Epistemological Quagmire

[ThomasDoubts]

     What are my epistemological beliefs?  I'm not sure.  In my signature below, I've got a quote from Karl Popper about Rationalism.  Am a rationalist?  I don't think so; at least not as they're generally thought of.  I don't believe in gods or souls or ghosts.  I don't believe knowledge or truth is subjective, or that it originates in the mind.  I don't believe my ideas can refute empirical evidence; on the contrary.

 

      I do, however, take issue with Empiricism.  Perhaps my biggest disconnect with empiricism is that I accept certain things to be true, a priori.  Perhaps Mises' work was not, in fact, based on a priori truths; he simply called them a priori/axiomatic/praxeological.  Maybe the idea that humans act with purpose is false.  I don't know.  It is my understanding though, that Empiricism rejects a priori truths, in favor of a posteriori truths.  It seems improbable to me that ideas like ethics, justice, or liberty could be derived from sense perception.  Am I wrong about this?

 

     Had you asked me several months ago about my epistemological beliefs, I would have identified myself as a skeptical empiricist, whatever that is.  Now, reevaluating my beliefs, I feel more lost.  I'll mention again, Karl Popper, because he's been pretty influential to me.  He developed an epistemological philosophy he called "Critical Rationalism."   This is where I'd most likely plant my flag, if only hesitantly.

 

I was watching Stef's 3 part video on epistemology, and it seemed he was making the case for empiricism.  I'm wondering how one marries empiricism with a priori truths or ideas like ethics or liberty.  I feel like I should know this by now, but I'm not so sure I do.

 

Many thanks to anyone who can help me fill my gap in understanding.

[dsayers]

I've found that the more I learn, the more I realize I have yet to learn. The more I understand to be true, the less cohesive that which is true seems to me.

It seems improbable to me that ideas like ethics, justice, or liberty could be derived from sense perception.  Am I wrong about this?

You'll have to forgive me for my aversion for labels. I prefer dealing with the nuts and bolts, as this sentence does.Everything we know is derived from sense perception. Without the senses, all you could know for sure is that YOU exist. The caveat being that when our perceptions conflict with reality, our perceptions must give way. A rod that passes through water appears to be bent, but we can determine with our other senses that this is not the case. Which leads to the question of why our interpretation of our eye's data did not conform to the empirical evidence. Which leads to knowledge and understanding.

Maybe the idea that humans act with purpose is false.

Your contemplation of "humans act with purpose" is for the purpose of determining its truth value, thus establishing that humans act with purpose.

[ThomasDoubts]

Your contemplation of "humans act with purpose" is for the purpose of determining its truth value, thus establishing that humans act with purpose.

 

 

Mises argued this was a priori knowledge?  Is it not so?

[TheRobin]

Without the senses, all you could know for sure is that YOU exist.

 

I apologize in advance for possibly hijacking the threat a little here, but: How would you know that? What would "know" even mean if there's a total absence of any input of any kind (i.e. having no senses)?As far as I would see it having no sensory input is the same as not existing (from a subjective point of view at least).

[dsayers]

Good catch! As soon as I wrote that, I realized it was an assumption and I began to explore whether it is true or not. Would we conceptualize self if we did not have sense perception to understand we can influence other things? Probably not.

 

@Rex: I don't know, could you define that for me please? I've only seen that word once or twice before you mentioned it.

[ThomasDoubts]

Sure.  From wikipedia:

The terms a priori ("from the earlier") and a posteriori ("from the later") are used in philosophy (epistemology) to distinguish two types of knowledge, justification, or argument:

• A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience (for example "All bachelors are unmarried"). Galen Strawson has stated that an a priori argument is one in which "you can see that it is true just lying on your couch. You don't have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical world. You don't have to do any science."^[1]

• A posteriori knowledge or justification is dependent on experience or empirical evidence (for example "Some bachelors are very unhappy").

There are many points of view on these two types of knowledge, and their relationship is one of the oldest problems in modern philosophy...

 

As I understand it, and roughly speaking, Emericism claims knowledge is a posteriori, while rationalism claims it is a priori.  When it comes to ethics, utilitarianism, I think, is the most popular bridging of the gap.

[dsayers]

• A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience (for example "All bachelors are unmarried"). Galen Strawson has stated that an a priori argument is one in which "you can see that it is true just lying on your couch.

 

I still don't follow. How is the ability to experience something from your couch knowledge that is independent of experience? "All bachelors are unmarried" is just the definition of the word.

 

Oh and since I keep forgetting to include it: Giggity.

[ThomasDoubts]

I still don't follow. How is the ability to experience something from your couch knowledge that is independent of experience? "All bachelors are unmarried" is just the definition of the word.

 

Oh and since I keep forgetting to include it: Giggity.

 

 

      Giggity... I had a chuckle to myself earlier about that haha.

 

      I think you're following just fine.  It's pretty much true by definition.  Mathematical truths, or certain principals are also often cited as a priori.  The argument is that they aren't derived from sense perception, and exist outside of our experience.  Another example:  In a voluntary exchange, Bob values Sue's good more than his own, and Sue values Bob's good more than her own; otherwise they wouldn't exchange.  All bachelors are unmarried.  These things, aren't derived from sense perception, nor empirically falsifiable, as I understand it.

 

     I'm wondering how the empiricist accepts such things to be true?  As I understand it, the empiricist is concerned with inductive a posteriori reasoning, whereas the rationalist is concerned with deductive a priori reasoning.

 

     I accept that if I were born and kept in sensory deprivation, I wouldn't "discover" these a priori truths, but I'm also not sure that they are derived entirely from sense perception.  Maybe they are, I'm on the outskirts of my understanding.  I think what I may be getting at here may be the problem of induction. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction.  I'm not sure.  I looked for a podcast/video from Stef dealing with this longstanding problem, and couldn't find one.

[dsayers]

 

Mathematical truths, or certain principals are also often cited as a priori.  The argument is that they aren't derived from sense perception, and exist outside of our experience.

