Definition of free will

[labmath2]

Those who argue for determinism are like those who argue for God, they have lots of argument, but no proof.

[Kevin Beal]

Great videos. I love how he explained consciousness as a low level neurologically based function being translated to some higher level form. I always viewed it that way as well but I thought of it in terms of programming. Look at machine code vs a high level computer language like python or javascript. The higher level instructions mean the exact same thing as the translated machine code, but we wouldn't call them the same thing, because one is human readable and the other isn't. In the same way I look at consciousness as corresponding to lower level neurological activity in the brain, but in a form that is advantageous to us if that makes sense.

I've probably just misunderstood, but I think I disagree with your analogy here.

 

I actually spend about 40+ hours a week writing javascript, which I love, and if I understand it rightly, it's a literal reduction all the way down to the bit. The same javascript always produces the same bits. Unless, maybe, you're using new Date() or Math.random(). I don't know enough about computer science to say...

 

John Searle's point is that, unlike javascript, consciousness is irreducible to the actual synaptic firings. There are neuronal activities which enable people to experience the color red, but the actual conscious experience of the color is not literally reducible to whatever neuronal subsystems that are involved in vision.

 

Looking into a pool of water and seeing a straight metal rod appear to be bent, is something we can check to see if the perception is the reality: that the rod is in fact not bent, but straight. We can't, however, do this same sort of check with consciousness itself. This is not a matter of just not having the right tools, it's actually to do with the nature of consciousness. You can't, for example, say that I'm not seeing red when I am. The perception as it relates to reality may be an illusion, but the actual conscious experience: red, is not an illusion, it just is.

 

The existence of consciousness is fundamentally subjective, unlike neurons. There is no conscious unit that is comprised of neuron-based units. There is nothing to point to concerning consciousness, where with neurons, we can point to very specific regions of the brain responsible for sensing pain in my leg.

 

The temptation is to think that something that exists subjectively cannot act causally on things that exist objectively. This is pretty clearly false, though, if you consider that money doesn't actually exist objectively. Pieces of paper composed of certain fibers and inks exist objectively, but money as we actually understand it, exists subjectively. More on that here. And it's causal relationship to our transactions is very real.

 

As far as free will specifically is concerned, whenever we have a causal account of chosen behavior, we will have a gap in this account "between the causes of my decision in form of beliefs and desires and the actual decision, and there is another gap between the decision and the performance of the action". If free will exists, it happens in those gaps.

 

Determinists seem to claim that a reducible account from consciousness to neuronal activity is possible here in these gaps, and thus free will is an illusion. It is my belief that, not only will no account ever be possible for this (due to irreducibility), but also that conscious intentional states involved are causally self referential. Which is really just another way of saying: I do something because I have decided to do it.

 

The causal relationship described by "self-referential" being: "I will succeed in carrying out my intention to raise my arm only if (a) I do raise my arm and (b) my intention to raise my arm causes my raising of my arm". If the arm raises itself, or my intention to raise it is not involved in its raising for whatever reason, then it's not a causally self-referential account.

 

By the same token, if my conscious decision is not causal in the carrying out of that decision, then free will does not enter into the equation. This is why consciousness must be made out to have no causal relationship with anything real by determinists. It has to be described as superfluous fluff on top of an already working machine. As soon as you concede that consciousness is itself causal, you make free will possible.

 

And that's why any account of determinism that is simply "the universe is causal" is a red herring and does not actually address free will at all.

 

I hope that makes sense. A lot of it is new information for me, but as Einstein put it "if you can't explain it simply, then you don't understand it well enough", so put me to the test if anything doesn't make sense

[Kevin Beal]

And this John Searle video is pretty great and relevant concerning the issue of ontological subjectivity:

[cynicist]

I've probably just misunderstood, but I think I disagree with your analogy here.

 

I actually spend about 40+ hours a week writing javascript, which I love, and if I understand it rightly, it's a literal reduction all the way down to the bit. The same javascript always produces the same bits. Unless, maybe, you're using new Date() or Math.random(). I don't know enough about computer science to say...

 

Well by my analogy I meant that all conscious functions are caused by neurological processes, that they are not separate things but the same thing translated to a higher form. (mind/body problem) The bit perfect part is you taking my analogy too far hehe. (I'm not saying that it can't be reduced to that level since I obviously don't know, but I doubt it maps 1:1 like computer code does)

 

John Searle's point is that, unlike javascript, consciousness is irreducible to the actual synaptic firings. There are neuronal activities which enable people to experience the color red, but the actual conscious experience of the color is not literally reducible to whatever neuronal subsystems that are involved in vision.

 

Looking into a pool of water and seeing a straight metal rod appear to be bent, is something we can check to see if the perception is the reality: that the rod is in fact not bent, but straight. We can't, however, do this same sort of check with consciousness itself. This is not a matter of just not having the right tools, it's actually to do with the nature of consciousness. You can't, for example, say that I'm not seeing red when I am. The perception as it relates to reality may be an illusion, but the actual conscious experience: red, is not an illusion, it just is.

 

Hmm, this seems to contradict what I heard in the video but I may be misunderstanding something. Starting at 5:57, Searle says the following:

 

I think that has a simple solution too, and I'm going to give it to you. And here it is: All of our conscious states without exception, are caused by lower level neuro-biological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the brain as higher level or system features.

 

Oh oops I see in my prior post I said consciousness when I should have said conscious functions. I think I get what you mean now. I'm not saying that all of consciousness is encapsulated in a particular part of the brain, but that the various parts that make up consciousness are reducible. Does that make sense?

