Definition of free will

[TDB]

Did my post sound snarky? I was hoping for amusing. I guess that was a mistake, as your response doesn't clear anything up for me. I should stick to the point and avoid making cracks.The truth or falsehood of determinism or free will seems irrelevant to me. Please help me understand how I should live my life differently in one case versus the other.

Should you call in with a bad case of atheism? Or anarchism?

Even assuming determinism, the day my belief in atheism or anarchism changes, my behavior will also change. I will start or stop attending church, or start or stop laughing at politics. But what does "robot me that believes in determinism" do differently from "robot me that believes in free will?"

- what about our justice system? Is it fair to punish people for, say a murder that was always going to happen?

Why ask about what is fair, if the punishment was always going to happen, if society has no choice? Or is it that we choose, but do not choose freely? Not understanding.In a different context I would be interested in discussing alternatives to punishment. Are you actually offering any alternatives, or just suggesting that people should never be punished?We seem to be taking it as uncontroversial that the universe is deterministic. Is that so?

[TheRobin]

@Mike Flemming: You say the people who accept free will are the ones that have to come up with experiment proofing it. What possible experiment would hypothetically change your mind?

[TDB]

@Mike Flemming: You say the people who accept free will are the ones that have to come up with experiment proofing it. What possible experiment would hypothetically change your mind?

Maybe one that shows that the universe is not deterministic?

[TheRobin]

Maybe one that shows that the universe is not deterministic?

And how would you possibly proof or disproof that? 

[TDB]

And how would you possibly proof or disproof that?

I don't know, we're out of my depth. But why think about it if it's not good enough to convince Mike Fleming?If it can't be proven in one way or another, isn't it irrelevant? hypotheses:* the universe is a big clockwork, and someone with the right equations, processing power, and data could calculate precise predictions of the state of the universe at any time. Our subjective experiences of thinking and making choices are closely analogous to rocks in a landslide, they are illusory. Our subjective experience is misleading, but we cannot correct it by discovering our mistake. It's like one of those optical illusions that refuses to go away even though you know what you think you see is not actually there.* the universe has nondeterministic elements in it, but I am still determined, and still wrong. Might as well be pessimistic.* the universe has nondeterministic elements in it, and my subjective experience of thinking, choosing, etc., is more or less accurate.* universe is a clockwork, but I am not. If I am part of universe, this is a logical contradiction. If I am separate from universe, that violates our definition of universe. By proving a contradiction, we show that one or more of our assumptions is incorrect, or equivocated, or misconceptualized. We goofed. The question is mis-specified.* This all assumes a naive version of the concept of time.* we don't really have a fracking clue, and might as well proceed however seems to work best using trial and error, not worrying about whether our model of one thing contradicts our model of something else we use in a different context. Actually, it seems like this is the best plan, whichever hypothesis appeals to you most.The floor is open for suggestions for experiments aimed at eliminating some of these from the running.

[TheRobin]

I don't know, we're out of my depth. But why think about it if it's not good enough to convince Mike Fleming? 

Why do you think I do?The point of my post was basically, that Mike (along with most determinists) claim that Determinism is basically science and rejecting it would be rejecting science. Hence I asked him what experiment would change his mind.Interestingly so far no aswer has come from any determinist, which should give a clue that it has nothing to do with science.

[TDB]

Why do you think I do?The point of my post was basically, that Mike (along with most determinists) claim that Determinism is basically science and rejecting it would be rejecting science. Hence I asked him what experiment would change his mind.Interestingly so far no aswer has come from any determinist, which should give a clue that it has nothing to do with science.

Gotcha. My own comment ("Why think about it") makes no sense to me now. I guess I was thinking something like, imagine two possibilities. In one scenario, you learn of a prestigious scientist performing an experiment that convinces you that determinism is true. In the other scenario, the same scientist proves to your satisfaction that determinism is false. Imagine "you" after both of these events. What will the "you" that believes in determinism do differently from the "you" who does not?

[greekredemption]

Why do you think I do?The point of my post was basically, that Mike (along with most determinists) claim that Determinism is basically science and rejecting it would be rejecting science. Hence I asked him what experiment would change his mind.Interestingly so far no aswer has come from any determinist, which should give a clue that it has nothing to do with science.