 

For something to be true independent of our experience is the definition of objective. I still don't see the possibility of prior knowledge. Can you list a mathematical truth that wasn't arrived at by use of our senses and put forth as a truth for the purpose of acting as a logical shortcut? The pythagorean theorem for example is used to qualify right triangles, but you can use your senses to prove it without the use of numbers. It's put forth as a truth to save you the time of having to prove it every time you'd need to utilize it to arrive at an answer.

 

 I accept that if I were born and kept in sensory deprivation, I wouldn't "discover" these a priori truths, but I'm also not sure that they are derived entirely from sense perception.

 

It seems to me that if you accept the first statement, the second follows. In order for it not to, there'd have to be a second variable, but your first statement lists sense deprivation as the only variable.

 

Heh heh. Al-right!

[TheRobin]

I think the thing about a priori claims are, that you can't proof them via empirical evidence (like, I can't proof you're an actual conscious human being typing), but the action the person does would not make any sense without that assumption. And we can know that from our own experience.

 

 

dsayers: I don't see how the pythagorean theorem can be proven without numbers, as it is a claim about a certain aspect ratio of lines that are in a specific constelation to each other. So how would you proof that without numbers, if you can't even explain the theorem without numbers (be they implied or openly stated)?

[ThomasDoubts]

For something to be true independent of our experience is the definition of objective. I still don't see the possibility of prior knowledge. Can you list a mathematical truth that wasn't arrived at by use of our senses and put forth as a truth for the purpose of acting as a logical shortcut? The pythagorean theorem for example is used to qualify right triangles, but you can use your senses to prove it without the use of numbers. It's put forth as a truth to save you the time of having to prove it every time you'd need to utilize it to arrive at an answer.

 

 

Well I don't know that you would need to prove it every time you needed it.  Isn't that the nature of mathematical truth?  It's unchanging and always true, by definition.  No doubt, you can empirically test pythagorean theory.  How about imaginary numbers:    -1 ^(1/2).  There is no such thing as an imaginary number in reality, no doubt any numbers at all.  Maybe they were derived from sense perception.  Like I said, I wouldn't come up with them if I were born with sensory deprivation.

 

 

It seems to me that if you accept the first statement, the second follows. In order for it not to, there'd have to be a second variable, but your first statement lists sense deprivation as the only variable.

 

Heh heh. Al-right!

 

 

 

Hmm, I see your point...  I wonder about the implications though.  Does accepting empiricism mean one can't accept an a priori truth?  If I say something is true by definition, how do I prove it?  Do I even need to?

 

I skipped a lot of philosophy in college.  My professor had a massive hard on for Descartes and within a month, erroneously confirmed my preconceptions of philosophy as entirely useless.  Please forgive my piecemeal understanding.

I think the thing about a priori claims are, that you can't proof them via empirical evidence (like, I can't proof you're an actual conscious human being typing), but the action the person does would not make any sense without that assumption. And we can know that from our own experience.

 

 

Ok that makes sense.  Would these claims be equally true, whatever that means, as empirically verifiable claims?  Is there a reason you can't accept both a priori claims and a posteriori claims?

 

I know this might be kind of an annoying topic, so apologies for that.

[dsayers]

 

dsayers: I don't see how the pythagorean theorem can be proven without numbers, as it is a claim about a certain aspect ratio of lines that are in a specific constelation to each other. So how would you proof that without numbers, if you can't even explain the theorem without numbers (be they implied or openly stated)?

 

There's lots of videos on youtube. Just search pythagorean theorem proof. The most interesting one I found was

. In light of your last sentence there, I thought maybe Patrick Grim's explanation would be beneficial to you. I uploaded it here.

 

Well I don't know that you would need to prove it every time you needed it.  Isn't that the nature of mathematical truth?

 

That was the point I was making.

 

I skipped a lot of philosophy in college.  My professor had a massive hard on for Descartes and within a month, erroneously confirmed my preconceptions of philosophy as entirely useless.  Please forgive my piecemeal understanding.

 

I have a buddy who checked out of philosophy (his words) while in college for the same reason, so I completely understand.

 

I don't think the topic is annoying at all. I just don't like the labels. Like talking about empiricism as if it's options despite every one of us being born empiricists.

[TheRobin]

@Falsaurius: I wouldn't see why both claims shouldn't be equally true, as both accurately describe aspects of reality.

 

 

@dsayers: Does that count as proof though? The theorem claims to be valid for each and every one of an unlimited amount of rectangular triangles, so how can it count as proof when you show that it works with a few specific triangles?

 

Also, I too would be curious to hear the reasoning behind the imaginary number in mathematics and how they were derived from the senses (or not). Cause that seems to me of the few things that aren't found in empirical reality that still can be proofen valid.

[dsayers]

Also, I too would be curious to hear the reasoning behind the imaginary number in mathematics and how they were derived from the senses (or not). Cause that seems to me of the few things that aren't found in empirical reality that still can be proofen valid.

 

Could you clarify this please? I read it a few times and am not sure exactly what you're saying. Near as I can tell, you're saying that "2" cannot be derived from the senses. Is that right?

[ThomasDoubts]

Could you clarify this please? I read it a few times and am not sure exactly what you're saying. Near as I can tell, you're saying that "2" cannot be derived from the senses. Is that right?

 

I don't mean to speak for Robin but maybe I can clarify.  He's talking about an imaginary number.  Mathematics has proved the validity of an imaginary number: i.  i= the square root of negative 1.  This is a contradiction of sorts because any number squared is a positive number, by definition.  i squared is negative, which is a violation of the laws of algebra.

 

You can't go find the number 2 in reality but that's not really the point, I don't think.  You can't find a negative number in reality either.  An imaginary number is just an extra brainfrack, in that it seems to violate basic logic, but is empirically verifiable.  Did I just come full circle there?  Aaahhhhh, my brain is cramping, gotta go get a coffee.

