Help me Understand Stefan's Definition of 'Ownership' (vs 'Direct Control')

[cynicist]

I want to step back to the initial post.

 

But if ownership is direct control, how can the Government control everything without owning it? (Perhaps you could argue they don't control it 'directly' but they control it as directly as anybody controls external objects.) Stefan has been clear that for him ownership is a biological fact, an is-claim, not an ought-claim.

 

Direct control of the body through the brain is the biological basis for ownership. Your point is based on a misunderstanding of what Stefan is saying. It's evident in the thread title

 

Help me Understand Stefan's Definition of 'Ownership' (vs 'Direct Control') 

 

There is no Ownership vs Direct Control (of the body). One is the basis and requirement for the other. You are thinking of the difference between direct control and ownership of an object, which is not really applicable to the body given that we can't relinquish direct control over it. (and again, it's the foundation of all ownership)

 

This is why the idea of voluntary slavery makes no sense.

[logic32]

I want to step back to the initial post.

 

 

Direct control of the body through the brain is the biological basis for ownership. Your point is based on a misunderstanding of what Stefan is saying. It's evident in the thread title

 

 

There is no Ownership vs Direct Control (of the body). One is the basis and requirement for the other. You are thinking of the difference between direct control and ownership of an object, which is not really applicable to the body given that we can't relinquish direct control over it. (and again, it's the foundation of all ownership)

 

This is why the idea of voluntary slavery makes no sense.

But the example of the stolen car demonstrates that control is not the basis of ownership. Since it isn't the basis for ownership of external objects, why would it be the basis for ownership of the body? Rather, the moral right to determine permissible use is the basis of ownership, and this is compatible with non-NAP breaking slavery.

 

"A fourth objection to full self-ownership is that it permits voluntary enslavement. Agents have, it claims, not only the right to control the use of their person, but also the right totransfer that right (e.g., by sale or gift) to others. Some libertarians—such as Rothbard (1982) and Barnett (1998, pp. 78–82)—deny that such transfer is even possible, since others cannot control one's will. This, however, seems to be a mistake, since what is at issue is the moral right to control permissible use (by giving or denying permission), not the psychological capacity to control. "

[cynicist]

But the example of the stolen car demonstrates that control is not the basis of ownership. Since it isn't the basis for ownership of external objects, why would it be the basis for ownership of the body? Rather, the moral right to determine permissible use is the basis of ownership, and this is compatible with non-NAP breaking slavery.

 

You can only claim ownership of the car BECAUSE you have direct control over your body. In fact you could only make this post and claim ownership of your argument through the direct control you have over your fingers. (control over an object is not the basis of ownership, but control of your body is)

 

Please explain what "the moral right to determine permissible use" is and where it comes from. If you want to argue that the basis of ownership is not biological, there are only two alternatives I can think of and neither make good arguments. (god and arbitrary, aka legal)

[Magnus]

 If it were impossible for self-ownership to be violated as it simply meant 'direct psychological control' then this would entail that the state throwing you in jail for no reason would not violate self-ownership, since you would at all points have direct psychological control over your body.

 

This is incorrect. 

 

Self-ownership doesn't "mean" direct psychological control.  They are not equal in all respects. 

 

Self-ownership is predicated on direct psychological control.  Self-ownership arises from self-control. 

 

And all the other forms of property rights we have arise, in turn, from self-ownership, as long as certain other conditions are met (e.g., being the first user of an object, or legitimately obtaining property rights in the object from the prior owner, etc.). 

 

Putting you in prison (for no good reason, like a drug charge or not paying taxes) is still a violation of your OTHER rights, which are broader than just the right to wiggle one's own fingers.  All of our rights BEGIN with self-ownership, but they extend outward from there, such as the right to do anything or go anywhere, when doing so does not infringe on other people's rights.  The jailers can still violate those rights (freedom of movement), and can confiscate your things, even though the jailers can never deprive you of direct psychological control of your body (short of forcibly inserting high-tech implants into your central nervous system). 