 

 

 

Determinists seem to claim that a reducible account from consciousness to neuronal activity is possible here in these gaps, and thus free will is an illusion.

 

Well I think more specifically their claim is that not only is it reducible to neuronal activity, but that this neuronal activity is necessarily determined by antecedent causal factors in the environment and nothing else, and that's why free will/choice is an illusion. The first point I'm more inclined to agree with (to some extent it has to be, even if its not a 1:1 relationship since the mind is not separate from the physical body) but the second is just silly.

 

And that's why any account of determinism that is simply "the universe is causal" is a red herring and does not actually address free will at all.

 

Yeah that's what I was talking about at the end of my longer post. This is really obvious just looking at the existence of life. (which is not just reactive but interactive) 

[michaelfcp]

 

 

Yeah that's what I was talking about at the end of my longer post. This is really obvious just looking at the existence of life. (which is not just reactive but interactive) 

 Of course, nature is interactive, and the conscious intentions are part of the casual chain.The problem in my opinion is in the title of this thread. How do you define free will. If free will is comparing our thoughts to an ideal, we have free will. We do that all the time. But this could very well be a deterministic process. For me free will means that in the past we were free to behave differently than we actually did. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 Of course, nature is interactive, and the conscious intentions are part of the casual chain.The problem in my opinion is in the title of this thread. How do you define free will. If free will is comparing our thoughts to an ideal, we have free will. We do that all the time. But this could very well be a deterministic process. For me free will means that in the past we were free to behave differently than we actually did. 

Conscious intentions would be an illusion just like free will. They would just be determined by the playing out of unconscious material forces. 

Under the causal determinist religion, the ideal you'd be comparing your thoughts would also be determined. How can there be a standard of truth when that standard must also have been determined at some point in this "causal chain"?

If you were never free to behave differently in the past than you did then it's not possible to behave differently than you're going to in the future or now.

[cynicist]

For me free will means that in the past we were free to behave differently than we actually did. 

 

Yes of course we were. Had we made different choices it would have been a different past. Given the exact same history, circumstances, etc (if you could "rewind" time) the actions would also be exactly the same. Human beings are not random, I don't go from making breakfast one day to attempting to murder someone for sustenance the next. We use reason and logic to make decisions. And given all the exact same factors, we would make the same decisions, but that doesn't mean we have no control over our decision-making.

 

For example I bought my Nexus 4 smartphone because it met certain criteria, namely it was the best phone on the market at the time for the price. If I rewind time then my criteria for choosing a phone would be the same, and the Nexus 4 would have the same characteristics, so naturally I'm going to choose it again. That's not the same as not having any choice. (I could easily change my criteria and therefore my resulting choice, or I could be influenced by a new phone coming out that meets my criteria better)

 

Now since you can't actually rewind time, that's not a useful way to look at it. Any change you make (including repeating the same action a second time under similar circumstances) is going to affect the future outcome. What I'm saying is, since you can never ever get the exact same conditions (even thinking about it changes the variables) what you are saying seems to have no relevance to the real world.

 

Free will is about looking into the future to anticipate where we will be and using that information to guide our actions to a particular end, through our ability to conceptualize. If we did not have our abstract thinking capacity then we would be looking at the next 20 minutes trying to figure out where to get the next banana from, like other apes.

 

However, since we can think in terms of lifetimes, our will is free relative to other animals. Our capacity for choice/planning/etc is greatly enhanced by this ability. 

 

 Of course, nature is interactive, and the conscious intentions are part of the casual chain.

 

I don't think you understood my point in saying that. Since a rock is reactive, the way it interacts with causality is very limited and relatively easy to predict. Once you add another dimension to it like with biological organisms, you get interactivity, which is another mode of relation to causality. Now, not only are you affected by prior causes, but you can actually BE a cause in a direct sense. Animals obviously take it to another level with their memory capacity and limited intelligence, the natural result of which is expanding the pool of possible actions based on their greater prior history and capacity for future planning. 

 

And human beings take it to the most complex level we know of atm: We are able to conceptualize things like time and act accordingly, to compare our states to possible ideals, which results in a limitless potential for action. (well, limited by our imagination at least) This is why we call that capacity free will and why animals do not have it. It's just a term to explain what we see which clearly separates us from other beings. It describes the result of an obvious phenomenon, a higher order of intelligence. There is no magic or mysticism involved, but at the same time human behavior is not determined like a rock. (we would need to be purely reactive in order for that to be the case)

[Kevin Beal]

Oh oops I see in my prior post I said consciousness when I should have said conscious functions. I think I get what you mean now. I'm not saying that all of consciousness is encapsulated in a particular part of the brain, but that the various parts that make up consciousness are reducible. Does that make sense?

Yea, it does make sense. I think that what I did was use "reducible" in two different senses without pointing out the difference. First I used it in the sense that smaller systems make up larger ones (word -> sentence -> essay) and then in a second more particular sense in which a reduction is supposed to account for a phenomena in a way that is either eliminative (rainbows & sunsets)(illusory) or non-eliminative (solidity as molecular configuration)(non-illusory).

 

Thinking back, I'm not even sure what I was driving at with the few paragraphs. Of course you are right with your analogy and very well put, I think. I unreservedly concede that point.

 

The way that consciousness is generated, which brain regions are involved, what kinds of neuronal activity are involved in what kinds of conscious experiences is all possible, I'm sure. But the actual conscious experiences themselves aren't reducible in the eliminative or non-eliminative sense. Not in the first because it's real no matter how you cut it, and not in the second because you can't do the check for consciousness like you can for the metal rod in water.

