On self onwership

[alexqr1]

It is this point that needs evaluation. In what sense do you mean own? If control is necessary for ownership, then there are physical entities i cannot own because i cannot control them. If of course you mean own in a different sense, let me know. You can try many coming up with substitutes for own till you come up with something simpler. What is sufficient for ownership?

That is a good point. I realize I should had pointed this out before and I did not, I apologize for that.I mean own in the sense that one has a moral right to exercise control over the person. It is not the control itself which I am referring to, but the moral right to control.

[labmath2]

Do you have control over your emotions? The rate at which your heart beats? So clearly you don't have full control over every aspect of your body. (not sure why you brought up flying)

 

I am confused, i was under the impression you claim you do not own your action when you have a gun to your head, not because you don't have exclusive control, but because you do not have full control. I am simply pointing out that i do not understand what you mean by you do not have full control as it would seem you never have full control. However, it is still the case that you have exclusive control over your actions (you are not being physically forced to act). 

That is a good point. I realize I should had pointed this out before and I did not, I apologize for that.I mean own in the sense that one has a moral right to exercise control over the person. It is not the control itself which I am referring to, but the moral right to control.

 

Moral right to control is no less confusing than own. If to own is to have moral right to control, then how does one gain moral right to control and what is sufficient for moral right to control? If i may point out, own in the sense moral right to control is an axiom, because it not descriptive, but prescriptive.

[alexqr1]

Moral right to control is no less confusing than own. If to own is to have moral right to control, then how does one gain moral right to control and what is sufficient for moral right to control? If i may point out, own in the sense moral right to control is an axiom, because it not descriptive, but prescriptive.

How one gains moral right to control is what I intend to prove, however, it is not relevant for the following statement using the definition I proposed for ownership:--B--All physical entities either can or can't be owned, there is no other possibility and they are mutually exclusive.Regardless of how ownership is attained, the statement still stands. Your questioning of how to attain ownership regarding my statement is like me saying:All humans either are alive or they are notand you replying:How do they become alive? There is no relevance to that question. Regardless of how they became alive or even IF they are alive or not, either way the statement still stands: All humans either are alive or they are not.In the argument, self-ownership is not the starting point, so it is not used as an axiom.

[labmath2]

How one gains moral right to control is what I intend to prove, however, it is not relevant for the following statement using the definition I proposed for ownership:--B--All physical entities either can or can't be owned, there is no other possibility and they are mutually exclusive.Regardless of how ownership is attained, the statement still stands. Your questioning of how to attain ownership regarding my statement is like me saying:All humans either are alive or they are notand you replying:How do they become alive? There is no relevance to that question. Regardless of how they became alive or even IF they are alive or not, either way the statement still stands: All humans either are alive or they are not.In the argument, self-ownership is not the starting point, so it is not used as an axiom.

 

I feel like i have said this a lot but there is till confusion. First for me to properly answer that question i have to know what it means to own. IN the case of can all humans fly, i would have to understand what you mean by fly to answer the question. If you mean get inside a plane and be lifted up into the air, then yes, however if you mean spontaneously lifting off the floor, then no. We have to be on the same page about what exactly you are referring. It is for this reason that i keep asking you to explain what you mean by own.

 

If i ask what would be sufficient for someone to be considered flying, you may say as long as their leg is not touching the ground, they are flying. Of course after some thought i will point out that if i am in a pool, my leg may not necessarily touch the ground, then you will refine the definition till what you mean by flying is so well defined there is no misunderstanding. Only after what that means can i answer the question can all humans fly.

 

Do the same thing for ownership so that what you mean by someone owing something is so well defined that it excludes all instances that someones does not own something, but includes every instance of someone owing something. Once that is clear, then whether all physical entities can be owned can be tested against your definition (condition sufficient for ownership) and if there is no exception, then all physical entities can be owned, but if there is one exception, then all physical entities cannot be owned.

 

If in fact all physical entities cannot be owned, then --C-- in the list you made does not follow

I hope this is more clear.