I suppose you'd have to find a process that consistently behaves in a non-deterministic manner. And then somehow explain that in the context of the universe.

 

It's difficult to think up an experiment that would reject determinism, as experimentation to some extent relies on the same assumption (i.e. that in the same conditions a test repeated ad infinitum will yield the same results).

 

Of course a determinist would merely ask the free will proponent to show the physical mechanism which allows free will itself. This should be enough to convince the determinist, or science in general, that perhaps the assumptions we make about the universe are wrong, or at least inconsistent.

[Mike Fleming]

Why do you think I do?The point of my post was basically, that Mike (along with most determinists) claim that Determinism is basically science and rejecting it would be rejecting science. Hence I asked him what experiment would change his mind.Interestingly so far no aswer has come from any determinist, which should give a clue that it has nothing to do with science.

 

I've answered this one before. 

 

It is like a religious person asking me "What experiment would change my mind that their is a God?".

 

Are you an atheist?  What would you say to a believer who asked you the above?

[TheRobin]

I've answered this one before. 

 

It is like a religious person asking me "What experiment would change my mind that their is a God?".

 

Are you an atheist?  What would you say to a believer who asked you the above?

 

Can you link the post where you answered that then please? I must've missed it then.

 

In regards to the question I'd probably ask them to define "God" first, after that, we know what characteristics (which inlcude effects) we are looking for. (ofc most gods are defined in a self-contradictory way, so no experiment is possible, cause the definition is meaningless).But assuming the definition wouldn't be meaningless, then the question would be valid, wouldn't it? 

[Mike Fleming]

Can you link the post where you answered that then please? I must've missed it then.

 

In regards to the question I'd probably ask them to define "God" first, after that, we know what characteristics (which inlcude effects) we are looking for. (ofc most gods are defined in a self-contradictory way, so no experiment is possible, cause the definition is meaningless).But assuming the definition wouldn't be meaningless, then the question would be valid, wouldn't it? 

 

Can't remember where else I stated it but I said the same thing so it doesn't matter.

 

The point is that the way God is defined leaves no room for HIm when you take into account scientific facts.  For an atheist the interesting question is not "Can we design an experiment to prove God?", the interesting question is

 

"Why do so many people believe there is a God?"  

 

Or at least it is for me.  Asking if we can do an experiment seems pointless to me, though I am always happy to look at whatever may come up.  The problem is that the whole concept goes against scientific facts and so it is much the same as asking about unicorns or bigfoot.  I don't 100% know they don't exist, but honestly, there was no reason to think so in the first place so why bother?

 

The same is true of free will.  It is, in all honesty, a bizarre concept to me now that I have taken into account the scientific facts of the universe.  How could it possibly work?  I would not even have the slightest conception.  It just doesn't make sense.  If someone's got something for me to look at I'll look at it, but I've looked at all the major free will arguments, including the one on the host's channel and dismissed them all.

 

The more interesting question to me at this stage is

 

"Why do people believe there is free will?  How and why did the idea come about?"

 

I haven't answered it satisfactorily yet but it has something to do with the fact that it is our intuition to think so and, like with so many things, our initial intuition turns out to be wrong the more we learn about the universe.   Religion incorporates many intuitive ideas that people have of the world because we had little information of the world at the time.  That's why you have things like Genesis story, the explanation's about thunder, sun revolving around the Earth, etc. which turn out to be incorrect.   Free will falls into the same category.

[RestoringGuy]

Free will seems to be discussed, in part, as knowing what is free will and how experimentally it is manifested.  I found an interesting idea of three viewpoints described by P.C.W. Davies http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/0703041 as follows:

 

A.  laws of physics  ->  matter  ->  information.

 

B.  laws of physics  ->  information  -> matter.

 

C.  information  ->  laws of physics  ->matter.

 

The conventional view is A.  Davies writes "Matter conforms to the given laws, while information is a derived, or secondary property having to do with certain special states of matter".

 

For view B, "Nature is regarded as a vast information processing system, and particles of matter are treated as special states which, when interrogated by, say, a particle detector, extract or process the underlying quantum state information so as to yield particle-like results."

 

Davies says "The attractions of scheme C is that, after all, the laws of physics are informational statements."

 

My own thinking is that understanding these relationships could be important before trying to decide exactly what free will is or how to test for it.