 

To quickly re-iterate the point of the second half of my post (given this distinction), to say that consciousness is superfluous fluff on an already working machine (epiphenomenalism) and is not itself causal, is to say that consciousness can be reduced eliminative-ly. But showing how this doesn't work logically means consciousness is (or can be) causal introduces the causal self-reference I talked about above. And once you grant all these things, you are basically already saying that people do things because they chose to do them, and that this choice was causal. Which is just another way of saying that we have free will.

 

Hopefully that is clearer. I apologize for the confusion!

[cynicist]

Yeah absolutely, that cleared things up for me too. I was just reiterating on what Searle was saying, that logically if the mind is a product of the body rather than something distinctly separate from it, then it must have some neurological basis in the brain. I see how my analogy could give the wrong idea though, maybe I can clear it up or create a better one.

 

Honestly, I have a hard time understanding consciousness as some weird artifact or by-product rather than an integral part of the "biological machine", so I hadn't considered the idea you mentioned (epiphenomenalism).

[greekredemption]

 

I had to take a break from this thread to avoid a mental breakdown but I really wanted to address this. What about the linearity of the causal chain precludes free will? Again, I just don't understand where this line of thinking is coming from. The linear aspect is what makes free will possible!@#!

 

Time goes one way, yes, absolutely, but since it has a predictable consistency we know that and can plan for that, we are able to affect causality by interacting with it differently. A rock has past movement altering its future course in the present, but we can predict how events will unfold and guide our actions accordingly, in addition to being guided by past experiences. And unlike other animals we can do it in an abstract way, which is how we are aware of our own mortality. (and which gives us a much more advanced capacity for planning) Why is that hard to understand? 

 

And No no no no. Choice is a requirement for human intelligence. The ability to make choices implies the ability to anticipate causality. We make decisions based on expectations and plan in order to bring those expectations to fruition. If choices were ephemeral, how would planning work? Clearly part of intelligence has to include keeping track of choices relative to our plans. If our choices weren't recursive in this way, how would we ever succeed at anything beyond simple tasks? (I'm talking about the shallow form of planning that a chimpanzee requires for simple tool-making compared with the depth of planning required for building a motherfucking space shuttle)

 

It's pretty simple, really. Every thing that occurs in the universe, from an exploding supernova to my apparent decision in 6 words' time to use a comma, is part of this causal chain. In order to be consistent, we cannot exclude ourselves from the causal chain we observe. It doesn't matter how much forethought you think you can put into something, all those thoughts, all those firing synapses, are just part of a single causal chain. Unless, somehow, the essence of what is 'you' is somehow able to inject a thought from outside that causal chain. Basically, unless you can magic inputs into existence, you cannot possibly have free will.

 

So, yeah, your argument is easy to understand, but is inconsistent with the universe as we understand it. And as I've said before, determinism does not preclude complexity, again as is evident from the universe itself. Complexity exists all over the universe without any apparent 'will' to control it. Why would we be so different?

 

And yes I know this is superficially a performative contradiction or whatever. But, y'know, there can be truth beyond performance.

[Kevin Beal]

And yes I know this is superficially a performative contradiction or whatever. But, y'know, there can be truth beyond performance.

What is truth? It's that which accurately describes what is real. This exists subjectively within human minds. Rocks perform actions.

 

The condition of satisfaction for beliefs is that the belief actually represents reality, and actually even more than that when you're talking about reason; i.e. that your capacity to reason was causal in the accurate conclusion: your true belief. (Stef's analytic rejection goes more into this).

 

If you believe whatever you believe because antecedent causes forced you to believe it, then it makes no sense to say that you reasoned it through. The reasoning is epiphenomenal in this case (as I describe in my previous post) and is not itself causal. So all you know is that you have beliefs with no satisfiable conditions of satisfaction.

 

If you are a determinist, then no, nothing is true. All your arguments are static on a TV screen.

 

The moment you start talking about reason and causally generating belief and action as a conscious being, you are talking about free will.

 

You don't understand the performative contradiction argument. Please go back over it because you completely missed the point.

 

You don't escape it by falsely asserting that free will must be "outside the causal chain" (whatever that even means).

[greekredemption]

Truth maybe, but not reason or argumentation or debate or superior positions, or better or worse in any objective sense. So, it necessarily follows that I can reject your arguments out of hand and you cannot reasonably complain about it.

Alright, so if you make the assumption of free will then my saying "I don't have free will" is a performative contradiction. But free will is not necessarily required for that outcome to be correct. Therefore there is no necessary contradiction.

 

Rejecting an argument on the basis of a performative contradiction may be correct in some cases, but oftentimes it just lacks rigour. Not wanting to be provocative, but to me it is lazy philosophy.

[Kevin Beal]

Alright, so if you make the assumption of free will then my saying "I don't have free will" is a performative contradiction. But free will is not necessarily required for that outcome to be correct. Therefore there is no necessary contradiction.

 

Rejecting an argument on the basis of a performative contradiction may be correct in some cases, but oftentimes it just lacks rigour. Not wanting to be provocative, but to me it is lazy philosophy.

This is not what the argument is, though. Which is why I suggested revisiting it. You are being lazy.

 

It is a necessary contradiction because you claim to have reasoned thru the position while saying that reasoning (part of free will) is not real. I have made the case in the last and a few other posts as to why reason requires free will and it's covered in pretty much all of Stef's videos on determinism. Take the time to actually see what it is you call "superficial" and "lazy". Because this obvious strawman is definitely superficial and lazy.