[alexqr1]

I feel like i have said this a lot but there is till confusion. First for me to properly answer that question i have to know what it means to own.

Again, to have the moral right to control.

IN the case of can all humans fly, i would have to understand what you mean by fly to answer the question. If you mean get inside a plane and be lifted up into the air, then yes, however if you mean spontaneously lifting off the floor, then no. We have to be on the same page about what exactly you are referring. It is for this reason that i keep asking you to explain what you mean by own.

Which is why it was necessary for me to define own, and I did.

If i ask what would be sufficient for someone to be considered flying, you may say as long as their leg is not touching the ground, they are flying. Of course after some thought i will point out that if i am in a pool, my leg may not necessarily touch the ground, then you will refine the definition till what you mean by flying is so well defined there is no misunderstanding. Only after what that means can i answer the question can all humans fly.

OK, so to own in this context, it is necessary for you to have the moral right to control. How you gain that right comes later, but that question is as irrelevant to my statement as asking how does a man get to fly once “flying” has been defined when saying all humans either fly or they don’t.IF owning means having the moral right to control a physical entity, then a physical entity can either be owned or it cannot. Again, how we get to gain that right does not alter the statement does it?

Once that is clear, then whether all physical entities can be owned can be tested against your definition (condition sufficient for ownership) and if there is no exception, then all physical entities can be owned, but if there is one exception, then all physical entities cannot be owned.

As of right now –B—I am not concerned with the question of whether or not a physical entity can be owned and you are already talking about that. The statement is:--B—All physical entities either can or can't be owned, there is no other possibility and they are mutually exclusive.As far as that statement goes it is irrelevant whether physical entities can or can’t be owned. If they can be owned, then the statement is correct, if they can’t be owned the statement is still correct.There are only 2 ways to disprove that statement: 1) Physical entities at the same time can and can not be owned. Or 2) There is at least a 3rd possibility other than they can be owned or they can’t be owned.You see, whether they can be owned or not is irrelevant to the statement, what is relevant is that if they can be owned then it is false to say that they can’t and if they can’t be owned it is false to say that they can and that there is no other possibility.Invent any definition for “fly” you want and you will find that if a person is able to fly, then saying that he is unable to fly is false, and if the person is unable to fly then saying he is able to fly is false and there is no 3rd possibility. Except that you could say sometimes they can and sometimes they can’t but that is where the metaphor ends because being able to fly or not may be contingent upon physical variables, but a theory of ethics reguarding ownership is contingent upon principles and to apply different principles to similar entities requires subjective valuation at which point any theory of ownership becomes irrelevant.

[labmath2]

Now i see the problem, It was my misunderstanding. but there is still a problem with the leap. i will add a clause into statement B to show you the missing link.

 

--B--

All physical entities either can or can't be owned (by what?), there is no other possibility and they are mutually exclusive. Agree? If no, then explain, if yes then: Yes i agree.

 

--C--

All the universe of possibilities that exist regarding the ownership of individuals (how did you go from ownership of physical entities to ownership of individuals?) are mutually exclusive and one has to be true if we are to find an objective, universal and consistent theory of morality that can be applied to reality. That universe is composed by the following possibilities:

1) No one owns anyone

2) Everyone owns everyone

3) Some own others

4) Every person owns his/herself

 

If B is consistently followed, C would look more like this.

--C--

All the universe of possibilities that exist regarding the ownership of things are mutually exclusive and one has to be true if we are to find an objective, universal and consistent theory of morality that can be applied to reality. That universe is composed by the following possibilities:

1) Nothing owns anything

2) Everything owns everything

3) Some things own other things

4) Everything owns itself.

 

A more appropriate B for your c is more like this.