 

Al-right.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imaginary_number

[TheRobin]

Could you clarify this please? I read it a few times and am not sure exactly what you're saying. Near as I can tell, you're saying that "2" cannot be derived from the senses. Is that right?

No, I see how you can derive numbers from the senses (either via amount or ratio aspects). Even negative numbers can make sense empirically, if you include directions (where negative would be the opposite direction or something like that).But I don't see how in reality you could ever observe or derive the squareroot of negative one (which is the imaginary number (or see Rex's link)). So I'd count that as an example of something that can be proofen, but is outside the realms of empirical observation.

[dsayers]

You both speak as if the square root of a negative number can be proven. Where is this claim coming from? The ability to describe something isn't proof of it. Giggity.

[ThomasDoubts]

You both speak as if the square root of a negative number can be proven. Where is this claim coming from? The ability to describe something isn't proof of it. Giggity.

 

Perhaps this will be helpful in demonstrating competing thoughts.  I'm afraid I'd be thought of as a looney, but I'd like to hear more about fictionalism.  Each of the 3 schools of thought, so to speak, seems to have problems, and I can't say that any of them present a closed case argument.  If you're too lazy   to watch all ten minutes, the imaginary number talk is around the 4:20 mark.

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1EGDCh75SpQ 

[dsayers]

Perhaps this will be helpful in demonstrating competing thoughts.

 

Sorry, it wasn't. For one, I don't feel it addressed my question. Also, it doesn't really fit with the aversion I shared up front for labels. Calling the way I think about numbers by a specific name doesn't alter it, nor even accurately represent it. For example, he mentioned pi as if it's a difficult number to deal with. 22/7 is pretty straightforward. Since the division never terminates, it comes down to how precise you'd like to be (where 22/7 won't suffice). Our inability to see things that small or hold numbers that long doesn't make them less useful or more imaginary. It's not at all comparable to the square root of a negative number.

 

Mathematics has proved the validity of an imaginary number: i.  i= the square root of negative 1.

 

I was asking where this proof was. Giggity goo.

[ThomasDoubts]

Sorry, it wasn't. For one, I don't feel it addressed my question. Also, it doesn't really fit with the aversion I shared up front for labels. Calling the way I think about numbers by a specific name doesn't alter it, nor even accurately represent it. For example, he mentioned pi as if it's a difficult number to deal with. 22/7 is pretty straightforward. Since the division never terminates, it comes down to how precise you'd like to be (where 22/7 won't suffice). Our inability to see things that small or hold numbers that long doesn't make them less useful or more imaginary. It's not at all comparable to the square root of a negative number.

 

Yeah I noticed the Numberphile guy tackled Pi, but not i.  Pi is much easier to deal with, I wish he would have tackled i.  The problem with proving Pi is it has to terminate to be a thing.  No matter how close your approximation, your are talking about your approximation, not pi.  Because Pi doesn't terminate you can't really call it a number.  I'm probably not doing this justice...

 

I was asking where this proof was. Giggity goo.

 

I've studied a decent amount of math, but it's a bit rusty.  I'm not certain of the proof myself, I want to say it has something to do with Euler's Formula or the Quadratic equation, but that could be totally wrong.  At any rate, it's used in many area's of calculus, and with many practical applications, and held up.  Let me check the interwebs and see what I can come up with.

[Chris Harris]

I would like to put some input into the conversation. When I first heard about these types of knowledge, mathematics was one of the examples listed as a priori. To me this does not seem to be the case since in order to develop mathematics we require two things, our mind and our senses. Our mind is that which derives mathematics from our sensual experience. One way I think about it (please let me know if this is helpful) is that numbers themselves do not exist within reality but what does exist are discrete individual objects. So mathematics must have been created by our mind (most likely to classify and group individuals) in order for us to conceptually categorize objects that we perceive.

 

This is in line with what dsayers was mentioning when he(?) talked about everything being derived from sensual experience. Even though once the logic/method of mathematics is discovered, it becomes independent of experience, it was first derived from sensual experience. To help back this up (this is not very scientific since it can't be verified though I hope it helps) if we were somehow a consciousness without a body and senses, mathematics (along with logic and most everything else) would be of no use to us at all since we would have no need to classify objects which we can never experience.

 

I hope this makes sense and was not just a restatement of what has already been said.

[ThomasDoubts]

I would like to put some input into the conversation. When I first heard about these types of knowledge, mathematics was one of the examples listed as a priori. To me this does not seem to be the case since in order to develop mathematics we require two things, our mind and our senses. Our mind is that which derives mathematics from our sensual experience. One way I think about it (please let me know if this is helpful) is that numbers themselves do not exist within reality but what does exist are discrete individual objects. So mathematics must have been created by our mind (most likely to classify and group individuals) in order for us to conceptually categorize objects that we perceive.

 

This is in line with what dsayers was mentioning when he(?) talked about everything being derived from sensual experience. Even though once the logic/method of mathematics is discovered, it becomes independent of experience, it was first derived from sensual experience. To help back this up (this is not very scientific since it can't be verified though I hope it helps) if we were somehow a consciousness without a body and senses, mathematics (along with logic and most everything else) would be of no use to us at all since we would have no need to classify objects which we can never experience.

 

I hope this makes sense and was not just a restatement of what has already been said.

 

I think this makes perfect sense.  Like if I'm born in complete sensory deprivation, I don't think I would in 100 years I would have developed any mathematical arguments or proofs.  It's not directly related, but there's the popular pysche case of this girl Genie.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genie_%28feral_child%29#Characteristics_and_personality.   I don't expect much knowledge to come from such a person.  It seems clear to me that sense perception is necessary, but perhaps not sufficent.

 

My personal inclination about the aquisition of knowledge is that it comes from errors in logic, and is validated empirically.  The laws of nature must be static; else they wouldn't be laws.  Our understanding of nature is evolving.  Only when the theory precisely describes the empirical, is there knowledge, but not certain knowledge.  .The world is round--  preposterous.  Objects with mass bend light--  preposterous.  People can communicate instantaneously on opposite sides of the planet-- preposterous.