[labmath2]

It's pretty simple, really. Every thing that occurs in the universe, from an exploding supernova to my apparent decision in 6 words' time to use a comma, is part of this causal chain. In order to be consistent, we cannot exclude ourselves from the causal chain we observe. It doesn't matter how much forethought you think you can put into something, all those thoughts, all those firing synapses, are just part of a single causal chain. Unless, somehow, the essence of what is 'you' is somehow able to inject a thought from outside that causal chain. Basically, unless you can magic inputs into existence, you cannot possibly have free will.

 

So, yeah, your argument is easy to understand, but is inconsistent with the universe as we understand it. And as I've said before, determinism does not preclude complexity, again as is evident from the universe itself. Complexity exists all over the universe without any apparent 'will' to control it. Why would we be so different?

 

And yes I know this is superficially a performative contradiction or whatever. But, y'know, there can be truth beyond performance.

 

I think i get your argument so i will try to rephrase it for you. If i am completely off, then correct me. 

 

We know that everything we have observed from planetary motion to particle motion act according to certain predictable patterns. We understand how electrons and protons interact, how the moon and sun affects tides, and even how to send rockets to space because of we understand the "rules" that guide these events. We also understand a lot about living organisms, particularly humans. If we assume no particle is exempt from the "rules" that guide particle behavior, then even our particles are following those same rules of mass and energy. That is not to say there aren't fantastically complex aggregates of these particles that seem to defy the "rules," i.e birds flying despite gravity or ice being lighter than water, but upon further inspection, we have come to realize these phenomenal are not proof of exemptions, but rather ingenious circumvention of the norms while still obeying the "rules." If this assumption holds up at every level, then humans must also be no more than ingenious circumvention of the "rule" of cause and effect. Hence, while it may seem we are making decisions, we are no more than cellular automatons that cannot see the "rule" that guides our actions. 

 

The problem with this line of reasoning is that at best it suggests strong cause and effect and not actually determinism. If determinism is true, then we cannot know it because we cannot experience the world outside of our deterministic environment. For us to see that it is in fact deterministic, there would need to be some plane of existence that is higher than ours, i.e the God plane or Olympus, from which we can see all the dominoes that have fallen and all the ones that are going to fall. Simply put, the argument does nothing and is at best self defeating.

[cynicist]

It's pretty simple, really. Every thing that occurs in the universe, from an exploding supernova to my apparent decision in 6 words' time to use a comma, is part of this causal chain. In order to be consistent, we cannot exclude ourselves from the causal chain we observe. It doesn't matter how much forethought you think you can put into something, all those thoughts, all those firing synapses, are just part of a single causal chain. Unless, somehow, the essence of what is 'you' is somehow able to inject a thought from outside that causal chain. Basically, unless you can magic inputs into existence, you cannot possibly have free will.

 

So, yeah, your argument is easy to understand, but is inconsistent with the universe as we understand it. And as I've said before, determinism does not preclude complexity, again as is evident from the universe itself. Complexity exists all over the universe without any apparent 'will' to control it. Why would we be so different?

 

And yes I know this is superficially a performative contradiction or whatever. But, y'know, there can be truth beyond performance.

 

I'm pretty sure you just replied without reading anything that I posted, or at the very least skimming it. The whole point of my post is that this 'will' exists as part of the causal chain, not outside of it, so why are you strawmanning me?

If you believe whatever you believe because antecedent causes forced you to believe it, then it makes no sense to say that you reasoned it through. The reasoning is epiphenomenal in this case (as I describe in my previous post) and is not itself causal. So all you know is that you have beliefs with no satisfiable conditions of satisfaction.

 

If you are a determinist, then no, nothing is true. All your arguments are static on a TV screen.

 

This is the insane thing about determinism that its advocates don't seem to understand. If causality obliviates free will then reason goes down too, and if you can't reason then you can't know the truth anyway. I for one am not going to be talked out of possession of my own mind.  

The problem with this line of reasoning is that at best it suggests strong cause and effect and not actually determinism. If determinism is true, then we cannot know it because we cannot experience the world outside of our deterministic environment. For us to see that it is in fact deterministic, there would need to be some plane of existence that is higher than ours, i.e the God plane or Olympus, from which we can see all the dominoes that have fallen and all the ones that are going to fall. Simply put, the argument does nothing and is at best self defeating.

 

The worst part about it is that free will can't exist without a deterministic universe. There is no such thing as truly random or 'outside of causality', if there was then we wouldn't be debating it because matter would be too unstable and unpredictable to support us. The very consistency that allows us to be around is the same consistency that lets us predict the future and makes free will a possibility. And yet people point to time being linear and consistent as if that's an argument AGAINST free will. 

[greekredemption]

This is not what the argument is, though. Which is why I suggested revisiting it. You are being lazy.It is a necessary contradiction because you claim to have reasoned thru the position while saying that reasoning (part of free will) is not real. I have made the case in the last and a few other posts as to why reason requires free will and it's covered in pretty much all of Stef's videos on determinism. Take the time to actually see what it is you call "superficial" and "lazy". Because this obvious strawman is definitely superficial and lazy.

 

This is the argument as I understood it, actually. And that is only true for a conception of reason that relies on free will. Perhaps both are simply complex systems (a computer could of course say 'I don't have free will', if given the correct inputs). Anyway as we discussed earlier it seems to me that qualia do not preclude a non-free will position; I would say that the reasoning process, just like any other, has an input and an output, although I, or you, may not experience it that way (well evidently we don't).

 

The problem with this line of reasoning is that at best it suggests strong cause and effect and not actually determinism. If determinism is true, then we cannot know it because we cannot experience the world outside of our deterministic environment. For us to see that it is in fact deterministic, there would need to be some plane of existence that is higher than ours, i.e the God plane or Olympus, from which we can see all the dominoes that have fallen and all the ones that are going to fall. Simply put, the argument does nothing and is at best self defeating.

