Science and Determinism vs Free Choice

[RestoringGuy]

I assume you are talking about quantum mechanics when you talk about indeterminacy here?  I don't see how that gets you to free will.   Saying either things are determined or things are random doesn't in any way prove that people actually get to choose.

 

As for the asking about whether determinists want determinism to be true.  Speaking for myself, no I didn't.  I wanted to prove it wrong.  I didn't like the idea at all and wanted free will to be right.  But I also promised myself I would go with whatever the facts showed.  And so, after a long time exploring the subject, reading about it, watching videos, listening to podcasts, etc and thinking about it I came to the inevitable conclusion that there was no free will.   It took me some time after that to realise that the idea wasn't as bad as I initially thought it was.  There's an analogy to the believing in god/atheism transition there also.

I think there is an odd helper verb.  Few have considered what really is "getting to" do something, versus just doing.  If there is a choice I make, I don't know if I get to do it, or if I must do it despite having more than one possible way to proceed.  It may be determined that I have no choice whether a choice must be made, I can only influence the odds.  When a lifeless atom is about to decay, I will call it a choice only because more than one outcome is possible.  In my view, the free will position does not have to prove that people get to choose.  It may only require multiple choices be rationally accessible to us, randomly accessible or otherwise.  Illustrated by the Monty Hall problem, probabilities can have dependencies and they can become structured in ways that evade common sense.  Free will is nothing more than random behavior that is heavily filtered and structured by the rules we call rationality.  It is a subtractive process, starting with uniform randomness and then descending into structure as four forces of physics require.  There is evolutionary exclusion of irrational states, and free will becomes revealed to us through the behavior of matter.  This is the opposite from the determinists, who hold that solely the rules themselves can influence matter.  To determinists, the universe starts out basically stupid, and the illusion of free will and morality is generated by the rules as a newly added feature of the universe.

 

I know what you say.  But determinism is more like God because God is an additive beast (a creator).  I stay away from the psychological arguments because I know they won't work. I also spent decades clinging to determinism.  But I realized, to have rules that make any sense, it must be purged from the subatomic realm and consequently from almost everything.  The psychological and religious arguments I think distract us from the true arena of physics where the truth ought to be shown.

[cynicist]

The arguments for free will very much remind me of the way that people try to prove God exists.  Just like the latter can't be done, of course, the former cannot be done either, but you see all this equivocating from them, all these different creative ways to try to prove free will, when the simplest most obvious answer is determinism.

 

Nice trolling there. Clearly the simplest most obvious answer is free will. Damn, there is no eye rolling smiley.

[Mike Fleming]

Can you tell me what you are hoping to accomplish with this?

 

Just pointing out that that's what it feels like to me.  Probably being a bit antagonistic about it, and I apologise for that, but I think the analogy is a valid one.

I think there is an odd helper verb.  Few have considered what really is "getting to" do something, versus just doing.  If there is a choice I make, I don't know if I get to do it, or if I must do it despite having more than one possible way to proceed.  It may be determined that I have no choice whether a choice must be made, I can only influence the odds.  When a lifeless atom is about to decay, I will call it a choice only because more than one outcome is possible.  In my view, the free will position does not have to prove that people get to choose.  It may only require multiple choices be rationally accessible to us, randomly accessible or otherwise.  Illustrated by the Monty Hall problem, probabilities can have dependencies and they can become structured in ways that evade common sense.  Free will is nothing more than random behavior that is heavily filtered and structured by the rules we call rationality.  It is a subtractive process, starting with uniform randomness and then descending into structure as four forces of physics require.  There is evolutionary exclusion of irrational states, and free will becomes revealed to us through the behavior of matter.  This is the opposite from the determinists, who hold that solely the rules themselves can influence matter.  To determinists, the universe starts out basically stupid, and the illusion of free will and morality is generated by the rules as a newly added feature of the universe.

 

I know what you say.  But determinism is more like God because God is an additive beast (a creator).  I stay away from the psychological arguments because I know they won't work. I also spent decades clinging to determinism.  But I realized, to have rules that make any sense, it must be purged from the subatomic realm and consequently from almost everything.  The psychological and religious arguments I think distract us from the true arena of physics where the truth ought to be shown.

 

You've kind of lost me here to be honest.  

 

My understanding of quantum physics, (I'm not a physicist) is that the quantum effects don't effect the macro world.  That they essentially cancel out.   But regardless, even if they don't that just makes the macro world more random, and more difficult to understand as a result, but still doesn't provide any more of a concept of free will than determinism.  It just means that choices that people make are random which, to me, doesn't really fit the facts.   People seem to make choices based on accumulated knowledge and experience to me.  

[RestoringGuy]

My understanding of quantum physics, (I'm not a physicist) is that the quantum effects don't effect the macro world.  That they essentially cancel out.   But regardless, even if they don't that just makes the macro world more random, and more difficult to understand as a result, but still doesn't provide any more of a concept of free will than determinism.  It just means that choices that people make are random which, to me, doesn't really fit the facts.   People seem to make choices based on accumulated knowledge and experience to me.  

Mostly the quantum effects cancel out.  Chaos (a deterministic theory) provides that any effect, however small, can have influence on larger scales.  It is a dead horse.  Your response exhibits the same error both free will people and determinists often make.  Because a choice is random does not prove there is no prior cause.  A loaded die for example, may have a definite and reproducible preference, but only a preference not a guarantee.  The die exhibits behavior that is both random and causally influenced by its special construction.  The fact that the die is static, having no dynamic internal metabolism, seems to make it rather stupid.

