Lying

[Mister Mister]

   Is lying immoral?

[PatrickC]

 

   Is lying immoral?

 

What would be the best response to someone who asked you for directions to your partner so they could kill them? 

[ribuck]

I don't consider lying to be immoral, but it's almost always stupid and counter-productive. The exception, of course, is when you're lying to someone who wishes to harm you. When the ax-murderer asks where your chldren are, feel free to say they're with their aunt in Africa.

In other circumstances, lying is counter-productive. You can achieve more by building long-term trust-based relationships, than by seeking short-term exploitation.

[Arius]

Lying isn't UPB.  It lacks consistency and isn't objective.  Lifeboat scenarios are a distraction.

[TheRobin]

Well, no unchosen positive obligations: you don't owe anyone to tell them the truth as you see it.I personally also differentiate being honest, to telling other people honestly what I think and feel. There were often times, when I honestly didn't WANT to tell other people the truth, because I didn't like them or wasn't comfortable, or I didn't have the time/interest, didn't enjoy it etc. so in a situation where I have to chose between being honest towards my feelings/preferences and not telling other people honestly about it, I'd always chose being honest towards myself. Else it would just be bullying myself for th sake of other people, which is surely not preferrable and doesn't make one happy anyway.Arius: I also don't quite see how lying fits into UPB, as UPB only measures behaviour but not intentions. And the action of "speaking words" can not be made into a universal commandment

[Arius]

Lying=making false statements

(unless you'd like to define it differently)

People should lie translates as: False statements are preferable to true statements. 

That is, you should believe "false statements are preferable to true statements" is a true statement...  Perhaps you see the contradiction.

Simply, "people should lie" is identical to "false is preferable to true".  However, you've already demonstrated a preference for true statements by making an argument which I should believe.

I could go through the entire two-guys model, but I believe it is sufficient to point out that lying (as a behavior) is not objective and not consistent.  Because lying lacks two of the four properties of a UPB, and because it is contradictory to argue for the preferability of false over true, it cannot be UPB.

[ribuck]

There were often times, when I honestly didn't WANT to tell other people the truth, because I didn't like them or wasn't comfortable, or I didn't have the time/interest, didn't enjoy it etc.

That is the situation in which many people would tell a "white lie". Personally I've never done that. I just tell a different truth, for example: "I'd rather not say".

[Kawlinz]

 

Lying=making false statements

(unless you'd like to define it differently)

People should lie translates as: False statements are preferable to true statements. 

That is, you should believe "false statements are preferable to true statements" is a true statement...  Perhaps you see the contradiction.

Simply, "people should lie" is identical to "false is preferable to true".  However, you've already demonstrated a preference for true statements by making an argument which I should believe.

I could go through the entire two-guys model, but I believe it is sufficient to point out that lying (as a behavior) is not objective and not consistent.  Because lying lacks two of the four properties of a UPB, and because it is contradictory to argue for the preferability of false over true, it cannot be UPB.

 

I don't think TheRobin is saying "lying is UPB". Lying is not "making false statements", it is "making a false statement to a specific person at a specific time". He's not advocating that lies are ALWAYS preferable to truths. He's saying that sometimes, when he doesn't want to talk about a specific thing with a specific person, he may lie and is honest with himself as to why he is lying.

[Arius]

I translate the OP's "Is lying immoral" as "Ought people lie or not".  If the question is about a specific instance of lying, then I've misunderstood what we're talking about.  I was discussing idealized behavior.  Lying can't be UPB, just like theft and rape.  Unfortunately, the
logical implication is that any should-claim that starts out "People
should lie..." is wrong.  If all instances of rape are wrong, each
instance of rape is wrong.  If all instances of lying are wrong, each
instance of lying is wrong.  Of course, Rape and theft fail UPB because they can't be universalized.  Lying can be universalized, but it is incompatible with argumentation.  Additionally, Lying is not objective or consistent.  It fails UPB for different reasons, but it still fails.

I don't think TheRobin is saying "lying is UPB". Lying is not "making false statements", it is "making a false statement to a specific person at a specific time". He's not advocating that lies are ALWAYS preferable to truths. He's saying that sometimes, when he doesn't want to talk about a specific thing with a specific person, he may lie and is honest with himself as to why he is lying.

As far as not wanting to tell someone the truth...  Sometimes I lie to people.  When I do, I stop and tell them I just lied (I dislike lying).  I then use that as a springboard to discuss my relationship with them, with the goal of discovering why I lied and remedying that problem (i.e. I just lied to you, why do you suppose I did that?).  Lying is either a tool for control or a defense mechanism (or possibly both).  If I lie to someone, it means I'm uncomfortable with some aspect of our relationship.  Generally, I'm either scared or I feel threatened in some way.  By facing my choice to lie and understanding why I took that action, I can better understand the terms of my relationships with that person.  I'm of the opinion that, should you find yourself lying to someone, it is a clear indicator that there is something wrong in your relationship to that person.  However, the morality of lying and the relationship dynamics of lying are (at least in my mind) two entirely different things.

[endostate]

Is lying immoral?

When? Is it an act of self defense?

[TheRobin]

Arius: you run into some problems with that argument.

1) using the word "false", that doesn't differntiate between an honest mistke/error and deceit. so you're saying to make an error is immoral. Since there's no way to measure the internal state, whether a statement is honest or deceitful can never be determined, so it doesn't fall under UPB, because it is not objective measurable behaviour.2) if you're saying people should tell true statements (il.e. telling truth is UPB). leaving aside the "true"-part (for the reason posted above), what you're implying is, people are obliged to respond to questions from others, people should always respond to others etc. creating an unchosen positive obligation.3) there's more than one way to be truthful: if I ask you for your password on your bankaccoutn you can a) give it to me b) tell me "No, I don't want to give that to you" c) respond with "I find it rather rude you asked me that" etc. which means you'd need another principle of which of these are now to be universally preferred.I mean I completely agree that lying is NOT UPB, but telling the truth is not UPB  either. But neither is breaking NAP, so it's not immoral or unethical or "bad" to lie whenver you want to.

[Kawlinz]

Just like "eating brocolli" isn't UPB, it doesn't mean that eating brocolli is immoral.

[Arius]

1) using the word "false", that doesn't differntiate between an honest mistke/error and deceit. so you're saying to make an error is immoral. Since there's no way to measure the internal state, whether a statement is honest or deceitful can never be determined, so it doesn't fall under UPB, because it is not objective measurable behaviour.