 

Actually, I tend to agree with this. What I've argued doesn't necessarily suggest determinism (although it may imply it) but instead asserts any given not-free will position. 

 

Also your summary of my position is well put, I can't really disagree with it.

 

I'm pretty sure you just replied without reading anything that I posted, or at the very least skimming it. The whole point of my post is that this 'will' exists as part of the causal chain, not outside of it, so why are you strawmanning me?

 

This is the insane thing about determinism that its advocates don't seem to understand. If causality obliviates free will then reason goes down too, and if you can't reason then you can't know the truth anyway. I for one am not going to be talked out of possession of my own mind.  

 

The worst part about it is that free will can't exist without a deterministic universe. There is no such thing as truly random or 'outside of causality', if there was then we wouldn't be debating it because matter would be too unstable and unpredictable to support us. The very consistency that allows us to be around is the same consistency that lets us predict the future and makes free will a possibility. And yet people point to time being linear and consistent as if that's an argument AGAINST free will. 

Okay, so how can you claim to have free will if all its inputs are from previous causes? What's free about it if what is you is simply the sum of various inputs along the causal chain? The post of yours I replied to seemed to confuse complex systems (e.g. memories, the perception of our own mortality, reason itself, etc) with free will. These things do not in themselves support a free will view, as it seems to me they all have inputs and outputs along the causal chain just like anything else complex.

[TheRobin]

I'd say the whole "causal chain" argument is a red herring anyway.

 

Of course, if I lift my arm that is caused by some process in my brain. So is any other behaviour. But just because state S causes behaviour B doesn't mean there was no choice or alternative.

What determinist need to show is that state S can't possibly cause any other behavour that B. Where as the free will position argues that it could as well cause B1, B2, B3, etc. (or S1,S2, which then causes B1, B2,)

 

Like, if you look after it happened it will always be part of a causal chain by definition. But the question is, whetehr that was the only thing that could've psosibly happened.

[Kevin Beal]

This is the argument as I understood it, actually. And that is only true for a conception of reason that relies on free will. Perhaps both are simply complex systems (a computer could of course say 'I don't have free will', if given the correct inputs). Anyway as we discussed earlier it seems to me that qualia do not preclude a non-free will position; I would say that the reasoning process, just like any other, has an input and an output, although I, or you, may not experience it that way (well evidently we don't).

Ok, so it's different. I have absolutely no idea how or why it's different, because you don't say. Or how this difference actually addresses the issue. If you just say that it's what people call reason but determinist style, then you've completely ignored the criticism.

 

We have no idea how this is supposed to resolve the issues of preferred states or reason independent from mere belief. You imply that it does resolve these things, but provide nothing for me to actually come to the same conclusion myself.

 

It's not even a bad argument. It's not an argument at all...

 

Also, The Robin makes a fantastic point.

[cynicist]

Okay, so how can you claim to have free will if all its inputs are from previous causes? What's free about it if what is you is simply the sum of various inputs along the causal chain? The post of yours I replied to seemed to confuse complex systems (e.g. memories, the perception of our own mortality, reason itself, etc) with free will. These things do not in themselves support a free will view, as it seems to me they all have inputs and outputs along the causal chain just like anything else complex.

 

All inputs are not from previous causes, that's what I've been saying this whole time lol. For human beings previous causes are one factor, a very strong factor obviously, but not the only one. Reason and imagination are examples of inputs that are not limited to prior causes alone, if they were then you could not actually call them reason or imagination. (you would say they are the illusion of thinking and creativity, because it is all the result of antecedent causes)

 

Those complex systems are what make free will possible and also distinct from the choices of other animals, I'm not confusing them for free will. I'm not sure what part of that was unclear, but let me know.

 

You are looking at the past and only seeing some of the events that led to a particular course of action. You aren't seeing all the possibilities that the human had considered before making their decision because those aren't visible. 

 

This is the argument as I understood it, actually. And that is only true for a conception of reason that relies on free will. Perhaps both are simply complex systems (a computer could of course say 'I don't have free will', if given the correct inputs). Anyway as we discussed earlier it seems to me that qualia do not preclude a non-free will position; I would say that the reasoning process, just like any other, has an input and an output, although I, or you, may not experience it that way (well evidently we don't).

 

If everything I do is the result of prior events, then any claim I make of choice or thought that is not determined by history is an illusion. Your computer example is great, because we aren't even under an illusion that they are thinking or reasoning when executing programs. We acknowledge that they cannot do those things BECAUSE they are given prior instruction through programming. So if we are given the same 'instruction' through prior causes, then we are no different from machines in that regard.

[Kevin Beal]

A fly lands on my leg -> I choose to swat it -> it flies away unharmed

 

That's a causal story. The circumstances of the fly on my leg cause me to decide what I would like to do about it which results in the fly getting away because I missed.

 

Is this not causal? Of course it is. The idea that causality == determinism is not true.

[cynicist]

A fly lands on my leg -> I choose to swat it -> it flies away unharmed

 

That's a causal story. The circumstances of the fly on my leg cause me to decide what I would like to do about it which results in the fly getting away because I missed.

 

Is this not causal? Of course it is. The idea that causality == determinism is not true.

 

And to use your example to explain what I mean specifically.

 

A fly lands on my leg > I am irritated and choose to swat it > I realize that if I swat it I will end up with a stain on my leg/pants (looking at future consequences) > I then decide to shoo it away rather than swat it

 

To the observer though, this process looks like:

 

A fly lands on my leg > I shoo it away with my hand

 

Determinists look at the last situation and say, "AHA! It's all causal. The fly landed on his leg and then he shoo'd it away". It's like, yes, he would never have shoo'd it away had the fly not landed on his leg beforehand, but that doesn't mean that was the only action he could have taken.

