Help me Understand Stefan's Definition of 'Ownership' (vs 'Direct Control')

[logic32]

Big fan of Stefan, particularly his work on feminism, but I am a little confused by his definition of 'ownership'. In 'Why you were bullied' he says "The brain owns the body, what that means is it directly controls the body." But another video title is 'The Bundy Ranch: The Government Owns Nothing And Controls Everything'. 

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.I'm humbly asking for assitance in helping me understand these concepts, and I thank Stefan for the great work he does!Frank 

[cynicist]

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.

 

There is a lot embedded in there. First of all what Stefan is talking about is ownership of your body, but that's not the only type of ownership that exists; It's simply where the concept of property originates from. Responsibility is a form of ownership in regards to your actions that doesn't necessarily mean direct control. For example, if you try to rob a convenience store and the owner attempts to defend himself with a gun, but kills an innocent bystander by accident, you would be held responsible for his death since you set in motion the events that led to it. (even though you didn't shoot the person directly)

 

Now for the second part, government is a fictional entity so it can't own or control anything, but I'm assuming you know that and are just using this language out of convenience since that's how most people talk about it. Those who claim to be a part of the government claim to own/control everything, since they reserve the right to take it at will through force. That's theft, which is the taking of another's property, and not a legitimate form of ownership. (it is an ought-claim like you mentioned)

 

Philosophylines has the clip here, I know he's not the most popular here but I'll link it 

 

This is my first time hearing of him, but I can see why he's not popular here. He makes a lot of mistakes in that video by not looking at the context of the conversation. Stefan was not giving a detailed explanation of all forms of ownership, he was just talking about ownership of the body. (where anything besides direct control wouldn't make sense)

[Magnus]

Big fan of Stefan, particularly his work on feminism, but I am a little confused by his definition of 'ownership'. In 'Why you were bullied' he says "The brain owns the body, what that means is it directly controls the body." But another video title is 'The Bundy Ranch: The Government Owns Nothing And Controls Everything'. 

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.I'm humbly asking for assitance in helping me understand these concepts, and I thank Stefan for the great work he does!Frank 

 

It's the difference between positive assertions and normative assertions (questions of fact vs. questions of law). 

 

Control is a positive assertion -- it describes a feature of objective reality, an empirical fact.  You either control something, or you don't.  Or you might have partial control over it, or you might have competing efforts between two or more people to control something.  In any event, to say that someone controls something says nothing about whether he should control it. 

 

Ownership is a normative concept.  It's an abstraction, in particular an ethical proposition.  Ownership is the right of exclusive control (of something).  As such, it's a key concept in property rights, or property law.

 

Ownership in general is not a fact.  But self-ownership certainly arises from biological fact.

[logic32]

It's the difference between positive assertions and normative assertions (questions of fact vs. questions of law). 

 

Control is a positive assertion -- it describes a feature of objective reality, an empirical fact.  You either control something, or you don't.  Or you might have partial control over it, or you might have competing efforts between two or more people to control something.  In any event, to say that someone controls something says nothing about whether he should control it. 

 

Ownership is a normative concept.  It's an abstraction, in particular an ethical proposition.  Ownership is the right of exclusive control (of something).  As such, it's a key concept in property rights, or property law.

 

Ownership in general is not a fact.  But self-ownership certainly arises from biological fact.

Thanks, okay, well I suppose I'm a bit confused as to why in all other cases ownership is a rights claim whereas specifically with self-ownership it is simply an is-claim, with no normative content. So how does Stefan get from the normatively inert 'self-ownership' to the morally significant claim (which is how most libertarians I am aware of would view self-ownership) which is the moral right to exclusively control permissable use of the body. A thief who has stolen your car has 'car-ownership' in the same way that you have 'self-ownership' - he directly controls the car. But I'm not clear as to why this should have any normative significance. In the case of the thief it clearly doesn't entail that he owns your car in the standard sense.Cheers for the responses!

[cynicist]

Thanks, okay, well I suppose I'm a bit confused as to why in all other cases ownership is a rights claim whereas specifically with self-ownership it is simply an is-claim, with no normative content. 

 

It's always a descriptive (is) claim. Anything else is invalid.

 

So how does Stefan get from the normatively inert 'self-ownership' to the morally significant claim (which is how most libertarians I am aware of would view self-ownership) which is the moral right to exclusively control permissable use of the body.

 

Maybe you could explain this a bit more. The moral argument is a direct consequence of the descriptive claim. (if you didn't directly control your body you couldn't be responsible for any of your actions, so how could morality even exist?)

 

A thief who has stolen your car has 'car-ownership' in the same way that you have 'self-ownership' - he directly controls the car. But I'm not clear as to why this should have any normative significance. In the case of the thief it clearly doesn't entail that he owns your car in the standard sense.

 

It doesn't. Like you said, direct control doesn't necessarily imply ownership when it comes to things other than your body. 

[ParaSait]

Thanks, okay, well I suppose I'm a bit confused as to why in all other cases ownership is a rights claim whereas specifically with self-ownership it is simply an is-claim, with no normative content. So how does Stefan get from the normatively inert 'self-ownership' to the morally significant claim (which is how most libertarians I am aware of would view self-ownership) which is the moral right to exclusively control permissable use of the body. A thief who has stolen your car has 'car-ownership' in the same way that you have 'self-ownership' - he directly controls the car. But I'm not clear as to why this should have any normative significance. In the case of the thief it clearly doesn't entail that he owns your car in the standard sense.Cheers for the responses!