 

Stupid theory->testing->didn't work->Stupid theory #2->Oh shit, that's close->Refine theory->retest->empirical validation eureka->theory tenetively "proved".

 

It must be logical to be true.  Empirical evidence shows us that there are errors in accepted logic when we propose irrational theories and stumble closer to the truth.   In short, I think the problem of induction is not to be overlooked.  I accept the products of the scientific method in my everyday life, but I also accept that much of what I know, may in fact be false, or at least that it can't be proved with certainty.   Will the sun "rise" tomorrow?  I have no reason to believe it won't, but I also cannot prove it will.  It seems to me that a priori/axiomatic truths are required to salvage ethics (doesn't UPB rest on them?).  They're certainly required to salvage Austrian Economics, of which I'm a proponent.  As I understand it, empirical epistemology rejects them, while I accept them as true by definition.

 

It was always true that nature behaved in a certain way, I think knowledge is a rational proof describing it precisely.  Was the "stupid theory" derived from sense perception?  I'm certain we need sense perception to even think about these things, but it's not clear to me that it's sufficient.  I may be 99% sure that objects with mass don't bend light, because it never has.  Then Eistein comes up with a stupid theory that turned science on it's head.

 

It seems to me that the only Truth is axiomatic, or true by definition or extended deduction.  Truths about nature are always falsifiable, otherwise, it wouldn't be science.  What is missed is that they just haven't been falsified yet, if ever, but it must be possible and they cannot therefore be claimed as certainly true.

 

Sorry if I got away from the math too much, and wasn't responding directly to you all the way through.  I was hoping to drag the discussion back a bit more on topic.  I think I'm pretty much in agreement with you though Chris.

 

For you Dsayers:    http://www.proofwiki.org/wiki/Definition:Complex_Number

http://www.math.toronto.edu/mathnet/answers/imagexist.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euler%27s_formula#Applications_in_complex_number_theory

 

The last one is supplemental/related 

[dsayers]

What is missed is that they just haven't been falsified yet, if ever, but it must be possible and they cannot therefore be claimed as certainly true.

 

The capacity for being false is a requisite for being true. To use the capacity for falsehood to undermine truth is paradoxical and self-detonating. You are saying it is certainly true that that which could possibly be false cannot be certainly true.

 

The problem with proving Pi is it has to terminate to be a thing.  No matter how close your approximation, your are talking about your approximation, not pi.

 

Pi is representative. 22/7 is not an approximation, even if its quotient is. For example, there is nothing unknown or imprecise about 14 pi.

 

To bring pi back inline with your topic, human beings do not possess the capacity to sense carbon monoxide, but we are capable of utilizing technology to interpret it in ways our senses can detect. Similarly, we are capable of utilizing technology to interpret the quotient of pi to eight quadrillion decimal places.

 

Or how about this. Once you introduce the facet of interpretation, you have to take notice of this discussion of pi being in base 10. In base 22, pi is simply written as .7

[ThomasDoubts]

The capacity for being false is a requisite for being true. To use the capacity for falsehood to undermine truth is paradoxical and self-detonating. You are saying it is certainly true that that which could possibly be false cannot be certainly true.

 

I didn't say it was certainly true that...  I said it cannot be claimed certainly true, if it can be falsified.  Subtle difference.  If it could be potentially falsified, how could it possibly be certainly true?

 

 

Pi is representative. 22/7 is not an approximation, even if its quotient is. For example, there is nothing unknown or imprecise about 14 pi.

 

To bring pi back inline with your topic, human beings do not possess the capacity to sense carbon monoxide, but we are capable of utilizing technology to interpret it in ways our senses can detect. Similarly, we are capable of utilizing technology to interpret the quotient of pi to eight quadrillion decimal places.

 

Or how about this. Once you introduce the facet of interpretation, you have to take notice of this discussion of pi being in base 10. In base 22, pi is simply written as .7

 

 

Changing the base does not make Pi any less of an irrational number.

 

I agree that we use our senses to interpret reality, and detect things like carbon monoxide.  I'm not suggesting sense perception is invalid, useless, or anything like that.

 

Side note, did you ever see the savant on Letterman recite pi to a bazillion decimal places?  Fascinating...

[dsayers]

I didn't say it was certainly true that...  I said it cannot be claimed certainly true, if it can be falsified.  Subtle difference.  If it could be potentially falsified, how could it possibly be certainly true?

 

If I say my shoes are brown, I'm also saying that they have the capacity to not be brown. The fact that my shoes have the capacity to not be brown doesn't mean that they're not brown.

 

Changing the base does not make Pi any less of an irrational number.

 

I'm sorry if I missed earlier that your claim was that pi is an irrational number. I don't know how to answer that since I don't know what it means. Is 22 an irrational number? Is 7 an irrational number? Is division an irrational process? If you answered no to all of the above, what makes 22/7 irrational? The fact that in base 10, the quotient doesn't terminate? If so, then changing the base does matter.

 

When I brought up CO, I wasn't talking about CO. I was pointing out the importance of interpretation. 22/7 is much clearer than its quotient in base 10. In base 22, .7 is clearer than 22/7. Well, in base 22, I suppose it would be written 10/7.

 

To take a different angle at interpretation, is a dog any less a dog if the French refer to it as chien or the Spanish refer to it as perro? Or that in Spanish, the phonetic gato describes a cat while in French, it describes a cake? Interpretation doesn't alter identity, which is why I reject the claim that pi is goofy since 22/7 clearly isn't.

[ThomasDoubts]

If I say my shoes are brown, I'm also saying that they have the capacity to not be brown. The fact that my shoes have the capacity to not be brown doesn't mean that they're not brown.

 

Yes they'd be brown, until I pushed you into a tub of wine.  Actually I wouldn't do that, but if I did....

It's also not true that color is objective.  Color is an illusion developed by our brain.  If they appear some color other than brown to a colorblind person, is he wrong?  The perception of color is subjective.  You could say your shoes reflect these wavelengths I suppose, but that doesn't mean they always will.