 

Am I explaining this clearly?

[Kevin Beal]

Determinists look at the last situation and say, "AHA! It's all causal. The fly landed on his leg and then he shoo'd it away". It's like, yes, he would never have shoo'd it away had the fly not landed on his leg beforehand, but that doesn't mean that was the only action he could have taken.

 

Am I explaining this clearly?

Totally. That's why I have no idea what determinists mean when they say "outside the causal chain", as if the totality of "causality" were some grand physics equation.

[greekredemption]

All inputs are not from previous causes, that's what I've been saying this whole time lol. For human beings previous causes are one factor, a very strong factor obviously, but not the only one. Reason and imagination are examples of inputs that are not limited to prior causes alone, if they were then you could not actually call them reason or imagination. (you would say they are the illusion of thinking and creativity, because it is all the result of antecedent causes)

 

How can 'reason and imagination' generate inputs without antecedent causes? How is that possible?

 

If everything I do is the result of prior events, then any claim I make of choice or thought that is not determined by history is an illusion. Your computer example is great, because we aren't even under an illusion that they are thinking or reasoning when executing programs. We acknowledge that they cannot do those things BECAUSE they are given prior instruction through programming. So if we are given the same 'instruction' through prior causes, then we are no different from machines in that regard

 

 

That is basically my argument. We are merely very complex computers, and given the right inputs one of the outputs may well be to utter, "I don't have free will."

 

Totally. That's why I have no idea what determinists mean when they say "outside the causal chain", as if the totality of "causality" were some grand physics equation.

 

It matters not that you can conceive of other courses of action; given identical inputs, that series of events would not have happened any other way, including the thought process you had when 'choosing' the action. Consider a lab experiment where all inputs are identical and the test is repeated identically; the output of the test will be identical every time unless the inputs change. Given identical inputs even a double pendulum will demonstrate identical outputs. So unless your brain is gathering inputs from outside of the causal chain, or somehow generating its own, there is no way any action you take can possibly be chosen. We must be subject to the same rules as everything else!

[cynicist]

How can 'reason and imagination' generate inputs without antecedent causes? How is that possible?

 

I said not limited to antecedent causes. In other words, not determined by antecedent causes but greatly influenced by them. No one just has the schematics for a space shuttle pop into their heads randomly, they build on the work of others.

 

That is basically my argument. We are merely very complex computers, and given the right inputs one of the outputs may well be to utter, "I don't have free will."

 

So you realize that you are arguing against reason then?

 

It matters not that you can conceive of other courses of action; given identical inputs, that series of events would not have happened any other way, including the thought process you had when 'choosing' the action. Consider a lab experiment where all inputs are identical and the test is repeated identically; the output of the test will be identical every time unless the inputs change. Given identical inputs even a double pendulum will demonstrate identical outputs. So unless your brain is gathering inputs from outside of the causal chain, or somehow generating its own, there is no way any action you take can possibly be chosen. We must be subject to the same rules as everything else!

 

Given a particular set of circumstances, yes a person will choose a particular action every time. I'm not sure how that invalidates choice.... (that's like saying I'm a robot because I choose life over death all the time, if I had TRUE free will, it would be random! ) The reality is we never have identical inputs, in part because we can imagine being in a similar situation again and plan for how to deal with it if it does happen. 

 

So far this comes down to: If you define free will as independent of causality (whatever that means), then it doesn't make sense. And if you say choice is part of the causal chain then somehow it becomes an illusion, but reason becomes a 'complex system' that is part of the causal chain.

 

(why choice doesn't qualify as a 'complex system' that is part of the causal chain, no one will ever know)

[greekredemption]

Given a particular set of circumstances, yes a person will choose a particular action every time. I'm not sure how that invalidates choice.... (that's like saying I'm a robot because I choose life over death all the time, if I had TRUE free will, it would be random! ) The reality is we never have identical inputs, in part because we can imagine being in a similar situation again and plan for how to deal with it if it does happen. 

 You're considering this way too proximately.

 

What I was trying to demonstrate was that effects are determined entirely by their causes and nothing else. There is nothing in 'you' which can circumvent that. What you see as your actions, your choices, are simply the effects of a variety of different causes, in the same way that the manner in which the double pendulum swings is determined by a variety of causes directly and wholly leading to the effect. Ultimately, all of the synapses firing in your brain are part of that same chain.

 

The upshot of this is that at any given state in space and time, there is only one possible future state, and so on. What you see as a series of choices are in fact nothing of the sort.

 

This is why determinists will often describe free will as 'magic', in that for it to be true it must necessarily violate physical laws, i.e. be supernatural.

 

(why choice doesn't qualify as a 'complex system' that is part of the causal chain, no one will ever know)

 

Because it would violate it. That's a real contradiction, right there.

 

edit: obviously all experience is a complex system, and the experience of choice is in some manner existent within that.

[Kevin Beal]

It matters not that you can conceive of other courses of action; given identical inputs, that series of events would not have happened any other way, including the thought process you had when 'choosing' the action. Consider a lab experiment where all inputs are identical and the test is repeated identically; the output of the test will be identical every time unless the inputs change. Given identical inputs even a double pendulum will demonstrate identical outputs. So unless your brain is gathering inputs from outside of the causal chain, or somehow generating its own, there is no way any action you take can possibly be chosen. We must be subject to the same rules as everything else!