 

You seem to be assuming that self-ownership is the one and only right a person has, and as long as you have that, your property rights can't be violated.  That's clearly false. 

[cynicist]

Magnus, your post is well put and accurately describes the mistake the OP is making, but your use of the word 'rights' makes things confusing. (like how people using the term 'government' as if it is a real entity is confusing)

 

Relevant youtube:

 

[logic32]

This is incorrect. 

 

Self-ownership doesn't "mean" direct psychological control.  They are not equal in all respects. 

 

Self-ownership is predicated on direct psychological control.  Self-ownership arises from self-control. 

 

And all the other forms of property rights we have arise, in turn, from self-ownership, as long as certain other conditions are met (e.g., being the first user of an object, or legitimately obtaining property rights in the object from the prior owner, etc.). 

 

Putting you in prison (for no good reason, like a drug charge or not paying taxes) is still a violation of your OTHER rights, which are broader than just the right to wiggle one's own fingers.  All of our rights BEGIN with self-ownership, but they extend outward from there, such as the right to do anything or go anywhere, when doing so does not infringe on other people's rights.  The jailers can still violate those rights (freedom of movement), and can confiscate your things, even though the jailers can never deprive you of direct psychological control of your body (short of forcibly inserting high-tech implants into your central nervous system). 

 

You seem to be assuming that self-ownership is the one and only right a person has, and as long as you have that, your property rights can't be violated.  That's clearly false. 

But how do those other rights follow from (or 'arise from', 'extend outward' from) direct psychological control? Without simply committing the naturalistic fallacy and confusing is-claims with ought-claims, as Rothbard does (Matt Zwolinski explains how here http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/07/reading-the-ethics-of-liberty-part-2-rothbard-on-natural-law/)

 

"When we examine the case of Crusoe, Rothbard claims, we are confronted with a number of “inescapable,” “natural facts.” Crusoe has only his own body to rely upon; he has no instincts to tell him automatically how to live; there are various natural resources that can be used to satisfy his desires, some in their raw form, some only after having been transformed by human effort. Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and reason is his means of survival (30).

 

Fair enough, so far. But where in this catalogue of natural facts are we to find morality? Where is the “ought,” the normativity that is the characteristic mark of moral and political thought? For Rothbard, the key transitional concept is ownership. For when Crusoe examines his own situation, Rothbard claims, he discovers “the natural fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership over his self” (31).

 

Self-ownership, for Rothbard, is a natural fact, constituted by our control over our self (our body and our actions). My body is mine because I alone determine how it moves and what it does. And so self-ownership extends naturally to ownership over external goods. For by “mixing our labor” with the land, we come to have control over it, too. And our property in it extends only so far as our control extends – to stand on the shore of a new continent and claim ownership over the entire thing would be “empty vainglory” (34). True property in external goods is equivalent to actual control over them (34).

 

There is, however, a serious confusion at work in this argument. It is a confusion that stems partly, I think, from Rothbard’s Crusoe methodology. Part of the greatness of Human Action is how well that approach works for the analysis of economics. Mises is able to show that even economic concepts that seem essentially interpersonal, like that of “exchange,” are really fundamental features of human action discernible even in the case of “autistic” action.

 

But it’s just not clear that you can do this with ethical concepts like “ownership.” And that’s because ownership really is an essentially interpersonal concept. To claim ownership over a thing – or over one’s self! – is to make a claim against others. It is to claim, at a minimum, that they must refrain from interfering in your use of the thing.

That kind of interpersonal claim is the essence of property. Without it, you simply don’t have property. A thief might control the purse he has stolen from you, but he doesn’t own it. Your ownership of the purse, in contrast, isn’t defeated by the fact that the thief is now controlling it. What gives you ownership is not actual control, but the normative right to control.

