How is property a necessary result of the non-aggression principle?

[ceruleanhansen]

I am quite new, and searched a bit, but was unable to find something that adequately explained the status of property in aggression. How is it aggressive for me to disrespect your ownership? The communists say that the amount of labor put into the creation of something determines the amount of ownership given to a producer of a good, which is a reasonable way to define ownership, but it also lacks any coherent moral basis. Simply asking "why is labor the most relevant factor in value" seems to break the entire communist argument on moral ownership. I understand very well that the market would implement powerful mechanisms to deter theft. This is obvious. So why do we need to add the extra barrier of morality? Isn't it sufficient to say that theft is an undesirable behavior that the market can take care of on it's own?

Usurpation of property is aggressive insofar as aggression to the owner is required. I certainly believe that theft (to use an arbitrary example) is undesirable and would be strongly mitigated in an anarchist society. But the discussion here is about the morality of theft, and I do not believe that theft is immoral according to the non-aggression principle.

[Arius]

Insomuch as theft requires violence, it is a violation of the NAP.  For example, a robber might use a gun or knife to coerce someone into surrendering some piece of property.  Alternatively, one person might clutch a piece of property so tightly that no other person could arrest control without the exercise of force.  The labor theory of value is a holdover from a time when workers were surfs and could not legally acquire ownership of the means of production.

There are three non-state arguments about property which I am familiar with.  First, ownership of external items extends from self-ownership, and creating a thing is the strongest claim to value.  That's your right-leaning view.  Second, ownership is a type of relationship between people and the exact terms must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  That's your centrist view.  Lastly, ownership is economically convenient, but it has no moral context as property doesn't exist beyond some kind of state.  That's your left-leaning view.

Under the first model, if I add value to something which exists in nature, I become the decider of its use.  There are several reasons which are generally offered to justify this claim.  It might be that, as I have used my time to create the value, I become its owner (whomever pays the cost owns the item).  Alternatively, it might be that I have the most to lose by the misuse of the value (whomever has the most invested owns the item).  Regardless, by committing an act of theft (usurping control without investing or paying the cost), the creator of the value loses the original investment in creating the value.  The argument goes, if you steal the byproduct of the use of a person's life, it is no different than depriving the person of life for that period of time.  Thus, the right-leaning model equates theft with either assault or kidnapping.

The second model requires that people hold abiding by agreements as a virtue.  Because those people involved have agreed upon the distribution of items, the person who commits an act of theft is violating the terms of an agreement they previously reached.  While not necessarily an NAP violation under strict a physical-force-only interpretation, the centrist-voluntarist considers a breach of agreement a type of moral transgression.  That is, violating agreements is something people ought not do.

The third model is anti-individualist.  It presumes that ownership exists as a tool of rule and control.  I can't offer a compelling argument for a collectivist form of property ownership, as I don't believe it's either morally or ethically viable.  So, I can't comment on NAP violations with respect to a left-anarchist property model.

Both right and centrist small government models reject theft as incorrect.  However, theft is only an NAP violation under the right-leaning model.

[Brandon Buck _BB_]

Property isn't a result of the NAP. The NAP is a derivitave of property. Specifically, ownership of the self. The notion of material property ownership flows from self ownership. Thus, I own my body and because of that, you cannot use it or harm it without my consent. To do so is to agress against me. Since I also own my material property, the same applies.

[ceruleanhansen]

 

Property isn't a result of the NAP. The NAP is a derivitave of property. Specifically, ownership of the self. The notion of material property ownership flows from self ownership. Thus, I own my body and because of that, you cannot use it or harm it without my consent. To do so is to agress against me. Since I also own my material property, the same applies.

 

What is the rational metric for determining morally valid standards of ownership of material property? What makes homesteading for example a more valid moral basis for determining ownership than need (as posited by the communists), use (as posited by classical anarchists of the Proudhon type), or popular vote (as posited by democrats and anarcho-communists of the Bakunin type)?