[Edinburger]

Free will is merely an acceptance that our subjective experience is actually real. Sometimes there are exceptions, and sometimes some unconscious behavior looks conscious, and hypnotism has an affect on us, and all of this. So it's not as if every single thing we experience is the way we perceive it, but some of it kinda has to be, and I'm submitting that our conscious decision making falls under that category. And as long as determinists accept this (via performative contradiction) then I will too. It's kinda ridiculous to ask me not to.

Why does 'some of it kind of have to be'?

[Kevin Beal]

Why does 'some of it kind of have to be'?

Were your beliefs and desires in any way causal in asking me this question? If yes, you've accepted the causal nature of your conscious awareness. If not, then we're not having a conversation. I'm talking to a cleverly constructed robot who only simulates beliefs and desires.

 

If you accept that conscious awareness is itself causal, as I see it, you can go one of two ways with that. You can say that the causal component is such that it makes our experience of choice illusory, or you can say that free will and causality are in no way in conflict with each other. (I go with the latter).

 

We can look at a series of events where I've chosen to go to Rob's Grill over Lin's Sushi Joint because they've got a special deal on my favorite meal tonite. If we take into consideration all of the variables in this "equation" we can determine that I would indeed have chosen Rob's Grill. But does this mean my experience of choosing the place is illusory because the variables point to this decision? No, it doesn't.

 

If I have the desire for my favorite meal and the belief that it is on sale and I value things consistent with this decision, then obviously that's what I'm going to do. I don't just pick a place at random according to some math_random() function in my neurological makeup.

 

What it means to choose is to take my desires and beliefs into consideration, even if that desire is to flip a coin.

 

What determinism says is that this choice is illusory and the entire subjective experience of making the decision is superfluous. It is not necessary at all. And indeed many philosophers state this explicitly. It's part of a broader position in the philosophy of mind called epiphenomenalism.

 

Epiphenomenalism is basically saying that consciousness is not causal. To take an analogy, it's like the graphical representations on the screen you are looking at. The pixels don't determine anything. They are just an afterthought from the vantage point of the computer. All the computer cares about it symbol manipulation. The pixels are for our benefit, getting meaning from the computer which knows no meaning.

 

And you can say "why is this distinction important between choosing and appearing to choose? Why should we not treat them the same, since the result is the same anyway?". And the reason for that is the performative contradiction. You cannot say that you have a correct or better or logical position if you do not accept the reality of this subjective experience, the experience of making choices, the experience of free will (freedom of the will).

 

This is touched upon by Ayn Rand and other philosophers, but I think Stef argues it the best:

[Edinburger]

Were your beliefs and desires in any way causal in asking me this question? If yes, you've accepted the causal nature of your conscious awareness. If not, then we're not having a conversation. I'm talking to a cleverly constructed robot who only simulates beliefs and desires.

 

If you accept that conscious awareness is itself causal, as I see it, you can go one of two ways with that. You can say that the causal component is such that it makes our experience of choice illusory, or you can say that free will and causality are in no way in conflict with each other. (I go with the latter).

 

We can look at a series of events where I've chosen to go to Rob's Grill over Lin's Sushi Joint because they've got a special deal on my favorite meal tonite. If we take into consideration all of the variables in this "equation" we can determine that I would indeed have chosen Rob's Grill. But does this mean my experience of choosing the place is illusory because the variables point to this decision? No, it doesn't.

 

If I have the desire for my favorite meal and the belief that it is on sale and I value things consistent with this decision, then obviously that's what I'm going to do. I don't just pick a place at random according to some math_random() function in my neurological makeup.

 

What it means to choose is to take my desires and beliefs into consideration, even if that desire is to flip a coin.

 

What determinism says is that this choice is illusory and the entire subjective experience of making the decision is superfluous. It is not necessary at all. And indeed many philosophers state this explicitly. It's part of a broader position in the philosophy of mind called epiphenomenalism.

 

Epiphenomenalism is basically saying that consciousness is not causal. To take an analogy, it's like the graphical representations on the screen you are looking at. The pixels don't determine anything. They are just an afterthought from the vantage point of the computer. All the computer cares about it symbol manipulation. The pixels are for our benefit, getting meaning from the computer which knows no meaning.