 

I'm sorry if I missed earlier that your claim was that pi is an irrational number. I don't know how to answer that since I don't know what it means. Is 22 an irrational number? Is 7 an irrational number? Is division an irrational process? If you answered no to all of the above, what makes 22/7 irrational? The fact that in base 10, the quotient doesn't terminate? If so, then changing the base does matter.

 

When I brought up CO, I wasn't talking about CO. I was pointing out the importance of interpretation. 22/7 is much clearer than its quotient in base 10. In base 22, .7 is clearer than 22/7. Well, in base 22, I suppose it would be written 10/7.

 

To take a different angle at interpretation, is a dog any less a dog if the French refer to it as chien or the Spanish refer to it as perro? Or that in Spanish, the phonetic gato describes a cat while in French, it describes a cake? Interpretation doesn't alter identity, which is why I reject the claim that pi is goofy since 22/7 clearly isn't.

 

Pi is an irrational transendetal number.  i is an imaginary complex number.  You can read about the properties of these things if you'd like.  22/7 is not pi, I don't know why we're talking about it.  22/7 is an approximation.

[dsayers]

Yes they'd be brown, until I pushed you into a tub of wine.  Actually I wouldn't do that, but if I did....

It's also not true that color is objective.  Color is an illusion developed by our brain.  If they appear some color other than brown to a colorblind person, is he wrong?  The perception of color is subjective.  You could say your shoes reflect these wavelengths I suppose, but that doesn't mean they always will.

 

K, well I use CO to try and make a point and you read just CO. I use brown to make a point and you read just brown. I'm afraid I'm unable to speak in a way that's useful to you. I apologize and will indeed try to improve upon that for the future.

[ThomasDoubts]

What is CO?  I had no idea what you were talking about.  I should have asked.  Apologies

 

 

{edit}  Nevermind, Carbon Monoxide, I gotcha.  I'm not saying that Carbon Monoxide doesn't exist because we don't percieve it.  We certainly percieve it's effects, like lightheadedness or whatever.  I'm not suggesting sense perception is invalid, or that we can't use technology to make better use of sense perception.  What I'm suggesting is that scientific truth claims are always open to falsification and therefore never certainly true.  Scientific truth claims are still objective.  We could still say with 99.999% certainty that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light.  That could still be proved false, could it not?

[TheRobin]

You both speak as if the square root of a negative number can be proven. Where is this claim coming from? The ability to describe something isn't proof of it. Giggity.

 

How do you define proof in mathematics then? As far as I understand it, it math, when you can show, how something is valid within the framework of the basic axioms that's mathematical proof.

 

Or how would you proof something simple like 2+2=4? Or do you count that as a definition too?

[Pepin]

We could still say with 99.999% certainty that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light.  That could still be proved false, could it not?

At the moment, we would say that particles with mass cannot attain a velocity of the speed of light or faster because the current models of reality and all of the validation of the model through testing demonstrates no reason to believe the contrary. I don't think it makes much sense to say that something is less true because it can be falsified, as falsification is the means by which its validity is accepted. If a discovery is made which contradicts the statement, then the validity of special relativity becomes more constrictive. As a comparison, special relativity did not invalidate classical mechanics, but rather set limitations as to when the model is valid and how much error would be involved in any calculation.

[ThomasDoubts]

At the moment, we would say that particles with mass cannot attain a velocity of the speed of light or faster because the current models of reality and all of the validation of the model through testing demonstrates no reason to believe the contrary. I don't think it makes much sense to say that something is less true because it can be falsified, as falsification is the means by which its validity is accepted. If a discovery is made which contradicts the statement, then the validity of special relativity becomes more constrictive. As a comparison, special relativity did not invalidate classical mechanics, but rather set limitations as to when the model is valid and how much error would be involved in any calculation.

 

I don't know what you mean when you say "less true."  My only point is that you can't be certain.  I'm thinking of science as this methodology by which our understanding is this slow process of convergence to the truth that comes about by finding errors in our theories.  It seems axiomatic to me that a falsifiable theory cannot be certainly true.  You'd have to exhaust the infinite number of ways the theory could be proved false, or if you prefer, imperfect or imprecise.  Special relativity was a refinement; in other words, classical mechanics was proved false under certain conditions, and special relativity attempted to fill the void.

 

If truth is correspondence with the facts, derived from sense perceptions, it begs the question.  Which facts?  How do we know that the theory corresponds with the rights facts, or all of the facts?

 

 

{edit} I wanted to add something that I overlooked on my first reading; the idea of setting limitations, and being forthright about model error.  This is proper science, in my opinion.  I think what Einstein did was not prove special relativity, but rather proved classical mechanics as incomplete/false.  In the area's that classical mechanics were(in hindsight) clearly false, special relativity was proposed as an explanation, and has held up as far as we can tell.  In a 100,000 years will we have a better understanding that corrects errors in Einstein's work, or builds upon it to explain some unforeseeable circumstance or phenomenon?  If that is possible, I don't see how it can be said that the claims are absolutely and certainly true.  They're just true, near as we can tell.

 

I've read you next post and enjoyed it, as well as considered some other material.  I think I may need a few hours to marinate and maybe delineate my arguments/thoughts a bit.

[Pepin]

I say "less true" because from what I understand, you are making a distinction between scientific claims and logical claims, such as those in mathematics. Claims and models derived through empiricism can be considered true, but less true than the statement "2+4=6".

 

If truth is correspondence with the facts, derived from sense perceptions, it begs the question.  Which facts?  How do we know that the theory corresponds with the rights facts, or all of the facts?

 

Maybe a dumb question, but how do you know it doesn't?

 

I'm going to attempt to make a clarification below, so if it feels like I'm sidestepping the issue just keep reading and hopefully I am not. Really, I hope I'm not wasting my time in describing something you already agree with, or an argument you find irrelevant. Anyway.

