Definition of free will

[Bedouin]

I haven't really been reading everything here, but I just wanted to clarify something: Why are Rainbow Dash's points all being downvoted? I don't see anything nasty about his posts. Maybe he's wrong (I'm not certain he is) but his arguments seem concise and reasonable. Downvoting just seems a little OTT. Could any more seasoned members of the community answer this for me? Is it a general tendency to downvote things that we do not agree with here, no matter how reasonable the opponent is being?

[Kevin Beal]

I haven't really been reading everything here, but I just wanted to clarify something: Why are Rainbow Dash's points all being downvoted? I don't see anything nasty about his posts. Maybe he's wrong (I'm not certain he is) but his arguments seem concise and reasonable. Downvoting just seems a little OTT. Could any more seasoned members of the community answer this for me? Is it a general tendency to downvote things that we do not agree with here, no matter how reasonable the opponent is being?

Are you rainbow dash under a different account? Just kidding

 

I think I remember downvoting one because it was obvious that RD was being obtuse, ignoring the relevant part of a post I made that already addressed what RD said. I think he even quoted that part...

 

One example is the question "is free will random?" when I had said to RD in an earlier post that, at least the way I define it, has nothing whatever to do with randomness. I remember having that experience of being annoyed by the seeming obtuseness multiple times.

 

I'm inclined to believe that RD's an intelligent person, so that makes me think it's obtuseness.

 

Is that alright? Can I downvote for that reason?

 

Here's a thread about this topic generally. That's the most appropriate place to bring it up, I think. And you can always report abusive behavior to the mods if you see it.

[Rainbow Dash]

One example is the question "is free will random?" when I had said to RD in an earlier post that, at least the way I define it, has nothing whatever to do with randomness. I remember having that experience of being annoyed by the seeming obtuseness multiple times.

In my previous post I explained how I logically concluded how free will must be random. If there is a flaw in my argument please point it out to me so I can stop wasting everyone's time.

[Kevin Beal]

Those videos still don't answer the main problem I have with free will, which I am sorry if I haven't explained it well enough before. I will explain:

 

Everything that happens fits in to one of two categories: either I knew for certain beforehand that it would happen, or I didn't know for certain beforehand that it would happen. If I knew for certain beforehand then it must have been deterministic. If I didn't know beforehand, then from my perspective it was random. For example, since I can't calculate the result of a coin flip before it hits the ground, coin flips are random to me, even though coin flips are considered physically deterministic. Since all actions must fit into one of these two categories I described, and you already explained that free will and determinism can't coexist, that only leaves the possibility that free will is random from an individual's perspective. Is free will actually a form of randomness (by how I described it), or did I make a mistake? 

Okay, here's my response. I think there are a couple of errors you are making here. But first, I want to point out that the intention behind posting the videos was not to prove free will, but rather to introduce people to John Searle since the guy has a ton of very smart things to add to discussions like this. And even if you are a determinist, he can still teach you a hell of a lot about metaphysics (like he did me the past month or two).

 

The definition of random

The first error I believe you are making is a factual one about what randomness means. There is often a distinction made between "random" and "true random". In talking about metaphysics, I believe the relevant and accurate meaning is the "true random" one. In programming every language (pretty much) has some kind of random function in it's native library that mixes things up so well that it may as well be random, but is not actually random. Usually they use the timestamp as a base and mix from there since the time is different every time you call the function. Likewise, and as you suggested, flipping a coin might as well be random, but is physically determined. Determinism precludes true randomness. True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make. An example of this is in quantum physics which you or someone else pointed out earlier.

 

 

Predictability as a standard

The second error I think you are making is in making personal predictability the standard for how we determine whether something is determined or free will. This has problems both ways. The first is that if our prediction does not come true in a deterministic model, then surely, we know that some consideration was not made, some variable unaccounted for. Also, we can predict what decisions people will come to for lots of reasons with differing degrees of certainty. If their decision is a delicious meal over a pile of manure, then that's pretty obvious, or if we neuro-linguistically program someone to eat the manure then we can predict that they will. Maybe it's just the best manure on the planet in some culture where they do that sort of thing, or the person is not as susceptible to NLP or something, in which case we were wrong.

 

 

Randomness is not free will

The third error would be (if you were making this argument) in saying that randomness allows for free will, but actually it doesn't. I suspect that you know the reason already, and is why you asked the question, but just in case: if someone acts randomly, obviously we can't consider them to be acting of their own free will. There is no difference to a determined human robot whether or not the effect of their actions had a determined antecedent cause or if the effect is random, neither allows for the freedom of the will to come in and do its self referential, self generating causal "magic", so to speak.

 

 

Free will is causal

The reason that randomness is brought up by people is, I believe, because there is a confusion between their conception of "causal" and their conception of "determined". This actually presents a big problem for determinists that I will try to highlight again.