 

And you can say "why is this distinction important between choosing and appearing to choose? Why should we not treat them the same, since the result is the same anyway?". And the reason for that is the performative contradiction. You cannot say that you have a correct or better or logical position if you do not accept the reality of this subjective experience, the experience of making choices, the experience of free will (freedom of the will).

 

This is touched upon by Ayn Rand and other philosophers, but I think Stef argues it the best:

You make some good points here and some I don't quite understand but I need to look into the topic more. Thanks

[Kevin Beal]

This podcast is great!

FDR56 Emails of the week - and free will!

[RestoringGuy]

Were your beliefs and desires in any way causal in asking me this question? If yes, you've accepted the causal nature of your conscious awareness. If not, then we're not having a conversation. I'm talking to a cleverly constructed robot who only simulates beliefs and desires.

 

Epiphenomenalism is basically saying that consciousness is not causal. To take an analogy, it's like the graphical representations on the screen you are looking at. The pixels don't determine anything. They are just an afterthought from the vantage point of the computer. All the computer cares about it symbol manipulation. The pixels are for our benefit, getting meaning from the computer which knows no meaning.

 

I do not see the shame in conversing with a cleverly constructed robot.  The cleverness may exceed your expectations.  The common free will position seems overly negative toward technology and AI.  While it may be the case that a pure algorithm has no free will (a position I agree with), that in itself does not estabilsh machine impossibility with regard to free will.  It may be the case that computers that you and I know will execute their zeros and ones with near perfection.  As you say, they know no meaning.  But they do fail and make computational mistakes at some extremely small rate.

 

Much like evolution and genetic mutation eventually generating the human brain through a process of rare events, there is no law of physics that seems to prohibit us from building a machine with free will.  I do not adhere to compatibilism and such play on words.  But by exploiting errors in a physical process where symbols get manipulated, simulation is not the only option.  Atoms or bits, it should not matter although the process they follow does matter.  The meaning generated from a random process can be real, because intellectual challenges might be solved by "errors" that win out.  It would seem to me that a machine might purposely allow non-algorithmic mistakes in its symbol manipulation, and take advantage of certain kinds of detectable errors that will be better than any algorithm might generate.  It is merely the attempt at self-improvement allowed for by extreme trial-and-error instead of simple straight-line processing.  That kind of robot might have a capacity for free will.  It could be a clever enough construction to find a refined answer that you cannot predict it will find.  You also cannot predict non-living matter in a puddle 4 billion years ago in a swamp would eventually grow into humans.  So it would seem there is some leeway in what random patterns can do to make free will possible.

[Kevin Beal]

I do not see the shame in conversing with a cleverly constructed robot.  The cleverness may exceed your expectations.  The common free will position seems overly negative toward technology and AI.

For the record, I would love to talk to a cleverly constructed robot / AI and have multiple times to varying degrees of satisfaction. I just don't pretend to myself that they are responsible for what they are saying, available for correction or making decisions the way I do when talking to people.

 

And if you are talking about computers like the kind that AI's and robots and you use to type your response, then to my knowledge, yes, they are limited to symbol manipulation. They have different methods for input and output like this screen and your keyboard, but what it means to "compute" is a simulation of the kinds of logical processes humans perform in their brains done at the level of symbol manipulation, for the benefit of other humans who need to read or develop on top of that.

 

As far as anyone is aware, semantics, meaning, consciousness, free will etc require the wetware of the brain. If we could tap into that by building wetware machines of some sort, then I think we could have true AI and conscious robots.

[RestoringGuy]

As far as anyone is aware, semantics, meaning, consciousness, free will etc require the wetware of the brain. If we could tap into that by building wetware machines of some sort, then I think we could have true AI and conscious robots.

