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Stefan points out that the axioms described in the “UPB in a Nutshell” section of UPB are ones that must bind any moral system. As such, the ethical framework I forward will hopefully arise under these axioms without contradiction. In regards to Utilitarianism Stefan had this to say: “I do not believe that morality can be defined or determined with reference to “arguments from effect,” or the predicted consequences of ethical propositions. Utilitarianism, or “the greatest good for the greatest number,” does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since the odds of any central planner knowing what is objectively good for everyone else are about the same as any - 10 - central economic planner knowing how to efficiently allocate resources in the absence of price – effectively zero. Also, that which is considered “the greatest good for the greatest number” changes according to culture, knowledge, time and circumstances, which also fails to overcome the problem of subjectivism. We do not judge the value of scientific experiments according to some Platonic higher realm, or some utilitarian optimisation – they are judged in accordance with the scientific method. I will take the same approach in this book.” This is quite a piercing and accurate criticism. The problem any theory which tries to aggregate some good faces, whether it’s pleasure, happiness, or some other “good”, is that it inevitably cannot measure that good objectively. Therefore, there is no way an individual, let alone a central planner could assess what the correct moral decision would be. Call this the measurement problem. Utilitarianism faces various other problems as well (such as the repugnant conclusion, and the utility monster and probably a few others I’m unaware of). Though this seems to be the most condemning problem of them all, since without its solution, Utilitarianism doesn’t get off the ground. Let’s turn to a quick thought experiment. There is a choice machine. This machine knows all of your current preferences and it updates each time your preferences change. This machine has a phenomenal grasp of deterministic physical forces and can assess the various outcomes of any set of decisions. This machine will best choose the decisions you have before you, in accordance with whatever outcome would best suit your preferences. The machine does this job without fault. Do you choose to let the machine run your life? There is a second choice machine. It too knows all of your current preferences and it updates each time your preferences change. While it doesn’t make the best possible choices in accordance with outcomes and your preferences, it makes the choice you would have made. Do you let this machine run your life? Making decisions can be quite stressful and you would get the exact same life you would have had, but without any of that stress. If you would not let either of these machines run your life, it is likely because you are a rational person. Any rational person innately values choice. But what if we plugged choice itself into the principle, “whatever maximizes x, is good”? Well let’s take a quick look at the meaning of choice. Choice is the willful use of a conscious mind. So a coma patient that is still conscious is making choices about how to direct his attention. Lifting your leg is a choice, as is not lifting your leg. So choosing not to make a choice is itself a choice. Seems pretty straightforward. In fact, so long as there is a conscious person by themselves(in total isolation from other actors), they are making as many choices as they can. That is, choice is always maximized On the other hand, when more than one moral agent gets involved, things get interesting. If A and B decide on an exchange, both of them will the exchange to happen and so you have two choices resulting in one exchange (mutual assent). However, if A were to replace B’s items with his own, despite the fact that B may have traded anyway, there is one less choice than there could have been. A abolished a choice of B’s. When A murders B, A takes away B’s choice for euthanasia, or to remain alive. When A rapes B, the option with greater choice is that where B and A had consensual sex. I know what you’re thinking, A’s a real asshole. I agree. But aside from that, where do A and B get off claiming they have the right to bodily integrity? Well Mill makes a good point (at least there’s one), that human beings are themselves outside the consideration of exclusively being means to other ends. That is, an any given time, we humans are ends in and of ourselves. Preservation of conscious entities and indirectly the shells that sustain them are inherently valuable. If you see a baby drowning in a puddle and there’s no one around, you at the very least get the baby out of the puddle. If not, you are A a psychopath and B not fully rational. More on this later. Choice and Markets How could one go about maximizing choice? Doesn’t this version of Utilitarianism suffer the same measurement problem as the others? Well, no. So, choice is binary in that you either opt for A, or you don’t. In another sense it’s pluralistic in that you may be giving up a litany of other choices by making any one choice. This is what economists refer to as opportunity cost. By saying that somehow making a choice isn’t a choice because of all the other opportunities you pass up, you’re sneaking in a requirement for choice that wasn’t in the original definition. In any given circumstance with more than one conscious actor, you can have an exchange where there is mutual assent. In each of these exact instances