Intent is irrelevant.  I'm simply pointing out that any argument in-favor of lying is logically inconsistent.  "People should make false statements..." is always contradictory.  It's actually funny, because argumentation is a process whereby we correct each others beliefs to more closely match reality.  A lie (if intent is unknown) is just a statement which doesn't match reality.  I suspect you want the word "lie" to mean something more than "making false statements".  I'm reluctant to include any reference to intent because it is unknowable.  I much prefer to discuss only the empirical (and sometimes the rational).

2) if you're saying people should tell true statements (il.e. telling truth is UPB). leaving aside the "true"-part (for the reason posted above), what you're implying is, people are obliged to respond to questions from others, people should always respond to others etc. creating an unchosen positive obligation.

There are no positive unchoosen obligations and all relationships are voluntary.  If you wold prefer not to answer a question, don't.  If you consider "not responding" as a type of lying, perhaps someone has convinced you that full-disclosure is virtue.  I assure you, it isn't.  I'm only addressing lying as "making false statements".  Because argumentation requires a universal preference for truth, there is no rational argument for falsehood over truth.  I don't know about all the rest of the nonsense people lump into the word "lying".  I can't talk about the intentions behind omission or half truths.  Perhaps a more general definition of what you believe constitutes lying would make this a more productive conversation.

3) there's more than one way to be truthful: if I ask you for your password on your bankaccoutn you can a) give it to me b) tell me "No, I don't want to give that to you" c) respond with "I find it rather rude you asked me that" etc. which means you'd need another principle of which of these are now to be universally preferred.

I don't follow you.  As long as my statement is true, it doesn't matter what I say.  I can reject your request, just leave, ignore you, or give you the information.  All the statements in those activities will have the same truth value.

I mean I completely agree that lying is NOT UPB, but telling the truth is not UPB  either. But neither is breaking NAP, so it's not immoral or unethical or "bad" to lie whenver you want to.

Mandatory full disclosure is not UPB.  That would be horrible (so many drinks would be thrown in faces).  However, if telling the truth isn't UPB, we run into this problem:  On what basis are you correcting my argument?  If truth isn't universally preferable, it's only sometimes preferable, perhaps my entire argument is incorrect...false...but this is one of those times when false is preferable to true.  There are too many problems with trying to make pro-false arguments.  No, because argumentation rests on the assumption that true is preferable to false, and pro-true (rational) argumentation is UPB, I'd argue that making true statements is UPB.  Certainly, we act like making true statements is UPB.  When I say something which is false, there are waves of people who wish to dispute the veracity of my statement.  I've yet to have a single person say "Your statement is false, but perhaps this is an instance of false being preferable to true, so I will not believe your incorrect statement over my correct statement"...just doesn't happen.

Now, I will say that simply "making statements" has no status in the UPB model.  It's more like "eating broccoli" than rape.  There is neither a positive obligation nor a general prohibition with respect to making statements.

 

 

[TheRobin]

I think I see what you mean.

But I still would argue that you can't make a claim that truth is universally preferable (meaning always and in every situation), since there doubtlessly are situations in which you don't prefer to tell the truth, claiming its universally preferable doesn't work. (Taking the murderer asking for directions for instance there telling/not telling the truth is diametrically opposed, so how could that be universal?)

(btw, I might have accidently misclicked on the "report abuse" button when I wanted to "quick reply", IN CASE AN ADMIN READS THIS: MY BAD, SORRY, NOTHING TO SEE HERE, MOVE ALONG )

[Arius]

 

But I still would argue that you can't make a claim that truth is universally preferable (meaning always and in every situation), since there doubtlessly are situations in which you don't prefer to tell the truth, claiming its universally preferable doesn't work. (Taking the murderer asking for directions for instance there telling/not telling the truth is diametrically opposed, so how could that be universal?)

On the individual level, that's true.  There are a number of cases in which a rapist would prefer to rape rather than to not rape or a thief would prefer to steal.  There are all sorts of instances where an individual would prefer to misbehave.  I, myself, do lie from time to time.  Individual instances don't change the problem of preferability  In the cases of rape and theft, the behaviors can't be universalized as they require non-preference (so they cannot be universally preferred).  Making false statements requires that the statement maker first demonstrate a preference for truth (by arguing and invoking "is true = ought to believe"), only to make statements which violate that preference (i.e. now believe this thing which is false).  The contradiction is different, but evident.

Let's indulge in a bit of lifeboat analysis.  So, there's this murderer, and somehow I know this person intends to kill someone (who isn't me)?  Presumably, if I provide accurate directions, the result will be the death of some unrelated third party.  Keeping the entire thought experiment within the confines of my response, I'm not prohibited from rejecting their request for directions.  I could say "I'm not telling you because you intend to kill so-and-so".  That's the truth.  If the murderer intended to kill me, rather than some third party, the exact same answer would suffice.

The opposite of "making false statements" isn't "making true statements", it's "not making false statements".  In response to the murder's question I can eat broccoli, as that behavior is not making a false statement.  Personally, I'd want to know why there was so much murderous intent in the air, but that's just me.  I'm not saying that true statements are universally preferable to not making statements, only that true statements are universally preferable to false statements.  There are many times where silence is the better choice (i.e. the lost murderer).

 

Murderer: "Hey, do you know where Dave lives? I want to murder him."

Me: *Eats broccoli*

 

[TheRobin]

but the reason all the NAP-violating behaviours are UPB violations are because part of their definition is that they are against the preferences of others.The problem I have is that if you say it is preferable that statements are true (i.e. in accordance with reality) and my reality at the moment is that I really don't want to let the other person know the truth, then making a true statement is self-contradctory, since prefering to make a true claim is against my preference of not making the claim, either my action of making the claim is not true to my reality or my claim about reality is not true, but there will be a falsehood there regardless.So I don't see why I should logically choose one falsehood over the other.Or to put it in a dialogue way: "I really don't want to tell you the truth that I don't want to tell you the truth." Making this claim is self-contradictory so it can't be UPB to make this claim.

[Arius]

So, you're saying that, because you would rather not tell the truth, making a false statement is preferable to you?  I don't disagree.  There are numerous instances of individuals preferring against universal preferability.  Universal preferability is part of a logical argument, individual preference is a largely subjective.  Claims about idealized behavior fall in the realm of universal preferability.  That is, when I want to do things, that's a matter of individual preference.  When I want to make arguments about what people should do, that's a matter of universal preferability.  There can't be universal preferences for behaviors which contain logical contradictions when universalized, but there can be individual preferences for such behaviors.  I may prefer to steal, but that has nothing to do with the universal preferability of theft.  You may prefer to lie, that has nothing to do with the universal preferability of lying.