--B--

All humans either can or can't be owned, there is no other possibility and they are mutually exclusive. Agree? If no, then explain, if yes then, 

 

In order to accept any answer to your C, then we need to actually apply a testable definition of ownership. Ownership as moral right to control is not a testable hypothesis. In your exclusion of 1,2, and 3, you had to use some testable hypothesis of ownership. The reason i say a testable hypothesis is needed is so we can check all situations (theoretically) to see if it holds. From my current understanding of ownership, 4 is not always true, there are conditions that have to be satisfied for 4 to be true. One of those conditions is that i have to be alive for me to won myself. If i modify 3 to say some people own you sometimes, this is not necessarily false (when you are a child, when you are dead, when you are mentally insane...). Of course in --B-- we already restricted ownership to humans for C to follow, otherwise there needs to be another step between B and C to say some things cannot own things.

[alexqr1]

OK so before I address your response, do we so far agree that --A-- and --B-- are correct?

 

If so, we have established these 2 things:

 

(1) FOR THE CONTEXT OF THIS CONVERSATION, OWNERSHIP IS DEFINED AS THE MORAL RIGHT TO CONTROL

(2) INDIVIDUALS CAN EITHER BE OWNED OR NOT, NOT BOTH AT THE SAME TIME AND NOT NEITHER.

 

Please understand I am not dismissing or ignoring your counter-argument about --C--, it is just that I want to make sure those 2 statements have been established before we move on.

[labmath2]

OK so before I address your response, do we so far agree that --A-- and --B-- are correct?If so, we have established these 2 things:(1) FOR THE CONTEXT OF THIS CONVERSATION, OWNERSHIP IS DEFINED AS THE MORAL RIGHT TO CONTROL(2) INDIVIDUALS CAN EITHER BE OWNED OR NOT, NOT BOTH AT THE SAME TIME AND NOT NEITHER.Please understand I am not dismissing or ignoring your counter-argument about --C--, it is just that I want to make sure those 2 statements have been established before we move on.

Yep i agree. But again, ownership defined as Moral right to control makes C untestable since it is not an empirical thing we can check for.

 

Before you answer for C, what do you and Stefan mean by universalizable? I have heard Stefan say that you cannot universalize that everyone ought to act in such a way as to maximize their happiness. His argument is that some people acting to maximize their happiness infringes on other people's happiness, but that theory says nothing about you acting to maximize other people's happiness so there is no explicit contradiction.

[Andrew79]

(not sure why you brought up flying)

Because he's not arguing, or interested in arguing, in good faith.If it's not obvious from comments like, "I cannot control myself to spontaneously fly so please explain."Then surely his first post in this thread, where he acts like no-one's ever actually examined the basis for self-ownership, is enough to cast doubt on his intentions.And that's ignoring posts he's made in other threads...

[cynicist]

I am confused, i was under the impression you claim you do not own your action when you have a gun to your head, not because you don't have exclusive control, but because you do not have full control. I am simply pointing out that i do not understand what you mean by you do not have full control as it would seem you never have full control. However, it is still the case that you have exclusive control over your actions (you are not being physically forced to act). 

 

You don't have full control over the situation due to being forced by someone else at gunpoint. That's not the same as not having control over your body. The fact that any of this needs to be explained is hard for me to believe.

 

Because he's not arguing, or interested in arguing, in good faith.

 

Yeah, definitely trollish.

[labmath2]

You don't have full control over the situation due to being forced by someone else at gunpoint. That's not the same as not having control over your body. The fact that any of this needs to be explained is hard for me to believe.

 

What would full control over a situation look like. I assume your decision are also restricted by nature and other peoples choices to some degree. What makes this instance wrong, but those other instances okay. If i had to answer the question, i will say the difference with the gunman is that you are conscious of threat coming from another person. If there was a threat from another person, but you are not conscious of it, then it cannot influence your decision. If you are conscious of a threat, but it is not from another person, while it influences your decision, we do not really care. There are other things to consider as well, like how believable the threat is and whether it really influenced your choice. Other instances where other people's choice influence your decision is ignored since it is not in he form of threat. My understanding of threat is not a result of self ownership, just intuition about what is right and wrong. 