If I have the same beliefs and desires and am placed in the same situation I have to respond to, I am going to choose the same course of action, obviously.

 

If I have the exact same desires and beliefs, of course I'm going to respond the same way. That's still not determinism.

 

All you've accomplished is saying "if everything is the same, then everything is the same". Or, "if events are taking place in the same manner, then they take place in the same manner".

 

When you say something as vague as "input" anything you want can fit in there, including an event where free will took place: "input X = choosing to swat a fly".

 

Also, consciousness does generate it's own effects. Emergent phenomena can be causal as that new state, independent of the atoms that compose it. Water splashes, solids hit, minds think. Atoms don't do any of these things.

 

Causal descriptions have to take into account what the objects involved actually are. Rocks don't think or act, but humans (when they are conscious) do. And that's important. Where is your account of this? How does this figure into your brand of determinism? If you don't actually address it, then you aren't really talking about people, much less consciousness and free will.

[labmath2]

Kevin and cynicist i am going to play devils advocate here because i want to get a sense of what you mean by free will. 

 

Chess algorithms have come a long way and some of the best chess bots can compete with some of the best chess players and give them a run for their money. 

Here is the question:

Would you consider a chess bot's decision an act of free will? I prefer non superficial answer. I want you to compare and contrast a chess master (or GM) and a chess bot's decisions as it pertains to the game of chess, and help us understand in what sense they either both have free will, or one has free will and the other does not. 

[cynicist]

Because it would violate it. That's a real contradiction, right there.

 

You are saying it is an uncaused cause, and that's why its a violation of determinism right? I'm saying choice is a synthesis of causal factors (past, present, future). There is no single cause. When you argue causality as linear for humans the same way it is for rocks you invalidate consciousness, intelligence, and reason as well as choice. Saying that one is an illusion and the others are 'complex systems' doesn't get around that.

[Kevin Beal]

Would you consider a chess bot's decision an act of free will? I prefer non superficial answer. I want you to compare and contrast a chess master (or GM) and a chess bot's decisions as it pertains to the game of chess, and help us understand in what sense they either both have free will, or one has free will and the other does not. 

No. A chess program doesn't consciously decide things. There is no meaning or understanding that it experiences.

 

Using terms like "decide" and "think" when describing artificial intelligence is metaphorical. When talking about it with humans, we mean it literally.

[labmath2]

No. A chess program doesn't consciously decide things. There is no meaning or understanding that it experiences.

 

Using terms like "decide" and "think" when describing artificial intelligence is metaphorical. When talking about it with humans, we mean it literally.

 

I have no idea what you mean by the word conscious, meaning, understanding, and experience there, and if a chess bot does not decide, then describe the act of making one move as opposed to the other in a non decision method. Let me add a third category to make this clearer, if a chimp was thought to play chess, would the chimps moves (on a chess board) also be an act of free will or not?

[cynicist]

Would you consider a chess bot's decision an act of free will? I prefer non superficial answer. I want you to compare and contrast a chess master (or GM) and a chess bot's decisions as it pertains to the game of chess, and help us understand in what sense they either both have free will, or one has free will and the other does not. 

 

The problem with any computer analogy is that computers are programmed by humans, which we are arguing have choice. You can't use them as an example without consideration of that fact, that humans are designing them to mimic us as much as possible. A chess bot's decision is not an act of free will at the moment. It is certainly possible that it could be in the future but not without human intervention.

 

I have no idea what you mean by the word conscious, meaning, understanding, and experience there, and if a chess bot does not decide, then describe the act of making one move as opposed to the other in a non decision method. 

 

It isn't really deciding. It's just following whatever logic it was programmed to by a human. So it is limited to whatever the human deems is the best decision. 

 

Let me add a third category to make this clearer, if a chimp was thought to play chess, would the chimps moves (on a chess board) also be an act of free will or not?

 

Chimps wouldn't be much different than a computer I think. I mean a human could train a chimp to make certain moves in particular situations, but a chimp is not going to come up with chess strategies on its own and wouldn't really understand what it was doing on an abstract level. To the chimp it would be moving physical pieces of wood to different squares.

[greekredemption]

If I have the same beliefs and desires and am placed in the same situation I have to respond to, I am going to choose the same course of action, obviously.

 

If I have the exact same desires and beliefs, of course I'm going to respond the same way. That's still not determinism.

 

All you've accomplished is saying "if everything is the same, then everything is the same". Or, "if events are taking place in the same manner, then they take place in the same manner".

 

When you say something as vague as "input" anything you want can fit in there, including an event where free will took place: "input X = choosing to swat a fly".

 

Also, consciousness does generate it's own effects. Emergent phenomena can be causal as that new state, independent of the atoms that compose it. Water splashes, solids hit, minds think. Atoms don't do any of these things.

 

Causal descriptions have to take into account what the objects involved actually are. Rocks don't think or act, but humans (when they are conscious) do. And that's important. Where is your account of this? How does this figure into your brand of determinism? If you don't actually address it, then you aren't really talking about people, much less consciousness and free will.

What I'm trying to accomplish (apparently unsuccessfully) is to show that at any point in time, there is only one possible future, whether you're a rock or a human - for everything in the universe there is only one future state. Actually, I don't think it matters at all whether or not a thing "think or act". You and I are, from the universe's point of view, no different from rocks; we are essentially just matter and energy, like the rock. And like the rock, we are subject to the same rules of cause and effect and in the same way.

 

Consciousness absolutely cannot generate its own effects! How is that possible? Your brain had some inputs and then came some outputs. Cause and effect. What went in directly affected what came out. It doesn't matter how emergent the phenomena was, a series of past inputs determined the output. It is physically impossible for your brain to "generate its own effects". Or, at least, if it does it would break some of the most fundamental rules of the universe.