I’m not saying that Crusoe doesn’t own himself, or the nuts and berries he mixes his labor with. I’m saying that Rothbard hasn’t shown that he does. Pointing to the “natural fact” that Crusoe controls himself and his berries does not establish that he owns them in the sense of having a moral claim against others. To think that it does is to confuse the “is” of what Crusoe possesses with the “ought” of what he has a right to possess.

 

Unfortunately, Rothbard proceeds to argue in the chapters that follow as if he had established the normative claims of self-ownership and ownership of external goods. Indeed, his entire understanding of the free society is based on these concepts (40). And so, the oversight here is not a minor one. It is, instead, absolutely fatal."

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

So how do those other rights follow from direct psychological control? Without simply committing the naturalistic fallacy and confusing is-claims with ought-claims, as Rothbard does (Matt Zwolinski explains how here http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/10/reading-the-ethics-of-liberty-part-3-rothbards-confusion-about-self-ownership/)

 

"When we examine the case of Crusoe, Rothbard claims, we are confronted with a number of “inescapable,” “natural facts.” Crusoe has only his own body to rely upon; he has no instincts to tell him automatically how to live; there are various natural resources that can be used to satisfy his desires, some in their raw form, some only after having been transformed by human effort. Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and reason is his means of survival (30).

 

Fair enough, so far. But where in this catalogue of natural facts are we to find morality? Where is the “ought,” the normativity that is the characteristic mark of moral and political thought? For Rothbard, the key transitional concept is ownership. For when Crusoe examines his own situation, Rothbard claims, he discovers “the natural fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership over his self” (31).

 

Self-ownership, for Rothbard, is a natural fact, constituted by our control over our self (our body and our actions). My body is mine because I alone determine how it moves and what it does. And so self-ownership extends naturally to ownership over external goods. For by “mixing our labor” with the land, we come to have control over it, too. And our property in it extends only so far as our control extends – to stand on the shore of a new continent and claim ownership over the entire thing would be “empty vainglory” (34). True property in external goods is equivalent to actual control over them (34).

 

There is, however, a serious confusion at work in this argument. It is a confusion that stems partly, I think, from Rothbard’s Crusoe methodology. Part of the greatness of Human Action is how well that approach works for the analysis of economics. Mises is able to show that even economic concepts that seem essentially interpersonal, like that of “exchange,” are really fundamental features of human action discernible even in the case of “autistic” action.

 

But it’s just not clear that you can do this with ethical concepts like “ownership.” And that’s because ownership really is an essentially interpersonal concept. To claim ownership over a thing – or over one’s self! – is to make a claim against others. It is to claim, at a minimum, that they must refrain from interfering in your use of the thing.

That kind of interpersonal claim is the essence of property. Without it, you simply don’t have property. A thief might control the purse he has stolen from you, but he doesn’t own it. Your ownership of the purse, in contrast, isn’t defeated by the fact that the thief is now controlling it. What gives you ownership is not actual control, but the normative right to control.

I’m not saying that Crusoe doesn’t own himself, or the nuts and berries he mixes his labor with. I’m saying that Rothbard hasn’t shown that he does. Pointing to the “natural fact” that Crusoe controls himself and his berries does not establish that he owns them in the sense of having a moral claim against others. To think that it does is to confuse the “is” of what Crusoe possesses with the “ought” of what he has a right to possess.

 

Unfortunately, Rothbard proceeds to argue in the chapters that follow as if he had established the normative claims of self-ownership and ownership of external goods. Indeed, his entire understanding of the free society is based on these concepts (40). And so, the oversight here is not a minor one. It is, instead, absolutely fatal."

Are you here to talk about Stef's definition or Rothbards?

 

It's also worth mentioning that the article "Reading the ethics of liberty, Part 3 Rothbard's confusion about self-ownership" was written by the leftist Michael Moore. So it might be biased.

[Magnus]

Your link at Bleeding Heart went to a 404 page, so I can't read it and comment on it.

[FireShield]

.