[cynicist]

I think i understand now. The problem i had with the concept of self ownership is that you claim it arises naturally, as if its a description of something that already exists. However, self ownership is a prescription, an axiom, from which all other libertarian idea follow. Self ownership itself is assumed, instead of proven. The reason i emphasize this point is that many libertarians seem to assume there are only two positions, the acceptance of self ownership, or the denial of self ownership. There are other philosophies based on slightly different axioms that can also be generalized and have different consequences for the philosophy. An example is self autonomy by left libertarians, which does not see the self as a property, but the self as an agent and instead of straight ownership, advocates occupancy and use. Of course this has its problems as well, but you get the point, Another possibility is self control, in this case the mind is seen as the unit of control and the body its "puppet." In which case, we all try to increase the amount of control we exert and while others can exert control over things we used to control in our absence, we cannot control anything once our mind is gone. In this sense, we not only compete with others for control, we also compete with nature for control. 

 

I am sure if we subject each of these philosophies to the Socratic method, it will fail at some point because it is not a descriptive (except for maybe the self control, but i am not sure it gives rise to any real philosophy on which to build a society, since it simply describes what we observe) claim. 

 

Ah now I understand. I missed this earlier post. Please reread the part of your quote that I bolded. What you call 'self-control' IS self-ownership. When libertarians/anarchists say that self-ownership is an axiom, what they mean is that it is a self-evident truth. (descriptive, not prescriptive)

 

The other "axioms" you described are just language manipulations. So rather than say that you "own" the body they say that you "use" it. Well guess what, ownership is having control over something, like the body. 

 

In the realm of science and morality, I personally prefer Sam Harris' approach. We can certainly measure if an individual is better physically or psychologically in one state relative to another, and if the intention is to maximize each individuals physical and psychological well being, then we can try different rules and see which help us achieve this condition. A rule such as thou shalt not kill seems pretty self explanatory, but there are some areas which are much more difficult and i am willing to concede libertarian philosophy probably has the best solutions to date for those areas.. At this point i can only assume some people will roll their eyes and say well such a society will not have principles. I agree, but if there arises a situation where principles make people demonstrably worse off (one of those extreme examples people bring up, like life boat scenario), we should be willing to say if we are in the same situation, we would probably do the same thing and so should make it an exception.

 

How is an individuals well being a benchmark for science and morality? How is it a matter of preference to begin with? These things are supposed to be universal...

[labmath2]

If what you are saying is true, then the only problem i am having is in understanding how you go from the descriptive claim of self ownership to making value judgement. In my experience, value judgement is internal and descriptive claim is external. To give an example, we can verify if someone did something, i.e I built a car, but whether that is moral or immoral is internal since it is value we assign to the action.

[alexqr1]

Before you answer for C, what do you and Stefan mean by universalizable? I have heard Stefan say that you cannot universalize that everyone ought to act in such a way as to maximize their happiness. His argument is that some people acting to maximize their happiness infringes on other people's happiness, but that theory says nothing about you acting to maximize other people's happiness so there is no explicit contradiction.

While I think Stefan's eloquence would do wonders for this conversation, I don't think he will be pitching in and I am not here to defend his position but mine. What I mean with universalizable is that the principles are applied to all elements of the same criteria in the same way without arbitrary exceptions.--C--All the universe of possibilities that exist regarding the ownership of individuals are mutually exclusive and one has to be true if we are to find an objective, universal and consistent theory of morality that can be applied to reality. That universe is composed by the following possibilities:1) No one owns anyone2) Everyone owns everyone3) Some own others4) Every person owns his/herself

4 is not always true, there are conditions that have to be satisfied for 4 to be true. One of those conditions is that i have to be alive for me to won myself. If i modify 3 to say some people own you sometimes, this is not necessarily false (when you are a child, when you are dead, when you are mentally insane...).

I already went through the example of people who are dead, children and mentally insane are still subject to this argument to the extent that they are able to use reason.