[masonman]

 

What is the rational metric for determining morally valid standards of ownership of material property? What makes homesteading for example a more valid moral basis for determining ownership than need (as posited by the communists), use (as posited by classical anarchists of the Proudhon type), or popular vote (as posited by democrats and anarcho-communists of the Bakunin type)?

 

I second this very good question

[Rick Horton]

 

 

What is the rational metric for determining morally valid standards of ownership of material property? What makes homesteading for example a more valid moral basis for determining ownership than need (as posited by the communists), use (as posited by classical anarchists of the Proudhon type), or popular vote (as posited by democrats and anarcho-communists of the Bakunin type)?

 

I second this very good question

 

I made a film explaining "my" position on "property". I've been thinking about this issue, like you, for a while now.

Here is the link to the video. I think you'll NOT be bored by it. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7KdfKzp6Ng

[Arius]

What is the rational metric for determining morally valid standards of ownership of material property?

In order of importance: Non-aggression, mutual agreement

There may be other UPB-type processes which can establish morally valid restrictions on individual activity, but those are the only two I'm aware of.

What makes homesteading for example a more valid moral basis for determining ownership than need (as posited by the communists), use (as posited by classical anarchists of the Proudhon type), or popular vote (as posited by democrats and anarcho-communists of the Bakunin type)?

Discounting the body...Homesteading, use, and popular vote are all terms which require mutual agreement to be valid.  The body is anomalous because  (as a general rule) you necessarily have it at all times (versus non-body objects which aren't always in someone's possession).  It isn't actually possible to have an involuntary non-aggression-compatible possession swap of body parts.  Everything else can be involuntarily swapped without violating NAP, assuming no one is actively possessing the object at the moment of the control swap.

Realistically, people have common understandings (some sort of implicit agreement) of mutually accepted models of ownership.  In general, people do not behave as-if that simply setting-down an object releases an ownership claim.

A proposed a model of ownership (which could only be valid through mutual agreement), if advanced as the morally correct activity, is actually an attempt to use language to persuade the listener to agree (and behave in a manner consistent with that agreement) to the validity of the model.

[Magnus]

 

 

Property isn't a result of the NAP. The NAP is a derivitave of property. Specifically, ownership of the self. The notion of material property ownership flows from self ownership. Thus, I own my body and because of that, you cannot use it or harm it without my consent. To do so is to agress against me. Since I also own my material property, the same applies.

 

What is the rational metric for determining morally valid standards of ownership of material property? What makes homesteading for example a more valid moral basis for determining ownership than need (as posited by the communists), use (as posited by classical anarchists of the Proudhon type), or popular vote (as posited by democrats and anarcho-communists of the Bakunin type)?

 

You have to begin with what a property right really is.  A person is said to own a thing, but what that really means is the right to exclude other people from using a thing.  Or, more accurately, it is a right to exclude others by force from interfering with your use of a thing. 

In other words, a property right does not exist between a person and a thing; it exists between a person and another person with respect to their competing uses of some physical matter.

In property rights theory, we call this competition a "rivalry," and one person's use of the object in question is said to be "rivalrous" with the other person's.

The key feature of this issue is that the assertion of a property right is relative -- it posits that one person's claim of right to exclusive use is superior (or inferior) to some other person's claim. Therefore, the ethical challenge is articulating a principle, which is equally applicalble to everyone, that will distinguish between competing claims of exclusive use, to determine why one type of claim is superior than the other.

In your question, you asked how a claim based on prior use or homesteading is superior to a claim based on popular vote.  Consider the essence of your question in terms of rivalry: a homesteader is really just the first user of previously unused goods.  So, a prior user and a homesteader are really describing the same claim, the only difference being that the homesteader is the first user, and a prior user is merely claiming that he is ahead of you in line (whether he was first, or something later than first). 

So, let's say we have a person who has established a prior user of some object, and let's say it's a patch if dirt where he's trying to grow some plants.  Clearly, he is deriving some economic benefit from his use of this dirt, and the anticipated use of the plants growing there, or else he would not be using these things. His claim of Prior Use must be compared to all other competing claims -- let's start with the competing "popular vote" claim. 