[logic32]

Your link at Bleeding Heart went to a 404 page, so I can't read it and comment on it.

Sorry Magnus, I've corrected the link, my mistake. ProfessionalTeabagger, I think it's relevantly similar, since Magnus and others were claiming that self-ownership 'arises' from psychological control, or 'extend outwards' from it.Firstly I would point out that Magnus is not accurately representing Stefan's view on this matter by saying 'self-ownership is not the only right we have' and saying that it is not identical to psychological control, 

here Stefan is clear that self-ownership IS psychological control and NOT (he really stresses this) a rights claim (17:00). Of course, you may disagree with Stefan on this, but I wanted to point out Stefan's position. He stresses that rights do not exist (3:45) 'just to clarify, rights do not exist for me in any way at all' in response to the person he is talking to asserting (correctly) that self-ownership is standard conceived as a rights claim. 

[Magnus]

I'm not misrepresenting anything. I've never seen that video. I've been speaking of my own views on the subject, and responding to your characterizations of Stefan's statements. I have no desire to defend other people's views.

[logic32]

I'm not misrepresenting anything. I've never seen that video. I've been speaking of my own views on the subject, and responding to your characterizations of Stefan's statements. I have no desire to defend other people's views.

Ah, sorry, I meant that ("Firstly I would point out that Magnus is not accurately representing Stefan's view on this matter by saying 'self-ownership is not the only right we have' ") as in 'you are not representing Stefan's view' not that I thought you were 'misrepresenting' Stefan, which you of course were not because you never claimed that 'this is Stefan's view'. But it is Stefan's view which I (and all of us, I assume) am interested in discussing most, since it is so influential. Do you think there is a way of fusing your view that self-ownership is a rights claim with Stefan's claims to the contrary? And do you think we can derive the rights claims from Stefan's version of 'self-ownership' successfully? I want to stress that I was not accusing you of misrepresenting, what I said was that you were not representing Stefan's view, which was the view I was critiquing. I would like to thank you for your thoughtful responses and I certainly didn't intent to imply you had misrepresented Stefan, I hope that now it is clear what I meant by that.

Are you here to talk about Stef's definition or Rothbards?

 

It's also worth mentioning that the article "Reading the ethics of liberty, Part 3 Rothbard's confusion about self-ownership" was written by the leftist Michael Moore. So it might be biased.

I don't understand your comment about the article, it was written by Matt Zwolinski who is a leading libertarian.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I don't understand your comment about the article, it was written by Matt Zwolinski who is a leading libertarian.

I'm assigning ownership of it to Michael Moore. 

[cynicist]

But it’s just not clear that you can do this with ethical concepts like “ownership.” And that’s because ownership really is an essentially interpersonal concept. To claim ownership over a thing – or over one’s self! – is to make a claim against others. It is to claim, at a minimum, that they must refrain from interfering in your use of the thing.

That kind of interpersonal claim is the essence of property. Without it, you simply don’t have property. A thief might control the purse he has stolen from you, but he doesn’t own it. Your ownership of the purse, in contrast, isn’t defeated by the fact that the thief is now controlling it. What gives you ownership is not actual control, but the normative right to control.

 

Where does it become normative? I own my body, that's descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) my actions, hmm also descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) the effects that result from them, is that... no wait, descriptive. Taking someone's property against their will is an act of aggression, initiated by you. Even THAT's descriptive.

 

I'm still unclear as to how it could be normative since I don't understand what rights are or where they come from.

[labmath2]

Where does it become normative? I own my body, that's descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) my actions, hmm also descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) the effects that result from them, is that... no wait, descriptive. Taking someone's property against their will is an act of aggression, initiated by you. Even THAT's descriptive.

 

I'm still unclear as to how it could be normative since I don't understand what rights are or where they come from.

 

How do you define own in those instances? If you mean have responsibility for, then one owns what one has responsibility for, which makes the question of ownership even more complex.