 

There is a form of causal description which goes something like: given X input, we should expect Y output in the system C. The input of trajectory and force applied from the input a pool stick (X) to the billiard ball ( C) should result in it ending up in the corner pocket (Y). This is a determined process and the determinacy is pretty easy to see if we think about it. The billiard ball isn't going to suddenly decide to turn back and fight the pool stick or run away in some seemingly random direction or whatever absurd scenario you can think of.

 

This same causal form, however, also applies to other things. Given a traumatic childhood (X) we should expect the child ( C) to grow up to have issues with depression and anxiety and possibly drug addiction (Y). At no point is any physical determinacy referred to in this causal description. And further, it may turn out that the child gets help somehow and grows up to not have these problems. The causal description is a valid one even if it's not necessarily going to lead to the expected result. As far as the causal description goes, or the science of psychology for that matter, determinism has absolutely no relevance.

 

The sense in which we think of the billiard ball example can be a valid causal description must result in the expected outcome, but this same requirement isn't in the traumatic childhood causal description in order for it to be valid.

 

I can already hear the determinist in my own head telling me "well it's only because we don't have all the variables and we treat the second as 'good enough' that makes it valid". And maybe this is true, but it's not something that can be taken for granted. This must be demonstrated by the determinist that it must be a lack of accounting, and what is a principle "traumatic childhood produce dysfunctional adulthoods" will be replaced by a superior physics of psychology.

 

 

Conclusion

When you jump from the first type of causal description right to the second without pointing out that there is only an assumed determinism from X to Y in C, then we have to stop the discussion at that point and make that case, or else we are begged the question of determinism and it's a circular argument.

 

Free will, however it works, it must be causal and not random. It's just that causal is word with a distinct meaning from determined. Conflating the two terms leads to this question begging, circular silliness of assuming determinism before actually making the case for determinism.

[Rainbow Dash]

Okay, here's my response. I think there are a couple of errors you are making here. But first, I want to point out that the intention behind posting the videos was not to prove free will, but rather to introduce people to John Searle since the guy has a ton of very smart things to add to discussions like this. And even if you are a determinist, he can still teach you a hell of a lot about metaphysics (like he did me the past month or two).

 

The definition of random

The first error I believe you are making is a factual one about what randomness means. There is often a distinction made between "random" and "true random". In talking about metaphysics, I believe the relevant and accurate meaning is the "true random" one. In programming every language (pretty much) has some kind of random function in it's native library that mixes things up so well that it may as well be random, but is not actually random. Usually they use the timestamp as a base and mix from there since the time is different every time you call the function. Likewise, and as you suggested, flipping a coin might as well be random, but is physically determined. Determinism precludes true randomness. True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make. An example of this is in quantum physics which you or someone else pointed out earlier.

 

 

Predictability as a standard

The second error I think you are making is in making personal predictability the standard for how we determine whether something is determined or free will. This has problems both ways. The first is that if our prediction does not come true in a deterministic model, then surely, we know that some consideration was not made, some variable unaccounted for. Also, we can predict what decisions people will come to for lots of reasons with differing degrees of certainty. If their decision is a delicious meal over a pile of manure, then that's pretty obvious, or if we neuro-linguistically program someone to eat the manure then we can predict that they will. Maybe it's just the best manure on the planet in some culture where they do that sort of thing, or the person is not as susceptible to NLP or something, in which case we were wrong.

 

The reason I used random and determinism from an individual's perspective is because it shows my argument works no matter what perspective you look from. Suppose I am an omniscient being that knows everything that is knowable. Random from my perspective (meaning the future is unknown to me) would be your definition of true random. If I am an omniscient being can perfectly predict the future, then the only way I could have predicted the future was if the universe was just input in then output out, which would be an example of determinism. If you take my argument and substitute "perspective from an individual" with the more specific example "perspective from an omniscient being with perfect knowledge", I think I make a good case for how the universe must have either true random or true determinism.

 

 

The sense in which we think of the billiard ball example can be a valid causal description must result in the expected outcome, but this same requirement isn't in the traumatic childhood causal description in order for it to be valid.

 

I can already hear the determinist in my own head telling me "well it's only because we don't have all the variables and we treat the second as 'good enough' that makes it valid". And maybe this is true, but it's not something that can be taken for granted. This must be demonstrated by the determinist that it must be a lack of accounting, and what is a principle "traumatic childhood produce dysfunctional adulthoods" will be replaced by a superior physics of psychology.

True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make.

 

Determinism means the future is knowable given perfect information. True random means the future is not knowable given perfect information. That would logically mean that it impossible for something, including free will, to be neither deterministic nor true random. The only way this could not be contradictory is if being unknowable is required for but is not sufficient for being true random, which if is the case, I would like a better definition of true random.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

I think we need to clarify what we mean by subjective and objective. The existence of the color red, is this objective or subjective.If nobody can see red, then does red still exist?