[TheRobin]

I'm not sure you got my point. If I'm in a sitaution where I can't have a non-self-contradictory option of my action being in accordance with reality, why should I chose one over the other? Or why is telling truth better than acting truth?Also since UPB is always only valid within a certain context, what is the context in which you claim that making true statements is always preferable?

[Arius]

Sorry if I missed what you were saying.  Your argument seems to be very nuanced.

non-self-contradictory option of my action being in accordance with reality

Wow... a non-self contradictory option of...I don't understand, I'm sorry.  I think you've said something amazing, can you elaborate?

Why is telling truth better than acting truth?

Nope, I don't know what "acting truth" means.  Your actions are always consistent with reality, the opposite would be impossible.  Statements, claims, and arguments can be inconsistent with reality, but not actions.  I know why "telling the truth", insomuch as it means "making true statements", is universally preferable to "making false statements".  But I don't understand the phrase "acting truth" to compare the two ideas.

Also since UPB is always only valid within a certain context, what is the context in which you claim that making true statements is always preferable?

If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false (as the opposite position is contradictory).  That's all.

[TheRobin]

 

Nope, I don't know what "acting truth" means.  Your actions are always consistent with reality, the opposite would be impossible.  Statements, claims, and arguments can be inconsistent with reality, but not actions.  I know why "telling the truth", insomuch as it means "making true statements", is universally preferable to "making false statements".  But I don't understand the phrase "acting truth" to compare the two ideas.

Well that's my clumsy way of saying what Stef calls self-defeating arguments. If the action of making the argument contradicts the content of the argument. If the truth is, that I don't want to tell the truth, then the act of telling the truth contradicts the content of what I say, and if I say it, then it can't be true, since saying the truth is opposing it being true, so there is going to be a contradiction regardless.

Imagine this. I don't want to tell the truth and say "This sentence is showing my preference of not telling the truth to you" can the sentence stand logically?

Also since UPB is always only valid within a certain context, what is the context in which you claim that making true statements is always preferable?

If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false (as the opposite position is contradictory).  That's all.

 

But then lying can also be preferable, since I expect people to believe me if I'm lying to them as well (and as long as they don't realize I'm lying they will believe it probably or at least not with less probability than if I told them the truth). The only contradiction that can arise, is if I want to truthfully tell them that I am lying to them(like in the sentence above).

[Arius]

Gotcha.  You're talking about a situation where telling the truth results in a self-detonating proposition.

I don't want to tell the truth and say "This sentence is showing my preference of not telling the truth to you" can the sentence stand logically?

The sentence is illogical.  Just as-if I said "Right now, I'm lying".  I think it's a round-about way of constructing a Godel statement (i.e. "this sentence is false").  Generally, such statements are regarded as having indeterminate truth values, in much the same way an empty or null statement (i.e. " ") has an indeterminate truth value.  I think eating broccoli has the same truth value as a null statement, but that's just conjecture.  I am sure Godel statements aren't false, I think they aren't true either.  As such, if "making false statements" is prohibited, "making statements of indeterminate truth value" isn't.  Though, I think that, in a polite conversation, people would think you were crazy if you started communicating in statements with indeterminate truth values.

Murderer: "Where is Dave?  I want to murder him."

Me: "400 Tuesday hat: underground." *Eats broccoli*

But then lying can also be preferable, since I expect people to believe me if I'm lying

Here again we arrive at that same problem.  If false is sometimes preferable to true, then why are you disagreeing with me?  If my argument is wrong (false), this is one of those times when false is better.  If my argument is right (true), this is one of those times when true is better.  If this isn't one of those times when the preferability of truth works in my favor, then the preferability of truth always works in my favor.  Because this is one of those times when both false and true are better than each other, you should believe everything I say no matter what...  See how all that just fell apart?  The performance of correcting an argument or making an empirical statement that someone else ought to believe ("Bob is at his house") pre-supposes a universal preference for truth.

True and false are such low-level concepts that it is pretty much impossible to argue against true or for false.  In fact, I'm pretty sure that "for" means "is true" and "against" means "is false".  My point is, even if you make a false statement, you still want the other person to believe it is true.  In the act of making the false statement, you're betting on the other person preferring truth.  That is, you are demonstrating a non-preference for truth, while counting on someone else having a preference for truth.  It doesn't universalize.  The universal is either everyone has a preference for truth or everyone has a preference for false.  If everyone, somehow, has a preference for false, then no one should believe anything anyone else says (and lying successfully is impossible).  If everyone has a preference for true, then people accept correction from each other when a false statement is made.  As demonstrated, I reject the "sometimes" condition because argumentation breaks-down during its application.

[Kawlinz]

 

Gotcha.  You're talking about a situation where telling the truth results in a self-detonating proposition.

I don't want to tell the truth and say "This sentence is showing my preference of not telling the truth to you" can the sentence stand logically?

The sentence is illogical.  Just as-if I said "Right now, I'm lying".  I think it's a round-about way of constructing a Godel statement (i.e. "this sentence is false").  Generally, such statements are regarded as having indeterminate truth values, in much the same way an empty or null statement (i.e. " ") has an indeterminate truth value.  I think eating broccoli has the same truth value as a null statement, but that's just conjecture.  I am sure Godel statements aren't false, I think they aren't true either.  As such, if "making false statements" is prohibited, "making statements of indeterminate truth value" isn't.  Though, I think that, in a polite conversation, people would think you were crazy if you started communicating in statements with indeterminate truth values.

Murderer: "Where is Dave?  I want to murder him."

Me: "400 Tuesday hat: underground." *Eats broccoli*

But then lying can also be preferable, since I expect people to believe me if I'm lying

Here again we arrive at that same problem.  If false is sometimes preferable to true, then why are you disagreeing with me?  If my argument is wrong (false), this is one of those times when false is better.  If my argument is right (true), this is one of those times when true is better.  If this isn't one of those times when the preferability of truth works in my favor, then the preferability of truth always works in my favor.  Because this is one of those times when both false and true are better than each other, you should believe everything I say no matter what...  See how all that just fell apart?  The performance of correcting an argument or making an empirical statement that someone else ought to believe ("Bob is at his house") pre-supposes a universal preference for truth.