Of course in --B-- we already restricted ownership to humans for C to follow, otherwise there needs to be another step between B and C to say some things cannot own things.[/b]

I don’t understand.As we already established:(2) INDIVIDUALS CAN EITHER BE OWNED OR NOT, NOT BOTH AT THE SAME TIME AND NOT NEITHER.In the case that they can not be owned, then that possibility is already covered with:1) No one owns anyoneIf on the contrary, individuals can be owned then one of the following must be true:2) Everyone owns everyone3) Some own others4) Every person owns his/herself

[TheRobin]

 When libertarians/anarchists say that self-ownership is an axiom, what they mean is that it is a self-evident truth. (descriptive, not prescriptive)

 

just fyi, I'm an anarchist and I don't mean that  (or as labmath has pointed out, if you use it as a description, then there's no moral claim to it.)

[cynicist]

If what you are saying is true, then the only problem i am having is in understanding how you go from the descriptive claim of self ownership to making value judgement. In my experience, value judgement is internal and descriptive claim is external. To give an example, we can verify if someone did something, i.e I built a car, but whether that is moral or immoral is internal since it is value we assign to the action.

 

Morality is not subjective. Think of it this way: I can't say whether you should go South or not, but I can certainly tell you which direction is South.

 

 

(To be more clear, whether something is moral or not is descriptive. If I say building a car is evil, I'm not saying you should be evil or that you should build a car, I'm making a statement which describes your action in moral terms)

 

just fyi, I'm an anarchist and I don't mean that  (or as labmath has pointed out, if you use it as a description, then there's no moral claim to it.)

 

What do you mean? If it's not descriptive then there can be no moral claim.

[TheRobin]

What do you mean? If it's not descriptive then there can be no moral claim.

Maybe there's more to the idea of "descriptive" that I'm aware of. But aren't descriptive claims things like "A cat is mammal with whiskers" and the like? 

 

As I understand it, if one says "I control my body" then that's a description of reality. When one says "I should have the right to control my body" then that's a moral claim not a descirptive one.

[cynicist]

Maybe there's more to the idea of "descriptive" that I'm aware of. But aren't descriptive claims things like "A cat is mammal with whiskers" and the like? 

 

As I understand it, if one says "I control my body" then that's a description of reality. When one says "I should have the right to control my body" then that's a moral claim not a descirptive one.

 

No, that's exactly right. A descriptive claim is a statement of what is and a prescriptive claim is a statement of what should be. However, the only reason morality is possible is because the claim is descriptive. You have to be in control of your body and therefore responsible for your actions otherwise right and wrong can't be applied to them. If you change "I control my body" to "I should control my body" morality ceases to exist. 

 

 

You also may be going under the assumption that all moral claims must be prescriptive, but that's not the case:

 

"I should do X in order to be a good person" is an example of a (prescriptive) moral claim. "Murder is evil" is an example of a (descriptive) moral claim. 

 

 

Does that make sense?

[labmath2]

Cynicist, I am not sure you make a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. philosophical claims emerge from the a priori knowledge and scientific claims emerge from a posteriori knowledge. In my experience, a priori knowledge is true by definition, or by assumption. If it is true by definition then it cannot be falsified, but if it is true by assumption, if you can prove the assumption is false, then the conclusion is false. The difficulty i am having with grasping libertarian philosophy is that i am not sure if it is true by definition or by assumption.

[TheRobin]

No, that's exactly right. A descriptive claim is a statement of what is and a prescriptive claim is a statement of what should be. However, the only reason morality is possible is because the claim is descriptive. You have to be in control of your body and therefore responsible for your actions otherwise right and wrong can't be applied to them. If you change "I control my body" to "I should control my body" morality ceases to exist. 

 

 

You also may be going under the assumption that all moral claims must be prescriptive, but that's not the case:

 

"I should do X in order to be a good person" is an example of a (prescriptive) moral claim. "Murder is evil" is an example of a (descriptive) moral claim. 

 

 

Does that make sense?

 

I see what you mean, but I don't agree. First of all, unless we have a basis that "I should have the right to control my body" there can be no moral claims. (I don't know why you brought up "I should control my body" though). And you don't get that just from the claim "I control my body". Control is needed but not sufficient for making the moral claim (else, any living thing would have a moral claim to not being killed).And "murder" itself is only a possibility after you accepted that one should have the right to his or her own body, else you'd simply call it "killing" and not "murder". "Murder is evil" is really just shorthand for "I should have the right to control my body and therefore you shouldn't kill me (or don't have the right to kill me) and I'm justified in fighting back". So I don't see how you can make a descirptive claim that is moral.