 

Edit: I did some quick research on objectivity, and this may be as complicated as free will.

This definition of free will could possibly apply to quantum particles.

It doesn't need to be complicated because you've been using, at least in principle, some objective standard to have this debate. Logic is an objective standard for example because it is derived from an external source. It is a valid standard because it is empirically verifiable and universal. We have both already submitted to an ideal of reason and evidence in order to argue our positions. If you now have a problem with what is and isn't an objective standard by which we can measure our arguments, etc then the time to sort that out was at the start; not when contradictions in your position are pointed out; otherwise it just looks like you're looking for an epistemological escape hatch.

You have stated that the standard you are using to judge whether determinism is true is subjective. This standard is just as determined as everything else, right? But in order for such a proposition to be true it must be judged by an objective standard. Your proposition that determinism is true is not judged by an objective standard. Therefore that proposition cannot be true.  

[Kevin Beal]

The reason I used random and determinism from an individual's perspective is because it shows my argument works no matter what perspective you look from. Suppose I am an omniscient being that knows everything that is knowable. Random from my perspective (meaning the future is unknown to me) would be your definition of true random. If I am an omniscient being can perfectly predict the future, then the only way I could have predicted the future was if the universe was just input in then output out, which would be an example of determinism. If you take my argument and substitute "perspective from an individual" with the more specific example "perspective from an omniscient being with perfect knowledge", I think I make a good case for how the universe must have either true random or true determinism.

input in and output out is not determinism. I just spent a lot of time explaining why this is question begging. Please address that, and then we can continue.

 

 

 

Determinism means the future is knowable given perfect information. True random means the future is not knowable given perfect information. That would logically mean that it impossible for something, including free will, to be neither deterministic nor true random. The only way this could not be contradictory is if being unknowable is required for but is not sufficient for being true random, which if is the case, I would like a better definition of true random.

I know that's what you're saying, but what's your argument? You are just asserting this without backing it up. Why is determinism / randomness a valid dichotomy? Maybe it's a failure of my imagination, but I can't see why this supposed dilemma is necessary. Explain it to me in detail please.

[Rainbow Dash]

I know that's what you're saying, but what's your argument? You are just asserting this without backing it up. Why is determinism / randomness a valid dichotomy? Maybe it's a failure of my imagination, but I can't see why this supposed dilemma is necessary. Explain it to me in detail please.

knowable and unknowable is a dichotomy, therefor

the future is   knowable   given perfect information (determinism) and

the future is unknowable given perfect information (true random)

is a dichotomy.

 

(the definition for determinism and true random I gave are identical except one uses knowable and the other uses unknowable, in case that helps you make the connection for the case I am making)

 

Edit: to make it abundantly clear, for something to be neither deterministic nor true random by the definitions I gave, the future would have to be neither knowable nor unknowable given perfect information, which is a contradiction.

 

input in and output out is not determinism. I just spent a lot of time explaining why this is question begging. Please address that, and then we can continue.

The reason I used random and determinism from an individual's perspective is because it shows my argument works no matter what perspective you look from. Suppose I am an omniscient being that knows everything that is knowable. Random from my perspective (meaning the future is unknown to me) would be your definition of true random. If I am an omniscient being can perfectly predict the future, then the only way I could have predicted the future was if the universe had some way of determining the future state from current state, which would be an example of determinism. If you take my argument and substitute "perspective from an individual" with the more specific example "perspective from an omniscient being with perfect knowledge", I think I make a good case for how the universe must have either true random or true determinism.

 

Ok, I think that fixed it, sorry for my carelessness.

[Kevin Beal]

knowable and unknowable is a dichotomy, therefor

the future is   knowable   given perfect information (determinism) and

the future is unknowable given perfect information (true random)

is a dichotomy.

 

The definition you offer for "perfect information" is:

If I am an omniscient being can perfectly predict the future, then the only way I could have predicted the future was if the universe was just input in then output out

 

All I know as the reader is that perfect information both allows us to know what will happen in the future, and that it is incompatible with true randomness for reasons that are unstated. There is no way for me to know why it's a dichotomy beyond you telling me it is so.

 

The definition of true random I gave is:

True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make.

 

...and so if you get the opposite of this, you get something that is knowable given some consideration. But this can include things that don't assume (or require I would argue) determinism, such as an account like "if my buddy asks me to go to batting practice with him this weekend, then I will agree and meet him at the cages". I know what will happen, and yet it's not determined.

 

If you accept my definition of true random, then you cannot conclude that the dichotomy you presented is a true one without begging the question that determinism is true because what you are essentially saying is that I'm physically determined to go to the batting cages this weekend when my buddy asks if I'll go with him.

