Large Error in UPB - Confusing 'Opposite' and 'Negation' (Destroys attempted disproof of positive obligations)

[FiddlertheLeper]

It's not a question of whether you can prove it or not, it's a question of whether it is objectively true or not. Is there a fact either way as to whether one has a preference for x or y? Certainly Stefan's theory demands it. He claims people have preferences for certain things. This is essential to UPB, read appendix a: upb in a nutshell. Whether some preferences are objectively right or wrong doesn't affect whether those preferences EXIST! You're confusing what can be objectively considered to exist vs. what can be objectively considered right/wrong. Nothing I've said entails that it isn't the case that people can prefer certain things to other things...

While i personally disagree with your arguments against the coma test, i do agree that the lack of proof for subjective preferances does not equate to them not existing, or for them to "ought" not to exist.However, with regards to your overall argument, there are a number of problems, many of which have been stated in one form or another, and while you claim to have read and thought on these subjects, i see no real reflection of the position within your own arguments.  there remains a core problem i see in your arguments, Stefan is arguing against the idea of positive obligations being a requirement of morality, and the reason's for this are indeed sound within the framework of his theory.  If it cannot be universalized it doesn't work within the framework of UPB, positive obligations cannot be universalized, if everyone gives to charity, there would be no one for the charity to go to.  But the heart of the problem i see with your position, is that your actually affirming stefan's argument with your own position.  His argument that since we cannot possibly expect everyone to follow positive moral obligations (due to inability, lack of knowledge, etc) they cannot be universalized, and therefore do not work for UPB.  Stefan clearly stated that the person in a coma was not doing anything immoral, and thus positive obligation is unable to be universalized, thus does not work within UPB.  Am i mistaken in believing that is the same thing your saying?  if so please correct me, as i wish to address your argument from as objective and logical a position as i can.

 

Now his way of stating this may be confusing to you and others, that is entirely possible, but your confusion on his terms does not dismantle the underlying premises, which form the argument.  That, however is different from an objective fault, i have all but the last few of your posts, (as it has derailed from the original argument on to many while relevant in a sense tangents, that do not however directly reflect, or pertain to the original argument.) and i have yet to see anything that actually disproves UPB as you claim, since you seem very sure that UPB is wrong, could you possibly do your own version of the Appendix on UPB (the UPB in a Nutshell section), just a short logic train that will articulate or clarify the underlying falsehood of UPB? I in the very least would find it very helpful for figuring out if my disagreement with your argument stems from a misunderstanding of your position, or if it stems from an actual objective problem.  now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible.  Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon.   Thanks for your concern with insuring we are not basing a foundation moral theory on something that is not consistent with logic and evidence. hopefully we can get to the root of this, and figure out the objective value of your proposition, and either affirm Stefan's theory (in this regard) or affirm your position that is an incorrect theory.

[Trane]

Then tell me whether it is objectively true or not.

Whether *what* is? That people can prefer things? Yes, that is objectively true, e.g. I prefer apples to watermelons. It's a question of psychology.(Edit - lol, who voted down? What is there here to disagree with?!)

@FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible.  Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps! 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

@ProfessionalTeabagger

I'm afraid I just cannot follow you, to me it appears quite clear that two seperate concepts are being used. In any case, Flake is correct that this section could be tightened up. Just the way that when he uses opposite (of let's say x) one time it is 'not-x' and the other it is 'y, which is diametrically opposed to x' is not rigorous or clear in the manner that we would expect from a philosopher in his magnum opus. He should define 'opposite' before using it (he often correctly stresses the import of defining terms.)"Once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. "Couldn't it just be that I have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you do too (which your presence on the forum suggests) and so correct you because I believe that it satisfies your subjective preferences?

 

 

You just bypass all counter-arguments by claiming you can't follow me and that it appears to you that your original objection is correct and that's IT? Don't you think it you should attempt meet your own standards of rigor by least citing the parts you can't follow and what it is you don't understand about them?

 

You claimed the negation of stealing is not everything other than stealing. I gave you a dictionary definition of "negation" that may demonstrate that you are wrong. What do you not understand about that?

You claimed the opposite of stealing is NOT respecting property rights. I told you that not "respecting property rights" IS a definition being used in the section you're referring to. What is it that you can't follow about this?

I claimed that you have not actually demonstrated any equivocation but only asserted your own interpretation of "not stealing" (after having it pointed out to you that "refraining from theft" and "violating property rights " are used in the same context). What is it that you don't get about this?

If you do not respond to these objections and others directly then why should anyone take you seriously or not conclude you are a disingenuous person who is deliberately misconstruing the the phrase "not stealing"? 

 

If he should  define "opposite" before he uses it then why don't you define it in your objection?

Whether Flake is right or not is irrelevant to your objection? Your objection is that Stefan is equivocating by conflating "opposite" with "negation" and that because of this his disproof of positive moral obligations is destroyed and that the book should be completely rewritten. It is not that it needs to be "tightened up".  Demonstrate your main objection is correct or concede that you can't. 

 

As for the other thing- YES it could just be true that you have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you I do too (which my presence on the forum suggests) and so correct me because you believe that it satisfies my subjective preferences.

So what? What the hell has that got to do with it? I said that once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. If you correct me then logically it must be according to an objective standard, right? Otherwise it's not a correction. That standard must be universal, right? Being in accord with it must be a preferred state, right? Otherwise it cannot be wrong; just different. If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. 