 

If I say that all knowledge of reality is derived through sense experience, I am somewhat cheating because I would not suggest that precepts and concepts are components of sense experience, rather that they are results of sense experience through about 3.5 billions years of evolution. The first living creatures on this earth had no ability to perceive or to conceptualize, rather they were like little bio-mechanical machines. The organisms had no understanding or awareness, yet through the mechanisms of evolutionary theory, organisms developed sense organs, which are instruments that take in data through physical means and programs an corresponding action to particular data. So some organism that detects blue light of a particular magnitude might swim up to the object and attempt to eat it, and upon detecting yellow light might have an automatic response to travel as fast as possible in the opposite direction. This sort of survival is non-descriptive in that there is no awareness or purpose according to the sensations or reactions, it is just what happens.

 

As life grew more and more complex, the mechanism of accurate sensation became more important for survival. A class organisms that are able to correctly sense reality accurately have far better means for survival than those that don't. Survival is fundamentally based on acting and reacting in accordance to reality as a species that did not behave with any reference to reality would die off in pretty quite time, and since the senses were the means of gaining data of reality, the sense organs evolved to become quite good at sensing objective reality.

 

Through billions of years of evolution life began to gain the ability to perceive as a means of survival, which is ultimately a result of the senses, but is not the same as sense experience. To quote Rand.

 

The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of consciousness: they possess the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of perception. A “perception” is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things. An animal is guided, not merely by immediate sensations, but by percepts. Its actions are not single, discrete responses to single, separate stimuli, but are directed by an integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it. It is able to grasp the perceptual concretes immediately present and it is able to form automatic perceptual associations, but it can go no further.

 

Unlike early life, these organisms were not bio-mechanical machines that could only act or react to sense data, but rather they had the ability to ascribe sense data to entities. A key feature of this progression is awareness is the ability to ascribe actions to its own entity and to other entities. Due to this, the organism gains an ability to understand what it and other entities are capable of doing, as well as the ability to act on its own behalf in accordance with its perceptual model of reality.

 

Perception arose of course due to evolutionary mechanisms and was built on the foundation of the senses, but it is also good to point out that perception came to be because it described immediate reality well enough. Objects acted independent enough to allow for differentiation, and though there is of course a lot of error involved in this, it provides a far better means of survival through a greater understanding of reality.

 

Important ideas originate from perception. For instance, to an organism capable of perception: a predator remains a predator and does not change into a piece a kelp. Water remains as water and not lava. Structures that can't be passed through such as a mountain continue to have that property. What I am trying to get at is that the organism implicitly perceives that A is A, that this percept is based on a sort of empiricism through the senses, and that it makes total sense for this to be the case. Of course percepts can be invalid, but the organisms that act according to the percepts that most mirror reality will be far more likely to survive than those that have most inaccurate or invalid ones.

 

Once life perceives reality not as a whole, yet rather as separate entities that act, the idea of numbers and concept of relationships follow. It isn't that there is a precise understanding in any sense, rather that the organism has a general sense. For instance, some dinosaur might be able to fight off one or two raptors and stand to fight as it would gain a meal from it, but lack in ability to fight twenty. If coming upon a group of raptors, it would use its visual sense and its action would be based on the number of raptors it perceives. Though the differentiation the might be general in that it sees either "a few" or "a lot", it still has a concept of quantity.

 

The step that follows from this is conceptualization, which again is a result from the senses, but ought not to be confused with sense experience. To quote Rand again.

 

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition. By organizing his perceptual material into concepts, and his concepts into wider and still wider concepts, man is able to grasp and retain, to identify and integrate an unlimited amount of knowledge, a knowledge extending beyond the immediate concretes of any given, immediate moment.

 

In any given moment, concepts enable man to hold in the focus of his conscious awareness much more than his purely perceptual capacity would permit. The range of man's perceptual awareness—the number of percepts he can deal with at any one time—is limited. He may be able to visualize four or five units—as, for instance, five trees. He cannot visualize a hundred trees or a distance of ten light-years. It is only his conceptual faculty that makes it possible for him to deal with knowledge of that kind.

 

Man retains his concepts by means of language. With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. A concept is like a mathematical series of specifically defined units, going off in both directions, open at both ends and including all units of that particular kind. For instance, the concept “man” includes all men who live at present, who have ever lived or will ever live—a number of men so great that one would not be able to perceive them all visually, let alone to study them or discover anything about them.

 

The capacity to reason is a result of reality being objective and the understanding of reality being a key factor for survival. Reason is a means of validating or invaliding sensations, percept, and concepts through concepts. It is evolution's solution to the fallibility of sense and perception.

 

A key feature of conceptualization entails the ability to understand and abstract a property of an object as a thing in itself, disconnected from objects. A man has a percept of length which is the size of an entity when compared to the size of another entity, and the man is able to conceptualize the concept of length into something that does not have anything to do with a particular. Essentially, this is what mathematics is, the rational conceptualization of the attributes of percepts such as quantity, logic, and geometry.

 

New concepts such as irrational numbers, calculus, imaginary numbers and so on may not be based in sensation or perception, but they do not need to be because the validation and invalidation of the claims are based on the abstract concept of truth which already existed as a means to validate or invalidate percepts and sensations. Though this point might be subtle or slightly confusing, mathematics exists because: reality is objective, humans gain knowledge of reality through the senses, humans gain an understanding of objectivity through reality, conceptualization allows for objectivity to be a thing in itself, and mathematics is concept that is based on the concept of objectivity.

 

I hope this response helped in some way. I've been writing an article on a related topic, so I'm trying to avoid another article here, but I seemed to have failed.

[ThomasDoubts]

I say "less true" because from what I understand, you are making a distinction between scientific claims and logical claims, such as those in mathematics. Claims and models derived through empiricism can be considered true, but less true than the statement "2+4=6".

 

 

Maybe a dumb question, but how do you know it doesn't?