 

The way that you do this is by use of the term "perfect information" which is too vague, and is just a magical term that means anything we want for all I know.

 

The reason I used random and determinism from an individual's perspective is because it shows my argument works no matter what perspective you look from. Suppose I am an omniscient being that knows everything that is knowable.

First of all, I know why you took the approach you did. greekredemption and Mike Fleming already took that approach. I even mentioned that I suspected I knew where you were going with it when I said:

 

The third error would be (if you were making this argument) in saying that randomness allows for free will, but actually it doesn't. I suspect that you know the reason already, and is why you asked the question, but just in case: if someone acts randomly, obviously we can't consider them to be acting of their own free will. There is no difference to a determined human robot whether or not the effect of their actions had a determined antecedent cause or if the effect is random, neither allows for the freedom of the will to come in and do its self referential, self generating causal "magic", so to speak.

 

I'm on to you!

 

Random from my perspective (meaning the future is unknown to me) would be your definition of true random. If I am an omniscient being can perfectly predict the future, then the only way I could have predicted the future was if the universe had some way of determining the future state from current state, which would be an example of determinism. If you take my argument and substitute "perspective from an individual" with the more specific example "perspective from an omniscient being with perfect knowledge", I think I make a good case for how the universe must have either true random or true determinism.

How does a being who knows everything not know something? How could that work? It seems to me that even if something were truly random, a magical being with the ability to see the future would still know the outcome. What would stop them? Reason? Haha.

 

And I don't know what "if the universe had some way of determining the future state from current state, which would be an example of determinism" means. The universe isn't a thing in itself. It's a concept encompassing the entirety of existing entities.

 

And I noticed you pretty much copied and pasted what you already wrote. Was that really necessary? I promise I did read it, haha

[Rainbow Dash]

Ok, by perfect information I mean perfect knowledge of the current state of the universe. The state of the universe includes matter, energy and consciousness. I am not necessarily including knowledge of future states of the universe. Sorry I miscommunicated.

 

 

True randomness would have be unknowable, no matter how many considerations you make.

Can you please specify what you mean by considerations?

Logic is an objective standard for example because it is derived from an external source.

What is this external source you speak of?

[Kevin Beal]

To anybody: I would also like to hear from you and please let me know if what I'm saying is comprehensible and reasonable enough to earn your tentative agreement. I'm trying a new approach and would love your feedback

 

Ok, by perfect information I mean perfect knowledge of the current state of the universe. The state of the universe includes matter, energy and consciousness. I am not necessarily including knowledge of future states of the universe. Sorry I miscommunicated.

I'm sorry, but this is not helping me to understand how this justifies the claims you made above. I believe the problem I outlined is still an issue, that is that you are still begging the question. Consider the following:

 

Let's say we freeze time and we can walk around and read people's current thoughts, desires, goals, etc that they have. If we have free will, we will know what we will do next because we chose it. So if you know the current state, that I have just decided to do X, then you know that what I will do next is X. There's no determinism necessary here.

 

What do we know?

 

We know that we experience free will for much of the day and yet what we know about physics seems to suggest that everything is determined like particles are (which humans are made out of), which would necessarily make our experience of free will illusory. How do we resolve this apparent contradiction?

 

What do we know about the causal nature of the reality we live in, generally? And how does it relate to the physical determinacy we observe in physics, chemistry and the other hard sciences?

 

How does a physical, chemical and biological human system work causally? And which features of this human system work deterministically the way our physics models do, and which, if any, do not?

 

That's the form the conversation ought to take, I believe.

 

Can you please specify what you mean by considerations?

To take a programming metaphor, it means that if I have conditional statements in my code to validate the input or direct the direction of the program so that our desired result results.

if($rainbowDash == right) {  concedeArgument(this);} else {  pointOutError($logic);}exit;

[Rainbow Dash]

Let's say we freeze time and we can walk around and read people's current thoughts, desires, goals, etc that they have. If we have free will, we will know what we will do next because we chose it. So if you know the current state, that I have just decided to do X, then you know that what I will do next is X. There's no determinism necessary here.

Ok, but would we be able to tell what someone's choice will be before they make the choice in that scenario?

 

 

if($rainbowDash == right) {  concedeArgument(this);} else {  pointOutError($logic);}exit;

In the future, please use either Java or C#. I don't speak this language

[Kevin Beal]

Ok, but would we be able to tell what someone's choice will be before they make the choice [if we freeze time and can see into people's minds]?

You seem to be asking if we can know what a person will decide before they do. I think the answer is that it depends. Even without any special time freezing powers we can do this sometimes.

 

If I have known somebody for a long time and they are hemming and hawing between two different choices, I often have the experience of quietly grinning inside myself knowing that they are going to pick the one they always do. Or some other similar scenario.