I would like to mention that a confirmation process is taking place -- a filter on whatever kinds of things initially provide these decisions you describe.  The computer needs some sort of generator of useful symbols, keyboard is just one way.  On the other hand, maybe it is dice, a hot cup of tea, or directly to the wetware of the human brain.  But the origin of that wetware should not matter, as long as the process is rapid enough.  The rational process we want to identify, by my reckoning, is a combined result of (1) an ability to generate new symbol structures which cannot be algorithmically generated, and (2) a computational filter than weeds out meaningless data and allows rational data to remain in place as what we can call a consciousness.  This second part does not seem out-of-reach of today's computers.What I mean to illustrate is that lacking either one of these seems to cause some rational failure.  The algorithmically pure robot with no random "imagination" will fail to generate certain patterns, as it has certain limitations and a finite number of states.  Cleverness of programming might make it able to recognize good pattern if it ever sees one, but the same machine may simply lack the ability to produce a good pattern that it can subsequently evaluate.  That machine is irrational on the basis of being too boring.  We can call it a limited machine.On the other hand, so-called wetware without good enough pattern recognition will generate new results, but it can fail to be rational on the basis that false/useless/unproven patterns might be accepted just a readily as true/useful/proven patterns.  I can get any rational solution or answer by drawing Scrabble pieces, but it will take a long time and allow for constant gibberish.  If followed by a machine, such a process is irrational on the extreme basis of being symbolically too clumsy.  It is not "limited" it is too unlimited!   Now consider suitable random hardware plugged in a USB port, followed by algorithmic software to evaluate/filter such data such that it can answer a question or solve a problem with the correct mixture of these two approaches.  Done right I argue this can happen with equal adaptive power of human free will.  This process allows for responsibility to prefer what is right while also requiring an imaginative generator that no deterministic algorithm can provide.  This may not be wetware of the brain, but it is something I would label "mechanical and asymmetrically indeterminate".

[Kevin Beal]

I honestly have no idea what the hell you are talking about...

[Rainbow Dash]

If I have the same beliefs and desires and am placed in the same situation I have to respond to, I am going to choose the same course of action, obviously.

 

If I have the exact same desires and beliefs, of course I'm going to respond the same way. That's still not determinism.

 

All you've accomplished is saying "if everything is the same, then everything is the same". Or, "if events are taking place in the same manner, then they take place in the same manner".

 

When you say something as vague as "input" anything you want can fit in there, including an event where free will took place: "input X = choosing to swat a fly".

This isn't determinism? Your first line shows that events are necessitated by prior conditions. I thought we concluded that this is determinism.

 

As for "input X = choosing to swat a fly", I believe you are missing the point. Sure choosing to swat a fly resulting in you swatting a fly doesn't necessarily imply determinism, but the important question is: Is you choosing to swat the fly necessitated by any given amount of prior input? Your stance against determinism suggests your answer is no, but the first line of your post suggests your answer is yes, so I am once again confused.

[Sal9000]

Causal determinism says that past events dictate future event. What happened in the 10th BCE determines what I have for breakfast this morning (oatmeal). In short: we see the past as fixed. The causations goes in one direction only, from the past to the present to the future. However, there is no actual proof that this is actually the case. It may well be, that future events change past events. The introduction of temporal 'arrow' by thermodynamics does not change that idea.

[Rainbow Dash]

Causal determinism says that past events dictate future event. What happened in the 10th BCE determines what I have for breakfast this morning (oatmeal). In short: we see the past as fixed. The causations goes in one direction only, from the past to the present to the future. However, there is no actual proof that this is actually the case. It may well be, that future events change past events. The introduction of temporal 'arrow' by thermodynamics does not change that idea.

 

Do you really believe the future can change the past? So if I did something in the past that I now regret, I could do something in the present that could undo what I did? Not only does the future changing the past go against our understanding of the universe, it also results in paradoxes that can't happen.

[Sal9000]

Physical laws are time invariant. Without entropy you cannot tell if an event you witness is regressing or progressing in time. So far, nobody showed that the time arrow goes in one direction only. So the future changing the past is an option.

[Rainbow Dash]

Could you give me an example of how the future might be able to change the past, because the only way I can think of is if there was a time machine that could allow us to go back in time to change the past, which sound crazy to me. If there is a more sensible way for the future to change the past, please enlighten me.

 

*Edit*

*Important*

I am no longer allowed to post, I can only communicate through edits. I have been given no explanation as to why I can't post. Apparently FDR is a strong supporter of censorship. 

[Sal9000]

I know this sounds esoteric, but it depends on how you define time. Here is a nice article that shows what I mean http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/120423131902.htmThe Lorentzian manifold used to describe time in Relativity can be solved in many different ways. It is open for a variety of interpretations. You can (if you are good enough at maths) rearrange it in such a way that there is no 'closed past'.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_future#Causal_structure

[Tenko]

Hello everyone. I've posted here before. I want to reply to some of the ideas in the recent video so I had to find some space to post a long argument because the youtube comments section is too small.