 

 

 

[Wesley]

The past several posts have been me asking you what you mean with your rotating definitions of true, right, wrong, exists, objectively wrong, false, etc, etc, etc. I have not be arguing hardly anything, but trying to use your terms from the previous post to ask what you mean. You then rotate the terms to something else to conflate the issue more. This does not seem to be getting me anywhere fast. I feel frustrated and I no longer have a desire to continue this discussion.

[Trane]

@WesleyI wouldn't feel like continuing either if the guy supposedly on your side just agreed with me that you were wrong!!"While i personally disagree with your arguments against the coma test, i do agree that the lack of proof for subjective preferances does not equate to them not existing, or for them to "ought" not to exist." - FiddlertheLeper

[kospe]

I want to try to clarify something for Trane. People are saying that, since he said that Stefan's UPB is flawed, he is practicing UBP and therefore his argument is invalid. I'm going to put aside the debate about whether or not Trane is showing universal preferences. I don't believe Trane has ever said that there are no universal preferences, he has simply said that Stefan's conception of it is flawed. Now, even if Trane's denial of Stefan's conception of UPB shows universal preference, that doesn't invalidate his claim that about negation vs. opposite, it simply means that there are universal preferences but Stefan has drawn false implications from that fact. Does that make sense?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'.

 

 

This fails. Those in need is not specific.  Anyone can claim to be in need and giving can be defined any way. Completely retarded.

If it is a moral obligation then people are obliged to give. That means they must give or be forced to give. This renders the "giving" part irrelevant. If the rich do not give then "those in need" can take because the rich are not meeting their moral obligation. So the positive moral obligation of "if you are rich, give to those in need" is identical to "if you are poor, take from the rich". Of course welfare statists never put it this way or else their thuggery would become apparent.

 

Edited September 6, 2013 by ProfessionalTeabagger

[Trane]

@ProTeabagger"As for the other thing- YES it could just be true that you have a subjective preference for using sound arguments, believe that you I do too (which my presence on the forum suggests) and so correct me because you believe that it satisfies my subjective preferences.

So what? What the hell has that got to do with it? I said that once you correct someone you are appealing to an objective standard. That standard must be universal and alignment with it must be preferable to all other states. If you correct me then logically it must be according to an objective standard, right? Otherwise it's not a correction. That standard must be universal, right? Being in accord with it must be a preferred state, right? Otherwise it cannot be wrong; just different. If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "The arguments Stefan makes that are erroneous are objectively unsound. That standard is universal - whether a conclusion follows from its premises/whether the premises are true are factual is-statements. That isn't the same as appealing to a universal MORAL standard, positing universal values."If it is not a preferable state to, say, have your propositions conform to reason and evidence / truth then the whole concept of correction is a logical non-starter. "I understood that YOU held it subjectively that you prefer to have your propositions conform to reason and evidence/truth? I do also. I'm not claiming that it is objectively moral or universally preferable that you OUGHT to have that preference. However, you do (don't you?) so I am operating on that basis. If you were to say that you do not value reason and evidence whatsoever then I wouldn't correct you as you would be beyond reason, and I wouldn't claim that you objectively should value those things. The concept of correction is not a logical non-starter in this sense - if an argument is unsound, it may be improved and perhaps become valid, sound, or maybe just dispensed with. In the same say, I might say that it is not universally preferable to use accurate dates, whilst still (considering that me and you both have subjective preferences for using the same dates) correcting your ascription of the beginning of WW1 to 1722.Teabagger - re: 'those in need', for argument's sake, let's just make it 'if you are extraordinarily wealthy and others are starving to death due to poverty, you ought to give them just enough to survive'. That is a universalizable moral rule in the sense that it can be applied to all moral agents. Stefan claims such positive obligations are not universalizable. That is false.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I want to try to clarify something for Trane. People are saying that, since he said that Stefan's UPB is flawed, he is practicing UBP and therefore his argument is invalid. I'm going to put aside the debate about whether or not Trane is showing universal preferences. I don't believe Trane has ever said that there are no universal preferences, he has simply said that Stefan's conception of it is flawed. Now, even if Trane's denial of Stefan's conception of UPB shows universal preference, that doesn't invalidate his claim that about negation vs. opposite, it simply means that there are universal preferences but Stefan has drawn false implications from that fact. Does that make sense?

 

 

I'm confused by your post Kospe. Who said that because Trane stated UPB was wrong his argument about confusing "opposite" with "negation" was wrong? Could you make a list of those people who are saying this and quote them?

[Kevin Beal]

I don't make the claim that you objectively ought to believe things that are based on reason and evidence. I have a subjective preference for basing beliefs on reason and evidence and I assume that you have this preference also based on your presence here.

 

Nope. But this is a contradiction. You aren't asking me to accept your conclusion like you like vanilla ice cream. It is incumbent upon me to accept your conclusion if it's true because I prefer truth over falsehood. That is what you are communicating to me. It's a rational standard that is true regardless of your preferences and is binding on me.

[Trane]

@KevinBeal'Nope' as in you don't value basing your beliefs on reason and evidence? If not, please let me know as this is quite relevant!Can you explain exactly where the contradiction is? There's a hidden ought-statement there which is that 'you ought (or have reason) to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences', I don't claim that myself, but I expect you would claim that you are taking the relevant action to base your beliefs on reason and evidence. Once again, given your presence on a forum valuing reason and evidence as a method for coming to true beliefs I think it is reasonable for me to assume that you have that preference.I would not claim it to be objectively true regardless of your preferences that you ought to take the necessary action to achieve your preferences, so we disagree there. That itself is a subjective preference you may or may not hold.

[kospe]

Sure ProfessionalTeabagger

If there's some better way than UPB, then use that instead of using UPB to explain how UPB is wrong.