 

But to answer this in a hopefully more satisfying way, consider what goes into the decisions that we make. We have outcomes that we are familiar with, outcomes we desire, are anxious of, think would be funny and all sorts of motivations that inform the decisions we ultimately pick. If you imagine reading someone's mind in frozen time, these are the considerations that I would make, anyway.

 

If I know that a person is made anxious by X and they have no goals of overcoming their anxiety about X, then I'm inclined to imagine that they are going to act to avoid X.

 

If we try and imagine what is that point where the avoidance of X is going to be chosen as their next move, that point is self referential. That is, that these motivations of desires, pains, anxieties, excitements, etc, are relative to the content of the desires, pains, anxieties, etc. If I have a desire to drink water, then the conditions of satisfying my desire include drinking the water. If I drank water but did not have the desire to drink water, then it's something else: I'm not satisfying my desire to drink water. It can only be satisfied if the desire itself is what causes the drinking of the water, and the only way to satisfy that desire is to drink the water.

 

This is pretty confusing stuff. At least it was/is for me. But in talking about the desire itself and its conditions of satisfaction, it must be causally self referential (as John Searle would put it). So here are a couple more examples to hopefully help get the idea across.

 

Similarly, memories are also causally self referential in that if I remember watching the movie Ender's Game, in order for me to have that memory, not only must I have seen the movie, but seeing the movie must cause my memory of it.

 

If I really see a tree, then it must not only be that I have a visual experience whose conditions of satisfaction are that a tree is there, but the fact that there is a tree there must cause the very visual experience that has those conditions of satisfaction.

 

The idea here as it pertains to free will is that knowing what conditions of satisfaction result in my decisions is what it means to make a decision. So to answer your question, if we knew enough about what the conditions of satisfaction are in making that frozen person's decision, that person would be at some point in making that decision.

 

The actual neurological mechanisms that allow for this self generating cause, this intentional causality, are unknown at this time. Actual work in cognitive science surrounding this issue are very new and far from conclusive from what I understand. Stef mentioned in a recent call-in show that he was working on getting a neuroscientist on the show to talk about research in this area. Not all neuroscientists are determinists. Baroness Susan Greenfield talks about some of the latest in this area that is worth a listen:

 

[cynicist]

Edit: Nevermind

[Rainbow Dash]

The idea here as it pertains to free will is that knowing what conditions of satisfaction result in my decisions is what it means to make a decision. So to answer your question, if we knew enough about what the conditions of satisfaction are in making that frozen person's decision, that person would be at some point in making that decision.

Is every one of these conditions of satisfaction knowable if you make enough considerations?

[Kevin Beal]

Is every one of these conditions of satisfaction knowable if you make enough considerations?

Yes, because a condition is a consideration. If a condition is satisfied, the way that it is satisfied can be considered.

 

I'm absolutely convinced that we can have a science of free will, and in many ways we already do, and that is what is meant by rationality. There are irreducible aspects like where neurology meets consciousness, but certainly we can systematically make considerations the way we do in the soft sciences like psychology, praxeology, etc.

 

Free will requires unconscious material and neurological activity, and so certain considerations aren't subjectively experienced, but those that are, are what it means to decide something of your own free will.

 

Here's a relevant quote from John Searle:

 

 

It is important to emphasize that such explanations are not deterministic in form. The form of an intentionalistic explanation of behavior does not imply that the action had to occur, that the intentional causes are insufficient to determine that the action had to be performed. Nor are they deterministic in practice except in odd pathological cases. When I explain my own behavior by stating the beliefs and desires that motivated me to act, I do not normally imply that I could not have done otherwise. Typically when I reason from my desires and beliefs as to what I should do, there is a gap between the causes of my decision in the form of beliefs and desires and the actual decision, and there is another gap between the decision and the performance of the action. The reason for these gaps is the intentionalistic causes of behavior are not sufficient to determine behavior. Some exceptions to this are cases of addiction, obsession, overwhelming passion, and other forms of pathology. When I decide whom to vote for in an election, the intentionalistic explanation of my behavior does not give causally sufficient conditions. This contrasts with the heroin addict taking a drug because he wants heroin and believes the drug is heroin. In this case, the addict cannot help himself, and the explanation does give causally sufficient conditions. The name usually given to this gap is "the freedom of the will." It remains an unsolved problem in philosophy how there can be freedom of the will, given that there are no corresponding gaps in the brain.

[Rainbow Dash]

Yes, because a condition is a consideration. If a condition is satisfied, the way that it is satisfied can be considered.

 

I'm absolutely convinced that we can have a science of free will, and in many ways we already do, and that is what is meant by rationality. There are irreducible aspects like where neurology meets consciousness, but certainly we can systematically make considerations the way we do in the soft sciences like psychology, praxeology, etc.

