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Physicalism (Materialism) Verifies Free Will Defining free will and physicalism The 'will' is the conscious experience of deciding and initiating human actions. Stefan Molyneux defines free will as the ability to compare an action to an ideal standard, but I will take a broader definition of free will which I would assume Stefan would agree with (without allowing for compatibilism): Free will is the ability to choose between possible actions independently of events that are external to a persons 'will'. That is, a person who decided to pursue action A at time X could have chosen action B under exactly the same external circumstances if he or she had 'willed' to do so. The opposite of free will is determinism which is: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the 'will'. Another definition of determinism is that events including the 'will' are determined by previously existing causes, however, this definition will not be used because I believe it does not necessarily touch the core of the issue which is whether our 'will' can act undetermined by external causes. If we were to assume this second definition, then determinism would be compatible with free will. Physicalism (also known as materialism) is the doctrine that the real world consists only of the physical world. The contradiction between free will and physicalism In this section, I will play devil's advocate and suggest a contradiction between free will and physicalism. Stefan argues that it is self-evident that free will exists, i.e., that our will causes human actions, as anyone arguing against this is causing their human action of 'arguing'. Not only that, but they are assuming that the other person is in a sense causing their 'listening' or 'acceptance' or 'non-acceptance' of their argument, which are also human actions. An issue with free will that probably troubles the minds of others in this community is that if free will is self-evident, it is true. If it is true, then determinism is false. If determinism is false then physicalism is false. It seems if we accept free will, we must abandon physicalism and adopt mind-body dualism, that is, that the 'will' is real but is independent of the physical world. It seems that the physical world is synonymous with objective reality because all that is objective is in some way measurable and that which is measurable is physical. However, mind-body dualism would mean that reality consists of more than objective reality, which means truth is subjective. However, the statement that 'truth is subjective' demonstrates that truth is objective, which is a contradiction. We are left in a bind. Either determinism or free will is true. Determinism must be false because free will is self-evident, and free will must be false because mind-body dualism is self-contradictory. This is a contradiction. Defending free will and physicalism I believe there is an error in the above reasoning. It does not follow that "if determinism is false then physicalism is false". In fact, I will now argue that if physicalism is true, then free will is true, and hence determinism is false. The 'will', self, or consciousness exists and this is self-evident (cogito ergo sum; I think therefore I am). Therefore, physicalism would imply that the 'will' is physical. This conclusion is in line with physicalist theories of consciousness including Integrated Information Theory (IIT) which states that a system's consciousness is determined by its causal properties and is therefore an intrinsic, fundamental property of any physical system. If physicalism is true, then consciousness is a property of the causal links between neurons in a person's neural network. Then, consciousness is identical to the neural network. They are one of the same. If consciousness is the neural network, then our 'will' is also the neural network. Determinism would suggest that human actions are caused by this neural network but that human actions are caused by events external to our 'will': Determinism would suggest that the neural network itself is determined by external events such as non-conscious 'zombie' networks or neural networks connected to but external to the brain such as the peripheral nervous system. Therefore, if our brain determines actions and our brain is determined by external events, then our actions are determined by external events. However, it is not necessarily the case that external events determine our conscious neural network. According to IIT, the neural network is causally linked in such a way that the system is more akin to a positive feedback loop than a feed-forward system. That is, rather than external events causing consciousness causing action, external events play a role in consciousness (for example, I might say the reason I drank a glass of water is that I am thirsty) but that consciousness is caused by prior consciousness. Therefore, actions would be caused by consciousness, but consciousness would not be caused by external events. And because the 'will' is synonymous with our experience of consciousness, our 'will' has self-caused the action. It is not even that non-conscious processes cause our 'will'. It is that our 'will' and indeed our 'self' is composed in that integrated neural network that plays out causes and effects with itself. This is exactly what free will is, it is the freedom of the 'will' to act without being determined by external events, and because the ‘will’ is equal to the neural networks, the neural networks don’t count as external events. The best way to describe free will would be to say that it is an endogenous system. So we must conclude that physicalism actually demonstrates that free will is true and determinism is false. Looking at it from this perspective, it is completely, both ontologically and metaphysically accurate to say that 'I' convinced myself do to action A or action B. Conclusion The conception of free will I have suggested seems to dissolve much of the worries that people have about determinism. Some may worry that if determinism is true, then how can we ever be satisfied that we act rationally or are responsible for our actions? If external events determined that I would do something irrational or evil, how are we to expect any kind of integrity from ourselves. If we cannot expect integrity from ourselves, how can we say that we are really rational animals and how can we assign responsibility to ourselves and others? It seems that if determinism is true, then we are in a way doomed to a quasi-pathological life and we are fundamentally not in control of our own happiness. I believe this is the fundamental worry among free willers. The conception of free will I suggest solves this issue by suggesting that our self-integrity lies within the physical integrity (literally the integrated information) in our neural networks that retain a self-generating, endogenous system. If we look at free will with a physicalist lense, I believe we can preserve free will without compromising physicalism.