 

Trane is not saying that UPB should be re-written because that's his preference, but because of a standard for correct behavior that is true regardless of his preferences. Something like "it is UPB to re-write a book when there are big errors in it".

 

In fact the whole thing stinks of false moralizing.

 

Someone familiar with UPB should be aware of when they are using UPB, especially when they are criticizing it. Otherwise I'm inclined not to believe that they know what the flip they are talking about.

This is the best example I could find, but as I think about it, there could be other possibilities. Originally when I wrote by post, I was assuming (although I didn't realize I was assuming this until now) that this discussion about whether or not denying UPB actually confirms it was irrelevant (although still important) to the question in Trane's original post unless it was being used to answer Trane's criticism. In other words, I was thinking that, since this forum topic is about negation vs. opposite, there wouldn't be a discussion about debating and UPB unless you trying to answer Trane's attack. It is possible that this forum simply got side-tracked, as often happens, and it was foolish of me to assume one way or the other.

 

As far as what Kevin Beal said, it's possible he simply misworded his statement and he meant to say something else. If not, then my original post is directed to him.

[FiddlertheLeper]

@WesleyI wouldn't feel like continuing either if the guy supposedly on your side just agreed with me that you were wrong!!"While i personally disagree with your arguments against the coma test, i do agree that the lack of proof for subjective preferances does not equate to them not existing, or for them to "ought" not to exist." - FiddlertheLeper

Wait did you really just cherry pick my post, ignoring every single thing i said, except the one thing that could be twisted to work in favor of your argument? i now understand why people are having such a hard time getting through to you, your not at all interested in either UPB or the premises involved, nor providing any sort of objective feedback/criticism.  You seem to be simply looking for something you can twist to make you sound right and call others wrong/ad-homs/etc which while obviously others are more than willing to engage with you over/about, is still a pretty revealing desire.i would like it very much if you would at least speak to the arguments contained within my post if your going to attempt to quote me to defend your position, as i obviously do not agree with your position, so taking my words and trying to use them to support your position, is both disingenuous and quite rude.  I am more than happy to debate your original thought/post, or even what ever tangent you have now wandered onto.  But this would require actual debate, answering the points contained within posts is kind of central to that on a forum site.   

[Dave Bockman]

When you state that UPB is in error, you are validating UPB. When you say that UPB is false, and here is the evidence backing up my assertion, that's UPB. You cannot debate without UPB.

 

You cannot debate without UPB <----- that is a valid truth assertion

 

I would respectfully ask those interested to listen to this podcast: http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_872_Debating_and_UPB.mp3

hey that embedded player is cool

[Trane]

@FiddlertheLeperMan, I responded to you at length! Maybe you missed it, here it is again. I made a point of how polite and friendly you were so it is a shame you got the wrong end of the stick!"@FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible.  Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!""your not at all interested in either UPB or the premises involved, nor providing any sort of objective feedback/criticism." I hope you see that this was incorrect! 

@DaveThanks for the link, but you can debate without UPB. We may both have subjective preferences for having beliefs based on sound arguments. In that context, we can argue and debate things which we believe without positing UPB. If we told all others that they OUGHT to base their beliefs on sound arguments, then THAT would be invoking UPB (objective moral facts). However, in discussing, we are not necessarily doing that, since we may just share subjective preferences for truth over falsehood and beliefs based on sound argumentation.Thanks for posting the link!

[FiddlertheLeper]

@FiddlertheLeperMan, I responded to you at length! Maybe you missed it, here it is again. I made a point of how polite and friendly you were so it is a shame you got the wrong end of the stick!"@FiddlerTheLeperHey, thanks for your polite response!Stefan has a bizarre conception of what positive obligations would look like which is pointed out well by David Gordon. (Read 'The Molyneux Problem' and even better 'Mr Molyneux Responds'. Here's an example of a positive obligstion - 'If you are rich, give to those in need'. This is universalizable in the relevant sense - there's no reason this law couldn't be applied to everyone. Sometimes Stefan seems to misunderstand the concept of universalizability, imagining that it means moral rules can make no references to particular classes or circumstances. This is clearly false though - e.g. 'one may not use violence except in self-defense'. This rule makes reference to a particular class (those moral agents under attack) but that does mean that it cannot be applied to all moral agents equally! Therefore, this idea Stefan has that any positive obligation to give to charity would result in all giving to charity ceaselessly thus being self refuting since there is nobody left to give to (!) is nonsensical."now on to the other issue i have, throughout this thread you have continually stated appeals to objective reality, and it's importance, saying the your observation proves something "false" and it should be changed to no longer be "false" or regarded as invalid if no such change is possible.  Is most definately you placing obligations on others and exactly the behavior UPB is based upon. "That's not quite right - I am only saying that others are presenting unsound arguments and given their subjective preference for believing things based on sound arguments I would imagine I am assisting them by helping them to correct their arguments. I have never claimed that they objectively should value reason and evidence, only pointed out that despite this preference of theirs, they are nevertheless acting irrationally, and if they wish to be correct, they have reason to change their stance.Hope that helps!""your not at all interested in either UPB or the premises involved, nor providing any sort of objective feedback/criticism." I hope you see that this was incorrect!

I apologize, i did indeed miss this post.  thanks for quoting it again and pointing it out to me. 