 

Free will requires unconscious material and neurological activity, and so certain considerations aren't subjectively experienced, but those that are, are what it means to decide something of your own free will.

 

Here's a relevant quote from John Searle:

So free will is just the idea that the subjective experience affects the objective universe? In addition,with free will, the subjective experience can't be fully explained using only knowledge of the objective universe? Please tell me I am getting closer to understanding free will.

[Kevin Beal]

So free will is just the idea that the subjective experience affects the objective universe? In addition,with free will, the subjective experience can't be fully explained using only knowledge of the objective universe? Please tell me I am getting closer to understanding free will.

You seem to be asking two different things when you say "understanding free will". What it actually is, and how it works.

 

I would say that you already understand what it is just as we all have to in order to debate. Hopefully, I'm offering some idea of where to look for how it works by distinguishing between causality and determined, and by pointing out how intentionality is causally self referential. That is my intention anyway.

 

To address your specific questions, I would have to rephrase it, since this subjective experience of our own consciousness is absolutely part of the "objective universe". These are not separate realms. Things either exist, or they do not.

 

The way that I would phrase it is to say that the subjective mode of the existence of our own consciousness enables certain features such as rationality, goal setting, comparing things to ideals, etc, that through our own capacity for intentionality, we can cause our own behavior independent of a set of conditions that make it necessary. That I could have done something different, but I did what I did and not something else.

 

A rock's behavior is all determined by it's composition and outside forces. A rabbit is the same, except it can behave in ways that are volitional. A human is like the rabbit, except it's own capacity for volitional action can be reasoned through. A causal account of each of these entities must take into consideration the features of these entities. The causal nature of a rock is different from a rabbit, which is different from a human.

 

A rabbit is different from a rock in that it has a central nervous system, motor neurons and a set of conscious desires, therefor it can move around of it's own volition.

 

A human is different from a rabbit because it's desires do not necessarily determine its behavior, the way a rabbit or a heroin addict would be determined. This is out of a necessary lack of causal conditions determining the behavior.

 

As a child is growing up, they very likely lack any significant rationality or free will, but as we grow older and grow in our capacity to reason, to measure things against a standard or ideal, the more that intentionalistic gap grows and the freedom of the will be present.

 

You can see this pretty clearly in the case of children who have a very hard time deferring gratification and eating anything sugary they can find, or as an adult when we're overwhelmed by powerful emotions, or obsessions.

 

The distinctions I offer above should reveal the places to look for this gap and why it's connected with a capacity to reason.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

What is this external source you speak of?

Reality. Matter and energy. 

[Rainbow Dash]

Logic is an objective standard for example because it is derived from an external source.

What is this external source you speak of?

Reality. Matter and energy. 

How is logic derived from matter and energy?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

How is logic derived from matter and energy?

We derive logic from the consistent behavior of matter and energy. The laws of logic describe reality. You are using this objective standard to ask me the question? Are you going to respond to my challenges?

[Rainbow Dash]

We derive logic from the consistent behavior of matter and energy. The laws of logic describe reality. You are using this objective standard to ask me the question? Are you going to respond to my challenges?

If we are the ones deriving the logic, then logic is derived from our subjective experience of matter and energy, which is not an objective standard.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

If we are the ones deriving the logic, then logic is derived from our subjective experience of matter and energy, which is not an objective standard.

Fine. If you want to play that game then you admit you have no objective standard for your proposition. Therefore it is just opinion. It's something you prefer to believe. Some people like free will. Some people like ice cream. Some people like Jesus. Whatever. Our neurons determine the standard of truth. You happen to like determinism.  It fills in that sucking gap in human knowledge about the nature of causality. If you like something better tomorrow then that will be true.

You can't understand the difference between an objective standard and a subjective one while simultaneously claiming that determinism is true (which necessarily requires an objective standard). Until you can state what standard you're using, I refuse to debate you again and I request that others do the same. 

[Mike Fleming]

 

Free will is causal

The reason that randomness is brought up by people is, I believe, because there is a confusion between their conception of "causal" and their conception of "determined". This actually presents a big problem for determinists that I will try to highlight again.

 

There is a form of causal description which goes something like: given X input, we should expect Y output in the system C. The input of trajectory and force applied from the input a pool stick (X) to the billiard ball ( C) should result in it ending up in the corner pocket (Y). This is a determined process and the determinacy is pretty easy to see if we think about it. The billiard ball isn't going to suddenly decide to turn back and fight the pool stick or run away in some seemingly random direction or whatever absurd scenario you can think of.

 

This same causal form, however, also applies to other things. Given a traumatic childhood (X) we should expect the child ( C) to grow up to have issues with depression and anxiety and possibly drug addiction (Y). At no point is any physical determinacy referred to in this causal description. And further, it may turn out that the child gets help somehow and grows up to not have these problems. The causal description is a valid one even if it's not necessarily going to lead to the expected result. As far as the causal description goes, or the science of psychology for that matter, determinism has absolutely no relevance.