 

OK people make choices based on accumulated knowledge and experience.  Why is that not a simple change, or even a severe tilt in probability, rather than a sure-fire guarantee that behavior must change once proper stimuli is given?  The determinist and the free will people both will disguise probability as senselessly biased away from any structure.   I am suppose to accept without proof that "random must mean stupid".  If deterministic rules can be combined and meshed together in complex ways to produce surprising and rational outcomes, then it seems random events, when linked together and tamed by uneven odds, can also produce a surprising outcome.  Imagine a machine with randomly wearing parts, where the random bits are there to purposely break logical stalemates.  Through selection, machines that employ randomness at the proper level will gain the most advantage.  It would seem a deterministic machine that plays "rock, paper, scissors" can always be beaten by a suitable random device, assuming both machines can witness the inner workings of the other machine.

[Kevin Beal]

@determinists: have you listened to the podcasts on the subject? (3rd post in this thread)

[RestoringGuy]

@determinists: have you listened to the podcasts on the subject? (3rd post in this thread)

It's a philosophical argument.  The reason determinists remain unconvinced and they become irritated is that they are not yet presented with purely scientific basis for knowing their error.  If the decision is externalized to an objective test, independent of the cultural baggage of what exactly characterizes "will", there would seem to be no further requirement than to simply decide truth on the basis of fundamental physics.

[Kevin Beal]

It's a philosophical argument.  The reason determinists remain unconvinced and they become irritated is that they are not yet presented with purely scientific basis for knowing their error.  If the decision is externalized to an objective test, independent of the cultural baggage of what exactly characterizes "will", there would seem to be no further requirement than to simply decide truth on the basis of fundamental physics.

I doubt this very much, that the reason determinists are unconvinced is because it's a philosophical argument without conclusive scientific empiricism.

 

First of all, determinists do not tend to demonstrate any understanding of the philosophical basis so it's not as if they checked it out and then are holding out for neuroscience studies to confirm. Second, if they don't have an understanding of the philosophical basis, then what are we even talking about? And third, where is the evidence that our conscious decision making is an illusion created out of purely deterministic antecedent events?

 

There is no consensus among neuroscientists about the validity of determinism. In fact it sounds like MMD is getting a neuroscientist on the show to talk about some of the relevant research in this area (based on a comment Stef made in a recent call in show).

 

Consistently I see determinists equate the free will position to the ghost in the shell or to spirits or some other mystical (non) explanation. Most determinists don't even know what the debate is about.

 

Why have this very expensive phenotype (that is our subjective experience of making informed decisions) if it served no purpose at all? If you assume determinism, there is absolutely no need whatsoever for the subjective experience of making a decision, you'd just take the action. It costs the human organism a lot in different resources to create this "illusion", that could be spent elsewhere.

 

Have determinists ever heard any arguments like this? Almost certainly not.

 

I'm just saying that if you are a determinist who wants to tackle free will, then actually get to know the position. I hate the strawman that is constantly erected.

[DGB]

I doubt this very much, that the reason determinists are unconvinced is because it's a philosophical argument without conclusive scientific empiricism.

 

First of all, determinists do not tend to demonstrate any understanding of the philosophical basis so it's not as if they checked it out and then are holding out for neuroscience studies to confirm. Second, if they don't have an understanding of the philosophical basis, then what are we even talking about? And third, where is the evidence that our conscious decision making is an illusion created out of purely deterministic antecedent events?

 

There is no consensus among neuroscientists about the validity of determinism. In fact it sounds like MMD is getting a neuroscientist on the show to talk about some of the relevant research in this area (based on a comment Stef made in a recent call in show).

 

Consistently I see determinists equate the free will position to the ghost in the shell or to spirits or some other mystical (non) explanation. Most determinists don't even know what the debate is about.

 

Why have this very expensive phenotype (that is our subjective experience of making informed decisions) if it served no purpose at all? If you assume determinism, there is absolutely no need whatsoever for the subjective experience of making a decision, you'd just take the action. It costs the human organism a lot in different resources to create this "illusion", that could be spent elsewhere.

 

Have determinists ever heard any arguments like this? Almost certainly not.

 

I'm just saying that if you are a determinist who wants to tackle free will, then actually get to know the position. I hate the strawman that is constantly erected.

 

I'm in a discussion where I've asked multiple times for a definition of free will and have not been answered. I have been answered in other discussions, in person and such, but the answers always seem, to me anyway, to be exactly what I think determinism is (cause and effect). Some dispute what I think determinism is, and say that cause and effect doesn't mean there can't be free will, so I ask explicitly, what is "will", and what is it "free" from/to?My position is simply that humans do not escape causation in any way, I can't see how this is possible, but I'm no neuroscientist.

[Kevin Beal]

I'm in a discussion where I've asked multiple times for a definition of free will and have not been answered. I have been answered in other discussions, in person and such, but the answers always seem, to me anyway, to be exactly what I think determinism is (cause and effect). Some dispute what I think determinism is, and say that cause and effect doesn't mean there can't be free will, so I ask explicitly, what is "will", and what is it "free" from/to?My position is simply that humans do not escape causation in any way, I can't see how this is possible, but I'm no neuroscientist.

Humans can't escape causation, obviously. If determinism means that humans can't escape causation, then I guess that means I'm a determinist.

 

I would say that free will is a self generating, volitional action that was chosen with reference some ideal / preference. I chose to respond to this forum post, but I don't choose to kick my leg when my knee is hit with a rubber mallet.