True and false are such low-level concepts that it is pretty much impossible to argue against true or for false.  In fact, I'm pretty sure that "for" means "is true" and "against" means "is false".  My point is, even if you make a false statement, you still want the other person to believe it is true.  In the act of making the false statement, you're betting on the other person preferring truth.  That is, you are demonstrating a non-preference for truth, while counting on someone else having a preference for truth.  It doesn't universalize.  The universal is either everyone has a preference for truth or everyone has a preference for false.  If everyone, somehow, has a preference for false, then no one should believe anything anyone else says (and lying successfully is impossible).  If everyone has a preference for true, then people accept correction from each other when a false statement is made.  As demonstrated, I reject the "sometimes" condition because argumentation breaks-down during its application.

 

I think that's a great insight. It has some weird implications in my head but that's probably some stuff that I'd want to explore on my own. And as I was about to delve into a lifeboat scenario - We're not in one, so it's not important.

[TheRobin]

 

 

But then lying can also be preferable, since I expect people to believe me if I'm lying

Here again we arrive at that same problem.  If false is sometimes preferable to true, then why are you disagreeing with me?  If my argument is wrong (false), this is one of those times when false is better.  If my argument is right (true), this is one of those times when true is better.  If this isn't one of those times when the preferability of truth works in my favor, then the preferability of truth always works in my favor.  Because this is one of those times when both false and true are better than each other, you should believe everything I say no matter what...  See how all that just fell apart?  The performance of correcting an argument or making an empirical statement that someone else ought to believe ("Bob is at his house") pre-supposes a universal preference for truth.

True and false are such low-level concepts that it is pretty much impossible to argue against true or for false.  In fact, I'm pretty sure that "for" means "is true" and "against" means "is false".  My point is, even if you make a false statement, you still want the other person to believe it is true.  In the act of making the false statement, you're betting on the other person preferring truth.  That is, you are demonstrating a non-preference for truth, while counting on someone else having a preference for truth.  It doesn't universalize.  The universal is either everyone has a preference for truth or everyone has a preference for false.  If everyone, somehow, has a preference for false, then no one should believe anything anyone else says (and lying successfully is impossible).  If everyone has a preference for true, then people accept correction from each other when a false statement is made.  As demonstrated, I reject the "sometimes" condition because argumentation breaks-down during its application.

 

You're confusing things. Your statement was "If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false" Which is not true, since you can expect people to believe false statements just as well.

IF I'm correcting you I show a universal preferrence for truth, that's true. But that only means, that if I lie to someone I'm not really concerned of correcting him or having a debate with him. So every situation that isn't an argument/correction, that standard isn't applicable. (or you need to establish another implicitly true standard, which so far you haven't as far as I can tell.)

Also, I don't see how you can say that my contradiction simply has "no truth value", because it self-contradicts (so it basically shouldn't matter), but when you come up with a similar scenario then it suddenly matters and goes a proof that your scenario is the right one.


I think you make the basic mistake of having a UPB for a certain context and then apply it to every other context (even if it doesn't make sense there), that's like saying "Using mathematical symbols is UPB when doing math, so we should talk in mathematical symbols" (yeah, that's a bit of an extreme example, but just to show the principle at work)
Like "if you debate your show a universal preference for truth, therefore you should prefer truth in every other instance as well". I don't see how that would follow

[Kawlinz]

 

 

 

But then lying can also be preferable, since I expect people to believe me if I'm lying

Here again we arrive at that same problem.  If false is sometimes preferable to true, then why are you disagreeing with me?  If my argument is wrong (false), this is one of those times when false is better.  If my argument is right (true), this is one of those times when true is better.  If this isn't one of those times when the preferability of truth works in my favor, then the preferability of truth always works in my favor.  Because this is one of those times when both false and true are better than each other, you should believe everything I say no matter what...  See how all that just fell apart?  The performance of correcting an argument or making an empirical statement that someone else ought to believe ("Bob is at his house") pre-supposes a universal preference for truth.

True and false are such low-level concepts that it is pretty much impossible to argue against true or for false.  In fact, I'm pretty sure that "for" means "is true" and "against" means "is false".  My point is, even if you make a false statement, you still want the other person to believe it is true.  In the act of making the false statement, you're betting on the other person preferring truth.  That is, you are demonstrating a non-preference for truth, while counting on someone else having a preference for truth.  It doesn't universalize.  The universal is either everyone has a preference for truth or everyone has a preference for false.  If everyone, somehow, has a preference for false, then no one should believe anything anyone else says (and lying successfully is impossible).  If everyone has a preference for true, then people accept correction from each other when a false statement is made.  As demonstrated, I reject the "sometimes" condition because argumentation breaks-down during its application.

 

You're confusing things. Your statement was "If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false" Which is not true, since you can expect people to believe false statements just as well.

IF I'm correcting you I show a universal preferrence for truth, that's true. But that only means, that if I lie to someone I'm not really concerned of correcting him or having a debate with him. So every situation that isn't an argument/correction, that standard isn't applicable. (or you need to establish another implicitly true standard, which so far you haven't as far as I can tell.)

Also, I don't see how you can say that my contradiction simply has "no truth value", because it self-contradicts (so it basically shouldn't matter), but when you come up with a similar scenario then it suddenly matters and goes a proof that your scenario is the right one.


I think you make the basic mistake of having a UPB for a certain context and then apply it to every other context (even if it doesn't make sense there), that's like saying "Using mathematical symbols is UPB when doing math, so we should talk in mathematical symbols" (yeah, that's a bit of an extreme example, but just to show the principle at work)
Like "if you debate your show a universal preference for truth, therefore you should prefer truth in every other instance as well". I don't see how that would follow

 

I think the point here is that you're debating right now, so you've accepted it. And any attempt at correcting that statement (like "No, that is incorrect / false because...") is a debate or argument, so you've accepted truth over faslehood. Everyone is able to prefer truth over falsehood, so lying can't be UPB. Is that right?

 

I also want to point out that I enjoyed making the typo faslehood.

[Arius]

You're confusing things. Your statement was "If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false" Which is not true, since you can expect people to believe false statements just as well.

Why would anyone believe a statement they knew to be false?  As far as I know, people only believe false statements when they believe the statements to be true.  There's no valid argument that people ought believe false statements.  Heck, I can only use "true=ought believe" because the opposite is impossible.  Now, if you mean that a person might believe a false statement while imagining it to be true, that is often the case.  However, believing a false statement which you imagine to be true is a bit like a gift-wrapped box of poo.  The outside appears preferable, but the inside stinks.  That is, upon learning that the belief is false, the person will reject it in favor of some other true belief.

