (or perhaps particularly if similar experiences, over time, operate in a similarly coherent and beneficial way) one might reasonably conclude that it is (or that they are) not in the category of "something that isn't there." The following four rhetorical questions in the 7:51 AM post were intended to at least continue the discussion relating to your statement or conclusion that "[e]xperience therefore is insufficient for determining what is true." (1) Is "sanity" always a social construct measured by interaction with other humans? (Is a hermit insane, by definition?) (2) Is it ever "rational" for a person to assign fundamental significance to private experiences? (3) Is there any personal or private experience that an individual having such an experience could "rationally" accept as an experience or an evidence of a "superguy"? ("Empirical" in the broad sense of the word does not exclude private experience.) (4) Is knowledge always a social construct--can you only "know" that which you can "prove" to others, or that which others will agree that you know? In other words, what does one have on which to base a judgement of "truth" other than experience? Logic, reasoning, conversation, the clash of ideas, application of the scientific method, all these belong to the realm of experience. It seems to me that I never have anything but the immediate experience of the present and the memory of past experiences as evidence by which to judge. In anticipation of taking the position that everything which I experience, including conversations, discussions, arguments, texts, scientific or logical proofs, and so forth, belongs to the realm of experience, I raised the above rhetorical questions around the issue of whether private experience is rationally available as (privately) adequate evidence. In the post above responding to thecurrentyear, I further raised the question of whether experience which may be shared (not private) but is not replicable on command is rationally available as (privately) adequate evidence. (I assume your answer would be no and no--that it is not rational to rely on private experience, and that it is not rational to rely on experience which is not replicable on command, whether shared or not.) I notice that, according to the guidelines of this board, "[r]easoning from first principles, in accordance with empirical evidence, is the central methodology of our approach to truth" and "[t]he truth can only result from a positive and challenging mutual exploration of facts and principles." Now that I look at the guidelines, I guess what I may be doing, in effect, is exploring the boundaries and content of these two particular statements. What is sufficient to "determine truth" in your view? (Something similar to the statements on the board guidelines?)

I suppose. But if so, then what? My "belief" is labeled "irrational." And my motivation is therefore bad. OK then. Or maybe I am just trying to explore the existence or non-existence of one possible type of low-level or minimum common ground between my "irrational" belief or worldview and differing "rational" worldviews. Another approach at a same or similar exploration might be this: In Stefan's view, one must be agnostic about the existence of a "superguy" (a material superior being, as opposed to in immaterial one), since one must admit the possibility of that which is possible. Further according to Stefan, the burden is on the proponent to "produce" the "superguy," (presumably because immateriality was the main excuse for not "producing" "God" for inspection by the skeptic). But what about the "proponent" who is not seeking to prove "superguy" exists or to demand that others recognize "superguy," but simply asserts that the proponent is personally satisfied of the existence of "superguy" or a (presumed material) superior being? Can the simple asserter's "satisfaction" never be considered rational? Put another way, maybe what I am trying to do is to ask whether there exists, from the point of view of commenters here such as yourself, any hypothetically conceivable accumulation of "real" personal experiences--private or shared in common with other persons, but not replicable on demand and therefore outside the bounds of science (and therefore not useful to "produce" the "superguy")--which accumulation could be considered sufficient to meet a personal but nonetheless reasonable "superguy" burden of proof.

Person A (assuming for discussion that Person A experienced the events essentially as described) could choose to doubt her own sanity, or to attribute the experience to a random hallucination or dream-like event. In this particular experience, hearing an unseen voice, together with the accurate information content of the message from the unseen voice, is the main thing that makes the experience stand out from more common (or more easily explained) events. So person A could just attribute the voice experience, and that alone, to any common source of human false perception. Person A was acquainted with a "Mary Bliss," so the existing relationship could serve as a basis for a random self-generated thought that person A "should call" Mary--or, for a person prone to hallucinations (or for a person having a random hallucination), as a basis for a perceived voice referencing Mary. From the point of view of person A, however, the preexisting relationship with another "Mary Bliss" served as an anchor to "rationalize" the unusual voice experience as an actionable message--and to remember the event, in that person A made a mental note to call the Mary Bliss she knew. For persons other than person A, treating the story as false or assigning at least the voice experience (which, unlike the interaction with person P, was personal or private to person A) to hallucination or other purely human error is perhaps the most reasonable course. But if you were person A, you might conclude otherwise. Beyond the mere reference to Mary Bliss was the statement that Mary "will need your help today." If you were person A, you might conclude that a random hallucination seems unlikely to produce the correspondence of this content with later events. If person A has more than one experience over time of the category described roughly in the original post, it might be reasonable for person A to assume the existence of a "higher" or at least "unseen" "power" of some kind--or this is the proposition anyway. Some underlying related issues might be: Is "sanity" always a social construct measured by interaction with other humans? Is a hermit insane, by definition? Is it ever "rational" for a person to assign fundamental significance to private experiences? Is there any personal or private experience that an individual having such an experience could "rationally" accept as an experience or an evidence of a "superguy"? ("Empirical" in the broad sense of the word does not exclude private experience.) Is knowledge always a social construct--can you only "know" that which you can "prove" to others, or that which others will agree that you know? One other point about the type of experiences described roughly in the original post. Although they are often private in the sense that they are to some degree personal to an individual and in the sense that they are not subject to scientific testing because they are not replicable on demand, at least sometimes they are shared in at least one sense. In the example given, person A experienced unseen guidance regarding a need of person B, then helping person B. Person P experienced asking an unseen "God" for help and then receiving help from person A. Both persons, relating their respective private experiences, had a shared experience to that extent. +Will Torbald--assuming person A is "psychic" does avoid "multiplying entities." (But at least some psychics claim to communicate with unseen persons or entities. And person A experienced the voice and prompting as external.)

