Property rights and owning the effects of our actions

[square4]

Hi people,

 

This post is about an aspect of the the book “Universally Preferable Behaviour , A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics ” (online here) written by our host Stefan.

 

In the UPB book, it is argued that, since we own our bodies, we own our actions, so also the effects of actions, and therefore we own whatever we produce, such as a bow or a book. A homesteading theory or a theory of just acquisition is regarded as unnecessary to establish property rights.

 

It would be preferable if it would indeed be that simple. But after thinking about it, it seems to me that there are some problems with it, which I will explain below.

 

On page 75 of the UPB book, the ethical problem of theft is examined. I understand the argumentation as follows:

• I control my body

• I should control my body morally well (responsibility)

• I am allowed to control my body (ownership)

I think the argumentation needs one extra qualification in order to be logically sound:

• I inherently control my body

• I should control my body morally well (responsibility)

• I am allowed to control my body (ownership)

The responsibility to control something cannot be inferred from only the fact that we control something. For example, the government controls the economy, but it should not do so. But if we unavoidably (inherently) control something, then it can be inferred we should do so morally well. The reasoning is now valid because:

1. is obviously true

1.->2. is valid, assuming there is morality at all

2.->3. is valid, otherwise there would be an impossible moral obligation

What has been said for our bodies, can also be said for our actions, and the effects of our actions, as far as we can predict them. Let us examine further what this actually means.

 

We have control over what we will do next, because we can decide it. We control our future actions and the effects of those actions. Once we have acted, the effects of our actions materialize, and become a fixed part of history that we cannot control anymore. We are still responsible for past actions, because we have controlled it in the past. Responsibility can refer to both past and future moral obligations. But the right to control something now, cannot be automatically deduced from past obligations to control it. Besides, even if we had the right to control the effects of our past actions, it would be impossible to exercise it. We cannot control the effects of our past actions, any more than we can change history. We can only control the effects of our future actions.

 

In the reasoning of the UPB book, the right to control the effects of our actions is based on our ability to control it. Theft, on the other hand, implies that we have lost control over it. To argue that we are allowed to control something, after we lost control over it, therefore needs another type of reasoning. Secondly, in the theory under study, the right to control something is based on our obligation to control it well (responsibility). If someone would let any of this type of possession be stolen, it would create the impossible moral obligation upon him to control that which he cannot control, which is of course absurd. In fact, stealing of this type of possession is logically impossible, because we have control over it by definition.

 

For the reasons stated above, it seems to me that this type of reasoning is insufficient to establish property rights and handle the subject of theft. By the way, my argumentation is not intended to justify theft, but to get to a better theory of property rights. I think we need some type of homesteading theory to effectively proof property rights, or at least make them plausible.

 

Looking forward to your comments.

 

Best regards.

[dsayers]

Welcome to FDR! What do you mean by "should control morally well"?

 

If you own yourself and people are fundamentally not different from one another, then everybody owns themselves. If everybody owns themselves, then theft, assault, rape, and murder are immoral because they require exercising ownership over that which is owned by somebody else.

 

This is not a positive obligation like "should control morally well," but a negative obligation as "do not initiate the use of force against other people."

 

This is a useful video to check out to maybe aide in clarifying your verbiage:

 

http://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/38425-self-ownership-and-ethics/

[square4]

The term "should control morally well" was meant to be a neutral expression of responsibility. At that point of the argumentation, it is not yet proven what is our responsibility.

[Brandon Buck _BB_]

Adding the word "inherently" doesn't change the meaning of the statement "I control my body" and the statement (with or without the clarification) doesn't prove ownership. I can address a letter to a stranger with the phrase "Hello, my name is Brandon Buck, a human being, and I'd like to blah, blah, blah". By adding "a human being" I've done nothing more than state an obvious, a priori assumption. Likewise, I can control a rental car but the fact that I control it is not an a priori assumption that I own it. Moreover, if I build a simple rocket and set it aflight, I own the effects of my actions but I do not control them. And if I hit you in the abdomen with a ball bat, I own the effects of that action but I do not control what organs I injure or don't injure.

 

Stef touches on the aspect of control that, with respect to self ownership, proves the same but, he didn't elaborate. Control only helps to prove self ownership when we consider that a man cannot control another man's vocal cords, arm movements, etc. This is unique to self ownership, given that our bodies are the only property we can own which cannot be controlled by others and it is (to my reckoning at least) an a priori assumption.

 

With that said, there is nothing about ownership that should cause anyone to assume a person should or should not control his body responsibly. For instance, if I don't want lung cancer, I should refrain from smoking cigarettes. But if I smoke them, my self ownership is not up for grabs to the first person who promises not to smoke with my body.

[square4]

 

My purpose is to create a series of logical steps, expressed in operational terms, in order to verify logically the claim of ownership. But if ownership is indeed an a priori-assumption, then there is not much to analyse. Although most people assume some type of ownership over their body (they use it after all), libertarians usually see this ownership as much more absolute than others, so I don't think we can take it for granted. Or in other words, the claim of absolute ownership requires a (absolute) proof.

 

There is another argument in UPB book for self-ownership. It goes like this: you are debating, so you are exercising 100% ownership, so you should accept 100% ownership in general. Let's analyse this:

 

1. You are exercising "100% control over your body" in order to debate

2. So you accept behavior in the category "controlling your body 100%"

3. Therefore you should accept any behavior in the category "controlling your body 100%" (=absolute ownership)

 

But the last step from claim 2 to 3 is logically not valid, so it is not a proof.