 

Since I am the one who is in full control of my body, I am responsible for my body. Therefore, I'm also responsible for the effects of my body's actions. Ownership fundamentally stems from responsibility: if I make a claim about something for example, it's my claim, because I'm the one responsible for making that claim (so, it wouldn't make any sense for you to correct some arbitrary other person if it's the claim that I made that is wrong). The same counts for materials. If I build a house with the body that I naturally own, that house is the effect of my actions, therefore it's my house. That way, you can technically see ownership of external stuff as an extension of the body.

[Magnus]

Thanks, okay, well I suppose I'm a bit confused as to why in all other cases ownership is a rights claim whereas specifically with self-ownership it is simply an is-claim, with no normative content. So how does Stefan get from the normatively inert 'self-ownership' to the morally significant claim (which is how most libertarians I am aware of would view self-ownership) which is the moral right to exclusively control permissable use of the body. A thief who has stolen your car has 'car-ownership' in the same way that you have 'self-ownership' - he directly controls the car. But I'm not clear as to why this should have any normative significance. In the case of the thief it clearly doesn't entail that he owns your car in the standard sense.Cheers for the responses!

The first user of any object is the owner. So, we're the owner of our bodies. Also, a person's brain has (literally) exclusive control over his hands. There's no way around that, short of implanting electrodes and chips and servos. Anyone's control over your body requires your assent and compliance. The right of exclusive control can't be transferred, because the fact of exclusive control can't. Once you start dealing with external objects, then control-in-fact becomes at least disputable. So, that's why the issue of who has the right of control arises -- to differentiate between rightful control and wrongful control. But as to the body, full, exclusive control literally cannot be assumed by someone else. You can agree to let someone else guide you temporarily (e.g., employment), but that's really just agreeing to follow orders, not to surrender true, exclusive, complete control over your hands.

[labmath2]

I think all forms of the use of the word ownership is normative. Any instance where ownership is an "is" claim, there is a more precise description (like in the case of self ownership=self control, self ownership is affected by any condition that affects self control like mental disability). In all other instances of the use of ownership, it is a consequence of interactions and predetermined conditions of property rights and in this sense, it is normative. I am not sure Stefan makes a distinction between the two since even his use of self ownership (at least to my knowledge) exceeds simple self control. I think he uses self ownership to encapsulate both control and responsibilities to ones existence(influence on one's surroundings) as it affects others.

[logic32]

Thanks everyone!
 

The first user of any object is the owner. So, we're the owner of our bodies.

Also, a person's brain has (literally) exclusive control over his hands. There's no way around that, short of implanting electrodes and chips and servos. Anyone's control over your body requires your assent and compliance. The right of exclusive control can't be transferred, because the fact of exclusive control can't.

Once you start dealing with external objects, then control-in-fact becomes at least disputable. So, that's why the issue of who has the right of control arises -- to differentiate between rightful control and wrongful control.

But as to the body, full, exclusive control literally cannot be assumed by someone else. You can agree to let someone else guide you temporarily (e.g., employment), but that's really just agreeing to follow orders, not to surrender true, exclusive, complete control over your hands.

But what about this argument - let's allow that the brain has exclusive control over the body. This doesn't entail that a person has a right of exclusive control over his body. Even if you were to say that that person is the only possible candidate for ownership, since ownership requires this distinctly direct control (even though it clearly doesn't because we own external objects over which we don't have this direct control) it doesn't follow that the person DOES own the body, since you could say claim that humans cannot be legitimately owned. This also entails that the state doesn't violate your self-ownership, as at no point when, say, the state throws you in prison for some trivial act, have the agents of the state taken 'full exclusive control' of your body. Surely for anarcho-capitalists this isn't an acceptable conclusion?

As for your first claim, I'll quote Kinsella:
 

"Parents as First Owners

And what is wrong with relying on first use as the basis for self-ownership? To be sure, with respect to most claimants to one's body — a robber or state trying to conscript, say — one is indeed the "first user," and thus has a better claim to the body than the outsider. But what about one's parents? Is one really the first user of one's body? Was one's body simply lying around unowned, in state of nature, waiting for some occupant to swoop down and appropriate it?

No, obviously not. It was (one was) in the care of — and produced by — one's parents. So if we maintain that "first use" always determines the answer to the question "who owns this resource?", for any resource at all, then it would seem that parents do own their children. The mother owns the physical matter and bits of food and nourishment that assemble into the zygote, embryo, fetus, and then baby."

 

Since I am the one who is in full control of my body, I am responsible for my body. Therefore, I'm also responsible for the effects of my body's actions. Ownership fundamentally stems from responsibility: if I make a claim about something for example, it's my claim, because I'm the one responsible for making that claim (so, it wouldn't make any sense for you to correct some arbitrary other person if it's the claim that I made that is wrong). The same counts for materials. If I build a house with the body that I naturally own, that house is the effect of my actions, therefore it's my house. That way, you can technically see ownership of external stuff as an extension of the body.