 

People look at determinism like it's a chain of causal events locked inescapably together with no wiggle room. And such is apparently the case with a rock rolling down a hill. It's direction determined by certain variables like the hill's surface, it's density, the rock's shape and density, the wind etc.

 

A person is not like a rock though. A rock has no volition. A rabbit moves itself around without needing to be nudged, and a human similarly moves itself around and does so with the capacity for conscious motivation.

 

The problem with saying that causality necessitates determinism is that you have to look at a very isolated scope of events. Say I choose to lift my arm. There is nothing necessarily that makes the level of description "an electrical impulse travels to my brain lighting up relevant parts of the brain which are used to process information and then used to cause a response in the muscles that lift my arm" any more valid or causal than the level of description that says "I thought about lifting my arm and chose to do so to make whatever point about free will", lol.

 

Causality is not the same thing as a physics experiment. Obviously causality (and determinism) is required for a physics experiment to have any kind of reliable results from which theories can be based. But this level of description is not the be all and end all, otherwise we wouldn't need any other fields of science.

 

If you've programmed in any event driven language (like javascript) then you know that within the scope of a very specific input, the output is 100% determined, but the environment itself that these event loops are hooked into is not of the same nature. The application itself necessarily implies that the ultimate result of your use case is undetermined. Likewise the brain can include fully determined operations and self generating operations within the same organ.

 

And of course the inherent performative contradiction outlined in the podcasts is clear evidence of the free will position. This is just my own spin that is not covered in the series.

[DGB]

Humans can't escape causation, obviously. If determinism means that humans can't escape causation, then I guess that means I'm a determinist.

 

I would say that free will is a self generating, volitional action that was chosen with reference some ideal / preference. I chose to respond to this forum post, but I don't choose to kick my leg when my knee is hit with a rubber mallet.

 

People look at determinism like it's a chain of causal events locked inescapably together with no wiggle room. And such is apparently the case with a rock rolling down a hill. It's direction determined by certain variables like the hill's surface, it's density, the rock's shape and density, the wind etc.

 

A person is not like a rock though. A rock has no volition. A rabbit moves itself around without needing to be nudged, and a human similarly moves itself around and does so with the capacity for conscious motivation.

 

The problem with saying that causality necessitates determinism is that you have to look at a very isolated scope of events. Say I choose to lift my arm. There is nothing necessarily that makes the level of description "an electrical impulse travels to my brain lighting up relevant parts of the brain which are used to process information and then used to cause a response in the muscles that lift my arm" any more valid or causal than the level of description that says "I thought about lifting my arm and chose to do so to make whatever point about free will", lol.

 

Causality is not the same thing as a physics experiment. Obviously causality (and determinism) is required for a physics experiment to have any kind of reliable results from which theories can be based. But this level of description is not the be all and end all, otherwise we wouldn't need any other fields of science.

 

If you've programmed in any event driven language (like javascript) then you know that within the scope of a very specific input, the output is 100% determined, but the environment itself that these event loops are hooked into is not of the same nature. The application itself necessarily implies that the ultimate result of your use case is undetermined. Likewise the brain can include fully determined operations and self generating operations within the same organ.

 

And of course the inherent performative contradiction outlined in the podcasts is clear evidence of the free will position. This is just my own spin that is not covered in the series.

I'm not sure what this contradiction is, is it the thing about arguing the determinist position meaning you don't believe in determinism or something?I agree with pretty much everything you said there, I agree with stef for the most part when he talks about how he thinks choices are made, what I don't understand is where the argument with determinists is.Am I misunderstanding the determinist position? 

[cynicist]

I'm not sure what this contradiction is, is it the thing about arguing the determinist position meaning you don't believe in determinism or something?I agree with pretty much everything you said there, I agree with stef for the most part when he talks about how he thinks choices are made, what I don't understand is where the argument with determinists is.Am I misunderstanding the determinist position? 

 

 

The key problem with determinism is mostly hard determinism, where people think that everything is linearly causal like physics and that free will breaks causality, both ideas that are simply assumed to be true without evidence. Here is an interesting article that describes reciprocal causality and how it allows for advanced functions like imagination, intelligence, and free will. I think it should be required reading for all hard determinists, since it demolishes their argument while at the same time putting forth solid arguments for how free will could exist in a causal world.

 

http://www.atheistexile.com/2012/08/27/determinism-and-reciprocal-causation/

[Kevin Beal]

I'm not sure what this contradiction is, is it the thing about arguing the determinist position meaning you don't believe in determinism or something?

In exactly the same way that you can't argue that language has no meaning, yes.

 

It would be more accurate to not include the word "belief" since what the person believes is irrelevant to the truth value of the proposition. Their actions necessarily imply the reality of free will, would be (I think) a more accurate phrasing.

 

The "free" in free will means free from necessary antecedent events in the way you can (theoretically) predict with 100% accuracy where a rock will land down a hill. The rock and the hill and the wind all lack volition. Everything that happens to them is imposed on them by outside factors.

 

There are events that precipitated my response right here that could be considered causal like your question, my desire to communicate this idea, how I like going about that etc. But they aren't deterministic, I can't put these variables together and reach a result like you can in physics.

 

Jon Searles has a presentation where he describes the irreducibility of consciousness that blew my mind:

[DGB]

This has given me a lot to think about, thanks for those. The video was fascinating and I found his arguments pretty solid. The article was a bit harder for me to process but I'm going to look into it some more. I bought a book by Daniel Dennet today, his position is that consciousness is an illusion which Searl points out doesn't work - but I also believes he talks more about the biology of these things rather than strictly physics, so I'll see what I get from that.