Also, I don't see how you can say that my contradiction simply has "no truth value", because it self-contradicts (so it basically shouldn't matter), but when you come up with a similar scenario then it suddenly matters and goes a proof that your scenario is the right one.

It's not a contradiction.  A contradiction occurs when when two propositions are logically incompatible.  You making a "this statement is false" isn't a contradiction, it's nonsense.  I don't mean that pejoratively, there is actually no reason in statements which have indeterminate truth values. Let's explode your example (as I understand it) into two propositions: "I don't want to make a true statement"; "I don't want to reveal my desire to not make a true statement".  In that case, I can simply say nothing.  There is no contradiction as the two propositions are not incompatible.

IF I'm correcting you I show a universal preferrence for truth, that's true. But that only means, that if I lie to someone I'm not really concerned of correcting him or having a debate with him. So every situation that isn't an argument/correction, that standard isn't applicable. (or you need to establish another implicitly true standard, which so far you haven't as far as I can tell.)

All of UPB is dependent on truth being the preferable condition.  Check it out.  Why is rape not UPB?  Because it cannot be universalized without running into a logical contradiction.  Why do I care if the act of claiming rape as ethical is logically contradictory?  Because I've demonstrated a preference for truth in this line of questioning, and contradictory logic is the opposite of truth.  Suppose I say "But I don't have a preference for truth".  Of course, that's not true.  The claim "I don't have a preference for truth" is a truth claim...and a self-defeating argument.  There's no way around it, if you're gonna make arguments, you prefer true to false.  Any claims about what people ought do are gonna end-up being part of an argument. 

Of course, you may make all sorts of statements without regard for their truth value.  UPB is not a guide to what is possible.  However, as soon as you start asserting that the irrational statements you have made ought to be believed, you've wandered into a whole world of hurt.  People believe things which they imagine as true.  If you present an argument with an indeterminate truth value (or worse, a false truth value), nobody should believe you.

You're correct that by lying (making false statements) you've ventured beyond empirical statements and argumentation (both are flavors of UPB).  It is impossible to rationally argue for non-UPB as something people ought do.  It is impossible to rationally argue that people ought to lie (make false statements).  Thus, people ought not lie (i.e. if A is not UPB then not A is UPB).

[Kawlinz]

 

You're confusing things. Your statement was "If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false" Which is not true, since you can expect people to believe false statements just as well.

Why would anyone believe a statement they knew to be false?  As far as I know, people only believe false statements when they believe the statements to be true.  There's no valid argument that people ought believe false statements.  Heck, I can only use "true=ought believe" because the opposite is impossible.  Now, if you mean that a person might believe a false statement while imagining it to be true, that is often the case.  However, believing a false statement which you imagine to be true is a bit like a gift-wrapped box of poo.  The outside appears preferable, but the inside stinks.  That is, upon learning that the belief is false, the person will reject it in favor of some other true belief.

Also, I don't see how you can say that my contradiction simply has "no truth value", because it self-contradicts (so it basically shouldn't matter), but when you come up with a similar scenario then it suddenly matters and goes a proof that your scenario is the right one.

It's not a contradiction.  A contradiction occurs when when two propositions are logically incompatible.  You making a "this statement is false" isn't a contradiction, it's nonsense.  I don't mean that pejoratively, there is actually no reason in statements which have indeterminate truth values. Let's explode your example (as I understand it) into two propositions: "I don't want to make a true statement"; "I don't want to reveal my desire to not make a true statement".  In that case, I can simply say nothing.  There is no contradiction as the two propositions are not incompatible.

IF I'm correcting you I show a universal preferrence for truth, that's true. But that only means, that if I lie to someone I'm not really concerned of correcting him or having a debate with him. So every situation that isn't an argument/correction, that standard isn't applicable. (or you need to establish another implicitly true standard, which so far you haven't as far as I can tell.)

All of UPB is dependent on truth being the preferable condition.  Check it out.  Why is rape not UPB?  Because it cannot be universalized without running into a logical contradiction.  Why do I care if the act of claiming rape as ethical is logically contradictory?  Because I've demonstrated a preference for truth in this line of questioning, and contradictory logic is the opposite of truth.  Suppose I say "But I don't have a preference for truth".  Of course, that's not true.  The claim "I don't have a preference for truth" is a truth claim...and a self-defeating argument.  There's no way around it, if you're gonna make arguments, you prefer true to false.  Any claims about what people ought do are gonna end-up being part of an argument. 

Of course, you may make all sorts of statements without regard for their truth value.  UPB is not a guide to what is possible.  However, as soon as you start asserting that the irrational statements you have made ought to be believed, you've wandered into a whole world of hurt.  People believe things which they imagine as true.  If you present an argument with an indeterminate truth value (or worse, a false truth value), nobody should believe you.

You're correct that by lying (making false statements) you've ventured beyond empirical statements and argumentation (both are flavors of UPB).  It is impossible to rationally argue for non-UPB as something people ought do.  It is impossible to rationally argue that people ought to lie (make false statements).  Thus, people ought not lie (i.e. if A is not UPB then not A is UPB).

 

I think this is a great conclusion and looks sound. What do you think brought you to the understanding?

[TheRobin]

I think the point here is that you're debating right now, so you've
accepted it. And any attempt at correcting that statement (like "No,
that is incorrect / false because...") is a debate or argument, so
you've accepted truth over faslehood. Everyone is able to prefer truth
over falsehood, so lying can't be UPB. Is that right?

 

 

 

The point is that preference only makes sense when there is a goal given. now within a debate the goal is given (truth) so lying is non-preferable. Outside the debate no such goal exist therefore no universal preference can be applied there regarding telling truth or not.

[TheRobin]

@Arius: maybe you should tell me then what the difference is between "meaningless" and "illogical". The way I use the term "illogical" I take it to mean "self-contradictory" which is imo the same as meanigless (describing something as being X and non-X is imo meaningless), so I don't see the relevant difference that you're trying to make here.

If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false

Why would anyone believe a statement they knew to be false?

These are two different statements. So please either correct the first or direct your critique of my cirique towards your first statement to the correct place.
Most obivuos difference being that the idea behind lying is that the person in question does NOT know its a lie, which is why you can expect him to believe it

All of UPB is dependent on truth being the preferable condition

This is also incorrect. The fact of CORRECTING someone is implying that truth is the goal, therefore making statements based on reason and evidence UPB in regards to the context of an argument/debate. You can't have preferences without a goal and your goal was stated as "being expected to be believed" and clearly if your a skilled lier that goal than just as well be achieved by false statemtns than true ones, therefore making it incrorect to claim truth being preferable IF you simply want to be believed.