 

But isn't this making the mistake of conflating capitalist ownership in and morally responsibility for? As David Gordon said in his second review of UPB, "You cause the effects of your actions and are responsible for them, but it does not follow from this that you "own," in the moral or legal sense, these effects. What does it mean to "own" a murder? Molyneux also confuses a causal and a moral statement when he says that my article accepts that "I [Molyneux] exercise 100% property rights over the creation of the book Universally Preferable Behavior: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics (he refers to it as my book, and my arguments etc.)." Certainly Molyneux wrote the book; but that by itself implies nothing about who ought to have property rights in it."

 

It's always a descriptive (is) claim. Anything else is invalid.

 

 

Maybe you could explain this a bit more. The moral argument is a direct consequence of the descriptive claim. (if you didn't directly control your body you couldn't be responsible for any of your actions, so how could morality even exist?)

 

 

It doesn't. Like you said, direct control doesn't necessarily imply ownership when it comes to things other than your body. 

If self-ownership is just a descriptive claim, then there's no contradiction in saying 'I accept self-ownership is true, and I'm a socialist who thinks people should be taxed', which seems absurd. This 'self-ownership' doesn't seem to do anything for libertarianism.

Thanks a lot for the responses guys, and if Stefan has any thoughts himself I'd love to hear them in all humility. I'm eager to learn and simply want to make sure I have everything straight. I appreciate the feedback and assistance.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Big fan of Stefan, particularly his work on feminism, but I am a little confused by his definition of 'ownership'. In 'Why you were bullied' he says "The brain owns the body, what that means is it directly controls the body." But another video title is 'The Bundy Ranch: The Government Owns Nothing And Controls Everything'. 

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.I'm humbly asking for assitance in helping me understand these concepts, and I thank Stefan for the great work he does!Frank 

Because their control is not legitimate. You can control something without having legitimate ownership of it. That's called theft or borrowing. 

Don't confuse "direct control" = ownership with ownership = direct control. If I take your car and drive away with it I am in direct control of the car but that does not mean I own it. I cannot for example own the time and labor that made the car. That is something I would just be taking. 

You also have to use common sense when it comes to interpreting "controls everything". A statement like "the government controls everything" is true in one context and false in another. So be careful not to mix up contexts.

But isn't this making the mistake of conflating capitalist ownership in and morally responsibility for? 

This leads to interesting lines of philosophy.

[logic32]

Because their control is not legitimate. You can control something without having legitimate ownership of it. That's called theft or borrowing. 

Don't confuse "direct control" = ownership with ownership = direct control. If I take your car and drive away with it I am in direct control of the car but that does not mean I own it. I cannot for example own the time and labor that made the car. That is something I would just be taking. 

You also have to use common sense when it comes to interpreting "controls everything". A statement like "the government controls everything" is true in one context and false in another. So be careful not to mix up contexts.

This leads to interesting lines of philosophy.

^ I did link to that video in the original post but it was edited out because of other statements that Youtuber has made, I'm being open about where I'm getting these criticisms from (well some of them, I'm not just rehashing a_ar___pac and _hil______ l____, I can think for myself.)I still am not clear on the relationship between direct control and ownership. Stefan says that the brain owns the body means the brain is in direct control of the body. But this seems clearly falsifiable for example using the example you've just given (ironically YOU are now parroting a_ar___pac and _hil______ l____, that's the example given in the video I originally posted!)

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

^ I did link to that video in the original post but it was edited out because of other statements that Youtuber has made, I'm being open about where I'm getting these criticisms from (well some of them, I'm not just rehashing a_ar___pac and _hil______ l____, I can think for myself.)I still am not clear on the relationship between direct control and ownership. Stefan says that the brain owns the body means the brain is in direct control of the body. But this seems clearly falsifiable for example using the example you've just given (ironically YOU are now parroting a_ar___pac and _hil______ l____, that's the example given in the video I originally posted!)

"seems clearly falsifiable"? Make an effort. 

[logic32]

"seems clearly falsifiable"? Make an effort. 

"Make an effort" this isn't a very sympathetic way of interacting. It sounds like you don't care about my emotions, which Stefan would not approve of.

 

Well, you gave the example of a thief who had stolen a car, "If I take your car and drive away with it I am in direct control of the car but that does not mean I own it. "

 

Yet Stefan said that 'the brain owns the body means the brain is in direct control of the body'. I.e. for x to own y means that x has direct control of y. Here is an example where x owns y but x does not have direct control over y. 

 

To anticipate your response and be totally clear what I'm saying, you might say that rather than direct control being identical with ownership, or direct control entailing ownership, that ownership entails direct control. Yet imagine the owner of the car watching the thief drive away. He is the owner of the car. Yet he does NOT have direct control of the car. Hence even in its weakest form, Stefan's statement is falsified, as long as you accept that the car owner watching his vehicle being driven away is indeed the owner.

 

Thanks for responding!

[Kevin Beal]

heya logic32! Could you please define 'ownership'?!

 

I don't believe Stef ever said that the definition of ownership is direct control. Rather, it is the basis.

 

Ownership is a institutionally recognized claim to objects. The basis for how you can come to own different things depends on whatever the thing is. You can buy a car, but you can't buy a human, right?

 

The way we recognize new ways of ownership or resolve conflicts in grey areas is to look at which claim is the most logically consistent. It would make no sense to say that you could ever own me, right? And the self ownership argument is the reason for that. You can't reasonably claim ownership over something that I bought from someone who made that thing, right? Someone who exchanges value for value has a much better claim than someone who simply states that they own something, obviously.