 

Personally i find the idea of categorizing universals to only apply to certain groups, or to exclude certain groups to be while objectively possible and factually correct problematic. I come to this position on a couple of thoughts, (please note that i like many others here missed what you pointed out in how this is already used in the terms of self-defense, so this is all my initial response, and after time to reflect on the revelation i may indeed change my position, in other words, this is all off the top of my head) First would be that while self defense is a categorization of an action (or reaction in this case) I.e. anyone with the ability to control their own body can attempt to defend themselves, this is to me different proposition than one depending on actual difference's between individuals (i.e. rich/poor/etc).  Now this may seem arbitrary but hear me out, if a classification can be applied to all moral agents ( which, i know is a classification in it'self) like self defense, to me it fits UPB, and my basic understanding of morality (UPB definition or not).  But when a classification requires a qualifier like money or race, or class etc it becomes dangerous, and should be used with extreme caution, lest we wind up in a similar situation as we are now (killing is wrong, unless your a soldier, Stealing is wrong, unless your a tax collector, kidnapping is wrong, unless your a police officer etc).  

 

My second thought on the subject is that i have trouble thinking of any external classification with any sort of meaning that is possible to universalize itself not everyone can be rich, (as rich requires someone to be poor in order to have a meaning, if everyone was rich, we all just be average not rich. not the best wording i know, but i hope the basic idea is being transmitted) now i do not think these nullify the objective truth that according to definition universalization can be specific to a class as you pointed out, but i do feel that it should be avoided within any framework for an objective morale theory, for the reason i stated above, it's the fact that two groups of humans can have different (in fact opposite) rules to be moral that has created horrid things like Government, but while my observation is objective, my preference is subjective. 

 

This leads me to believe that while having a moral framework that regards external qualifies for positive obligations is possible in the sense of not contradicting itself or it's rules, that the benefit to having this clause included do not outweigh the possibilities for negatives.  Now classifications for actions taken against one another to me seems slightly different, as you have no control over the actions of another, but qualifications or classifications based on things such as relative wealth, health, race, etc seem to open up far too many complications, too many situations where something not ok, becomes ok, or vica-versa.  This would in my opinion leave morality in a state similar to our legal system with endless appeals and footnotes and objections exemptions etc, while a moral framework like this would certainly be possible to at least some extent, i would definitely not see such a framework as ideal, and believe the simplicity of UPB is one of it's triumphs.I also personally do not like the idea of positive obligations within morality, morality then becomes a controlling system like it is now, a framework that does not include qualifications or classifications (or at the very least avoids them wherever possible) seems to me to be far superior.  But this is, as far as i know, all my subjective preference.  To me, adding these kinds of qualifying classes runs the risk of the old child's book "If you give a mouse a cookie" scenario.

[Trane]

@FiddlerRe: universality - I'm sure that certain moral rules which make reference to groups may be undesirable. But this wasn't exactly the point. Rather Stefan claims (e.g. in his statements on gun control) that making reference to groups AT ALL violates universality and so is illogical in terms of morality - these CANNOT be moral rules. As the self defense example shows, this is not the case - rules which make reference to classes may be universalized and so are candidates for moral rules."but i do feel that it should be avoided within any framework for an objective morale theory, for the reason i stated above, it's the fact that two groups of humans can have different (in fact opposite) rules to be moral that has created horrid things like Government, but while my observation is objective, my preference is subjective." But with the self-defense example you don't have this problem. This suggests that it isn't really the feature of seperate classes that worries you, but rather certain particular cases where you feel the distinction is arbitrary and unjustified. (E.g. it is wrong to rape unless you have ginger hair.) David Gordon in 'Mr Molyneux Responds' says just this, that we need to critique rules on a case by case basis - but Stefan's sweeping proclamations that making reference to classes violates universality is false and should be retracted."I also personally do not like the idea of positive obligations within morality, morality then becomes a controlling system like it is now, a framework that does not include qualifications or classifications (or at the very least avoids them wherever possible) seems to me to be far superior.  But this is, as far as i know, all my subjective preference.  To me, adding these kinds of qualifying classes runs the risk of the old child's book "If you give a mouse a cookie" scenario."Morality in Stefan's sense is also a 'controlling system' - for example, it is just to be able to remove somebody who is on your property. Of course you would consider this just control, but it is control none the less, and left-anarchists (I'm not one) would consider it oppressive. So you can't just appeal to positive obligations being 'controlling' as a reason to reject them, since Stefan's moral system similarly restricts movement (e.g. to the property-less) and any moral system will similarly seek to prohibit actions it deems unjust.Finally, notice that you are arguing against positive obligations being part of a moral system based on their consequences particuarly the risk of abuse. This is an argument we could have - but its assumptions are consequentialist (which Stefan would denounce.) UPB doesn't say that positive obligations have bad consequences and so are immoral, it says that they are IMPOSSIBLE because they violate universality. That is false.(Btw, note that all this is seperate from the discussion regarding objectivity of preferences. I could believe that some preferences were objectively good to hold but still recognise that Stefan is erring in claiming that positive obligations necessarily violate universality.)