[logic32]

Where does it become normative? I own my body, that's descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) my actions, hmm also descriptive. I own (have responsibility for) the effects that result from them, is that... no wait, descriptive. Taking someone's property against their will is an act of aggression, initiated by you. Even THAT's descriptive.

 

I'm still unclear as to how it could be normative since I don't understand what rights are or where they come from.

Aggression is standardly defined as violating someone's property rights, so it is normative. If you don't have a property right in x, how can you say that me taking away x is aggression? What if I in fact have a property right in x?https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tobN6iY4iIs Stefan in this video asserts that property rights arise from the psychological fact of self-control, just as others have stated including Marcus, but I don't see how this follows. Stefan is clearly attempting a proof of property rights. The reason Stefan asserts that the state is immoral is that it violates your rights, since taxation is theft (see below from UPB). 

Here again he acknowledges property rights. So I think it's important for you to understand what rights are and where they come from! Since they are essential to the anti-state argument, i.e. that taxation is a violation of your property rights - as theft. UPB is largely concerned with establishing property rights. But I'm questioning whether it is successful because it appears to err in jumping illogically from descriptive statements (Stefan's version of self-ownership) to normative claims i.e. those of property rights. From UPB "If I say that I need the government to protect my property, but that the government is by definition a 

group of people who can violate my property rights at will, then I am caught in an insurmountable 

contradiction. I am saying that my property rights must be defended – and then I create an agency to 

defend them that can violate them at any time."

[cynicist]

Aggression is standardly defined as violating someone's property rights, so it is normative. If you don't have a property right in x, how can you say that me taking away x is aggression? What if I in fact have a property right in x?

 

Every dictionary I've seen defines it as some variation of, "initiating a hostile action" or "hostility to another", and both of those are descriptive.

 

So I think it's important for you to understand what rights are and where they come from! 

 

Please help me do this by defining what a right is and then explaining where it comes from. I've already asked several times.

 

Stefan is clearly attempting a proof of property rights. The reason Stefan asserts that the state is immoral is that it violates your rights, since taxation is theft 

 

Of course, you may disagree with Stefan on this, but I wanted to point out Stefan's position. He stresses that rights do not exist (3:45) 'just to clarify, rights do not exist for me in any way at all' in response to the person he is talking to asserting (correctly) that self-ownership is standard conceived as a rights claim. 

 

[logic32]

How do you define own in those instances? If you mean have responsibility for, then one owns what one has responsibility for, which makes the question of ownership even more complex.

Right, it doesn't seem helpful for me to use 'own' to mean both be morally responsible for and have full private property rights in. Because clearly the two aren't identical.

 

"Full ownership of an entity consists of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the entity: both a liberty-right to use it and a claim-right that others not use it, (2) rights to compensation if someone uses the entity without one's permission, (3)enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior restraint if someone is about to violate these rights), (4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (5) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights. Full ownership is simply a logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing. There is some indeterminacy in this notion (since there can be more than one strongest set of such rights), but there is a determinate core set of rights (see below)." - from Stanford. 

 

But when Stefan talks about 'owning a murder' he surely can't mean that you have this set of private property rights in the murder. For instance, can you sell the murder, or just transfer your property rights in it to someone else? The fact that Stefan might be morally responsible (or just causally responsible) for making an argument does not entail that he own the argument as private property. In the above video, 'A Proof Of Property Rights', Stefan seems to think he has proven full private property rights in the body by the end of the video, when in fact this is an illusion since he has conflated moral responsibility with full private property rights, when they are clearly distinct, as the 'own a murder' example shows.

 

Thanks for responding!

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

Aggression is standardly defined as violating someone's property rights, so it is normative. If you don't have a property right in x, how can you say that me taking away x is aggression? What if I in fact have a property right in x?

 

Aggression is the initiation of force. Issues of rights/ morality come up when people interact. Your body is your property and you will have have property rights. 