 

So yeah I'm not really talking about 'people', per se. I'm just talking about a consistent view of the universe where humans are neither special nor exempt.

 

You are saying it is an uncaused cause, and that's why its a violation of determinism right? I'm saying choice is a synthesis of causal factors (past, present, future). There is no single cause. When you argue causality as linear for humans the same way it is for rocks you invalidate consciousness, intelligence, and reason as well as choice. Saying that one is an illusion and the others are 'complex systems' doesn't get around that.

 

No there is no single cause, there are many, many causes. Many inputs. And only one future state.

 

And yes I suppose I am invalidating consciousness, intelligence, reason and choice (as are commonly understood and without caveats) in arguing that essentially human beings are no different from any other bundle of matter in the universe. But so what? The truth is the truth, and furthermore we know that our senses - or feelings, in this case - are not the most accurate ways to perceive or measure the universe. It took us thousands of years to figure out that the sparkly things in the sky are not merely just out of reach, but are many, many light years away. We all operate day-to-day on the basis that the Earth is flat, which of course it isn't, but it certainly appears to be from where we're standing. We also all operate day-to-day on the basis that each of us can have a profound effect on the motions of the universe, in spite of the fact that this runs against everything else we know about the universe.

[MysterionMuffles]

Always remember, I am the superior and 20% cooler Rainbow JAMZ who believes in free will.

[TDB]

I cheerfully admit I've never really understood what the argument is about and I started reading this thread hoping to figure it out. Sadly, I only got halfway through page 3 before I gave up, no wiser. I apologize for barging in late.

 

Is there an experiment that we could perform, even conceptually, that would show whether or not we have free will? If so, what is it? (Maybe godlike start two identical universes with identical initial conditions and then see if they diverge? Would that do it? Or maybe create two identical universes with people in them, and in one go tell subject X he has free will, and tell subject X he has no free will in the other, then see what they do differently? But then the universes aren't identical anymore...)

 

We seem to be taking it as uncontroversial that the universe is deterministic. Is that so?

 

I guess, by the deterministic view, I am really a robot running a sophisticated program simulating a person, and by becoming convinced that free will is wrong, I would realize I am a robot running a program and the program was timed to send me here to change my mind about free will? But even if free will is true, I am a robot running a sophisticated program written by evolution. My life is an accumulation of my failures and successes. But not if determinism is true?

 

Or an actor on a stage, and the end of the play is written, though I am so "method" that I've forgotten I am acting? Or I think I am improvising, but actually I am reciting the script verbatim?

 

If there is no experiment we can actually perform, does this question have any substance or meaning? How should I change my life if I become convinced that free will is an illusion, or that it is real? It seems completely irrelevant. Should I call in sick on Monday with a bad case of determinism?

[Mike Fleming]

I cheerfully admit I've never really understood what the argument is about and I started reading this thread hoping to figure it out. Sadly, I only got halfway through page 3 before I gave up, no wiser. I apologize for barging in late.Is there an experiment that we could perform, even conceptually, that would show whether or not we have free will? If so, what is it? (Maybe godlike start two identical universes with identical initial conditions and then see if they diverge? Would that do it? Or maybe create two identical universes with people in them, and in one go tell subject X he has free will, and tell subject X he has no free will in the other, then see what they do differently? But then the universes aren't identical anymore...)We seem to be taking it as uncontroversial that the universe is deterministic. Is that so?I guess, by the deterministic view, I am really a robot running a sophisticated program simulating a person, and by becoming convinced that free will is wrong, I would realize I am a robot running a program and the program was timed to send me here to change my mind about free will? But even if free will is true, I am a robot running a sophisticated program written by evolution. My life is an accumulation of my failures and successes. But not if determinism is true? 

 

There have been experiments showing that people's brains have made decisions before they are consciously aware of the decision.

 

As for calling yourself a robot simulating a person, this is all just semantics.  If we are all robots and not persons then what is a person?  They don't exist if you use that definition so how do you simulate it?  We are people, but we are also fundamentally deterministic machines.  We are carbon-based rather than silicon based.  But if you think about how we are created from the sperm and egg and in the womb it is an entirely physical process.

 

For those who claim we have to prove there is no free will, it is basically the same as religious believers saying atheists have to prove there is no God.   The burden of proof is on the free will believer.  Unlike the religious believer, who can always say we just don't know, the free will believer has a much more difficult time because it's much more tangible and down-to-earth.  You don't need to prove that other realms don't exist in order to disprove free will.

 

 

 

If there is no experiment we can actually perform, does this question have any substance or meaning? How should I change my life if I become convinced that free will is an illusion, or that it is real? It seems completely irrelevant. Should I call in sick on Monday with a bad case of determinism?

 

 

Should you call in with a bad case of atheism?  Or anarchism?

 

The more I think about it the more important I think determinism is.  Some reasons why 

- first and foremost it is the truth.  It is important for our brains to know the truth of the world so we have an accurate map of reality.  I know that thinking in terms of determinism, when you know and accept it to be truth can lead to a great deal more clarity when applied to various aspects of life.

- what about our justice system?  Is it fair to punish people for, say a murder that was always going to happen?  We certainly don't want to allow murder but we need to ask the question of what is most appropriate.  The current system relies on the fact that people have free will.

- I think it is a more devastating blow to religion than atheism is.  What sense can anyone make out of heaven and hell if there is no free will?  Unlike with atheism, where believers can always say you can't prove there isn't a God, determinism is provable.  As we learn more about the brain it will become more and more obvious.