[FiddlertheLeper]

@FiddlerRe: universality - I'm sure that certain moral rules which make reference to groups may be undesirable. But this wasn't exactly the point. Rather Stefan claims (e.g. in his statements on gun control) that making reference to groups AT ALL violates universality and so is illogical in terms of morality - these CANNOT be moral rules. As the self defense example shows, this is not the case - rules which make reference to classes may be universalized and so are candidates for moral rules."but i do feel that it should be avoided within any framework for an objective morale theory, for the reason i stated above, it's the fact that two groups of humans can have different (in fact opposite) rules to be moral that has created horrid things like Government, but while my observation is objective, my preference is subjective." But with the self-defense example you don't have this problem. This suggests that it isn't really the feature of seperate classes that worries you, but rather certain particular cases where you feel the distinction is arbitrary and unjustified. (E.g. it is wrong to rape unless you have ginger hair.) David Gordon in 'Mr Molyneux Responds' says just this, that we need to critique rules on a case by case basis - but Stefan's sweeping proclamations that making reference to classes violates universality is false and should be retracted."I also personally do not like the idea of positive obligations within morality, morality then becomes a controlling system like it is now, a framework that does not include qualifications or classifications (or at the very least avoids them wherever possible) seems to me to be far superior.  But this is, as far as i know, all my subjective preference.  To me, adding these kinds of qualifying classes runs the risk of the old child's book "If you give a mouse a cookie" scenario."Morality in Stefan's sense is also a 'controlling system' - for example, it is just to be able to remove somebody who is on your property. Of course you would consider this just control, but it is control none the less, and left-anarchists (I'm not one) would consider it oppressive. So you can't just appeal to positive obligations being 'controlling' as a reason to reject them, since Stefan's moral system similarly restricts movement (e.g. to the property-less) and any moral system will similarly seek to prohibit actions it deems unjust.Finally, notice that you are arguing against positive obligations being part of a moral system based on their consequences particuarly the risk of abuse. This is an argument we could have - but its assumptions are consequentialist (which Stefan would denounce.) UPB doesn't say that positive obligations have bad consequences and so are immoral, it says that they are IMPOSSIBLE because they violate universality. That is false.(Btw, note that all this is seperate from the discussion regarding objectivity of preferences. I could believe that some preferences were objectively good to hold but still recognise that Stefan is erring in claiming that positive obligations necessarily violate universality.)

I am glad i was wrong about you, this is turning into an interesting discussion (for me, not trying to imply it wasn't for you or others beforehand).  To your first point, not sure if my clarification will make any difference or if it even has a leg to stand on so to speak, but to me the difference comes down to classes defined by attributes, versus classes defined by actions.  Self defense is a response to an action (an attack against you), the positive obligation of charity is a response to an attribute (being rich, or the recipient being poor) i wish i knew the proper way to phrase this, or the terminology, but to me this difference seems important, and is part of my unease with the second kind of class.  Now i don't think this invalidates the idea of classes, but it's only the second type of class where i see major problems, (not implying the first kind is faultless, but responses to actions are less likely to be used as blanket excuses or justifications i think, again this is probably subjective) i would love to get both your feed back and others as to what this implies (for me) is this unease simply a defense mechanism for a bias i hold? or does it have objective value? is there a true difference in the value of classes defined by attributes, versus those defined by actions? 

 

But on to your second point, which i humbly accept, i am not nearly well versed enough in ethics or moral theory to be able to really get down to the nitty gritty and dispute (if it's possible) this idea of classes, and what should or should not be allowed to constitute a class.  I recognize that i am arguing from effect in the case of not wanting a moral framework that allows for different moral rules for different classes, and i am sorry for that, i do not have Stefan's amazing mind or ability (or eloquence) to argue purely from the stand point of morality, perhaps in a good number of years with more work in this area on my part i will be able to, but as of now, i feel i fall short. Now for the control, i guess i should have been more specific, i meant that requiring certain actions to be taken, is different than saying certain actions should not be taken, while if a person wanders on to another's lawn, the owner has the moral right to remove him (without violence) but he is not required to do so to be moral.  To me this difference is (to refer to our current imperfect system, i know an understatement) the difference between "stealing is illegal" (or bad) and "To be legal (or good) you Must pay taxes" the first is valid, the second is not.  Now i don't think this argument is nearly capable of invalidating all positive moral obligations, but it highlights part of the problem i have with the idea.

 

Now for my true subjective preference, i want a moral framework that applies to all humans equally, that only makes any sort of exception to it's rules when you are responding to the actions of another, who has violated the moral rules stated within the framework, and even then, you should be encouraged to use the least immoral means of negating the risk/loss/encroachment available to you, that stands a reasonable chance of success. 

[Dave Bockman]

 

@DaveThanks for the link, but you can debate without UPB. We may both have subjective preferences for having beliefs based on sound arguments. In that context, we can argue and debate things which we believe without positing UPB. If we told all others that they OUGHT to base their beliefs on sound arguments, then THAT would be invoking UPB (objective moral facts). However, in discussing, we are not necessarily doing that, since we may just share subjective preferences for truth over falsehood and beliefs based on sound argumentation.Thanks for posting the link!

 

 

You're welcome, and you're in error.

 

Unless your definition of a debate is not 'the mutual comparisons of potential truth statements to an objective standard'

 

if it is enything other than the above definition, it's not a debate.

 

Also whe you say 'You can have a debate without UPB' and then go on to supply the proof of the validity of your argument, that's UPB.

[Flake]

You're welcome, and you're in error.

 

Unless your definition of a debate is not 'the mutual comparisons of potential truth statements to an objective standard'

 

if it is enything other than the above definition, it's not a debate.

 

Also whe you say 'You can have a debate without UPB' and then go on to supply the proof of the validity of your argument, that's UPB.

 

 

That sounds like some kind of argumentation ethics. Argumentation ethics has been thoroughly refuted.

[Trane]

That sounds like some kind of argumentation ethics. Argumentation ethics has been thoroughly refuted.

Quite. The funny thing is that UPB is basically just a rehashing of Hoppe's argumentation ethics which has been 'thoroughly refuted' by Robert Murphy and Gene Callahan. http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html Definitely worth reading. 