 

There is no ontologically objective sense in which we say that property "exists". And the temptation is to say that therefore property is a false concept, but it's the same thing as saying that this is not my argument / position because it doesn't exist in an ontologically objective sense.

 

By "ontologically objective" I mean things like rocks and trees which you can touch. As opposed to ontologically subjective which is things like dreams, consciousness, web developers (jobs), money (independent of fibers and inks), things that "exist" in that they are represented as existing, but have no physical existence. Perhaps a needlessly complicated idea for this discussion, but it's important in addressing the previously mentioned temptation to dismiss property on the basis of lacking physical existence. After all, there is no signature written in the aether surrounding my computer or my body.

 

Hopefully that makes sense.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

"Make an effort" this isn't a very sympathetic way of interacting. It sounds like you don't care about my emotions, which Stefan would not approve of.

 

Well, you gave the example of a thief who had stolen a car, "If I take your car and drive away with it I am in direct control of the car but that does not mean I own it. "

 

Yet Stefan said that 'the brain owns the body means the brain is in direct control of the body'. I.e. for x to own y means that x has direct control of y. Here is an example where x owns y but x does not have direct control over y. 

 

To anticipate your response and be totally clear what I'm saying, you might say that rather than direct control being identical with ownership, or direct control entailing ownership, that ownership entails direct control. Yet imagine the owner of the car watching the thief drive away. He is the owner of the car. Yet he does NOT have direct control of the car. Hence even in its weakest form, Stefan's statement is falsified, as long as you accept that the car owner watching his vehicle being driven away is indeed the owner.

 

Thanks for responding!

Control is necessary but not sufficient criteria for ownership. You don't have direct control over you car when you park it either but you still have ownership of it. You don't have direct control of your body when you sleep but it's still yours. 

"For X to own Y means that X has direct control of Y" is not the same as "For X to be in control of Y means X owns Y". That's a common straw-man of ownership. 

[logic32]

Control is necessary but not sufficient criteria for ownership. You don't have direct control over you car when you park it either but you still have ownership of it. You don't have direct control of your body when you sleep but it's still yours. 

"For X to own Y means that X has direct control of Y" is not the same as "For X to be in control of Y means X owns Y". That's a common straw-man of ownership. 

 

 

I understand that ^ which is why I specifically said I was interpreting Stefan as saying "For X to own Y means that X has direct control of Y" i.e. ownership entails direct control as opposed to the other claim.

 

"To anticipate your response and be totally clear what I'm saying, you might say that rather than direct control being identical with ownership, or direct control entailing ownership, that ownership entails direct control. Yet imagine the owner of the car watching the thief drive away. He is the owner of the car. Yet he does NOT have direct control of the car. Hence even in its weakest form, Stefan's statement is falsified, as long as you accept that the car owner watching his vehicle being driven away is indeed the owner."

 

But that example ^ shows that control ISN'T necessary for ownership, because the person who owns the car is watching it being driven away in someone else's control. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I understand that ^ which is why I specifically said I was interpreting Stefan as saying "For X to own Y means that X has direct control of Y" i.e. ownership entails direct control as opposed to the other claim.

 

"To anticipate your response and be totally clear what I'm saying, you might say that rather than direct control being identical with ownership, or direct control entailing ownership, that ownership entails direct control. Yet imagine the owner of the car watching the thief drive away. He is the owner of the car. Yet he does NOT have direct control of the car. Hence even in its weakest form, Stefan's statement is falsified, as long as you accept that the car owner watching his vehicle being driven away is indeed the owner."

 

But that example ^ shows that control ISN'T necessary for ownership, because the person who owns the car is watching it being driven away in someone else's control. 

 

Yes, "Ownership entails control", not "control entails ownership". What's the problem? 

 

With the car example that's called theft or illegitimate ownership if you like. The rightful owner may not have physical control over the car but they still control other aspects. Among other things they control the creation of the car, the time and labor that made it. The car is part of them but not part of the thief. So thief is taking their time and labor (creativity, etc). That time and labor cannot both be owned by the thief and the owner. So the thief's ownership is illegitimate. Hope that clears it up.  

[cynicist]

But what about this argument - let's allow that the brain has exclusive control over the body. This doesn't entail that a person has a right of exclusive control over his body.

 

What's a "right of exclusive control"?

 

As David Gordon said in his second review of UPB, "You cause the effects of your actions and are responsible for them, but it does not follow from this that you "own," in the moral or legal sense, these effects. What does it mean to "own" a murder? Molyneux also confuses a causal and a moral statement when he says that my article accepts that "I [Molyneux] exercise 100% property rights over the creation of the book Universally Preferable Behavior: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics (he refers to it as my book, and my arguments etc.)." Certainly Molyneux wrote the book; but that by itself implies nothing about who ought to have property rights in it."

 

I've never heard of this guy either. Owning a murder means being responsible for, that's just obvious. And writing the book does indicate that he owns the work...

 

If self-ownership is just a descriptive claim, then there's no contradiction in saying 'I accept self-ownership is true, and I'm a socialist who thinks people should be taxed', which seems absurd. This 'self-ownership' doesn't seem to do anything for libertarianism.

 

Why is that absurd? People can have crazy opinions. Just because he thinks people should be taxed doesn't mean it's not theft.