 

When I debate for the existence of free will I find it hard to follow the opposing arguments, usually because I am thinking what free will is ends up being different from what the other person is thinking free will is. Since I cant just lose my own vocabulary in order to talk to someone I have to use a new word or a sentence containing the definition provided by the other person, not the words "free will". When trying to find out what they think free will is, it's like I can never get past that one step to get further into the argument. Even if we talk for hours it can still happen.

 

The determinist might say something like this, "In a deterministic universe, on a tuesday morning in a cafe, Bob had a slice of lemon pie. Like a rock rolling down a cliff can only land in a certain position, Bob could only have had that lemon pie and not the cherry pie, or anything else for that matter. Therefore choice is an illusion and Bob does not have the power of free will."

 

I am not arguing against determinism. I'm arguing for the existence of free will within a deterministic universe. So aside from that, here are a few questions...

 

Can you answer yes to these questions? A lack of free will involves Bob choosing lemon pie? The presense of free will involves Bob doing what he chose not to do, which would be eating a cherry pie or abstaining from pie altogether? Eating our least favorite food instead of our most favorite food would then be an example of free will, because we were capable of breaking our own preference and changing what would have happened?

 

How could it be that the power of free will is only achieved by doing something that you chose not to do? Is it not true that sacrificing your choice and doing what you don't want to do is evidence of a lack of free will, and not evidence for it presense?

 

Doesn't it seem like someone interested in propagating slavery would prefer that people believe having free will = doing what you don't want to do and having no free will = doing what you want to do? When a person believes they are only free when they don't get to choose, haven't they already resigned to slavery? If a person believes they don't have free will because of determinism (or anything else) aren't they resigning their free will by voluntarily choosing to do so? How else could they have come to a preference of belief on the subject than by exercising the power of preference of belief? Is a slave made by the power of the enslavers or by the power of the slave?

 

Can you answer yes to these questions? Is a lack of free will manifested when Bob arrives in the cafe with a choice between 7 different flavors of pie? Is the power of free will only manifested if Bob can achieve the impossible, which would be to eat a cherry pie that day instead?

 

Does free will only involve the power to do things that can never happen because determinism did not allow them to happen; the power to do the impossible? Is it fair to attack free will by defining it as including only that which is impossible, despite the definitions anyone else is working with?

 

If there is no such thing as free will, then why should we bother building a society geared towards freedom? If no one has the power of choice, how can a government or a lack of government shift the nature of the universe from deterministic to magical? If societal restructuring cannot create free will, then what's the point of it all? If people are automatons, and they have no free will, then why bother trying to setup a society which expands freedom? Do you want to give more options to people who, in reality, each have only one option?

 

If you say to a man that hearing is an illusion, are you not depending upon the existence of real hearing? Are you not waiting for that man to hear what you say and consider it and reply to it?

 

If you say to a man that he has no free will, are you not attempting to change his opinion on the subject? Are you not recognizing that the man could possibly change his mind and agree with you, or do you really believe that he has no free will and thus cannot change his mind and will never agree with you? If he can never agree with you, then why did you try to convince him? Who managed to convince you?

[cynicist]

When I debate for the existence of free will I find it hard to follow the opposing arguments, usually because I am thinking what free will is ends up being different from what the other person is thinking free will is. Since I cant just lose my own vocabulary in order to talk to someone I have to use a new word or a sentence containing the definition provided by the other person, not the words "free will". When trying to find out what they think free will is, it's like I can never get past that one step to get further into the argument. Even if we talk for hours it can still happen.

 

Yes, it's really annoying. I've figured out that the definition of free will for them is that our behavior is tied to some mystical element like a soul that we can't understand or measure. (essentially that choice has an entirely random element to it) I've never seen someone who was not religious try to argue this, and I think their conflation of free will with religious nonsense has a lot to do with why they seem so unwilling to consider an alternative to determinism. (I won't even get into the excusing of responsibility that comes with it)

 

Unlike you I find using 'free will' as a term very helpful, but I can understand why you avoid using it.