[cynicist]

Right, it doesn't seem helpful for me to use 'own' to mean both be morally responsible for and have full private property rights in. Because clearly the two aren't identical.

 

Responsibility/ownership are identical besides the distinction between actions and objects. 

[logic32]

Every dictionary I've seen defines it as some variation of, "initiating a hostile action" or "hostility to another", and both of those are descriptive.

 

 

Please help me do this by defining what a right is and then explaining where it comes from. I've already asked several times.

 

Well there's obviously an inconsistency from Stefan there right! He both asserts that he has proven property rights exist and then says that rights for him do not exist. But if rights don't exist then how is the state violating our rights? Maybe you could attempt to square this circle.Which of my claims do you disagree with? I'm not stating my AGREEMENT with both claims which would be what is required for you to accuse me of inconsistency, I stated that Stefan ASSERTS these things. Hence the meme you posted seems misplaced, unless you think it is absurd to even consider that Stefan might have been inconsistent.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ This explains the modern understanding of rights claims, there are legal rights, moral rights, liberty rights, claim rights, property rights (a type of claim rights). You're probably familiar with Hohfeldian analysis which is the standard way to understand rights. So I can't just answer 'what is a right' because it depends on whether you are talking about a legal, claim, moral, right, etc. But if you are clearer on what you are asking, I should be able to answer. For instance:   

A has a liberty right to φ if and only if A has no duty not to φ.

A has a claim right that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

 UPB is largely concerned with establishing property rights. But I'm questioning whether it is successful because it appears to err in jumping illogically from descriptive statements (Stefan's version of self-ownership) to normative claims i.e. those of property rights. 

No, the factual descriptive nature of property is the basis of property rights. Whenever the government taxes you it claims a right to tax you whether explicitly or implicitly. As such it claims a right to forcibly take part of your property while denying you the same right. 

You can test this starting out with the fact of property/selfownership and then playing through a scenario were some party begins to assert rights. 

Well there's obviously an inconsistency from Stefan there right! He both asserts that he has proven property rights exist and then says that rights for him do not exist. But if rights don't exist then how is the state violating our rights? Maybe you could attempt to square this circle.

Exist is meant in two different senses. For example, the scientific method does not exist  (externally to human consciousness) but in another sense it does exist and is objective because it is derived from objective reality.

Similarly, property rights are derived from the objective fact of self-ownership. These rights do not exist in reality but they exist in another sense and are objective. 

[logic32]

Aggression is the initiation of force. Issues of rights/ morality come up when people interact. Your body is your property and you will have have property rights. 

On what basis is your body your property? It doesn't follow from the fact of psychological control that you have full private property ownership over your body. So it doesn't follow from the fact that you control yourself that the state is initiating force against you through taxation by violating your property rights, since psychological control is not a property right.

 

 

 

Responsibility/ownership are identical besides the distinction between actions and objects. 

So if you are responsible for your nephew, you own your nephew? How does that make any sense? And that distinction is a pretty big one don't you think, given that it is the exact example Stefan uses in UPB (below) and you are suggesting it is erroneous since you claim responsibility/ownership are not identical when it comes to actions.

 

You being causally responsible for or having psychological control of your body does not entail full private property rights in your body, hence it doesn't follow from those things that the state is initiating force and violating your property rights. So clearly responsibility and property ownership are not identical.

 

"Since we own our bodies, we also inevitably own the effects of our actions, be they good or bad. If we own the effects of our actions, then clearly we own that which we produce, whether what we produce is a bow, or a book — or a murder." - UPB

No, the factual descriptive nature of property is the basis of property rights. Whenever the government taxes you it claims a right to tax you whether explicitly or implicitly. As such it claims a right to forcibly take part of your property while denying you the same right. 

You can test this starting out with the fact of property/selfownership and then playing through a scenario were some party begins to assert rights. 