These Popular Voters also want to put these objects (dirt and plants) to some economic use, and they claim that their economic uses of them is somehow more important than the economic use of the Prior User.

On what basis could the Popular Voters' claim poossibly be ethically superior to the Prior User's claim?  Could the Popular Voters take a vote to put the Prior User in chains and force him, under threat of pain, to continue to farm the land and then eventually turn over all of the crops to the Voters?  The only difference between him and them is that they outnumber him.  But that action is a rather clear definition of slavery -- if the Prior User declines, and they do this anyway, they are enslaving him.  I think we all would object to the ethical claim of slavery, since we already acknowledge the validity of claims of Self-Ownership, and clearly the Prior User has self-ownership.  In property terms, we say that the Popular Voters cannot have a superior claim to the exclusive use of the Prior User's body than the Prior User has in his own body. 

So, what happens instead when the Popular Voters leave his body alone, but instead come along at harvest time and tell the Prior User that he has to hand over all his crops?  And if he doesn't relent, then they will assert their claim of exclusive use of the crops, so if he resists their taking it all, they'll physically hold him down until they've departed with the crops.  The Popular Voters have graciously allowed the Prior User to be the nominal "owner" of the land, but have instead asserted that he's just not allowed to make his intended economic use of it by keeping the crops he has grown. 

I think we would both agree that this scenario is really no different than overt slavery, since the Popular Voters are doing the same thing as if they had openly enslaved him -- taking all of his productivity by force. 

At what point in this rilvalrous contest over control of these objects does a popular vote become ethically superior to the Prior User's right to control these objects?  We know that slavery is not superior to his self-ownership, and that de facto slavery is equally inferior to the Prior User's property rights in the fruits of his productivity.  Is 90% slavery ethically superior to 100% slavery?  80%?  50%?  10%? 

Any number you pick is arbitrary.  The problem with arbitrary assertions is that they articulate no ethical principle.  What ethical principle makes a popular vote superior to a rivalrous claim based on prior use? "We want X" is not a valid ethical principle. It's not an ethical principle at all, actually.

[ceruleanhansen]

 

Could the Popular Voters take a vote to put the Prior User in chains and force him, under threat of pain, to continue to farm the land and then eventually turn over all of the crops to the Voters? 

 

Accepting popular vote as a means of settling property disputes does not require us to accept popular vote in other matters. This is not inconsistent anymore than propertarian anarchists here who accept aggression in defence of property but reject it otherwise.

 

The only difference between him and them is that they outnumber him.

 

This is a meaningful difference. If a large number of people are going to be affected by what is done with a piece of property, why shouldn't they have a say in what is done with it?

 

So, what happens instead when the Popular Voters leave his body alone, but instead come along at harvest time and tell the Prior User that he has to hand over all his crops?  And if he doesn't relent, then they will assert their claim of exclusive use of the crops, so if he resists their taking it all, they'll physically hold him down until they've departed with the crops.  The Popular Voters have graciously allowed the Prior User to be the nominal "owner" of the land, but have instead asserted that he's just not allowed to make his intended economic use of it by keeping the crops he has grown

 

It would not be in their own interests to do that. This kind of scenario
is problematic with or without democracy. What if the farmers just
decide not to sell their crops one year and inflict mass starvation?
Both propertarian anarchism and democracy presuppose a certain level of
rational self interest among the populace. 

 

At what point in this rilvalrous contest over control of these objects does a popular vote become ethically superior to the Prior User's right to control these objects?

 

 When the community's decided use for the property is more likely to lead
to a morally superior outcome to the Prior User's decision.

 

[Alan C.]

If a large number of people are going to be affected by what is done with a piece of property, why shouldn't they have a say in what is done with it?

It would depend upon how they were affected.

What if the farmers just
decide not to sell their crops one year and inflict mass starvation?

The farmers aren't inflicting starvation.

When the community's decided use for the property is more likely to lead
to a morally superior outcome...

Morally superior according to whom and according to what metric?

[ceruleanhansen]

 

The farmers aren't inflicting starvation.