Logic begins when it is discovered that A is A, however, how does one discern what is discoverable without first knowing that A is A? Empiricism is a precept to our nature. After all, we are born as little scientists. Empiricism is a given. One cannot argue against it or for it without presupposing it. But if empiricism requires an understanding of logic, then is logic also a precept? (By precepts I mean involuntary knowledge about the world that is not conceptual, no different to how animals know things. It is regulated by our neurobiology.) If logic is a precept, then is it the case that logic is not a concept. But if logic is not a concept, then does logic exist in reality after all? Embedded in the neurons of our brain, so to speak?

Hey, I made a video. It's got some interesting stuff in there, I think. Some funny stuff, some bad words, my opinion of Deepak Chopra and some other stuff. It's my first video, so I welcome feedback about the content as well as the production. I'm pretty much a n00b. Let me know what you think! (It might take a while to process)

What better to do on New Year's Eve than to philosophize, am I right? So I am reading "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by Leonard Peikoff and I want to share with you how I came to accept the axioms of Objectivism because this was a big struggle for me. Maybe this can be of help to others and perhaps I can have any potential mistakes corrected. My understanding is that there are no contradictions between the metaphysics of Objectivism and UPB. However, the approaches are distinct in that Objectivism has a focus on establishing its theoretical framework in a more formal way as can normally be found in philosophical works while UPB focuses on establishing its tenets through looking at what people do in conversation. In other words, UPB does not really contain axioms in the traditional sense other than what is self-evident when people argue. I.e., UPB takes a shortcut and I assume this is done due to it being more effective and practical in everyday life. Objectivist metaphysics, on the other hand, goes deeper in that it uses axioms that refer to our first sensation of the world. The three Objectivist axioms are Existence, Consciousness, and Identity. My error in grasping them was that I am used to evaluating concepts through the method of how one establishes arguments: Through evidence plus deductive or inductive reasoning. The challenge here is that the validation of the Objectivist axioms require no deductive or inductive reason. It is not something that is grasped through analysis. Rather, what I needed to do was to dilute my focus on the abstractions and simply look at the world around me with its various objects, actions and properties. When I focus on just looking around I have to accept that something (identity) exists (existence) of which I am aware (consciousness). This is self-evident just by perceiving the world. I am not sure whether identity are a function of existence, of consciousness, or of both, but I think that it does not fundamentally matter because without accepting this axiom I contradict myself. This because I have to implicitly rely on identity when I use concepts which I evidently do since I am writing this forum post. Another interesting thing about Objectivist metaphysics is that identity is an implicit of existence rather than something that refers to an essence that are in the things. The latter is what Aristotle stated in one of his principal works: "Metaphysics." In other words, in Objectivism existents do not have identity. They are identity. I am not sure what to make of that but I really find that fascinating. Hope that helps and please point out any errors. Happy 2015!

If you had to explain what the term metaphysics referred to, what would be your simplest explanation? If you take the Wiki's first line, it simply states, "Metaphysics is a traditional branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it"Someone could read that and easily say, "Yeah, but isn't that exactly what physics does?"And as one reads further through the Wiki, there is quite a bit of terminology that's rather overwhelming to someone just learning philosophy. Eventually, one gains this vague grasp that 'metaphysics' refers to belief systems, but that's not really a succinct explanation of the term. When left at that, some people ask, "What's the point of metaphysics when you have physics?" In other words, who cares about beliefs when there is science?So, after watching the below video, I'm considering that maybe the best way to explain metaphysics is to refer to it as the simulation our minds create. And maybe a great way to demonstrate that is to point out the sensation of color. Or how a child after a growth spurt has to recalibrate his/her coordination in order to realign his/her perception with reality. And, maybe even pointing out how the mind compensates for our blind spots. Basically leading one to point out the importance of truths and falsehoods of our internal "simulation" which really determines our perception of reality.(On a side note, funny thing I recently noticed is how sleep deperavation can affect one's coordination by creating "lag" in the simulation -- ended up dropping a cup when I tried to transfer it from one hand to the other.)