 

I would say I know for certain that it (a particular theory/truth claim) doesn't have the right facts, or all of the facts if it doesn't have perfect predictive power at all times and in all circumstances.  Lacking perfect predictive power, you'd at least have to have some theory accounting for the error, and an ability to isolate it.  Otherwise, you're just "pretty close."

 

 I'll have to think about that question, I'm not sure...

 

In answer to the question about my intent: yes and no, maybe.  How do you like that for an answer haha?  I haven't made this clear, and I might begin to condradict some of my previous posts but my position is kind of malleable, in the sense that I'm discovering things as I discuss and research ideas.  Sorry for any confusion I may have caused or may cause in the future.  Below I'm going to detail a kind of framework I'm working with, and then go through and address your post more directly.  If you'd prefer, feel free to skip ahead and come back to this.

 

The distinction I'm trying to draw is between conceptual, abstract, a priori, axiomatic, logical deductive knowledge; and scientific empirical knowledge.  Furthermore, within the realm of scientific knowledge, I think a further distinction may be made between a present time "in the moment" perceptual knowledge (an interplay of perception and concepts) and a more fundemental framework of objective theoretical knowledge.

 

In the apriori, axiomatic realm, we have self evident claims like "2+2=4," and "Man acts purposefully," and, "I own myself," and, "This is an apple."(I'm holding an apple) These claims can be said to be certainly true.

 

In the category of perceptual knowledge you have claims like, "My shoes are brown," or "The pencil bends when partially submerged in water, and viewed from the proper position," or "The sun rises every morning in the East."  Perception without concepts or language does not produce useful knowledge, but rather an experience.  Sensory perception is constant input, which is constantly tested against held conceptual or theoretical knowledge.  Claims of this sort are subjective and not necessarily true, because they lie fundementally on fallible cognitive inference and the validity of prior knowledge conceptual understanding.  Because sensory perception is fundementally empirical, these claims must be compatible with theoretical or conceptual knowledge to make a valid truth claim.  Incompatibility presents a problem requiring integration with accepted truths or "discoverable" truths, and is the precurser to rejection and the aquisition of new knowledge via an inquisitive mind.

 

In the latter category you have claims like, "The color brown is a perceptual illusion produced when the human brain processes particular wavelengths of light," or "light is refracted when passing though water in such and such a way," or "The Earth rotates around the sun in such and such a way."  These claims must be falsifiable, and the more falsifiable, the better.  The truth value of these claims are proportional to the precision of hypothesized predictions reflecting empirical evidence and the consistency with which it can be replicated.  The "truest" claim is most falsifiable (most precise), never falsified, and perfectly and precisely predicts future behavior with the unwavering consistency.

 

 

 

I'm going to attempt to make a clarification below, so if it feels like I'm sidestepping the issue just keep reading and hopefully I am not. Really, I hope I'm not wasting my time in describing something you already agree with, or an argument you find irrelevant. Anyway.

 

If I say that all knowledge of reality is derived through sense experience, I am somewhat cheating because I would not suggest that precepts and concepts are components of sense experience, rather that they are results of sense experience through about 3.5 billions years of evolution. The first living creatures on this earth had no ability to perceive or to conceptualize, rather they were like little bio-mechanical machines. The organisms had no understanding or awareness, yet through the mechanisms of evolutionary theory, organisms developed sense organs, which are instruments that take in data through physical means and programs an corresponding action to particular data. So some organism that detects blue light of a particular magnitude might swim up to the object and attempt to eat it, and upon detecting yellow light might have an automatic response to travel as fast as possible in the opposite direction. This sort of survival is non-descriptive in that there is no awareness or purpose according to the sensations or reactions, it is just what happens.

 

I'm cool with this so far, with one minor exception.  I wonder about the term "programs."  To me, that implies a programmer.  I think it would be more accurate to describe it as emergent phenomenon of mutation, or randomness, or something less directed, for want of a better word.  But I'm with you.

 

 

As life grew more and more complex, the mechanism of accurate sensation became more important for survival. A class organisms that are able to correctly sense reality accurately have far better means for survival than those that don't. Survival is fundamentally based on acting and reacting in accordance to reality as a species that did not behave with any reference to reality would die off in pretty quite time, and since the senses were the means of gaining data of reality, the sense organs evolved to become quite good at sensing objective reality.

 

Through billions of years of evolution life began to gain the ability to perceive as a means of survival, which is ultimately a result of the senses, but is not the same as sense experience.

 

This seems perfectly fine and likely to me, and I quite agree with that last distinction if I understand you correctly.

 

 

To quote Rand.

The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of consciousness: they possess the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of perception. A “perception” is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things. An animal is guided, not merely by immediate sensations, but by percepts. Its actions are not single, discrete responses to single, separate stimuli, but are directed by an integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it. It is able to grasp the perceptual concretes immediately present and it is able to form automatic perceptual associations, but it can go no further.

 

 

Unlike early life, these organisms were not bio-mechanical machines that could only act or react to sense data, but rather they had the ability to ascribe sense data to entities. A key feature of this progression is awareness is the ability to ascribe actions to its own entity and to other entities. Due to this, the organism gains an ability to understand what it and other entities are capable of doing, as well as the ability to act on its own behalf in accordance with its perceptual model of reality.

 

Perception arose of course due to evolutionary mechanisms and was built on the foundation of the senses, but it is also good to point out that perception came to be because it described immediate reality well enough. Objects acted independent enough to allow for differentiation, and though there is of course a lot of error involved in this, it provides a far better means of survival through a greater understanding of reality.

 

I don't want you to think you haven't added anything new, because you have, but I still find myself in agreement.  The fact that there is much error as a result of the emergence of perception fits my way of thinking (not that that makes it true).  More error=more problems=more opportunity for differentiation=more random beneficial mutation.