Exist is meant in two different senses. For example, the scientific method does not exist  (externally to human consciousness) but in another sense it does exist and is objective because it is derived from objective reality.

Similarly, property rights are derived from the objective fact of self-ownership. These rights do not exist in reality but they exist in another sense and are objective. 

But in what sense is the 'factual descriptive nature of property' the basis of property rights? This is crucial. You can't just CALL psychological control 'self-ownership' or 'property' and think that somehow proves that you have a full property right in yourself. You then state 'then claim a right to take your property' but clearly they don't, since they wouldn't accept that you have a property right in what is being taxed. So at some point you do need to demonstrate that you have a property right in x rather than just calling something that isn't even normative 'self-ownership' and act like you've proven something to do with property rights.

[cynicist]

Well there's obviously an inconsistency from Stefan there right! He both asserts that he has proven property rights exist and then says that rights for him do not exist. But if rights don't exist then how is the state violating our rights? Maybe you could attempt to square this circle.

 

Colloquialism - A saying that expresses something other than the literal meaning of the words it contains.

 

So I can't just answer 'what is a right' because it depends on whether you are talking about a legal, claim, moral, right, etc. But if you are clearer on what you are asking, I should be able to answer. 

 

It doesn't really matter, since those are just types of rights, and I'm asking what a right is. Given the context of the thread though, let's go with property rights.

 

So if you are responsible for your nephew, you own your nephew? How does that make any sense?

 

Saying that you are responsible for your nephew is referring to being held accountable for your actions in regards to your nephew. In other words, you own the effects of your actions.

 

And that distinction is a pretty big one don't you think, given that it is the exact example Stefan uses in UPB (below) and you are suggesting it is erroneous since you claim responsibility/ownership are not identical when it comes to actions.

 

No, I'm saying they are identical in meaning, just rarely in usage. Saying that you 'own' effects like murder sounds weird, because we generally use 'responsible for' in its place. 

 

You being causally responsible for or having psychological control of your body does not entail full private property rights in your body, hence it doesn't follow from those things that the state is initiating force and violating your property rights. So clearly responsibility and property ownership are not identical.

 

Ok, say that you are correct. Then where do property rights derive from?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

On what basis is your body your property? It doesn't follow from the fact of psychological control that you have full private property ownership over your body. So it doesn't follow from the fact that you control yourself that the state is initiating force against you through taxation by violating your property rights, since psychological control is not a property right.

Because I own it.  I AM me and can't not own myself. It's private property. It's not un-owned, right? It can't be publicly owned (leaving aside possibly ways to volunteer for that) because I am part of the public. It can't be partly publicly owned, right? 

The state is initiating force against me when they tax. They use force and that force is initiated.

So if you are responsible for your nephew, you own your nephew? 

 

Words and concepts can have different senses and be used in different contexts. 

[logic32]

Because I own it.  I AM me and can't not own myself. It's private property. It's not un-owned, right? It can't be publicly owned (leaving aside possibly ways to volunteer for that) because I am part of the public. It can't be partly publicly owned, right? 

The state is initiating force against me when they tax. They use force and that force is initiated.

Words and concepts can have different senses and be used in different contexts. 

You could certainly argue that human beings cannot be legitimately owned as private property (full private ownership as Stanford puts it). Thus, individuals may not own themselves but nonetheless control themselves. Given that this is the case, were people to not own themselves they would still have the capacity to control their body in the manner required for survival and so would not die out. One could even argue that people ought to be free to control themselves unless they perform certain freedom limiting actions, such as murdering another, because this has good consequences such as people not experiencing the suffering and preference violation that comes with one losing control over one’s body as a result of the actions of another. However, this need not entail full private property ownership. 