[HasMat]

As I said in the other thread, I think the key to understanding here is identity.

 

identity is essential to any concept of free-will, free-will is essential to any concept of control/selfdeterminism.

 

the problem is that identity is a metaphysical concept, like string theory.

 

define your personal identity against

1) AI

2) parallel universe version of identical you

3) space dust who happens to message each other just like your synapses

4) the 2100 A.D. version of you that was sewn onto supercyborg A25 flesh-monster, along with 100 other cyborg hopefuls

5) software version of your brain

6) software/hardware hybrid that models your body also

 

identity is a mythology that only has meaning within the context of a metaphysical backdrop. When does identity emerge, when does it disappear? Life, as a process, has no more meaning or significance than a fire, a hurricane, or any other selfperpetuating process. yet we wanna say identity is bounded by life.

 

stefan says there are trees (real) but no forest (conceptual amalgamation). but the tree is a grouping of cells, of molecules, of atoms, quarks, quanta. Who picks which amalgamation has meaning? he likes life, but scientifically life is a process. life is not matter, its not information, its a chain of events. reducing our identity to a process = determinism=real atheism.

 

if no metaphysical, no identity. if no identity, no free will, just quanta doin' stuff. What does it mean to be you? that's what identity is all about.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

As I said in the other thread, I think the key to understanding here is identity.

 

identity is essential to any concept of free-will, free-will is essential to any concept of control/selfdeterminism.

 

the problem is that identity is a metaphysical concept, like string theory.

 

define your personal identity against

1) AI

2) parallel universe version of identical you

3) space dust who happens to message each other just like your synapses

4) the 2100 A.D. version of you that was sewn onto supercyborg A25 flesh-monster, along with 100 other cyborg hopefuls

5) software version of your brain

6) software/hardware hybrid that models your body also

 

identity is a mythology that only has meaning within the context of a metaphysical backdrop. When does identity emerge, when does it disappear? Life, as a process, has no more meaning or significance than a fire, a hurricane, or any other selfperpetuating process. yet we wanna say identity is bounded by life.

 

stefan says there are trees (real) but no forest (conceptual amalgamation). but the tree is a grouping of cells, of molecules, of atoms, quarks, quanta. Who picks which amalgamation has meaning? he likes life, but scientifically life is a process. life is not matter, its not information, its a chain of events. reducing our identity to a process = determinism=real atheism.

 

if no metaphysical, no identity. if no identity, no free will, just quanta doin' stuff. What does it mean to be you? that's what identity is all about.

This argument is just quanta and has no meaning. 

[HasMat]

The "free" in free will means free from necessary antecedent events in the way you can (theoretically) predict with 100% accuracy where a rock will land down a hill. The rock and the hill and the wind all lack volition. Everything that happens to them is imposed on them by outside factors.

I find this definition to be metaphysical. This impredictability you propose, arising from the self, is a property of endless value. Eternal spirit. We are made of like 10^50 quanta. Compared to infinity it might as well be zero. random jumps and jiggles arising from this self would of necessity be extra-planar.

 

If you want this randomness to be authored by the 'self' you can call it free-will. If you want it authored by some background random number generator of the universe it cannot be called free will.

 

personal identity is essential to any conception of freewill, and now you have a new problem, defining this spark of the self of infinite RND.

Yes and life is also an illusion. There is no life. There are simply self-replicating machines. At no point in evolution did some magical property called "life" get beamed into self-replicating matter. We are simply a more complex version of rocks and should shed this superstition called life and accept the truth that we are non-living. You can't get life from non-life and you can't get free-will from cause and effect.

This exactly.

 

LIfe is a metaphysical concept giving rise to the idea of identity. No self-respecting atheist should succumb to the superstition of life having any intrinsic meaning. its an idea, a grouping/simplification of inanimate matter.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I find this definition to be metaphysical. This impredictability you propose, arising from the self, is a property of endless value. Eternal spirit. We are made of like 10^50 quanta. Compared to infinity it might as well be zero. random jumps and jiggles arising from this self would of necessity be extra-planar.

 

If you want this randomness to be authored by the 'self' you can call it free-will. If you want it authored by some background random number generator of the universe it cannot be called free will.

 

personal identity is essential to any conception of freewill, and now you have a new problem, defining this spark of the self of infinite RND.

This exactly.

 

LIfe is a metaphysical concept giving rise to the idea of identity. No self-respecting atheist should succumb to the superstition of life having any intrinsic meaning. its an idea, a grouping/simplification of inanimate matter.

Yeah duuude, like . . . quantum foam Maaaan. 

[RestoringGuy]

First of all, determinists do not tend to demonstrate any understanding of the philosophical basis so it's not as if they checked it out and then are holding out for neuroscience studies to confirm. Second, if they don't have an understanding of the philosophical basis, then what are we even talking about? And third, where is the evidence that our conscious decision making is an illusion created out of purely deterministic antecedent events?

 

Consistently I see determinists equate the free will position to the ghost in the shell or to spirits or some other mystical (non) explanation. Most determinists don't even know what the debate is about.

 

Why have this very expensive phenotype (that is our subjective experience of making informed decisions) if it served no purpose at all? If you assume determinism, there is absolutely no need whatsoever for the subjective experience of making a decision, you'd just take the action. It costs the human organism a lot in different resources to create this "illusion", that could be spent elsewhere.