 

They are knowingly choosing to let everyone else starve. You might think it is acceptable for them to do that, but at least do so honestly.

 

Morally superior according to whom and according to what metric?

 

According to the rational moral intuitions of those involved. Even Molyneux doesn't go farther than claming that our moral intuitions (at least, the logically consistent and universally applicable ones) can be derived from a set of first principles. Moralist positions such as those presented by Molyneux are essentially descriptivist. The is-ought problem has not been solved, so if you are going to be a moralist you can't really have a rational source for your moral claims other than moral intuitions. Molyneux's view is fine here, and I agree with the principle that the human moral intuitions that are capable of consistent, universal application (categorical imperatives, in the language of Kantianism), but the standards for who can own property according to his views do not really seem consistent with any first principles. My inquiry here can be more succinctly summarized like this: What makes a certain kind of property morally valid, and from what moral principles does such ownership derive?

[Magnus]

 

 

At what point in this rilvalrous contest over control of these objects does a popular vote become ethically superior to the Prior User's right to control these objects?

 

 When the community's decided use for the property is more likely to lead
to a morally superior outcome to the Prior User's decision.

 

 

This is the root of your confusion -- what you said here is circular reasoning. You haven't answered the question at all.

As Alan said, you have not identified the criteria by which you identify the "morally superior outcome."  What is the ethical principle that enables you to distinguish ethical and unethical behavior?

(I prefer to use the term "ethics" instead of "morals," but here I mean essentially the same thing.)

[Arius]

The is-ought problem has not been solved, so if you are going to be a moralist you can't really have a rational source for your moral claims other than moral intuitions.

Whew.  I was afraid there was a reason I should believe anything you say.

 

[ceruleanhansen]

 

Whew.  I was afraid there was a reason I should believe anything you say.

 

Being passive aggressive isn't a substitute for an argument. Grow up. I am not asking you to believe anything I say, I am asking you why you believe what you believe. I came here to learn. Stefan's book Universally Preferable Behavior explicitly mentions that it has not solved the is-ought problem.

[ceruleanhansen]

 

As Alan said, you have not identified the criteria by which you identify the "morally superior outcome."  What is the ethical principle that enables you to distinguish ethical and unethical behavior?

 

As a nihilist I do not have any ethical principles. Perhaps that makes me "evil" according to moralists, but it is the honest outcome of my thinking. I mentioned democracy because I believe it to be just as arbitrary as homesteading in a moral sense. But it seems like the claim of the propertarian anarchists derives from descriptivist ethics. That is, it attempts to find the consistent axioms upon which our moral intuition is based. This is more psychological than philosophical, but that is irrelevent - I don't see how the specific circumstances under which a propertarian anarchist calls property valid or invalid are at all related to any such axioms (I believe the term Molyneux uses is "first principles", but I am a newbie and don't want to misuse that phrase in case it means more than that).

 

(I prefer to use the term "ethics" instead of "morals," but here I mean essentially the same thing.)

 

That sounds interesting, what is the distinction? I sometimes use ethics to mean a theory of morality, and morals to mean the judgments that result from an ethical theory's application. Most ethical theorists I meet use them interchangeably though, and I've picked up the habit myself.

 

[Alan C.]

They are knowingly choosing to let everyone else starve. You might think it is acceptable for them to do that...

Whether or not I think it's acceptable is beside the point.

In the scenario you presented, you said that the farmers were "inflicting" starvation. The farmers are not the cause.

In centrally planned economies (eg. North Korea) people are prevented from feeding themselves by threats of physical harm from the State. That's inflicting starvation.

If your neighbor refuses to grow food for you, he isn't inflicting starvation. If he refuses to suture your wound, he isn't inflicting bleeding. If he refuses to brush your teeth, he isn't inflicting cavities.

What makes a certain kind of property morally valid, and from what moral principles does such ownership derive?

Property becomes morally valid when the producer respects the freedom of others to likewise produce property of their own. The principles involved are established by his behavior (ie. demonstrated preference).

[Arius]

Being passive aggressive isn't a substitute for an argument.