@Dave Bockman, you're confusing objective standards for FACTS and objective standards for VALUES. You can refer to the first (e.g. it is objectively true that WW1 began in 1914) seperate from the second (e.g. it is objectively true that one ought not to lie.) If the objective standard you speak of is the first, then UPB is not assumed within a debate, since the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Similarly, if you mean the second, then the two people may simply have subjective preferences for beliefs based on sound arguments. Thus you can have a debate without UPB, because both myself and the person I am arguing with have a subjective preference for beliefs based on sound arguments, and I don't claim that they objectively ought to have that preference.Edit: downvoting without responding is not an argument, it just reveals that you were emotionally upset by my arguments but cannot effectively respond.Edit 2: Looks like I won! Nobody can refute the arguments against UPB I made. That is very satisfying to me, I must say!

[TDB]

From UPB:"VIRTUE AND ITS OPPOSITE

The opposite of “virtue” must be “vice” – the opposite of “good” must be “evil.” If I propose the moralrule, “thou shalt not steal,” then stealing must be evil, and not stealing must be good. This does not meanthat “refraining from theft” is the sole definition of moral excellence, of course, since a man may be amurderer, but not a thief. We can think of it as a “necessary but not sufficient” requirement for virtue." (p. 65, ‘UPB: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics’)This section is the lynchpin of Stefan’s argument and is combined with the ‘coma test’ to prove that we have no positive obligations. Unfortunately it contained a blatant error, which you’ve probably noticed already. Stefan has confused ‘negation’ and ‘opposite’. 

The negation of giving is not-giving. The negation of black is not-black.

The opposite of giving is taking. The opposite of black is white. 

Not-giving is not identical to taking, nor is not-black identical to white. Thus quite clearly the concepts of ‘negation’ and ‘opposite’ are distinct. 

Showing how Stefan is wrong here has nullified his coma test (p.67). Stefan’s argument is that if we have positive obligations (say, giving to charity), then a man in a coma must be evil, since he is performing the opposite of virtue – not-giving to charity. This is supposedly absurd, since he is unable to avoid his ‘actions’. 

But Stefan’s argument fails because the man is not performing the opposite of giving to charity – merely the negation. He need not be virtuous or wicked. The fact that an action is not virtuous does not prove that it is immoral. Eating ice cream may not be virtuous – does this prove that eating ice cream is immoral? 

This all shows that at the very least, ‘UPB’ needs to be completely rewritten to accommodate these findings. It contains overt errors. This analysis cannot be dismissed as ‘nit-picking’ unless you feel that proving positive obligations do not exist was not a major part of Stefan’s project. Feel free to proclaim yourself a supporter of ‘UPB’ ‘apart from the stuff about positive obligations not existing’, but it would be akin to a Marxist saying ‘well, you can ignore the part about abolishing private property.’ If Stefan won’t correct even this glaring flaw in his work, it raises serious questions about his rigour and credibility. If you are an honest supporter of Stefan, I suggest that you bring this to his attention so that he may revise ‘UPB’ at the earliest opportunity. It would genuinely strenghthen FDR as well as UPB.

Why do you call this "the lynchpin of Stefan's argument?" Seems to me the passage you quote could be edited out of the book without significant loss. And where is the glaring error?

 

'The opposite of “virtue” must be “vice” – the opposite of “good” must be “evil.” If I propose the moral rule, “thou shalt not steal,” then stealing must be evil, and not stealing must be good.'

 

Maybe you are pointing out the difference between 'not stealing' and whatever would be the opposite of stealing. Giving? Or pointing out that 'not stealing' can be 'not evil' without actually being good. This is a quibble. Stefan's words are not very clear or careful, and that is a criticism, but I suspect you could tidy up the prose.

 

'This does not mean that “refraining from theft” is the sole definition of moral excellence, of course, since a man may be amurderer, but not a thief. We can think of it as a “necessary but not sufficient” requirement for virtue.'

 

This part of the quote seems to have nothing to do with your complaint. Maybe I am missing something?

 

If the man in the coma is obligated to give to charity and fails to do so, he fails to meet his obligation, he has done wrong. 'negation' or 'opposite' are beside the point.

 

In other parts of the book, Stefan does some confusing related thought experiments, something like, if stealing was good, we would have to be stealing all the time. At first I had a reaction like yours, if something is good, how does that imply we must always be doing it? I think the answer is that what he really wants to talk about is what can be punished by defensive/retaliatory violence. This is not identical to "bad". We must always be doing the negation of that which is violently punishable. If the punishable act is an act of commission, we must always be omitting it. If it is an act of omission, we must always be committing it.

[LuckyNumber23]

I think OP is right. Here is why. In classical logic any statement is true or false.Example: Today's lottery numbers are 1, 2, 3.When the numbers are correct, the statement is true.When the statement is false, any of these statements can be true:The lottery numbers are: 1, 2, 41, 2, 51, 2, 6...4, 5, 9Since there is no opposite in classical logic, any of these results can be valid. How would you chose the opposite? What is the opposite of 1, 2, 3?In modal logic there is no such thing as opposite as well, just in case you try to come up with a deontological argument for UPB. The problem is too, that classical logic (true / false) and modal logic (good / bad) are lumped together. Btw, this is somewhat similar to the is / ought dichotomy. 

[Kevin Beal]

Opposite

 

 

 

having a position on the other or further side of something; facing something, esp. something of the same type.

 

 

 

diametrically different; of a contrary kind.

 

Statements can absolutely have opposites. That is to say that a diametrically different; of a contrary type. "Negation" is opposite, but also any other kind of mutually exclusive proposition (to the degree to which it is mutually exclusive).