That is a good point.  But by similar argument, by deliberately avoiding the scientific side, free will people (which I am) should really shut up about rocks and the weather.  Once you are dealing with combined measurements smaller than Planck's constant, all deterministic bets are off.  Once a rock rolls far enough, bounces enough times, to make its outcome sensitive to sub-Planck uncertainties in initial position, not a difficult task given chaos, pure determinism is gone.  Chemically, there is no determinism of whether two atoms will bond.  To concede that determinism is hunky-dory when it comes to rocks and weather is just playing into mystical causes.  That metaphor for determinism should be abandoned.

 

The expensive phenotype thing does not work either.  For all we know, it is like pretty feathers, tricking mates and competitors to believe who is superior.  Neither side can get the science right.  I think fixing that problem is the best approach.

[Kevin Beal]

That is a good point.  But by similar argument, by deliberately avoiding the scientific side, free will people (which I am) should really shut up about rocks and the weather.  Once you are dealing with combined measurements smaller than Planck's constant, all deterministic bets are off.  Once a rock rolls far enough, bounces enough times, to make its outcome sensitive to sub-Planck uncertainties in initial position, not a difficult task given chaos, pure determinism is gone.  Chemically, there is no determinism of whether two atoms will bond.  To concede that determinism is hunky-dory when it comes to rocks and weather is just playing into mystical causes.  That metaphor for determinism should be abandoned.

 

The expensive phenotype thing does not work either.  For all we know, it is like pretty feathers, tricking mates and competitors to believe who is superior.  Neither side can get the science right.  I think fixing that problem is the best approach.

Whether or not there is indeterminacy at the quantum level does nothing to explain free will. It's a red herring. You can be entirely right and still there is no free will.

 

Also, I did qualify the rock down the hill as theoretically 100% deterministic. I am not a physicist, so for the sake of argument, I'm willing to accept that it describes fully deterministic events. We can grant the premise and if determinism is wrong, it will still fail.

 

I was asked "free from what", as in what are we comparing free will to. Obviously a rock rolling down a hill has no free will. That's why the analogy was made.

 

And I have no idea what you are talking about with the pretty feathers thing. If you are saying that both sides of the debate can provide scientific arguments then that's not really any kind of real response to what I said. I made a very specific point with a heavy implication that should throw determinism into serious doubt, not a deal clincher but it is something determinists (and Daniel Dennett) would have to explain.

[Kawlinz]

Consistently I see determinists equate the free will position to the ghost in the shell or to spirits or some other mystical (non) explanation. 

 

I used to when I was a determinist. "magic" was my favorite one.

 

I think the flaw was that I was claiming "matter and energy is a causal chain that can't be broken by *magic*", all while I was appealing to concepts in my attempt to affect matter and energy. 

[RestoringGuy]

Whether or not there is indeterminacy at the quantum level does nothing to explain free will. It's a red herring. You can be entirely right and still there is no free will.

 

Also, I did qualify the rock down the hill as theoretically 100% deterministic. I am not a physicist, so for the sake of argument, I'm willing to accept that it describes fully deterministic events. We can grant the premise and if determinism is wrong, it will still fail.

 

I was asked "free from what", as in what are we comparing free will to. Obviously a rock rolling down a hill has no free will. That's why the analogy was made.

 

And I have no idea what you are talking about with the pretty feathers thing. If you are saying that both sides of the debate can provide scientific arguments then that's not really any kind of real response to what I said. I made a very specific point with a heavy implication that should throw determinism into serious doubt, not a deal clincher but it is something determinists (and Daniel Dennett) would have to explain.

It is good but not compelling.  There are pretty feathers, colorful flowers, and other elaborate natural beauty that is resource-expensive.  The butterfly has false eyes, a useful trick.  If I were a determinist, I would say your illusion of free will is simply a trick to make the opposite sex impressed with your powers of control, convince your competitors you are not bound by rules that they are.  There is a payoff to faking it, although I don't believe free will is fake.Consider two things:(1) There is a sense that free will does not exist for really stupid things, such as the rock, my big toe, a rolling die.  This has nothing to do with determinism.  Stupid and non-strategic behavior rules out "will" in general.(2) There is a sense that free will does not exist for things with a fixed and determined outcome, such as a closed deterministic computer program.  This has nothing to do with stupidity.  Fixed behavior, no matter how smart or strategically-inclined, rules out freedom because there is only one way to go.My impression is that physics is being discarded by the free will side too quickly, with the belief that physics isn't up to the job.  So when you say "it will fail", it does not fail because it does not address both considerations, it only addresses #1 and subsequently gives the compatibilists a free ride.

[HasMat]

In exactly the same way that you can't argue that language has no meaning, yes.

 

It would be more accurate to not include the word "belief" since what the person believes is irrelevant to the truth value of the proposition. Their actions necessarily imply the reality of free will, would be (I think) a more accurate phrasing.

 

The "free" in free will means free from necessary antecedent events in the way you can (theoretically) predict with 100% accuracy where a rock will land down a hill. The rock and the hill and the wind all lack volition. Everything that happens to them is imposed on them by outside factors.

Are you saying there is an additional property of randomness to causality within a self?

 

I dont see how a person can disbelieve in metaphysics and believe a 'self' suspends causality in any way whatsoever, even infintestimally small. I understand inability to measure (the internal forces/outcome), but what is being proposed is not lack of measurement precision, but predictability based on same laws that 'external' universe is following.

 

What does outside even mean? are there 2 sets of causality? where causal forces come from should be irrelevent if there is only 1 set of causality.

 

If you could, please redefine the question with only a living self (no rock comparisons) and without references to internal and external. if you cant do that, explain why you need those things to frame the question. I think it will be an enlightening process, if not for you then hopefully me.