+dsayers--- I think maybe I stepped on a semantic hot button with the use of "belief"--maybe there is a more neutral substitute that might work for the purposes of discussion--such as, for example, "adopt a working hypothesis affirming the existence of" benevolent superguy activity, in place of "believe" in benevolent superguy activity. The question I am trying get at is something like this: could experiences like the one described in the original post make it reasonable--for the person who actually had the experience(s)--to adopt a working hypothesis affirming the existence of at least some degree of benevolent superguy activity? I am not trying to prove there is a "deity", whatever that means. Whatever I am "trying" to do is much less than that, though not totally clear to me-- Maybe what I am trying to do is to explore is whether there are or could be conditions, personal to an individual, under which adopting a working hypothesis of the existence of some kind of "higher power" is not unreasonable. +neeeel Understood. +rosencrantz What follows is might be only the relatively weak conclusion given in the lines above responding to dsayers, or something similar. Something like "for an individual who has had certain experiences, it may be reasonable, for that individual, to provisionally assume the existence of a benevolent superguy." Why the benevolent superguy doesn't intervene more often (or more often in circumstances involving risks of harm--or actual harm--more critical than the potential loss of a job, for example) is another question (and a very good one for anyone who adopts the working hypothesis that a superguy supposedly similar to the conventional "God" exists). But whether the hypothesized superguy intervenes often or infrequently, it may still be reasonable, for the individual with the relevant experiences, to at least provisionally assume the superguy's existence.

(Full [really partial] disclosure: I am a believer in "God" and would be considered by some to be a species of "Christian.") Many religious believers, myself included, have had experiences which we attribute to "God" or at least to some other (benevolent) influence beyond what science currently acknowledges or addresses (like Stefan's "superguy" hypothetical). I propose that, for someone who has had a particular type of experience--which I will attempt roughly to characterize, and an example of which I will describe--to believe in some sort of (at least partially benevolent) "higher power" may be at least as reasonable as not to believe. This proposition is obviously not an attempt at an objective proof of the existence of "God"--it is rather an attempt to suggest that belief in a "higher power" may not be unreasonable in an individual case. Engaging fully in this discussion would require a willingness to suspend disbelief for at least a moment, in order to ask yourself: assuming this were my experience (i.e., assuming the experience were mine and it was "real" to me), would I find it at least "not unreasonable" to believe in a higher power of some kind? The particular type of experience I have in mind is a subset of this general category: person A feels externally "guided" by some means to act in some way that responds to a need of (or request made in prayer by) person P. The subset (which admittedly may or may not exist, in the reader's opinion and/or experience) is those experiences in which the degree of specificity or information content of the "guiding" received by person A, and the match or correspondence of that information with the person P or with the specific need or request of person P may be (to persons A and/or P who share the experience and become aware of the other person's side of the story) as reasonably explained by an unseen superguy as by chance. The specific example goes like this: On a busy weekday morning, in the middle of difficulties involved in getting her more-than-usually-unruly young children to school on time, person A hears a voice, source unseen, say "Mary Bliss is going to need your help today." Person A finds this unusual (of course), but person A is a Christian believer and is friends with a "Mary Bliss," and so person A makes a mental note to call Mary later that day just to check in. While driving to another appointment after getting the kids to school, person A notices person P, another woman and a stranger to person A, at the side of the street. Person A "feels prompted" that person P needs help, but person A is in a hurry and so keeps driving. The feeling that person P needs help comes again, and stronger, so person A (somewhat reluctantly) turns her vehicle around and drives back to person P, stops, and asks if person P needs help. Person P says, yes, please, and explains that she needs a ride to the hospital, which is only a few blocks away--her car (not on scene) has broken down and she can walk but will not be on time, and she is in danger of losing her job if she is not on time. She says she has been praying to get to work on time. Person A gives person P a ride to work at the hospital, and they make small talk during the short drive. As they arrive at the hospital on time for person P's shift, they exchange names, and (as you will no doubt guess) person P says "I'm Mary Bliss." The question is, what is a reasonable belief for person A regarding this experience? Should person A consider this an example of the fertility of the human mind? Or maybe an instance of the operation of the law of truly large numbers? Or is it at least not unreasonable to for person A to believe that an unseen superguy was helping person P and wanted person A to recognize that fact?