there is maximal choice occurring. What’s interesting is that went a voluntary interaction occurs something new is generated. If A gives B his pencil for a dollar, A values B’s dollar more than his own pencil and B values A’s pencil more than his own dollar. Also, A values B’s dollar more than B does and B values A’s pencil more than A does. Net economic value is necessarily created. Involuntary exchanges, however, are zero-sum. With the creation of economic value comes the expansions of resources. Choices are expanded directly as resources expand. If a market is merely the sum of all consensual interactions (including gifts, charity, etc…) then the market is at that point the most ethical state of affairs possible. What’s fascinating is that we know empirically that markets create the most resources netted compared to central planning or other involuntary exchanges, while simultaneous creating the greatest distribution of those resources to the greatest number of people. Voluntarism is necessarily the moral course of action as a direct result of maximizing choice. Then there is the question of how resources come to be decided upon, and by whom. For this, see Rothsbard’s Applications and criticism from the Austrian school. The basics are, in regards to the control of materials external to the body, if you work with something that no one else has a claim to, it becomes yours after a time. A farmer comes to a new territory, puts up a fence, and works the land. That land is his. I reject that the ownership of the self is necessary through these means, because the integrity of the body and its directed use by consciousness within its brain, is innately valuable. Other than that, this method of acquisition is unlimited. Let’s recap. We have free-markets as dictated by the maximization of choice, the respect for property rights due to the homesteading theory, and the intrinsic value of human life. The Intrinsic Value of Preserving Conscious Creatures Let’s revisit the conclusions we drew about the drowning baby. From the notion that one happens upon a baby drowning in a puddle, it is reprehensible that anyone should let it drown, despite perhaps desiring not to bend down. That is, bending down and saving the baby wouldn’t be their choice. This strikes most as intuitive. Similarly, if someone were to happen upon someone who had experience vertigo and fallen into a body of water and was drowning, it would be equally vile not to throw that person a nearby self-inflating life vest. There is also the popular flag pole scenario (though this seems the most farfetched I’ll admit) where a man on a balcony of a very high building loses balance somehow and falls off the balcony. Luckily he grabs onto the flagpole outside the window of the story immediately below. Should a person deny the hanging man the ability to kick in the glass, or land on the balcony(which magically appeared to change this into a different thought experiment), or worse yet actively seeks to defend his balcony from the man trying to set down on it, we would say this strikes us as unsettling behavior. Yet none of the options that would ruffle our feathers in any of the above scenarios is one which there would be less choice. There is another value at play, and as you might have guessed that value one intrinsic to preserving conscious creatures. Only in these rare instances which pose negligible risk to moral actors does that intrinsic value necessarily outweigh the value of the choice to do nothing. This has certain restrictions. If for instance the person in the river did not fall there because of vertigo, and instead was trying to drown themselves, no one should interfere. Worst case scenario, the suicidal person is rescued and must commit suicide slightly after they had wished to initially. Also if you try and maximize conscious creatures, al the value problems and other problems of utilitarianism arise. That only happens if you try and directly create a greater aggregate preservation of consciousness. If in all circumstances where there are conscious actors with the ability to preserve their own lives(such that they are not in danger), choice is deferred to as the vehicle of maximization, then all is well in the measurement department. An immediate imposition of danger would be required for the value of life to be considered and what qualifies as “immediate” or as a “negligible risk” to the moral actor is no more or less than how we use those words. All words with meaning get that meaning through inter-subjective agreement. What would it matter if we could say such people were wrong for refraining from acting? A lot to the families of those imperiled. Compensatory damages to the families or the victims themselves, should they survive but not unscathed, would be a moral right. By abstaining from action, the bad actor injured the victim. They would be obligated to make them whole again. Similarly in the event of death, emotional damages should be compensated to the extent that they could be. What you wouldn’t get is some central planner telling people they have to wipe the noses of passers by. If you have read this far, thanks. The only thing I ask, before you issue your criticism is that you do your very best to defend this position first. Before you ask your question or point out a flaw, anticipate how I might respond and play out the back and forth. Again thanks for reading and have fun tearing it to pieces lol. EDIT: Mill further describes the relationship of people being ends in themselves, and this establishing the argument for self defense, where he says "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"