[logic32]

Yes, "Ownership entails control", not "control entails ownership". What's the problem? 

 

With the car example that's called theft or illegitimate ownership if you like. The rightful owner may not have physical control over the car but they still control other aspects. Among other things they control the creation of the car, the time and labor that made it. The car is part of them but not part of the thief. So thief is taking their time and labor (creativity, etc). That time and labor cannot both be owned by the thief and the owner. So the thief's ownership is illegitimate. Hope that clears it up.  

So you would say that the thief owns the car - and it is 'illegitimate ownership'? I disagree, it's not that he owns the car and it's illegitimate ownership, rather he controls the car but doesn't own the car. If you don't think that direct control entails ownership why not just say the thief controls the car but doesn't own it? Perhaps this would cause problems for Stefan's self-ownership argument, because he says self-ownership is the biological fact that you directly control your body. It's very odd to say that the car now has two owners because somebody stole it. If x owning y entails that x has direct control of y, then the person whose car has just been stolen (person A) cannot own the car, because he does not have direct control of the car. You suggest that person A 'directly controls' the time and labor that made the car, let's just accept this for the sake of argument, this suggests that he *may* own the time and labor that made the car (since as you say direct control doesn't entail ownership), but he cannot own the car, since he doesn't control it. I'm not clear on what it means for him to 'directly control' that time anyway. That's a red herring. If owning y entails direct control of y, then if x doesn't directly control y, then he doesn't own it.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

So you would say that the thief owns the car - and it is 'illegitimate ownership'? I disagree, it's not that he owns the car and it's illegitimate ownership, rather he controls the car but doesn't own the car. If you don't think that direct control entails ownership why not just say the thief controls the car but doesn't own it? Perhaps this would cause problems for Stefan's self-ownership argument, because he says self-ownership is the biological fact that you directly control your body. It's very odd to say that the car now has two owners because somebody stole it. If x owning y entails that x has direct control of y, then the person whose car has just been stolen (person A) cannot own the car, because he does not have direct control of the car. You suggest that person A 'directly controls' the time and labor that made the car, let's just accept this for the sake of argument, this suggests that he *may* own the time and labor that made the car (since as you say direct control doesn't entail ownership), but he cannot own the car, since he doesn't control it. I'm not clear on what it means for him to 'directly control' that time anyway. That's a red herring. If owning y entails direct control of y, then if x doesn't directly control y, then he doesn't own it.

You can say the thief controls the car but does not own it. So what? The argument is not "if you control X you own X". You might be a thief or rapist for example.

Directly controlling the time/labor means they made the thing. They control the right to say "this car is product of my time and labor" and that be true. The thief takes control of that time and labor, thereby retroactively enslaving the rightful owner. The thief claims ownership through the act of taking the car but does not have legitimate ownership. It's like a rapist taking control over the women's vagina. He has removed control from her but that does not mean she does not own the vagina. Do you see now?

[logic32]

What's a "right of exclusive control"?

 

 

I've never heard of this guy either. Owning a murder means being responsible for, that's just obvious. And writing the book does indicate that he owns the work...

 

 

Why is that absurd? People can have crazy opinions. Just because he thinks people should be taxed doesn't mean it's not theft.

Thanks for the response and engaging with me, I definitely think we are getting somewhere.

 

Well, rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.

Cohen has described self-ownership this way: "each person enjoys, over himself and his powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that he has not contracted to supply."

David Gordon is one of the foremost anarcho-capitalist philosophers today, and someone who I think is generally an asset to our movement, even if we consider his critiques of Stefan to be unfounded. The point he's making is that property ownership and moral responsibility are distinct. The relationship of being morally responsible for a murder is not the same as having a property right in a table, yet he is suggesting that Stefan conflates the two by using the term 'own' for both. If you have a property right in the murder than you should be able to sell it, or transfer that right, but what does this even mean in this context?

 

It's not that the opinion is crazy, rather that for almost all anarchist libertarian philosophers, self-ownership has normative significance such that it would be an implicit contradiction to say one is a statist yet supports self-ownership, since they would claim that the state violates self-ownership. Writing the book does not entail that he ought to have property rights in it. That would be inferring an ought from an is. You say it 'indicates' that he owns it. Well, you can make that argument if you want. I expect Stefan would disagree given that he is anti intellectual property. Isn't this actually a good example of responsibility for and property ownership of being distinct? I agree with Stefan as well as Stephan on IP. Incidentally, I'd like to thank Stefan for his work on IP and his role as part of the libertarian anti-IP movement.

You can say the thief controls the car but does not own it. So what? The argument is not "if you control X you own X". You might be a thief or rapist for example.

Directly controlling the time/labor means they made the thing. They control the right to say "this car is product of my time and labor" and that be true. The thief takes control of that time and labor, thereby retroactively enslaving the rightful owner. The thief claims ownership through the act of taking the car but does not have legitimate ownership. It's like a rapist taking control over the women's vagina. He has removed control from her but that does not mean she does not own the vagina. Do you see now?

Stefan stated that ownership of x entailed (he actually said 'meant') direct control of x. In the rape case, the woman still is the one directly controlling her body, so she would still own herself in that sense, I agree. However, that puts us in the awkward situation of having to say that her self-ownership has not been violated, since at all points she is the one in direct control of herself, not her rapist. The standard libertarian definition of self-ownership (which I would favour as a libertarian) doesn't have this problem. 