It's interesting you interpret my response that way.  I was genuinely relieved that you make statements with no expectation of belief on the part of others.

Grow up.

As it is an inevitability that that will occur, I assume you're trying to hurt my feelings.  Discussion and debate are not wars of wills.  You may, if it is your desire, say anything about me.  Thrashing wildly will not help you get at the truth.

I am not asking you to believe anything I say

Should I believe that?

Stefan's book Universally Preferable Behavior explicitly mentions that it has not solved the is-ought problem.

It does.  The is/ought problem is irrelevant.

Of the many assumptions we make by arguing, the most curious is this: if a proposition is true, it ought to be believed.  You see, if I should believe the things you say because they are true...well then, we've already crossed the is/ought problem.  If that's not the case, then there's no rational reason for anyone to believe anything you say.  From the implicit acceptance of the value of truth while arguing, the rest of the moral argument is developed.  If you do want to learn, I recommend starting at the beginning.

 

[ceruleanhansen]

 

Being passive aggressive isn't a substitute for an argument.

It's interesting you interpret my response that way.  I was genuinely relieved that you make statements with no expectation of belief on the part of others.

Grow up.

As it is an inevitability that that will occur, I assume you're trying to hurt my feelings.  Discussion and debate are not wars of wills.  You may, if it is your desire, say anything about me.  Thrashing wildly will not help you get at the truth.

I am not asking you to believe anything I say

Should I believe that?

Stefan's book Universally Preferable Behavior explicitly mentions that it has not solved the is-ought problem.

It does.  The is/ought problem is irrelevant.

Of the many assumptions we make by arguing, the most curious is this: if a proposition is true, it ought to be believed.  You see, if I should believe the things you say because they are true...well then, we've already crossed the is/ought problem.  If that's not the case, then there's no rational reason for anyone to believe anything you say.  From the implicit acceptance of the value of truth while arguing, the rest of the moral argument is developed.  If you do want to learn, I recommend starting at the beginning.

 

 

I am too defensive. I'll eat something and try to inch away from the edge of attack. I apologize!

[Arius]

I am too defensive. I'll eat something and try to inch away from the edge of attack. I apologize!

It's cool.  I get irritable sometimes too.

[Magnus]

 

As a nihilist I do not have any ethical principles.

 

Then why are you bothering to engage in the pretense of rational argumentation?

 

Perhaps that makes me "evil" according to moralists, but it is the honest outcome of my thinking.

 

I don't consider thinking, in and of itself, to be either evil or good.  I reserve the idea of good and bad for things that occur in the real, material world -- i.e., economic goods (and evils), things that are desired or un-desired.

 

I mentioned democracy because I believe it to be just as arbitrary as homesteading in a moral sense.

 

Democracy is more than arbitrary -- it is patently unethical.  It is the infliction of aggressive force according to the ratio of some groups' members' temporarily-aligned preferences.  Acts that are taken in the name of democracy are considered "ethical" one minute, but the same act is considered unethical when it is performed 5 minutes later, if the winds of preference of the "swing voters" happen blow in the other direction.  That's not an ethic.  That's just a gang.

 

 

 

(I prefer to use the term "ethics" instead of "morals," but here I mean essentially the same thing.)

 

That sounds interesting, what is the distinction? I sometimes use ethics to mean a theory of morality, and morals to mean the judgments that result from an ethical theory's application. Most ethical theorists I meet use them interchangeably though, and I've picked up the habit myself.

 

 

An ethic is a principle.  It is an abstract assertion that, out of the universe of all possible human actions, they can be divided into two categories -- unethical, and not-unethical. 

(As a matter of convenience, we can also label these two categories "ethical" and "unethical," but then that runs in the problem of some acts being ethically neutral, or "non-ethical."  To avoid that problem, it is a simple matter to lump non-ethical acts into the category of acts that are "not-unethical."  The point is to identify acts that are unethical (i.e., "wrong").) 

An ethic is the method used to draw the line between these two categories -- a metric, a rubric, a heuristic, a rule, a criterion.  An ethic is a hierarchical set of rules used to categorize the set of all possible human acts into those that are unethical and those that are not. 