 

The sense in which we think of the billiard ball example can be a valid causal description must result in the expected outcome, but this same requirement isn't in the traumatic childhood causal description in order for it to be valid.

 

I can already hear the determinist in my own head telling me "well it's only because we don't have all the variables and we treat the second as 'good enough' that makes it valid". And maybe this is true, but it's not something that can be taken for granted. This must be demonstrated by the determinist that it must be a lack of accounting, and what is a principle "traumatic childhood produce dysfunctional adulthoods" will be replaced by a superior physics of psychology.

 

 

 

Yes, it can be taken for granted.  You can't hide free will in complexity.  We have matter and energy and the physical laws of the universe.  We, ourselves, are a physical part of this universe.  Life is not something special, it is just energy moving matter around.  Our bodies are as subject to these causes as anything else.  

 

If you expect the determinist to demonstrate effectively the entire future state of the universe then you are correct, you will never accept determinism.    But I expect the free will people to provide some physical basis for free will, some basis for why we we stand outside the physical laws of the universe.  I can already prove that if you do not have enough variables, if you don't have enough information, you can't predict a future event.  

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Yes, it can be taken for granted.  You can't hide free will in complexity.  We have matter and energy and the physical laws of the universe.  We, ourselves, are a physical part of this universe.  Life is not something special, it is just energy moving matter around.  Our bodies are as subject to these causes as anything else.  

 

If you expect the determinist to demonstrate effectively the entire future state of the universe then you are correct, you will never accept determinism.    But I expect the free will people to provide some physical basis for free will, some basis for why we we stand outside the physical laws of the universe.  I can already prove that if you do not have enough variables, if you don't have enough information, you can't predict a future event.  

Straw man of the free will position. No one here has argued that free will is outside physical laws. YOU have concluded that based on an argument from ignorance and projected that conclusion onto our free will position. IOW, you've defined free will as necessarily being outside the "laws" and then argued that it must be outside the laws. 

[Mike Fleming]

Straw man of the free will position. No one here has argued that free will is outside physical laws. YOU have concluded that based on an argument from ignorance and projected that conclusion onto our free will position. IOW, you've defined free will as necessarily being outside the "laws" and then argued that it must be outside the laws. 

 

All I'm asking is do you have a physical basis for free will?  I admit I haven't read all the pages since I was last here, walls of text. but I haven't seen anything on this page.

 

I was basically responding to the fact that complexity does not equal free will. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

All I'm asking is do you have a physical basis for free will?  I admit I haven't read all the pages since I was last here, walls of text. but I haven't seen anything on this page.

 

I was basically responding to the fact that complexity does not equal free will. 

 

All I'm asking is do you have a physical basis for free will?  I admit I haven't read all the pages since I was last here, walls of text. but I haven't seen anything on this page.

 

I was basically responding to the fact that complexity does not equal free will. 

It's the same physical basis as your determinist superstitions. WTF else would it be? If you want to go argue some theistic, ghost in the machine view of free will then go argue with those people. Don't bring it to us. 

Who argued that complexity = free will? 

[Mike Fleming]

OK, fair enough. Can you give me a fairly succinct view of it?  Deterministic free will that is.

 

He had a title of Free Will is Causal and then talked about the child not necessarily turning out a certain way based on certain factors.  That seemed to be the only evidence being offered under that title which is just an argument of complexity because all information is just not known.  He compared it to the simplicity of the billiard ball.  I couldn't really detect any other evidence being put forward under the section of text under that title.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

OK, fair enough. Can you give me a fairly succinct view of it?  Deterministic free will that is.

 

He had a title of Free Will is Causal and then talked about the child not necessarily turning out a certain way based on certain factors.  That seemed to be the only evidence being offered under that title which is just an argument of complexity because all information is just not known.  He compared it to the simplicity of the billiard ball.  I couldn't really detect any other evidence being put forward under the section of text under that title.

Why would I want to give you a "succinct view" of THAT? What are you even talking about? "Deterministic free will"? 

[Rainbow Dash]

Let's say we freeze time and we can walk around and read people's current thoughts, desires, goals, etc that they have. If we have free will, we will know what we will do next because we chose it. So if you know the current state, that I have just decided to do X, then you know that what I will do next is X.

 

Ok, but would we be able to tell what someone's choice will be before they make the choice in that scenario?

 

You seem to be asking if we can know what a person will decide before they do. I think the answer is that it depends. Even without any special time freezing powers we can do this sometimes.

The idea here as it pertains to free will is that knowing what conditions of satisfaction result in my decisions is what it means to make a decision. So to answer your question, if we knew enough about what the conditions of satisfaction are in making that frozen person's decision, that person would be at some point in making that decision.