[Kevin Beal]

Are you saying there is an additional property of randomness to causality within a self?

 

I dont see how a person can disbelieve in metaphysics and believe a 'self' suspends causality in any way whatsoever, even infintestimally small. I understand inability to measure (the internal forces/outcome), but what is being proposed is not lack of measurement precision, but predictability based on same laws that 'external' universe is following.

 

What does outside even mean? are there 2 sets of causality? where causal forces come from should be irrelevent if there is only 1 set of causality.

 

If you could, please redefine the question with only a living self (no rock comparisons) and without references to internal and external. if you cant do that, explain why you need those things to frame the question. I think it will be an enlightening process, if not for you then hopefully me.

All I'm saying is that (assuming I understand determinism) there is a misconception that says that you can look at any event taking place right now and tie it deterministically through a series of necessary causal events necessitating the next (given some set of variables) all the way back to the big bang (or before, some distant event in the past, anyway).

 

Determinism assumes a fullness, a causality where every single instance and event is tied to another necessarily. And that to offer a causal description that says that I chose an action of my own volition is a naive proposition since if we were only able to account for every variable and event we could have predicted that result, in the same way we can do physics models that predict where a rock will land rolling down a hill.

 

1. causality connects every single event deterministically, and

2. the level of description that says that I choose to lift my arm is inferior to the much more accurate description that says that an electrical impulse is sent to my brain and triggering a series of impulses that lift my arm

 

Both of these premises appear to me to be necessary for the determinist position, and both are always assumed before any debate with a determinist ever begins. Determinists sometimes aren't even aware that they are operating from these premises.

 

I don't accept either premise. At least I've never once been given a reason that they should be true beyond mere assertion.

 

You can prove determinism right now if you can predict the exact manner in which I respond next time I do respond. Type it up, save it, timestamp it and then when I make my next response, you can show it to me and I'll be entirely convinced of determinism.

 

There is a fantastic bit about free will in the Psychology of Self Esteem where Nathaniel Branden distinguishes two descriptions of causality: one based on causality great for describing physics models (by Galileo) and one based on the identities of the actors involved in events (by Aristotle). He also makes a similar case to how Stef does around preferred states.

 

The point about appealing to preferred states and how a determinist can never logically do this without immediately contradicting themselves is here:

 

 

 

John Searle speaking to consciousness and causality:

[HasMat]

in the radiostream stefan requires the determinist pov to affirm 1. existence of truth (fine) 2. morality relative to truth (untenable for atheism)

 

stefan needs to create proofs for this. sudden creation of morality is theocratic.

 

if the determinist had taken the "morally defunk" position by denying the existence of morality (universally prefered state), which is the TRUE atheist conclusion...i think the discussion would have gone differently.

 

as ive argued (by assertion) many times, a nonmetaphysical universe has no universally prefered state. 6 milion dying jews has the same moral value as 6 million happy productive jews. its the puritanical conditioning that makes opponents cede this important distinction.

 

soulless rocks falling down the side of a cliff have literally zero moral content. what quality of a soulless person is above the rock? the distinction of life is meaningless. the life is subordinate to the same deterministic laws of science as the rock, to the same degree of strict obedience. no magic to overthrow sequential operation of natural law, destined by the stars. Without a divine creator (goals) and atleast 2 eternal properties of self (permanent duration, variability), without those, a being cannot have a non-zero moral existence. all of its everything was determined by forces outside its control and before its inception. its very distinction, as a self, is arbitrary without an extra-planar spark to bound and define it. life is a scientific process, not a self. For any kind of just duty to occur, the self needs a local power of causation that originates OUTSIDE and INDEPENDENT of the universe it acts in. otherwise they are just falling rocks. Morally bound selfs must have a property of defying the universe (breaking physical laws in relation to its 'owned' material self). A "1-way" causality on universe. otherwise no free-will, as the idea is generally thought of.

 

im not positing the universe is metaphysical, im saying it can't have morally colored consequence without it. Its a both/none situation.

 

for moral culpability, a self needs personal causation originating OUTSIDE its environments reach. it needs to sublimely OWN its behavioral causation in the deepest sense of the word.

 

Here is what free-will atheism needs

1. concept of self

2. way for self to determine reality while a)being a distinct entity apart from natural law and not fully subservient to it

                                                              b) not violating natural law

 

i dont think A and B are possible at the same time. If you are not 100% governed by natural law then universes are (atleast intermittently) overlapping/interfering.

 

I think most of the controversy is over the mass of a self. Who really 'owns' it? If its govered by solely physical laws, how does a solely physical self (no soul) break a chain of events? its only mode of instrumentation is domanated by a set of laws that can't abide ANY external (metaphysical) interference.

 

that kind of selfs only discretion depends on and is based on physical law, it has no man-cave to hide in outside the system to plot anything, then return and act on reality. it cant break any cycles, only obey law with absolute obedience.

[Kevin Beal]

How is the existence of physical laws, causation etc incompatible with the free will position? You state this repeatedly but never actually explain it. If it were actually true, then all you'd need to do is collect a sufficient number of variables and predict my behavior.

 

You see this in every determinism debate: "conscious volitional action can't violate the physical laws and causality!" because determinists always have the two premises I mentioned earlier presumed.

 

There is nothing that I'm aware of in physics or any other science that says that self generating, volitional, free will is incompatible. That should be a rather easy thing to prove, right? And yet no one ever does that, they always just presuppose it without any thoughtful consideration to what causation actually is. They repeat it ad nauseum as if simply saying it makes it true. They just picture a physics experiment and extrapolate the principle to everything in the universe. (I believe I have rescued physics in my event driven programming language analogy earlier in the thread.)