The first, obvious feature of ethics that we can deduce from this premise is that an act cannot be both unethical and not-unethical at the same time.  It is either one or the other.  That's implicit in the premise that acts can be sorted according to their ethical character. If we fail to do that, we've done nothing.

The second feature of ethics is that acts are categorized according to type -- the whole idea of sorting all possible human acts into one of these two categories is to avoid arbitrariness.  We could, I suppose, arbitrarily call some acts unethical and some acts not-unethical, and just go about our day randomly deciding that we're going to consider whatever we see happening on Wednesdays to be unethical, but everything happening on Thursdays is not-unethical.  Or we could just assign rightness or wrongness in a way that's totally random, minute by minute.  But if we do that, we haven't articulated a principle at all.  Two acts that are virtually identical could end up being characterized the opposite way from one another, for no reason.  The whole point of ethics is to articulate the reason for making ethical distinctions.  To do that, acts are lumped together into groups.  For example, we could conclude that certain homicides are considered murder (i.e., unethical homicide).  But murders that are committed by guns are no different from murders committed by knives (or any other instrument).  In other words, the particular weapon used has no ethical relevance in defining murder. The ethic that defines murder includes all types of behavior that cause death. If a type of action in question changes its ethical character from other acts otherwise of the same type, then we need to state the distinction in the ethical principle. 

In contrast, a "moral" is just a social custom. I can see why you have trouble distinguishing between ethics and morals.  For you, they are the same thing -- ethics are just social conventions, habits and customs disguised as ethical principles. One example is that many cultures have declared that it's moral for one group to enslave another, but not moral for the slaves to revolt and enslave their former masters. ("It's right for me but not for thee.")

However, the whole point of ethical philosophy is to identify the principles of ethics that are derived from reason (i.e., truth).  An ethicist would not consider mere habit and custom (or history or culture), whether by one person or a million, to define an ethical principle. 

Ethical reasoning is akin to any other form of reasoning, such as mathematical or logical reasoning.  Mathematics is the study of what must be true.  If we say that 2+2=4, and we also say that 2+2=5, and we also say that 4 is not equal to 5, then we are talking nonsense.  It's just gibberish.  There's no reason we can't use the symbol that looks like a "5" to represent what we know to be the number "4," but if 4 and 5 are different, then 2+2 cannot equal 4 and 5 at the same time. 

Ethics works in a similar way, but it concerns human social behavior rather than quantities.

[Tyff]

To the OP: I think it's crucial that you explain how aggression could be defined outside of property, sense all aggression refers to the concept of property.

 

[Mister Mister]

   I would accept the self-ownership principle, and I think that extends to objects we create from nature, or trade for goods/services we create.  Also I reject the concept of collective ownership, as owning really means who acts to direct an object in some way, and collectives cannot act.    There are two issues that I have given me some pause and I am still trying to work out.  One is the typical Marxist argument when a large number of people get together to produce something, and a small number of them get to direct the profit.  I sympathize with this argument, but I still see the problems with it.  As long as the workers are working voluntarily, it seems to me that they are getting the highest value for their labor relative to their ability to negotiate.  Also, where does it end?  If I want to make a guitar, I have to pay for someone to cut down the tree, the people who make the saw, which may involve mining iron and making steel, the people who make the finnish, etc.  The communist would say I am exploiting them and that they own a part of the guitar, or part of the profits if I sell it for more than the work that they all put into it.  I think this ignores the value of an individual envisioning a product and acting to bring it about, which multiplies the value from all the materials and labor involved.

  The other is when the use of property has costs upon others, the so-called externality argument.  I am still learning about this, but I think it is clear that the State does not solve this, as the State creates more externalities than anyone else, without ever paying for them.  Still I am not clear on how the market would deal with some of these things.

[Alan C.]

[view:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOzotWrHheU:640:390]

[Rick Horton]

 

To the OP: I think it's crucial that you explain how aggression could be defined outside of property, sense all aggression refers to the concept of property.