I think most of our argument we're currently having can be tracked back to how we differ in that point.

[Arius]

maybe you should tell me then what the difference is between "meaningless" and "illogical". The way I use the term "illogical" I take it to mean "self-contradictory" which is imo the same as meanigless (describing something as being X and non-X is imo meaningless), so I don't see the relevant difference that you're trying to make here.

It's taken me two days to figure out why comparing these two words bothers me.  I now know.  "Meaningless" is a subjective word, "illogical" is an objective word.  That is, logic is a type of argumentation (actually another flavor of UPB), while meaning is the subjective classification of an object into a context.  If a claim is logical, there is a mutually preferable system for proving that it is so.  A claim may be meaningless to me, but very meaningful to you.  As such, there is no mutually preferable system for determining meaningfulness.  I do not believe the two words are comparable.

These are two different statements. So please either correct the first or direct your critique of my cirique towards your first statement to the correct place.
Most obivuos difference being that the idea behind lying is that the person in question does NOT know its a lie, which is why you can expect him to believe it

People don't knowing believe false statements.  I kinda want to say "that's a fundamental rule of epistemology", but I think that would be impolite and that feels like some kind of fallacy to me.

I'll examine the opposite of the of the other statement (If you are going to make a statement, which you expect anyone else to believe, it ought not be false) to illustrate why it must be so.

Suppose that, if I am going to make a statement (we need that part), which I expect people to believe, it ought be false.  Now, should you believe that claim when I advance it?  If I'm correct in my claim (if it is true), then I've violated my principle to explain it.  So, that version of the claim is impossible.  Alternatively, we can try: If I am going to make a statement, which I expect people not to believe, it ought be true.  Should you believe that claim?  If the claim is true, then it requires you not believe it.  One more claim to evaluate.  How about: If I am going to make a statement, which I expect people not to believe, it ought be false.  Should you believe that claim?  In fact, you could without contradiction.  However, that is actually the opposite of the claim which I started with (statement, believe, true).  Thus, any claim besides (statement, believe, true) and (statement, not believe, false), both of which are actually forms of the same claim, is irrational to believe.  So while I might not have shown all my work, I assure you, if people do not knowingly believe false things, then statement, believe, true.

Now, you want to include the possibility that you make a claim, which is false, but the other person doesn't know it is and you'd like them to believe the false thing is actually true (a Christmas present full of poo).  Here's why that doesn't work.  I'll make the claim: If I am going to make a statement, which is false, and I expect people to believe it, they ought to believe it is true.  I'm going to call that claim "lying-1".  Perhaps that is a practical claim, I don't know.  What I do know is that it doesn't universalize.  You cannot simultaneously possess a preference for truth and produce deception (that's within the UPB two-guys model).  As such, lying-1 is not UPB.  Thus, not lying-1 is UPB.  Ethically, lying-1 fails.  Pragmatically, who knows?  I'm sure there are a million consequential reason to lie.  I'm just saying that none of them are sufficient to place the activity within the sphere of UPB.

Let me offer a second problem with lying-1.  The last section "they ought to believe it (a false statement) is true" is contradictory to peoples' universal preference for believing true things...which is part of a big epistemology argument I'm trying not to have.  Anything which necessarily includes going against the preferences of one of the participants (rape, theft, murder, etc) can't be UPB.  So, I'd say lying gets a seat right next to murder.

The fact of CORRECTING someone is implying that truth is the goal, therefore making statements based on reason and evidence UPB in regards to the context of an argument/debate. You can't have preferences without a goal and your goal was stated as "being expected to be believed" and clearly if your a skilled lier that goal than just as well be achieved by false statements than true ones, therefore making it incorrect to claim truth being preferable IF you simply want to be believed.

If fact, any time you want another person to believe something you say, you will make an appeal to some kind of UPB.  For example, if I want you to believe it's daytime, I might point at my watch and say "it's daytime".  I'm making an argument which appeals to both truth and empiricism (both flavors of UPB).  There is no claim, that ought to be believed, which resides beyond the scope of some type of UPB.  Argumentation is a type of UPB, and under it are things like math, logic, and (to a lesser degree) language.  All claims which can be evaluated, are evaluable within the framework of argumentation (I think that is argumentation's purpose).

Why am I writing all this about claims?  I'm not discussing what you (as a person) might do.  I'm discussing what someone might claim people ought do.  If, for example, you want to claim that people ought lie (always, sometimes, or never), I'm going to evaluate that claim for logical consistency and the ability to be universalized.  See, there's a difference between what one person does and what people ought do.  If the OP had been "can people lie", I'd have agreed in a heartbeat.  The question, because it falls in an ethical context, must be examined as "ought people lie" or "ought people not lie", rather than "can anyone lie" or "can't anyone lie".

I feel I should end on a high-note, so let me say: this is a fantastic conversation we're having right now.

[TheRobin]

 

maybe you should tell me then what the difference is between "meaningless" and "illogical". The way I use the term "illogical" I take it to mean "self-contradictory" which is imo the same as meanigless (describing something as being X and non-X is imo meaningless), so I don't see the relevant difference that you're trying to make here.

It's taken me two days to figure out why comparing these two words bothers me.  I now know.  "Meaningless" is a subjective word, "illogical" is an objective word.  That is, logic is a type of argumentation (actually another flavor of UPB), while meaning is the subjective classification of an object into a context.  If a claim is logical, there is a mutually preferable system for proving that it is so.  A claim may be meaningless to me, but very meaningful to you.  As such, there is no mutually preferable system for determining meaningfulness.  I do not believe the two words are comparable.

 

To keep it short here a bit (mostly because I don't see much point or enjoyment in writing or answering lengthy posts). If we accept that, then you still haven't logically discarded the problem with the self-detonating statement in the case of "you should always tell the truth". Seein as you use the same method to discard the "never tell the truth" (correctly, imo, no disagreements here). So I don't see why you don't accept the very same method in that other instance.
So is there a reason why the method is valid in one case but not in another?


Also in regards to universality (and here I might differ from UPB, frankly ,I'm not sure, since I'm on and off about what it actually claims and what not, so I'm just gonna go with what I can reason out myself and we'll see if that works anyway, if that's allright with you)

The reason you can't have ethics (or "the good") be non-universal is that it is defined as being preferable. So having it only preferable sometimes would mean that "that which is preferable" is sometimes "not-preferable", which obviously can't be.
In any other aspect though, that isn't necessarily the case.

