Fabrs

It is universal: it is evil to kill for ones capable of avoidance, it is for me, for you and for all such beings, it is evil today, tomorrow and forever, it is evil here and anywhere. Universal. By saying it is evil to kill for ones capable of avoidance we are not applying morality to non-moral ones. It's precisely because they are moral agents that we can talk about the morality of such actions.

Hi, MMD. I was already familiar with this video and unfortunately it doesn't deal with what I said. Molyneux says "it is UPB, which means it applies universally to the behavior of beings who are capable of preference". I responded specifically to that when I said "a moral proposition like "it is evil for people to kill animals" is still morality being applied universally to the rational consciousness of humans capable of avoidance of this conduct — universally because it is evil to kill for all beings capable of avoidance, it is evil for them anytime and anywhere." They just struggled about animals being capable or not of "learning" and "conceptualization" and "conceptual language" and so on, what is pretty irrelevant, because what animals can or cannot do doesn't change the fact that WE are, still, beings capable of such, — and we are talking about our behavior, not about theirs, so stop worrying about their lack of "philosophical capacities", because it doesn't change the fact that WE have such capacities. So "does morality apply to animals"? Well, maybe not. But that isn't the question. Instead, it is: "why would morality stop applying to our actions just because some victim's of it doesn't know philosophicaliy something?"

Hi, everybody! I would like to comment Molyneux's considerations regarding animal rights. ​ On page 91 of his book, Molyneux wrote: Molyneux's argument so far does not lead us to the conclusion that "killing fish" is an amoral situation, but only that SHARKS, as machines with no choice, could not be considered evil for killing fish. But what about the FISHERMEN that he mentioned and then "forgot"? They have a choice, so they are not prevented from being considered evil for killing fish. In other words, all Molyneux tells us is that sharks can not avoid killing fish, not that "killing fish" is necessarily, always, inevitable for everyone. We can express such an attempt to excuse humans from killing fish like this: 1. There can be no morality where there is no choice 2. Sharks have no choice in relation to killing fish 3. Therefore, we cannot consider evil sharks nor humans that kill fish. Obviously, the inclusion of "humans" in (3) is completely not supported. Maybe human beings can't exist in fact without killing "viruses and plants", but they certainly can survive without killing animals — as thousands of living vegans prove. (Note here that Molyneux stopped dealing with inevitability by choice, as in the previous case, and started speaking of inevitability for survival). Now, even if the argument that "we can not live without killing animals" is true, it would be just a factually correct claim, which does not mean that it would be an ethically significant one: so what, if this or that is a necessary condition for life? For example, if I necessarily need someone's kidney to survive does that authorize me to take that kidney? I bet not. The question is not what aggressors need or do not need to live, but what is ethically valid. This excerpt only reinforces the first answer given: it exempts from responsibility the shark that kills, fish or people, because he can't choose. But the point is to exempt people who kill sharks (or fish, or animals in general) — people who can choose. A moral proposition like "it is evil for people to kill animals*" is still morality being applied universally to the rational consciousness of humans capable of avoidance of this conduct — universally because it is evil to kill for all beings capable of avoidance, it is evil for them anytime and anywhere. *You may find "killing animals" a too specific formulation to be universal, but if that is a problem, note that when Molyneux formulates something like "it is wrong for people to kill people," the term "people" is even more specific than "animals". In fact, the following occurs: the requirement of avoidability leads us to reduce the formulation to the most universal possible. The point is only that Molyneux reduced the universal to "attacking people" because he mistakenly took life as impossible without attacking animals. But it is possible. But one is not "applying a moral theory to snails, rocks or trees." Moral theory is being applied to human actions, included when toward these beings. We would be "equating these beings with a rational conscience" if we were arguing the moral judgments intended for their actions were the same as the judgments for our actions. But Molyneux himself clarifies the solution to this, when he talks about how sharks (as well as landslides) can not be blamed. Given this difference (correctly pointed out by Molyneux, in fact) it is clear that there is no comparison. Ironically, it is Molyneux's argument that shows itself as an undue equation, equating us with an irrational consciousness, if it tries to exempt us, rational, from responsibility based on elements that exempt the irrational... All Molyneux has shown is that animal's actions, towards other animals or torwards us, are not subject to moral judgment. But that is just not the question, but rather whether our actions towards animals are subject to ethical analysis. The claim that Molyneux had to deal with, but did not even touch, is that "it is evil for people to kill animals," or rather, "it is evil for the ones capable of avoidance to kill, included when the victim is an animal."