 

Is every one of these conditions of satisfaction knowable if you make enough considerations?

Yes, because a condition is a consideration. If a condition is satisfied, the way that it is satisfied can be considered.

 

You seem to be describing determinism as defined by Wikipedia which states, "Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event, including human action, exist conditions that could cause no other event", You are claiming that given enough conditions, only one possible future can result.

[Mike Fleming]

When you develop a theory you gather physical facts and then develop a theory from them.  The entire problem with the free will argument is that there never have been any physical facts for it.  Only human intuition.  It "feels" like I have free will. But scientists have discarded human intuition as being unreliable.  Physical facts all support determinism.  What free will advocates are trying to do is work backwards.  "I want free will to be true and I don't like the idea of determinism so I'm going to reject it".  

 

I've already said before in here, I didn't like it at first either.  The mind rejects it because neuronal connections have been built over many years, pretty much our entire lives that assume free will to be true.  It takes time to adjust to the new reality.  It takes time for the brain to make new connections which support the new ideas and for the old connections to die.

 

Determinism is not the horror it is made out to be. It is simple reality.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

When you develop a theory you gather physical facts and then develop a theory from them.  The entire problem with the free will argument is that there never have been any physical facts for it.  Only human intuition.  It "feels" like I have free will. But scientists have discarded human intuition as being unreliable.  Physical facts all support determinism.  What free will advocates are trying to do is work backwards.  "I want free will to be true and I don't like the idea of determinism so I'm going to reject it".  

 

I've already said before in here, I didn't like it at first either.  The mind rejects it because neuronal connections have been built over many years, pretty much our entire lives that assume free will to be true.  It takes time to adjust to the new reality.  It takes time for the brain to make new connections which support the new ideas and for the old connections to die.

 

Determinism is not the horror it is made out to be. It is simple reality.

It's not just human intuition, it's the empirical observation that I can do it. Do you get that? It's a fact. There is no possible doubt that free will exists. If you think it is just determined that's fine but don't shove your religious view down my throat as if you've proved it. It is not known how volition works. It is not known how causation works. It's is not known if causal determinism is even valid. You are making stuff up to trying and wish away the gap in our knowledge. You don't know and your attempts to show some logical contradiction between being able to choose and the "laws" (which I don't think you have a clue about either and probably think are prescriptive) of the universe are contrived.  

Physical facts do NOT support determinism. You are just lying or delusional. You are lunatics. In fact I'm not even sure if determinism is currently the the consensus view in physics at the moment.

Don't you fucking dare tell me that I hold this position because I want it to be true when if it WAS true I would have no choice or control of the matter and there'd be no truth anyway. Don't preach your pretentious crap to me. Make an actual argument that isn't "I don't know how that works, therefore determinism". 

 

Who cares whether you liked it or not? Do you know how creepy that is? You are are like the Stepford philosophers. It's bad enough that you think you've proven there's no free will and /or that it HAS been proven but to have this condescending horseshit about how brains just need to adjust. You absolute creeps. This is a new secular religion. 

 

I don't have to make determinism out to be a horror. I just have to accurately describe it. Your position is so absurd I can't even begin to grasp it. This is what happens when you pretend you know something you don't know. We on the free will side here just don't know how choice works. Obviously you DO know how it works and we can all stop looking now. 

 

Determinist fail.

[Rainbow Dash]

To whoever disliked my last post, can you explain what was wrong with it?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

To whoever disliked my last post, can you explain what was wrong with it?

I disliked it because I was determined to do it and had no control. Blame the big bang and go get your explanation from IT.

[RestoringGuy]

When you develop a theory you gather physical facts and then develop a theory from them.  The entire problem with the free will argument is that there never have been any physical facts for it.  Only human intuition.  It "feels" like I have free will. But scientists have discarded human intuition as being unreliable.  Physical facts all support determinism.  What free will advocates are trying to do is work backwards.  "I want free will to be true and I don't like the idea of determinism so I'm going to reject it".  

That does not seem right.   Physics and the facts discovered about the universe seem to point in the opposite direction.  The uncertainty principle guarantees that all things are random.  It is only through frequent observation and unique constraints on various particles (spin, charge, etc.) that the random distributions die down just enough that some variables appear determined.  More specifically, the wavefunctions interact and you can say their interaction is determined, but they still do not collapse to a singular precise state.  The free will advocate's main error is they believe the human mind is special, unique, or priviliged in some yet-to-be-identified qualitative way.  Their error does not seem related to correctly ruling out determinism.

 

I am aware some determinists will allow for this and suggest subatomic behavior is random and causal, yet determinism survives as a valid idea.  OK, that is fine, but I try to avoid that definition because, by that standard, it is all to easy to think of determinism (in the QM sense) and causality as identical things.