 

UPB looks at theories and it's two primary standards are logical consistency and universality. So obviously UPB is concerned with opposing moral propositions.

 

You cannot say that there are no "opposites" in logic simply by saying that "3 is not the opposite of 4", and especially without defining "opposite". It's just sort of lazy.

[LuckyNumber23]

In classical logic there are only quantifiers (Every and it Exists) and relations (and, or, implication, equality, and negation). This is all that is to it (plus the truth values oc). The negation is not the opposite (only in some cases). Have a look at these statements:- I did not go to the movies. I went to the supermarket.- I did not go to the movies. I had an appointment with the dentist.- I did not go to the movies. I took a ride with my bike. All of these sentences are true. Lets now examine this example:Either I went to the movies or I did not. I assume you would conclude that going to the movies is the opposite of not going to the movies. However, not going to the movies includes the statesments, plus many others. So to stay in UPB's terminology you would not have one opposite, diametrically opposed, but a lot of them. 

[Kevin Beal]

"Going north instead of south" is different from "I decided to eat cheerios for breakfast rather than grapefruit".

 

One has a sort of "opposite" kind of quality. The difference between the two is sort of important.

[LuckyNumber23]

Sure, when it comes to directions and geography, opposition is properly defined. For most other actions this is not the case, hence negation is in these case not necessarily the opposition. I went to the opposition of North is different from I did not go North. Not going North includes going West, East, or South. Opposition is a special case of negation when it is sufficiently defined and can be quantified. 

[Kevin Beal]

Murder and the Non-Aggression Principle are also defined, are also opposites and are what UPB evaluates. Thus there are opposites in logic and the OP's criticism is invalid.

[kospe]

"Murder and the Non-Aggression Principle are also defined, are also opposites and are what UPB evaluates. Thus there are opposites in logic and the OP's criticism is invalid."

 

As I read this statement, it seems you are saying that:

1) Murder and the NAP are opposites and are evaluated by UPB

2) Therefore opposites exist in logic

3) Therefore the OP's criticism is invalid

 

I do agree with the first two statements, but does it follow that the OP's criticism in false? Unless I'm misreading you, then I would say no because the OP's criticism is not that there are no opposites in logic, but that UPB falsely equates opposite and negation (unless, of course, you are referring to another aspect of his criticism, but I don't know what that would be). It is perfectly consistent to say that opposites and negations aren't the same and still believe that opposites exist in logic.

 

You also seem to be replying to LuckyNumber23's comment that because directions are defined in geography, so opposites are do exist in geography. Your reply, again, as I read it, says that since Murder and the NAP are also defined and are opposites, therefore UPB always involves analyzing opposites. The problem I see with this statement is that Stefan doesn't do this. For example, he doesn't define charity and its opposite, he defines charity and its negation and then says that negation is the same as opposite. You could object, as you have done, that negation and opposite can be defined as the same, so now I will give definitions of these terms:

 

Opposite

: located at the other end, side, or corner of something; located across from something; completely different (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/opposite)

: situated, placed, or lying face to face with something else or each other, or in corresponding positions with relation to an intervening line, space, or thing (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/opposite?s=t)

: Placed or located directly across from something else or from each other (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/opposite)

 

Negate

: to cause (something) to not be effective (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate)

: to deny the existence, evidence, or truth of (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate?s=t)

: to make ineffective or void; nullify; invalidate (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negating)

 

I trust you don't need definitions for words like across, deny, or nullify, but I would be able to give them if you want. Now, these are the top definitions from three major dictionaries, and clearly we can see that opposite and negate do not mean the same thing except in rare exceptions.

[Kevin Beal]

I do agree with the first two statements, but does it follow that the OP's criticism in false? Unless I'm misreading you, then I would say no because the OP's criticism is not that there are no opposites in logic, but that UPB falsely equates opposite and negation (unless, of course, you are referring to another aspect of his criticism, but I don't know what that would be). It is perfectly consistent to say that opposites and negations aren't the same and still believe that opposites exist in logic.

 

Lucky Number 23 said he agreed with the OP on the basis that opposites do not exist in "classical logic". The rest of the necessary premises that show that the OP's criticism is invalid are covered very well by other people in this thread.

 

My comment was not meant to be a syllogism, but rather a demonstration that if you state that an argument rests on a premise and that premise is wrong, then by your own admission, your argument is proven wrong.

 

Also, a proposition is not a physical object so defining "opposite" within the context of propositions doesn't make any sense. That is why I offered the definitions that I did. They were the first two definitions that google provided in their search results. "Of a contrary kind" and negation are not worlds apart.

[Guest darkskyabove]

This thread has now become an example of how the reputation system can be abused. We have members applying negative rep to someone they disagree with, without, actually, disproving the argument; and giving positive rep to members who tow the line. (Hope it's worth the price of admission.)

 

Can we grow up here on the, supposed, #1 Philosophy Forum. The OP laid out a valid criticism; whether correct or not is yet to be determined. But all I have read from his detractors is blind, emotional, defense of Stefan. Reminds me of the Randians who went to any lengths to defend Objectivism. They ended up being parodies of themselves...

 

Any theory that claims: disagreement with the theory proves the theory, is a farce. Can you spell circular reasoning? If the only defense of UPB is that arguing against UPB validates UPB: HA, HA, HA...!

 

To use a phrase that the Randians choked on quite often: "Contradictions do not exist. If you find yourself facing a contradiction: check your premises. You'll find, at least, one of them is wrong."