Hello! So, I recently bought a book on anarcho-capitalism, called The New Libertarianism: ANARCHO-CAPTALISM by J. Michael Oliver. It's an attempt to reconcile objectivism with anarcho-capitalism, and as such it explains the basics of objectivist metaphysics. I'm at the very beginning of the book, where he talks about the existence axiom, but the problem is that I don't get it. The basic argument is that we are conscious, and if we're conscious there has to be something objective (outside of our minds) that we're conscious of, but is that really true? Can't I be conscious of my own fantasies? Thank you! /Sebastian

I wanted to give and get a few thoughts on Objectivism and post-Objectivist/Neo-Objectivist etc. philosophical work. To give a background, my first exposure to Objectivism was through an audio book version of Atlas Shrugged I had torrented (take that, Objectivist IP nerds!) I was already familiar with radical liberalism and market anarchism through various lectures and articles on Mises.org, Anti-state.com and similar websites. I think I first heard about libertarianism via a Yahoo political party search (I liked the LP platform), and had started reading economics articles on Lew Rockwell. Pretty soon I was emailing socialist parties asking them why they had such crazy ideas about international trade, but it wasn't for a while after that that I seriously investigated Ayn Rand. I think I might have heard a few of her views on metaphysics and God when researching atheism in my teens, but I didn't distinguish her in particular until I decided to give Atlas Shrugged a listen. I have a taste for pulp literature and hard boiled detective novels, both of which influenced Ayn Rand, so I generally enjoyed the story. I found it a bit weird and slow at times, but some of the dialogue was really great, and funny (Rand wouldn't appreciate that - she believed laughter was for destructive purposes!) I especially liked Hank Rearden, who's more charming as an uptight but straightforward sexy Rockefeller than the New Capitalist Man John Galt. I agreed or sympathized with many views Rand expressed in the book, but I was not especially taken in by her philosophy - probably because I had already felt many of the same influenced she had, and had already radicalized into libertarianism and egoism a bit further than she did. I am not an intensive student of Objectivism in general or Rand, but I have put some effort into reading works by Objectivists or those strongly influenced by its ideas; and as I said, I have read some of the source material that influenced Ayn Rand's own development such as Aristotle, Nietzsche and Mises. The best place to start would probably be standing on one leg. The first seems entirely reasonable to me. Although certain metaphysical theories and religious belief systems would deny or qualify this, I suspect that most Objectivists had the same experience of George H. Smith of loudly proclaiming the existence of the external world and futiley waiting for someone to argue with you. That is not to say there isn't merit in pointing this out: after all, academic philosophy and pop mysticism are rife with bizarre and contradictory standards that contrive to allow them a pretended solipsism, and following through the implications of a realist metaphysic will help us understand the relationship between ontological coherence and logical consistency: Rand, like Aristotle, wants to make metaphysics prove logic. Her arguments in favor of this are not particularly detailed. Peikoff has made more elaborate discussions, but probably the best Objectivist-Aristotilian metaphysic and ontology I have seen is in the work of George H. Smith such as Atheism: The Case Against God. I am not sure if I agree with Ayn Rand's epistemology, though it does not strike me as a crazy epistemology what I have read by her and Peikoff hasn't convinced me. In fact, it hasn't entirely stuck with me, which is why I'd like comments from others. My own epistemic views are similar to those of Roderick Long, himself an Aristotilian, and it would perhaps to be worthwhile to see what he has to say about Rand's epistemology. I know that David Gordon has a lecture on this available online, too, which I'll try to listen and pay attention to. In some literal sense every man is his own end in that only particular persons have ends or ideas about means. Rand's moral views, as I understand it ala David Kelley, is that when persons understand their nature they use their reason to assess facts and assign a value and disvalue according to some standard of life or flourishing. If that is what Rand means by 'morality' I suppose I would agree, but I have always had trouble with how she goes from this very general proposition to presuming an broad swathe of classical liberal legal virtues. I wouldn't even say that law and morality are the same thing. It reminds me of the very abstract arguments of theologians for the existence of a Benevolent Prime Mover which conclude with, "therefore Jesus." While I do believe there are plausible supports to be made for libertarian law, eudaemonian reasoning, virtue ethics, egoism, and the general advantages of an individualist, rationalist and capitalistic society I don't know that you could make any straightforward deduction of them from the fact that men must use reason in their pursuit of ends. I mean, certainly thugs do use reason.They are not 'faking reality', because the 'long run' contribution to the damage of society they make is miniscule and the benefits are rapid and direct. Arguments that being a thug leads to a poor disposition and shallow life, that you risk retaliation, etc. are all perfectly reasonable, but MAN'S NATURE just isn't going to cut it. I am a Mises U. disciple of the Austrian Priesthood, generally favoring Rothbard, Mises and Menger. I am also fond of certain elements of Joseph T. Salerno's formulations, particularly on causal realism and economic calculation. Given that, and my overall views on civil society and law, I am a firm endorser of laissez-faire capitalism and I believe that Rand had a reasonably good grasp on economics from her writings in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. It's not clear if she understood the Austrian theory of the trade cycle, but capital theory is obscurantist by its nature.