 

@HasMat: Have you watched the John Searle video I just posted?

 

Here's a related article on why you cannot explain the mind in terms of a computer (also by John Searle):

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/

[HasMat]

How is the existence of physical laws, causation etc incompatible with the free will position? You state this repeatedly but never actually explain it. If it were actually true, then all you'd need to do is collect a sufficient number of variables and predict my behavior.

 

I havent watched the video, its an hour long. but i did listen to the podcast. I might watch it next.

 

If you really want to understand my reasoning you need to explore the concept of self and the concept of independent causality.

 

I reason that in a nonmetaphysical universe a self is fantasy, like the idea of santa claus. An arbitrary conception, whose borders are 100% elusive and without meaning. If you can provide a definition of self I would be more than happy to challenge it. My stance is that its literally impossible to define a logical self without metaphysics. So if you can do it, i concede defeat. My position is that you have no more intrinsic meaning than a rock (without metaphysics), and any cohesive definition of selfs will appeal to magic.

 

if you cant the next step is exploration of independent causality. I define freewill as ownership of personal causality. (traditional) Individuals cant own universal laws. They go everywhere and have no personalized relationship. This includes all electroweak, strong, gravity, and it also includes the randomness constant.

 

there are a few conditions I believe are essential for ownership, but the very first is dominion. If universal laws control your matter you are not the boss of said matter. So either universal laws are boss, or the self is (atleast intermittently). Self MUST by (my) definition suspend and subdue natural law for ownership to occur, and that property must be of higher order than the universe. Intermittent and recessive on conflict is not dominion. If circumstance 'wants' you to hurt someone, but your freewill does not, you can only have moral responsibility for your actions if you have the option to weigh in, and have real power to overthrow GUTs causality for your matter. this doesnt mean you have to turn water into wine or fly around, an underdeveloped freewill would scarcely be able to prevent an angry reaction if someone punched him.

 

I would consider a definition of self to define its existence boundaries in both matter/energy and time. that means its 'body' and its birth/death. Im open to any kinds of selfs, even ones that don't exist in our current culture (futuristic robots, software, energy patterns) One limitation I would put on selfs, it cannot be the entire universe.

 

my position is not that metaphysics is real, just that its essential for selfhood and thus morality. if no metaphysics, no selfhood, no responsibility, no morality. the universe must by definition get cheated for morality to exist for any selfs who are less than the [big Bang].

 

freewilll needs a self to attach to.

[Kevin Beal]

Okay, explain it to me very simply like I'm daft. If you explained how free will requires a suspension of physical laws, I missed it. All I was able to suss out was a reiteration of what you already stated.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I suspect determinists think the "natural laws" are prescriptive.

[Kevin Beal]

I suspect determinists think the "natural laws" are prescriptive.

Very interesting. Could you elaborate?

[HasMat]

Okay, explain it to me very simply like I'm daft. If you explained how free will requires a suspension of physical laws, I missed it. All I was able to suss out was a reiteration of what you already stated.

The 2nd part of my explanation went like this:

physical laws are not owned by self (they are universal - electroweak, strong, 'gravity', quantum randomness)

free-will = self ownership of personal causation

 

 

so whatever makes a person 'free' must be OTHER than physical law. A only local (to 'self') violation of natural law is required, but not only that, it must be a force the self can legitimately claim it owns. Its not enough for god/FSM to violate physics in your matter for you to qualify for freewill, "you" gotta do it.

[Kevin Beal]

The 2nd part of my explanation went like this:

physical laws are not owned by self (they are universal - electroweak, strong, 'gravity', quantum randomness)

free-will = self ownership of personal causation

 

 

so whatever makes a person 'free' must be OTHER than physical law. A only local (to 'self') violation of natural law is required, but not only that, it must be a force the self can legitimately claim it owns. Its not enough for god/FSM to violate physics in your matter for you to qualify for freewill, "you" gotta do it.

"Free" meaning you cannot say given X input, Y output will result. The X there is the decision made against an ideal (prefered state). No one is saying that "free" is free from any physical laws.

 

There is nothing in the realm of physics that I'm aware of that requires human will to necessarily be setup as "X input necessitates Y output". From what I understand, you immediately run into logical problems as soon as you reduce consciousness (and by consequence: free will) to "X => Y". That would be equating the mind to a computer which (as described in the John Searle video I linked) cannot possibly explain answer the question of how human will can be accounted for deterministically. The reason being that all you are doing is providing a syntax devoid of meaning.

[HasMat]

"Free" meaning you cannot say given X input, Y output will result. The X there is the decision made against an ideal (prefered state). No one is saying that "free" is free from any physical laws.

 

There is nothing in the realm of physics that I'm aware of that requires human will to necessarily be setup as "X input necessitates Y output". From what I understand, you immediately run into logical problems as soon as you reduce consciousness (and by consequence: free will) to "X => Y". That would be equating the mind to a computer which (as described in the John Searle video I linked) cannot possibly explain answer the question of how human will can be accounted for deterministically. The reason being that all you are doing is providing a syntax devoid of meaning.

i dont think you are understanding the random nature of the universe, as being owned by the universe. Atleast not consistently. Simple chaos is a universal law. When selfs exhibit 'choice' are they following universal law of chaos, or an additional randomness only their matter enjoys?

 

I would call this having your cake and eating it too. You are blaming randomness for free-will when you want to assert freewills existence, and calling randomness a property of the universe when you want to say its not metaphysical.