[cynicist]

Cynicist, I am not sure you make a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. philosophical claims emerge from the a priori knowledge and scientific claims emerge from a posteriori knowledge. In my experience, a priori knowledge is true by definition, or by assumption. If it is true by definition then it cannot be falsified, but if it is true by assumption, if you can prove the assumption is false, then the conclusion is false. The difficulty i am having with grasping libertarian philosophy is that i am not sure if it is true by definition or by assumption.

 

It's true by definition, a priori. Its negation is self-contradictory. If I argue that human beings are not in control of their actions, then I'm not responsible for my argument, and you are not responsible for yours, but in that case it would make no sense to make an argument at all. If I suggest that I have no control over my actions, then I can't choose a preferred state like truth over falsehood. (therefore the argument self-detonates)

 

I see what you mean, but I don't agree. First of all, unless we have a basis that "I should have the right to control my body" there can be no moral claims. (I don't know why you brought up "I should control my body" though). And you don't get that just from the claim "I control my body". Control is needed but not sufficient for making the moral claim (else, any living thing would have a moral claim to not being killed).

 

I brought up "I should control my body" for two reasons. One is because "I should have the right to control my body" and "I control my body" don't really mean the same thing. When I talk about controlling your body, I'm talking about having responsibility for your actions. Rights are supposed to be about what others, namely the government, cannot restrict you from doing. The other reason is because rights don't actually exist. I know I know, but if you sit down and actually try to define what they are, you will have quite a challenge on your hands. (I've tried, closest I can get is a legal construct)

 

Also, I never argued control was sufficient for a moral claim, merely required.

 

And "murder" itself is only a possibility after you accepted that one should have the right to his or her own body, else you'd simply call it "killing" and not "murder". "Murder is evil" is really just shorthand for "I should have the right to control my body and therefore you shouldn't kill me (or don't have the right to kill me) and I'm justified in fighting back". 

 

You say "the right to my body", I say "self-ownership". Potatoes, potatoes.  In addition, you changed my descriptive claim to a prescriptive one. They have different meanings. When I say "Murder is evil" that doesn't contain any shoulds, it doesn't say how people ought to act on that information.

 

So I don't see how you can make a descirptive claim that is moral.

 

How is the claim "Murder is evil" either not descriptive or not moral?

[TheRobin]

How is the claim "Murder is evil" either not descriptive or not moral?

For simplicities sake (and also cause the odds of having a prodcutive debate in writing tends to go to zero if the timeframe is just big enough), Can you tell me what you mean with "murder" and "evil"? Maybe it either makes more sense then what I mean, or I can exaplin it in a way that's appropriate to how you approach thoses concepts.

[cynicist]

For simplicities sake (and also cause the odds of having a prodcutive debate in writing tends to go to zero if the timeframe is just big enough), Can you tell me what you mean with "murder" and "evil"? Maybe it either makes more sense then what I mean, or I can exaplin it in a way that's appropriate to how you approach thoses concepts.

 

Murder is premeditated killing. Evil is a state of incongruence with the standards of morality. 

 

 

I apologize if I'm mistaken but it seems like you are under the same premise that labmath brought up earlier in the thread:

 

If what you are saying is true, then the only problem i am having is in understanding how you go from the descriptive claim of self ownership to making value judgement. In my experience, value judgement is internal and descriptive claim is external. To give an example, we can verify if someone did something, i.e I built a car, but whether that is moral or immoral is internal since it is value we assign to the action.

 

In this quote he says value judgments are internal and descriptive claims are external. However, having morality or being morally good as a value (values are subjective) is not the same as claiming something to be morally good or evil. (morality is objective, so this can't be an opinion)

 

Does this clear anything up or am I mistaken? (if I am then again, I apologize)