 

 

 

I see it that way as well. Property = force. And what is property if it is not something people have to agree on? But, then that isn't enough either since not everybody will ever agree on anything.  So property is an idea, but not a thing. Holding on to something you want to keep doesn't make it yours no matter how much you want it to be. That doesn't mean we shouldn't or don't try to do it. But morals have ZERO authority besides the one deciding to hold on to a thing, in determining who gets what. After all, once there is an outside entity, or subject that is partial in deciding who gets what, or what you can have, you are experiencing FORCE. 

[Arius]

I think it's fair to say that, given a free-market, Marx's claims are questionable.  Surplus value itself would be a matter of mutual agreement in a society which did not use violence to solve social problems.  In the real world, the capitalist enjoys numerous state protections (Most of which are paid for by taxes on workers' labor).  I don't believe the theory was intended to describe the idealized world of employment through voluntary mutual negotiation.  Rather, it describes the real world, where the state forces workers into tight, hyper-competitive pockets of low-wage labor markets, but props-up capital owners by establishing and enforcing a complex stabilization and support model.  Of course, the problem is the state, not ownership.

I don't think it's reasonable to describe the current economic system in terms of an idealized free market.  The two types of economy are simply alien to one another.

[Rick Horton]

 

 

To the OP: I think it's crucial that you explain how aggression could be defined outside of property, sense all aggression refers to the concept of property.

 

 

 

I see it that way as well. Property = force. And what is property if it is not something people have to agree on? But, then that isn't enough either since not everybody will ever agree on anything.  So property is an idea, but not a thing. Holding on to something you want to keep doesn't make it yours no matter how much you want it to be. That doesn't mean we shouldn't or don't try to do it. But morals have ZERO authority besides the one deciding to hold on to a thing, in determining who gets what. After all, once there is an outside entity, or subject that is partial in deciding who gets what, or what you can have, you are experiencing FORCE. 

 

I think that this is a huge error in the NAP. Obviously we cannot avoid force, and the NAP hasn't dealt with it in any detail that can be measured in any way what ever so.

[Arius]

Obviously we cannot avoid force

Insomuch as one person can avoid asserting involuntary authority over another, we can actually avoid force.  Look at you and I, we don't force each other to do anything.  I don't demand you do things.  I don't threaten, harass, bully, or battle you, and you return the favor.  Why is it impossible for us to avoid force?  We seem to be doing it right now.

[Rick Horton]

 

Obviously we cannot avoid force

Insomuch as one person can avoid asserting involuntary authority over another, we can actually avoid force.  Look at you and I, we don't force each other to do anything.  I don't demand you do things.  I don't threaten, harass, bully, or battle you, and you return the favor.  Why is it impossible for us to avoid force?  We seem to be doing it right now.

 

But we have no property dispute

[Arius]

Rather than a general rule of us needing force, you mean force is necessary to resolve property disputes?  Is that in few, about half, most, or all cases?

Is this the logical extension of the log cabin/fishing hole example you proposed in your video?  Wherein, the log cabin guy and the fishing hole guy cannot reach an accord about the best use of the fishing/cabin area  It's a very Leviathan-esque story.

I think you have an interesting point about the relationship between violence and obstinance in cases of property disputes.  It's something I've been dwelling on.  I can see three non-violent solutions. Either people can be less obstinate (which I see as the preferable solution); or people must, as a foundational activity of forming a group, develop (and agree to) a system for resolving disputes; or (as a dialectic solution) the house can be built in some way that does not impede the ability to fish in the hole (people can all work-around each other).

 

[lyghtningrod]

 

 When the community's decided use for the property is more likely to lead
to a morally superior outcome to the Prior User's decision.

 

 

As a nihilist I do not have any ethical principles.

 

 

moral |ˈmôrəl; ˈmär-|
adjective
concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character

Isn't talking about a 'morally superior outcome' a direct contradiction of your claim to be a nihilist? How can there be a 'morally superior outcome' when you deny the existence of principles?

[Mister Mister]

   To be fair you were being a little passive agressive.  If you were really glad to not believe him you wouldn't have written anything.