 

Who owns the randomness in question? in the first half it seems attached to self, in the second half it seems attached to the universe. are there 2 distinct properties of randomness here?

 

I dont see how universal law (part of which is chaos) could be construed as selfdeterminism, i dont see how a secondary nonuniversal selfonly property of chaos isnt metaphysical.

[Kevin Beal]

i dont think you are understanding the random nature of the universe, as being owned by the universe. Atleast not consistently. 

The universe is a concept encompassing all that exists. It is not an entity upon which qualities can be ascribed.

 

What specifically is the error that I'm making? Admittedly, I am not understanding what you are saying. Please dumb it down as much as you can.

[Ray H.]

i dont think you are understanding the random nature of the universe, as being owned by the universe. Atleast not consistently. Simple chaos is a universal law. When selfs exhibit 'choice' are they following universal law of chaos, or an additional randomness only their matter enjoys?

 

I would call this having your cake and eating it too. You are blaming randomness for free-will when you want to assert freewills existence, and calling randomness a property of the universe when you want to say its not metaphysical.

 

Who owns the randomness in question? in the first half it seems attached to self, in the second half it seems attached to the universe. are there 2 distinct properties of randomness here?

 

I dont see how universal law (part of which is chaos) could be construed as selfdeterminism, i dont see how a secondary nonuniversal selfonly property of chaos isnt metaphysical.

 

I'm with Kevin at the kid's table on this one. Reading your posts is like looking at one of those posters made of dots that I'm supposed to cross my eyes to see the picture. I know there's probably something interesting there, but the effort it takes to make something out in the haze is just slightly more than I care to muster. Not that you should care.

 

That being said, you say that any cohesive definition of self relies on magic. I find that quite cynical. Only lazy, religious types would be guilty of such a definition. The rest of us struggle to define self, because it's a hard thing to understand as a biological manifestation. The same can be said about life. There are some concepts that we haven't got a good grasp on yet. You're coming very close to saying that we know everything there is to know now, so if we can't define self, then we are delusional in believing that such a thing exists. That flies in the face of every human being's experience of self. I experience me, you experience you. There is a practical, tangible experience of humans called self. Maybe current science isn't providing you with a satisfactory definition, but to claim that there could never be a cohesive definition without injecting magic is tantamount to believing that human knowledge has reached it's capacity. Clearly, it has not. And so, opportunities remain (and always will) to shed light on blindspots and erase supernatural spaceholders.

 

Since, I think, your argument regarding self being separate from the universe hinges on self requiring magic to exist, there's no reason for me to haggle over the details, since I don't agree that self requires magic. Self is a barely understood biological phenomenon that is fully part of the universe, and many rational people are interested in explaining it. You say its borders are 100% elusive. Really? I know I am not that lampshade across the room. I know I am not my dog. I know I am not you. I know I was that guy who broke his foot 2 years ago. I know other humans differentiate me from other human beings. There is at least a portion of a spectrum where I very clearly know that I am distinct from the rest of the universe. The ends of that spectrum may begin to blur, but then, much like quantum physics, they aren't likely to be relevant to my practical existence. Isn't that clear part of the spectrum evidence of some phenomenon regardless of how blurry the edges are?

[Kevin Beal]

i dont think you are understanding the random nature of the universe, as being owned by the universe. Atleast not consistently. Simple chaos is a universal law. When selfs exhibit 'choice' are they following universal law of chaos, or an additional randomness only their matter enjoys?

Saying chaos is a law is like saying that contradiction is truth. They are the opposite of each other. You cannot pull a principle out of something that is (by definition) meaningless. It's like the static that Stef talks about in Against the Gods? You can't say anything about it and still call it static (chaos).

 

I never once mention randomness, either. To say that it's either determinism or randomness is to set up a false dilemma. Having gaps in causality (that is one event is not necessarily tied inextricably to all others deterministically) is not the same thing as randomness. The physical laws that you are talking about aren't random, and human rationality isn't random either.

 

 

 

I would call this having your cake and eating it too. You are blaming randomness for free-will when you want to assert freewills existence, and calling randomness a property of the universe when you want to say its not metaphysical.

You seem to be using the word "metaphysical" in a way that I'm not familiar. If you could explain what you mean by that, it would help. And you have yet to show me where the randomness is in what I'm saying. You are just asserting it.

 

 

 

Who owns the randomness in question? in the first half it seems attached to self, in the second half it seems attached to the universe. are there 2 distinct properties of randomness here?

I don't understand the point you are making about self. Hopefully we can at least agree that selves exist since you are addressing me and I'm addressing you. You aren't responding to someone else, or responding to a glass of water, right?

 

Also, you either have to abandon the term "random" here, or stop telling me all about it, it's qualities / properties since you are saying that there is meaning in something that is meaningless by definition. It's a self defeating argument.

 

 

 

I dont see how universal law (part of which is chaos) could be construed as selfdeterminism, i dont see how a secondary nonuniversal selfonly property of chaos isnt metaphysical.

You keep telling me that I'm violating metaphysics, causality etc, but I don't accept that. Either you've gotta make the case to me that I'm violating them or move on to another point, because this is just going in circles.

 

Also, you keep jumping between "natural law", "physical law" and now "universal law", but don't define the first or third one one. Honestly, I can't tell if you are using them interchangeably or not. My understanding of natural law (at least on the surface) has nothing to do with metaphysics outside of ethics.

 

Please define your terms, explain what my argument is and where exactly the error in logic is. And please dumb it down, because either it's over my head, or it's irrational (or some third option I'm not aware of).