 

The premise that opposite and negation are the same thing is wrong. No matter how emotional one gets, it is never okay to mangle definitions to suit one's position.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

This thread has now become an example of how the reputation system can be abused. We have members applying negative rep to someone they disagree with, without, actually, disproving the argument; and giving positive rep to members who tow the line. (Hope it's worth the price of admission.)

 

Can we grow up here on the, supposed, #1 Philosophy Forum. The OP laid out a valid criticism; whether correct or not is yet to be determined. But all I have read from his detractors is blind, emotional, defense of Stefan. Reminds me of the Randians who went to any lengths to defend Objectivism. They ended up being parodies of themselves...

 

Any theory that claims: disagreement with the theory proves the theory, is a farce. Can you spell circular reasoning? If the only defense of UPB is that arguing against UPB validates UPB: HA, HA, HA...!

 

To use a phrase that the Randians choked on quite often: "Contradictions do not exist. If you find yourself facing a contradiction: check your premises. You'll find, at least, one of them is wrong."

 

The premise that opposite and negation are the same thing is wrong. No matter how emotional one gets, it is never okay to mangle definitions to suit one's position.

I find your post to be snarky and dishonest. If people are using the rep system improperly then prove it and don't just assert it. How would you know people are using it in the way you claim? This is just your opinion.

People ARE attempting to disprove the argument and whether they give a negative rep to something says nothing about whether they've dis-proven the argument or not. Your claim that it hasn't been dis-proven is also just your opinion.

Telling us we have to grow up is so god-damn patronizing. The fact of whether the OP's criticism is valid is not necessarily up to you. You claim that ALL you've read is is a blind, emotional defense of Stefan. If you're going to make a claim like that then you should obviously have read the whole thread. Are you actually saying there's nothing here but a blind, emotional defense? No one has made ANY rational arguments. Please describe how all MY responses are blind emotional defenses of Stefan. I don't think you can and I'M positive you will not be accountable for that claim or actually back up without back-peddling. you also don't seem to have even noticed that the OP has deliberately avoided certain challenges (which I'm going to call him out on). 

Who cares if it reminds you of "Randians"? What kind of argument is THAT? Who are you to assert that we need to "grow up" and then make a facile point like that?

The premise of the opposite and negation being the same thing and whether the referenced passage in UPB actually does that is what we're debating. You just state that opposite and negation are not the same thing as if that's what's actually been done in UPB and it's just case-closed. You can't have read many of the responses if you're saying that and the fact that you criticize us for not responding rationally and then don't actually respond to any of our arguments is hypocritical. You're argument against UPB is to mis-characterize it, call it a farce and then say "HA HA HA". You're not going to get around having to provide actual rebuttals by flinging shit.

If there's any immaturity in this thread it has come from YOU and your entire post is just a stink-bomb.

[kospe]

Lucky Number 23 said he agreed with the OP on the basis that opposites do not exist in "classical logic". The rest of the necessary premises that show that the OP's criticism is invalid are covered very well by other people in this thread.

 

My comment was not meant to be a syllogism, but rather a demonstration that if you state that an argument rests on a premise and that premise is wrong, then by your own admission, your argument is proven wrong.

 

Also, a proposition is not a physical object so defining "opposite" within the context of propositions doesn't make any sense. That is why I offered the definitions that I did. They were the first two definitions that google provided in their search results. "Of a contrary kind" and negation are not worlds apart.

I see what you were talking about with LuckyNumber23 and I believe you may be correct. I don't know all the differences between the types of logic, but I believe that Aristotle could be considered to use classical logic and he said, "But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences 'every man is white', 'no man is white', 'every man is just', 'no man is just'." Again, this might not be classical logic, but I'll try to do more research later and I ask Lucky to please explain what he means by classical logic.

 

I acknowledge that you didn't mean your statement to be a syllogism, but I don't necessarily see anything wrong with stating it in that form. Either way, it's not really an important issue.

 

You also say that we shouldn't discuss propositions as opposites because they are not physical things. But I, then, have a few questions I would like answered:

1) The numbers 3 and -3 are intangible, yet wouldn't we say they are opposites?

2) Molyneux has said that virtue and vice are opposites, so isn't he violating your idea that intangible things can't be opposites? (These two questions assume, of course, that your argument would apply to all intangible things so that only physical objects have opposites. This seems a perfectly reasonable assumption based on what you've said.)

3) Even if you say that other intangible things besides propositions can be opposites, if I propose that "we should do virtuous actions" and "we should not do vicious actions", are these not still opposites?

4) You said earlier that murder and the NAP are opposites. Suppose I states them as propositions. Are not the propositions "we should always murder" and "we should never murder" still opposites even though they are propositions?

 

Finally, you said that the OP has been refuted. It's been a few weeks since I read through this forum, but it I don't believe I was convinced at the time that the OP was refuted. But I do plan to reread the forum and evaluate the arguments. 

[Kevin Beal]

You also say that we shouldn't discuss propositions as opposites because they are not physical things. But I, then, have a few questions I would like answered:

 

You're right. I misspoke (misstyped?). I only meant to say that it doesn't make sense to describe opposite in the physical sense when describing propositions. "Opposite" can totally describe both, but obviously defining it in the physical sense is only going to confuse the issue regarding opposite propositions.

 

Thank you for pointing that out.

 

And a quick note about how I use the reputation system. I upvote posts that provide insight into the topic and downvote posts that are thoughtless appeals to the "truth", when in reality they have nothing to do with the truth (in my estimation). I think that's a good approach, but certainly I could be convinced otherwise.

[Kevin Beal]

But only if it's in accordance with the official doctrine of the boards