 

The thief doesn't take control of that time and labor, since that would require time travel, rather he takes direct control of the car. You say that directly controlling the time/labor means they made the thing but then immediately contradict this by saying the thief takes control of the time/labor when you clearly don't accept that this means he made the thing.

 

Thanks for the engagement, I want to understand where Stefan is coming from and I greatly appreciate the work he does in the liberty movement.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

Stefan stated that ownership of x entailed (he actually said 'meant') direct control of x. In the rape case, the woman still is the one directly controlling her body, so she would still own herself in that sense, I agree. However, that puts us in the awkward situation of having to say that her self-ownership has not been violated, since at all points she is the one in direct control of herself, not her rapist. The standard libertarian definition of self-ownership (which I would favour as a libertarian) doesn't have this problem. The thief doesn't take control of that time and labor, since that would require time travel, rather he takes direct control of the car. You say that directly controlling the time/labor means they made the thing but then immediately contradict this by saying the thief takes control of the time/labor when you clearly don't accept that this means he made the thing.Thanks for the engagement, I want to understand where Stefan is coming from and I greatly appreciate the work he does in the liberty movement.

So what if Stef said ownership of X entailed direct control of X? He's never said that control of X means you own it. 

In the rape example I'm saying the woman does not control her vagina because the rapist has taken control of it (and the other parts of her body he needs to control i guess). So when you agree you're misunderstanding.  

I favor the definition of self-ownership being discussed because it's the correct one.

The thief doesn't literally take control of the time and labor as it happens or is being used. The car is a manifestation of the time and labor and the thief takes that. They claim ownership of it through the act of stealing the car but that claim is not legitimate because they cannot have control of that time and labor. 

 

Oh BTW if you want to understand where Stef is coming from I'd recommend calling in tonight to his show. You may even get to the front of the cue if you say you want to present these objections. You'll understand where he is coming from hundreds of times faster that way. 

[Kevin Beal]

What am I? Chopped liver?

[AustinJames]

Big fan of Stefan, particularly his work on feminism, but I am a little confused by his definition of 'ownership'. In 'Why you were bullied' he says "The brain owns the body, what that means is it directly controls the body." But another video title is 'The Bundy Ranch: The Government Owns Nothing And Controls Everything'. 

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.I'm humbly asking for assitance in helping me understand these concepts, and I thank Stefan for the great work he does!Frank 

 

 

If you want to know more about Stefan's definition of ownership, he has many podcasts and chapters in his books that address the topic.  It is dismissive (or perhaps, dare I say, disingenuous) to take these two rather unrelated uses of the terminology in an attempt to seek further understanding.

 

What am I? Chopped liver?

 

The dismissal of Kevin's commentary has led me to question the intent of the original poster.

[cynicist]

Thanks for the response and engaging with me, I definitely think we are getting somewhere.Well, rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.

 

Sure, no problem. That definition is circular since an entitlement is a right.

 

The point he's making is that property ownership and moral responsibility are distinct. The relationship of being morally responsible for a murder is not the same as having a property right in a table, yet he is suggesting that Stefan conflates the two by using the term 'own' for both. If you have a property right in the murder than you should be able to sell it, or transfer that right, but what does this even mean in this context?

 

Ownership implies a type of possession, not ability to be sold. Accepting self-ownership doesn't include the ability to sell yourself into slavery, so there's already a tricky exception to his argument. 

 

It's not that the opinion is crazy, rather that for almost all anarchist libertarian philosophers, self-ownership has normative significance such that it would be an implicit contradiction to say one is a statist yet supports self-ownership, since they would claim that the state violates self-ownership. 

 

Sorry, what's the normative statement here?

 

Writing the book does not entail that he ought to have property rights in it. That would be inferring an ought from an is. You say it 'indicates' that he owns it. Well, you can make that argument if you want. I expect Stefan would disagree given that he is anti intellectual property. Isn't this actually a good example of responsibility for and property ownership of being distinct? I agree with Stefan as well as Stephan on IP. Incidentally, I'd like to thank Stefan for his work on IP and his role as part of the libertarian anti-IP movement.

 

IP is a fiction. Stefan created the work regardless. It would not exist otherwise, that's what I mean by it being indicative. (I'm using own in terms of being responsible for, not some imaginary monopoly on words)

[logic32]

What am I? Chopped liver?

Ah, sorry Kevin, I'll respond ASAP, I got drawn into the discussion with ProfessionalTeabagger and forgot about your post. 

 

If you want to know more about Stefan's definition of ownership, he has many podcasts and chapters in his books that address the topic.  It is dismissive (or perhaps, dare I say, disingenuous) to take these two rather unrelated uses of the terminology in an attempt to seek further understanding.

 

 

The dismissal of Kevin's commentary has led me to question the intent of the original poster.

Hey Austin, well I have watched and listened to many videos and podcasts on these issues, and I believe this dissonance is a real issue which is unaccounted for. For instance, in the 'Rights Ethics and Society' debate, which I have watched in its entirety. I think if anything it is dismissive of you to not address the issues and instead direct me to Stefan's enormous podcast library.I forgot to address Kevin's post, my bad, but I don't see how this means you should question my intent, unless you thought my aim of being here was to elicit a response from ProfessionalTeabagger and engage with him at the expense of others. I think that's an uncharitable interpretation of my actions.Thanks a lot for responding though, and I'll address Kevin's points soon! Thank you Kevin for engaging with me on these issues also.