 

 

Important ideas originate from perception. For instance, to an organism capable of perception: a predator remains a predator and does not change into a piece a kelp. Water remains as water and not lava. Structures that can't be passed through such as a mountain continue to have that property. What I am trying to get at is that the organism implicitly perceives that A is A, that this percept is based on a sort of empiricism through the senses, and that it makes total sense for this to be the case. Of course percepts can be invalid, but the organisms that act according to the percepts that most mirror reality will be far more likely to survive than those that have most inaccurate or invalid ones.

 

You're making too much sense to me.

 

 

Once life perceives reality not as a whole, yet rather as separate entities that act, the idea of numbers and concept of relationships follow. It isn't that there is a precise understanding in any sense, rather that the organism has a general sense. For instance, some dinosaur might be able to fight off one or two raptors and stand to fight as it would gain a meal from it, but lack in ability to fight twenty. If coming upon a group of raptors, it would use its visual sense and its action would be based on the number of raptors it perceives. Though the differentiation the might be general in that it sees either "a few" or "a lot", it still has a concept of quantity.

 

Dammit, dinosaurs can do math too?  I'm kidding.  I'd never really thought of this but, having never observed a dinosaur, I still think it's unlikely a TRex would try to fight off 20 raptors.  Who knows though; I've seen a Pit Bull try to fight off an overwhelming number of "attackers", rather than flee.  Is it safe to assume you're pretty much describing a fight or flight mechanism governed by the Dino's perception of quantity or threat level and "Those dino's aren't me?"  That wouldn't seem unreasonable to me.

 

 

The capacity to reason is a result of reality being objective and the understanding of reality being a key factor for survival. Reason is a means of validating or invaliding sensations, percept, and concepts through concepts. It is evolution's solution to the fallibility of sense and perception.

 

Yes, this is what I haven't articulated, but have been trying to get at.  Not only are our sensations, percept, and concepts valid or invalid, but so is our reasoning, I would add.  The "rules" of reason are objective, but our application/acceptance is not-- I hope that's clear.  To bring these things into unison is to pursue truth, I believe.

 

 

A key feature of conceptualization entails the ability to understand and abstract a property of an object as a thing in itself, disconnected from objects. A man has a percept of length which is the size of an entity when compared to the size of another entity, and the man is able to conceptualize the concept of length into something that does not have anything to do with a particular. Essentially, this is what mathematics is, the rational conceptualization of the attributes of percepts such as quantity, logic, and geometry.

 

New concepts such as irrational numbers, calculus, imaginary numbers and so on may not be based in sensation or perception, but they do not need to be because the validation and invalidation of the claims are based on the abstract concept of truth which already existed as a means to validate or invalidate percepts and sensations. Though this point might be subtle or slightly confusing, mathematics exists because: reality is objective, humans gain knowledge of reality through the senses, humans gain an understanding of objectivity through reality, conceptualization allows for objectivity to be a thing in itself, and mathematics is concept that is based on the concept of objectivity.

 

I hope this response helped in some way. I've been writing an article on a related topic, so I'm trying to avoid another article here, but I seemed to have failed.     <--  To my benefit, so you'll hear no complaints.

 

I was with you until your last paragraph, and I started getting wobbly knees.  Let me re-hash to make sure I understand, and that we're in agreement.

 

-Reality is objective and governed by universal laws--  Agreed.

 

-Humans gain knowledge of reality through the senses--  Agreed, I think.  I'm kind of wishy washy here, but I think it's just definitions.  It seems more accurate to me to say Humans gain information about reality through the senses.  If knowledge=Information, then that seems fine.  Knowledge seems to imply truth value, and sense data needn't necessarily correspond with truth.  Right, like pencils don't bend when you stick them in a cup of water.  This appears as a phenomenon to us, and begs for interrogation.

 

-Conceptualization allows for objectivity to be a thing in itself--  I had to read that about 3 times so bear with me.  Objectivity requires reasoning, and reasoning requires concepts?  Is that right?  Clearly objectivity isn't a tangible thing...

 

-Mathematics is concept that is based on the concept of objectivity--  Agreed.

 

 

Fortunately, or unfortunately I don't have much to disagree with you about.  Great article, by the way, if that's it in it's entirety.  I think the issue I've been having is that in my understanding of the history of philosophy/epistemology, there seems to be this titanic battle over what knowledge and truth are: a priori, logic, deductive vs. a posteriori, empirical, inductive.  I'm inclined to say they reinforce each other, but I get the impression that it would be some sort of philosophical heresy.  I am sure that reality is objective.  I am sure that perception is information.  I am sure that we can use that information to discover things that are true about reality.  I'm also sure that 2+2=4 and that I own my body.  Why is this so incompatible for philosophers? 

 

{edit}  I think I may be showing my ignorance of objectivist epistemology here.  Excuse me while I sink into the background and correct this. 

[null]

"Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" -- read it.

 

Rand points out that the dichotomy of necessary and contingent truths hinges on the mistake of conflating meaning (actual concrete referents) with definition (discriminating essentials). Basically: she reveals that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is Platonic forms in disguise.

 

She was brilliant on this subject in particular.

[ThomasDoubts]

"Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" -- read it.

 

Rand points out that the dichotomy of necessary and contingent truths hinges on the mistake of conflating meaning (actual concrete referents) with definition (discriminating essentials). Basically: she reveals that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is Platonic forms in disguise.

 

She was brilliant on this subject in particular.

 

 

Yes, I'm working my way through it for a second time.  I found it fairly dense, as a lay-philosopher.  I'd be reading the same sentence three times and still not be sure what she meant    I feel a bit silly that I hadn't taken the time to read much of Rand's published work, or anything Plato besides The Republic.  There's been so many other people I've been reading and I never made myself aware of how much of a philosopher she really was...  I already have a vastly greater appreciation for her work, and I'm sure I'm not quite fluent enough to grasp the depth of it.  I get the feeling that this is one of those books I'll come back to in 5 years and find all kinds of stuff I didn't appreciate/notice before.  I'm quite relieved to have found some sanity in Epistemology; I was worried all of philosophy was built on the foundation of gummy bears.

 

For me, definately worth owning a hard copy, and I don't just stick anything on my bookshelf