And I don't see that the claim "it's always preferable to tell the truth" is itself trut, since both extremes of "always/never" tell the truth are not true in at least one instance (which means the always/never can't be true, so we're stuck with "sometimes" and have to go from there)

Actually I'm kind of tempted to put together a short text on "the logic of lying", as I'm beginning to suspect there might be some people who have this idea, that it's somehow always better to tell the truth (a notion which I find unhealthy and also untrue). But that's not really relevant to the debate here anyway.


I'm not sure those two points really clear all up (seeing as you have written quite a lot), but I think it all centers around that idea that all(or most) behaviour can/should be either "always or never" and outside certain few conditions or definitions I don't see how this is the case logically (given the reasons above).


And on a side note: I too enjoyed our debate so far   made me think quite a lot about this stuff and lead to some amazing (for my taste) insights, so thanks for the challenge

[Arius]

If we accept that, then you still haven't logically discarded the problem with the self-detonating statement in the case of "you should always tell the truth". Seein as you use the same method to discard the "never tell the truth" (correctly, imo, no disagreements here). So I don't see why you don't accept the very same method in that other instance.
So is there a reason why the method is valid in one case but not in another?

"Always tell the truth"..at least in my mind, implies an involuntary positive moral obligation for full disclosure.  Equally, it suggests that truth-telling is always better than saying nothing or eating broccoli.  So, I reject the claim "people must make true statements" as a non-universal.  I'm not trying to argue for an obligation to always reveal everything (keeping secrets is, at least, morally permissible).  Keeping secrets (not revealing true information, and not presenting false information as true) can be universalized.  I just really want to make that clear, cause I keep getting the feeling that you believe "always tell the truth" and "don't lie" are opposites.  I don't regard them in that fashion.  One is a prohibition, the other is an imperative.  There is the middle-ground of "every behavior which is not making false statements" which should be considered.

I'll try explaining it like this.  Suppose someone offered-up the idea that "people shouldn't rape".  If someone offered a counter-argument of "people should consent to sex", the problem would become immediately apparent.  The claim "people should consent to sex" creates a positive moral obligation.  It also isn't the opposite of "people shouldn't rape".  I think "people shouldn't make false statements" and "people should make true statements" are being compared in a similar way.  That is, one creates a positive moral obligation, and is not the opposite of the other.

Also in regards to universality (and here I might differ from UPB, frankly ,I'm not sure, since I'm on and off about what it actually claims and what not, so I'm just gonna go with what I can reason out myself and we'll see if that works anyway, if that's allright with you)

I will not hesitate to do whatever I can to make this discussion as productive as possible.

 

In any case where a non-preference is a required condition of an action (rape, theft, etc), that action cannot be ethical.  I agree, that idea is foundational.  If a behavior is sometimes preferable by definition, you're right.  If a behavior is sometimes preferable in practice, I don't think that has any bearing on how it fits into an ethical structure.  Rape is, by definition, non-preferred by at least one participant.  That doesn't mean people in the world don't prefer to rape, only that they prefer not to be raped (the victim is always the non-preferring party).

I have an idea!  Permit me to redefine "lying".  I made a mistake, I see that now.  I defined it "making false statements".  That's incorrect.  I wanted to define it as "making false statements to people who prefer true statements".  That better fits with rape ("sex with people who do not prefer sex") and theft ("taking property from people who prefer to not have their property taken").  Then there' s no positive moral obligation and you can still lie to liars.  How does that sit with you?  If we go with that definition, then all the "who prefers the truth" discussion is more about identifying who may be lied to, rather than the fundamental morality of lying.  I think that's the way to go.  Because you're right, a behavior needs to be impossible to universally prefer to be excluded from ethics.  What do you think about lying as "making false statements to people who prefer true statements"?

 

 

 

[TheRobin]

well, it doesn't matter if your definition is taking into account the preference of others (something, which,empirically we can not know anyway, except by peoples choice of actions). Also then you still couldn't lie to a murderer asking for directions (since being a murderer doesn't imply not prefering true statements anyway, heck not even being a liar implies not prefering true statements )

you also run into the problem that, once you start redefining behaviour as behaviour that is dependant on the preferences of others, then you already say that one person's personal preference is enough to create an obligation towards what another person should prefer, which clearly isn't UPB.That'd be like saying "you shouldn't correct people, who prefer to not be corrected" or somethingThe problem with "not making false statements" is that by trying to not make false statements you end up making false statements in the event that you don't prefer to make a true statement.To recap: If I prefer not to tell the truth to someone, can't make a true statement telling them that. I can also not make a false statement telling them that, without violating the "no false statement"-rule. So neither can be a universal preference, now I don't say that certain situations don't logically imply that either speaking the truth or telling a lie is necessarily preferable. But you can't make a general rule of which is preferable independant of circumstance.

[Arius]

Sorry, I wrote a long post.  Please feel free to disregard any parts which you do not see as important. []

I wanna go back to the very beginning and explain why I have a gut-feeling that lying is unethical.  Perhaps if I explain the problems I see with accepting lying as morally permissible, you'll migrate my way a little (or vise versa).  Consent is an extremely important concept when discussing preferability.  If it's a legit move to fake consent (say "I agree" when you don't), then there is no empirical method of determining the difference between theft and trade, euthanasia and murder, or rape and consensual sex.  Right now, to determine the difference, I would examine if the two involved people had reached an agreement...  That is, in my mind, the only real method of observing consent occurring.  If, for example, a merchant can fake consent to a customer and it's not unethical to do so, then the customer has no method of determining if the purchase is theft or trade.  I simply cannot believe that consent, the foundation of voluntarism and primary means of determining preference, is unknowable.  That's just too wild for my mind.  So, I imagine that the "binding" property of UPB rests on some requirement that statements be true (or consent be valid once given).  If not, then how do we know that "yes" means "yes" or "no" means "no".  You see my dilemma?  Because of this, I'm willing to go to great lengths to argue against any intellectual vehicles for faking consent.

Imagine, one person consents to sex, but claims rape the day after.  If lying is morally permissible, the apparently consenting person actually was raped.  You can be a rapist in spite of the empirical evidence.