[Kevin Beal]

Ah, sorry Kevin, I'll respond ASAP, I got drawn into the discussion with ProfessionalTeabagger and forgot about your post.

Haha. I always just wanted to say that. No need to respond if you don't want to.

[logic32]

Sure, no problem. That definition is circular since an entitlement is a right.

 

 

Ownership implies a type of possession, not ability to be sold. Accepting self-ownership doesn't include the ability to sell yourself into slavery, so there's already a tricky exception to his argument. 

 

 

Sorry, what's the normative statement here?

 

 

IP is a fiction. Stefan created the work regardless. It would not exist otherwise, that's what I mean by it being indicative. (I'm using own in terms of being responsible for, not some imaginary monopoly on words)

"That definition is circular". Well, on that basis, all definitions are circular, since the definition means what it being defined. E.g. I might define a rhino as a herbivorous ungulate with a horn of southeast Asia and Africa in the family Rhinocerotidae and you'd say 'that's circular because a herbivorous ungulate of southeast Asia and Africa in the family Rhinocerotidae is a rhino'. Definitions work both ways, a=b, b=a. Here's more information on different categories of rights. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2

I disagree with Stefan and agree with Walter Block on non-NAP violating slavery. I think it is compatible with self-ownership, because you can tranfer the moral right to determine permissible use of your body. This is a side-issue, however, probably best not to get dragged down that road.

 

The normative statement is self-ownership - this is perceived as a normative claim (a rights claim) by pretty much every libertarian I've come across apart from Stefan. E.g. Rothbard defines it as "the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to “own” his or her own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference.” Cohen (not a libertarian) defines it thus: "each person enjoys, over himself and his powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that he has not contracted to supply."

 

I don't know what you mean by 'some imaginary monopoly on words'. The point is that Stefan arguably conflates ownership in terms of property with being morally responsible for something. Hence, to show that you are morally responsible for something does not demonstrate that you have a legitimate property rights claim in it. Isn't it misleading to say 'he owns x but he has no property right in x'? If 'owns' apparently means 'is morally responsible for' then the previous sentence makes sense.

 

Thanks for the engagement!

heya logic32! Could you please define 'ownership'?!

 

I don't believe Stef ever said that the definition of ownership is direct control. Rather, it is the basis.

 

Ownership is a institutionally recognized claim to objects. The basis for how you can come to own different things depends on whatever the thing is. You can buy a car, but you can't buy a human, right?

 

The way we recognize new ways of ownership or resolve conflicts in grey areas is to look at which claim is the most logically consistent. It would make no sense to say that you could ever own me, right? And the self ownership argument is the reason for that. You can't reasonably claim ownership over something that I bought from someone who made that thing, right? Someone who exchanges value for value has a much better claim than someone who simply states that they own something, obviously.

 

There is no ontologically objective sense in which we say that property "exists". And the temptation is to say that therefore property is a false concept, but it's the same thing as saying that this is not my argument / position because it doesn't exist in an ontologically objective sense.

 

By "ontologically objective" I mean things like rocks and trees which you can touch. As opposed to ontologically subjective which is things like dreams, consciousness, web developers (jobs), money (independent of fibers and inks), things that "exist" in that they are represented as existing, but have no physical existence. Perhaps a needlessly complicated idea for this discussion, but it's important in addressing the previously mentioned temptation to dismiss property on the basis of lacking physical existence. After all, there is no signature written in the aether surrounding my computer or my body.

 

Hopefully that makes sense.

Hey Kevin! I think Stanford gets the definition of ownership correct here - as you can see, we are concerned with private property (capitalist) rights.

 

"Libertarianism holds that agents are, at least initially, full self-owners. Agents are (moral) full self-owners just in case they morally own themselves in just the same way that they can morally fully own inanimate objects. Below we shall distinguish between full (interpersonal) self-ownership and full political self-ownership. Many versions of libertarianism endorse only the latter.

Full ownership of an entity consists of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the entity: both a liberty-right to use it and a claim-right that others not use it, (2) rights to compensation if someone uses the entity without one's permission, (3)enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior restraint if someone is about to violate these rights), (4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (5) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights. Full ownership is simply a logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing. There is some indeterminacy in this notion (since there can be more than one strongest set of such rights), but there is a determinate core set of rights (see below).

At the core of full self-ownership, then, is full control self-ownership, the full right to control the use of one's person. Something like control self-ownership is arguably needed to recognize the fact there are some things (e.g., various forms of physical contact) that may not be done to a person without her consent, but which may be done with that consent. It wrongs an individual to subject her to non-consensual and unprovoked killing, maiming, enslavement, or forcible manipulation."

 

Stefan said that 'the brain owns the body, which means that the brain directly controls the body'. I hold that there are counterexamples to this, for instance the man whose car is stolen and watches it as it is driven away by its thief. He does not directly control the car, yet he does own the car. So Stefan cannot be right that ownership entails direct control. He has said that self-ownership is simply the biological fact of direct control of the body, which would entail that direct control does indeed entail ownership. I am rather confused again since it would follow then that the car's thief, having direct control over the car, would own it - and so not be a thief!

 

I personally feel that the standard libertarian definitions of self-ownership are more in line with our intuitions than Stefan's definition, since it does not entail these odd cases where for instance a thief owns your car. Thanks very much for taking the time to engage with me!

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

Stefan said that 'the brain owns the body, which means that the brain directly controls the body'. I hold that there are counterexamples to this, for instance the man whose car is stolen and watches it as it is driven away by its thief. He does not directly control the car, yet he does own the car. So Stefan cannot be right that ownership entails direct control. He has said that self-ownership is simply the biological fact of direct control of the body, which would entail that direct control does indeed entail ownership. I am rather confused again since it would follow then that the car's thief, having direct control over the car, would own it - and so not be a thief!

Owning X entailing control of X is not the same control of X entails ownership of X. 

[cynicist]

"That definition is circular". Well, on that basis, all definitions are circular, since the definition means what it being defined. E.g. I might define an rhino as a herbivorous ungulate with a horn and you'd say 'that's circular because a rhino is a herbivorous ungulate with a horn'. Here's more information on different categories of rights. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2

 

No, the definition of entitlement is literally 'the fact of having a right'. So saying that a right is 'the fact of having a right to perform an action' is not a definition at all. (It would be like saying, 'A rhino is an object with the characteristics of a rhino'. You literally get zero characteristics which explain what the thing is)

 

The normative statement is self-ownership - this is perceived as a normative claim (a rights claim) by pretty much every libertarian I've come across apart from Stefan. E.g. Rothbard defines it as "the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to “own” his or her own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference.” Cohen (not a libertarian) defines it thus: "each person enjoys, over himself and his powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that he has not contracted to supply."

 

It doesn't have to be a normative statement. I mean I can say that my property rights were violated or more specifically that my money was stolen and they both can refer to the same thing. 

 

I don't know what you mean by 'some imaginary monopoly on words'. The point is that Stefan arguably conflates ownership in terms of property with being morally responsible for something. Hence, to show that you are morally responsible for something does not demonstrate that you have a legitimate property rights claim in it. 

 

Intellectual property is not a valid form of property.

 

I'm not sure what you mean by the rest of your statement. If you are morally responsible for an action that means you own that action. I don't know what you mean when you say 'legitimate property rights claim in it', are you talking about physical property like a house? If so, what does moral responsibility have to do with that? If you are talking about an action, then what do you mean by 'legitimate property rights claim'?

 

(Responsibility and ownership mean the same thing, they simply distinguish between actions and material objects)

 

Isn't it misleading to say 'he owns x but he has no property right in x'? If 'owns' apparently means 'is morally responsible for' then the previous sentence makes sense.

 

There is no such thing as a right to property. It's a legal construct created for a statist system. If there were no state you would just say 'he owns x'. 

[labmath2]

Owning X entailing control of X is not the same control of X entails ownership of X. 

 

I think the car example does two things.

1. ownership is not a necessary condition for control-the thief controlling the car

2. control is not a necessary condition for ownership- the owner watching the thief drive away the car.

[logic32]

Owning X entailing control of X is not the same control of X entails ownership of X. 

I know, that's why I gave an example where somebody owns X without controlling X, illustrating that ownership of X does not entail control of X.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I know, that's why I gave an example where somebody owns X without controlling X, illustrating that ownership of X does not entail control of X.

That's why I gave an argument that refutes that. An argument you have not addressed. Ownership does mean you always in control of the thing you own; otherwise there would be no theft, rape, murder or assault. Control of X (or lack of control of X for that matter) does not necessarily entail ownership (or lack of ownership). Ownership entails control. If I own the car that does not necessarily mean I am always in control of it. 

 

Also, the call in show is about to start and there's been some no-shows so you can get on and talk to stef directly. 

[Magnus]

If (in the absence of electrodes and servos) it's impossible to confer true, direct control of your body to another person, then how could you transfer the right of exclusive control to him?

[logic32]

If (in the absence of electrodes and servos) it's impossible to confer true, direct control of your body to another person, then how could you transfer the right of exclusive control to him?

 I think the Stanford encyclopaedia again explains it well:

 

"A fourth objection to full self-ownership is that it permits voluntary enslavement. Agents have, it claims, not only the right to control the use of their person, but also the right totransfer that right (e.g., by sale or gift) to others. Some libertarians—such as Rothbard (1982) and Barnett (1998, pp. 78–82)—deny that such transfer is even possible, since others cannot control one's will. This, however, seems to be a mistake, since what is at issue is the moral right to control permissible use (by giving or denying permission), not the psychological capacity to control."

 

So even if someone else is in direct control of their body, I can determine whether their actions are permissible or not by giving or denying permission, in the same way that you might own an animal. It is morally permissible for you to pick the animal up and transport it, and there's no confusion because the animal is in psychological control of itself in some sense. If your slave runs away, then you have not given permission for that use of that body which you own, so it should be returned to you, and your slave is initiating force against you. If it were impossible for self-ownership to be violated as it simply meant 'direct psychological control' then this would entail that the state throwing you in jail for no reason would not violate self-ownership, since you would at all points have direct psychological control over your body. So this indicates that self-ownership is (as is standardly accepted) the moral right to determine permissible use. Notice that it says control BY giving or denying permission.