Also then you still couldn't lie to a murderer asking for directions (since being a murderer doesn't imply not prefering true statements anyway, heck not even being a liar implies not prefering true statements )

I guess I'm not clear on why you'd even talk to the murderer.  We agree that full disclosure is not required, so I neither see the necessity nor the reason in lying to the murderer.

you also run into the problem that, once you start redefining behaviour as behaviour that is dependant on the preferences of others, then you already say that one person's personal preference is enough to create an obligation towards what another person should prefer, which clearly isn't UPB.

Well, you correcting me (and my caring what you do) is dependent on our shared preference for making true statements.  An action which necessarily includes going against the preference of another is either impossible on the individual level or a non-universal.  Your example "you shouldn't correct people who prefer not to be corrected" is interesting.  Of course, we'll need to agree on some definition of "correct", but I believe that the should statement is actually accurate.  That is, I believe you can't correct someone who prefers not to be corrected, as correction requires the correctee to accept the correction.  You can tell me a right answer all day, but I can simply refuse to accept your answer.  That is, I don't think correction is simply a matter of one person making a statement, it requires a second person to accept that statement as true.  I'd regard any impossible statement as outside the bounds of ethics.  People can't ought do what cannot be done.  Though, I'd be willing to further explore this question.

My guess is that preference only matters in the case that both people need to take some action according to the definition.  For example, in the case of rape, both people must perform some sex-act.  In the case of theft, both people must be interested in advancing an ownership claim.  Contrast that with eating.  An ought statement like "you shouldn't eat around people who prefer you not eat around them" isn't a valid moral prohibition because it is possible for everyone to both prefer people not eat around them and prefer to eat.

Perhaps it is necessary to include, in the definition, an act which the individual being lied to must perform...  In the case of theft, the victim is in the owning something.  In the case of rape, the victim is having sex.  In the case of murder, the victim is dying.  How about "people shouldn't present false statements as true to people who prefer to believe true statements, determine the truth of a statement based on presentation, and take action based on statements they regard as true"...   Which would mean "lying" would need an equally verbose definition.  Something like "Presenting false statements as true to people who prefer to believe true statements, determine the truth of a statement based on presentation, and take action based on statements they regard as true".  We've come a long way from "making false statements".

If I prefer not to tell the truth to someone, can't make a true statement telling them that. I can also not make a false statement telling them that, without violating the "no false statement"-rule. So neither can be a universal preference,

Doing nothing is not making a false statement.  You can't make either of the types of claims you suggest without problems, that's true.  However, you can refrain from making a claim at all.  If all you can do is lie, it's better not to talk, yea?  Help me out here...Why can't you make no statement in this case and the case with the murderer?  Rather, excepting both of the statements you have suggested as contradictory and impossible, why can't you simply perform another action which is consistent with the universal?

 

[TheRobin]

well, you're responsible for what you say, not whether you intentions are to make true or false statements (something which can't be measured anyway).So the examples with breaching contracts and faking rape aren't ones that suffer from the idea that you can't lie.

This seems a general problem I think, either it can be measured or it can't be UPB anyway and intentions can't be measured. And if it's immoral to make false statements then making an error is immoral and that's hopefully obviously non-sense.

why should I be obligated to not make a statement. In case that I want to divert someone for some reasons?  since that's not what I prefer to do anyway, so we have the subjecitve preference of others win vs. subjective preference of me and I don't see why I should be the one who's obliged to erm stop having my preferences.and even if its a negative prefernce. I could say I have a preference for people who write to me to not use the latters "a" and "o", but that doesn't mean people are morally obligated to stop using them, right?Also beacuse moral obligation inclued the right to use force to stop people, so are you willing to stop people from lying by (if necessary) shooting them?

[Arius]

So, you're saying that knowledge is irrelevant to ethics?  Absolutely everything a person knows could be wrong, yet they're just as morally culpable as you or I.  That there's no ethical difference between killing a falsely consenting person and a person who actually consents?  That there is no method of discerning if rape has actually occurred.  That all mutual transactions are morally indistinguishable from involuntary interactions.  It's just too much for me.  The idea that there's no such thing as consent....  I don't have a reason, but I just don't buy it.  I'll need to think on that.

Why wouldn't breaching contracts suffer from that problem?  If lying is the moral equivalent of eating, then there's nothing wrong with falsely entering a contract, or leaving one at any time.  If truth is not the binding agent, what is?   I'm not even sure that it's possible to claim an agreement has a different moral standing than a non-agreement if the basis of agreement is morally neutral.  insomuch as that's true, rape and consensual sex are the same thing.

Would you define "responsibility" for me?  I'm pretty sure we use the word differently.  Generally, when I use the word, there's some associated idea of knowing what you're doing.  I wouldn't claim my dog was responsible for anything.  At most, he performs actions.  I don't believe he's capable of contextualizing those actions or developing moral theories.  As I see it, the mental handicap of being a dog excludes him from culpability (a word I use interchangeable with "responsibility").

I could say I have a preference for people who write to me to not use the letters "a" and "o", but that doesn't mean people are morally obligated to stop using them, right?

That's an interesting question.  You'd first try to establish the use of 'a' and 'o', against preference, as a behavior.  Involuntary vowel exposure (IVE), yea?  So, for a person to IVE they must either write or say either of the vowels 'a' and 'o' against the preference of a nearby person.  Interestingly, you cannot both prefer to not be exposed to the vowels and to expose others to the vowels (as you expose yourself by exposing others).  A neutral obligation to IVE (people may IVE) would fail the two guys in a room test.   Now, the idea that there is a positive moral obligation to IVE is obviously wrong.  You can't argue "people should IVE".  However, the opposite claim of "people shouldn't IVE" can be a universal.  Of course, there's a broader formula to the claim.  Something like "you shouldn't perform acts which require one participant's preferring the act not be performed ".  Insomuch as that's true, there is a prohibition   If the broader claim is incorrect (if performing acts which require one participant's preferring the act not be performed is permissible), then why are rape, theft, and murder always wrong?

I'd like to leave the discussion of force out of this for the time being.  I'm of a different mind than you on the use of force, but I don't believe that discussion will add to this one (I am easily derailed).  Sufficed to say, I think the imposed consequences of all wrongdoings are similar.

why should I be obligated to not make a statement. In case that I want to divert someone for some reasons?  since that's not what I prefer to do anyway, so we have the subjecitve preference of others win vs. subjective preference of me and I don't see why I should be the one who's obliged to erm stop having my preferences.

You'd be obligated to not make a statement for the same reason a person who prefers to rape is obligated not to.  My guess is that the person who prefers to do wrong is just SOL in an ethical system.  Otherwise, we'll go right off the cliff of "there's no right or wrong"..I try to avoid that cliff.