 

Matt Zwolinski responds to Rothbard's similar argument here - 

 

Rothbard's argument - "(1) There are three and only three possibilities regarding ownership of the self: (i) each person is a full self-owner, (ii) “a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B,” or (iii) “everyone has the right to own his own equal quotal share of everyone else.” [For a New Liberty (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1978, p. 29)]"

 

Zwolinski's response - "(1) ignores a host of relevant alternatives to (i), (ii) and (iii), such as, for example,  (iv): “every person has a right to own (control) his person  in the following respects 1…N, but not in the following respects in which his ownership of his person is subject to restriction or regulation by others in the following ways…”."

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

You could certainly argue that human beings cannot be legitimately owned as private property (full private ownership as Stanford puts it). Thus, individuals may not own themselves but nonetheless control themselves. Given that this is the case, were people to not own themselves they would still have the capacity to control their body in the manner required for survival and so would not die out. One could even argue that people ought to be free to control themselves unless they perform certain freedom limiting actions, such as murdering another, because this has good consequences such as people not experiencing the suffering and preference violation that comes with one losing control over one’s body as a result of the actions of another. However, this need not entail full private property ownership. 

 

Matt Zwolinski responds to Rothbard's similar argument here - 

 

Rothbard's argument - "(1) There are three and only three possibilities regarding ownership of the self: (i) each person is a full self-owner, (ii) “a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B,” or (iii) “everyone has the right to own his own equal quotal share of everyone else.” [For a New Liberty (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1978, p. 29)]"

 

Zwolinski's response - "(1) ignores a host of relevant alternatives to (i), (ii) and (iii), such as, for example,  (iv): “every person has a right to own (control) his person  in the following respects 1…N, but not in the following respects in which his ownership of his person is subject to restriction or regulation by others in the following ways…”."

It's best not to alter my argument and then conclude something based on that alteration. Human beings own themselves as private property. That way they have to volunteer the time/labor, etc that is all part of their private property. 

Private property ownership is a fact. I own myself. That is a fact of reality. You own yourself. That is a fact of reality. As long as we both interact in a voluntary manner then neither of us is claiming a right that we deny the other. But something like the state must necessarily interact with people in a coercive manner. 

[cynicist]

Well it seems at the very least that you now understand what Stefan means, even if you think he is incorrect. Arguing about it's validity wasn't in the scope of the thread anyhow. Cheers.

[labmath2]

I think ROBERT P. MURPHY AND GENE CALLAHAN do a good Job of disproving property rights as imagined by Stefan (it seems to me he uses HANS-HERMANN HOPPE’S property rights claim). Here is the article where they refute that argument. Although, again i am not sure this addresses Stefan's argument since he never actually defines ownership.

 

https://mises.org/journals/jls/20_2/20_2_3.pdf

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I think ROBERT P. MURPHY AND GENE CALLAHAN do a good Job of disproving property rights as imagined by Stefan (it seems to me he uses HANS-HERMANN HOPPE’S property rights claim). Here is the article where they refute that argument. Although, again i am not sure this addresses Stefan's argument since he never actually defines ownership.

 

https://mises.org/journals/jls/20_2/20_2_3.pdf

When it got to the part where they argued that a collectivist could claim he can take someones kidney because technically they could still debate with one kidney I stopped reading. This is so much like a certain kind of criticism Stef's arguments gets. 

[labmath2]

When it got to the part where they argued that a collectivist could claim he can take someones kidney because technically they could still debate with one kidney I stopped reading. This is so much like a certain kind of criticism Stef's arguments gets. 

I am confused. Do you think their reasoning is invalid? I suggest you read the whole thing, even if you disagree, to at least get the full sense of arguments against the position that property rights cannot be denied without performative contradiction. Their strongest counter argument comes at the end where one could see a slave argue one position or the other, without owning (normative claim) himself/herself. The only necessary condition for said slave to argue is to control certain organs on his body, which does not grant him/her ownership anymore than animals control of their body prevents their enslavement.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I am confused. Do you think their reasoning is invalid?

Probably. I'm pretty sure it would have occurred Hoppe that one can still debate with parts of the body missing. FFS. It's like if Stef argues that you have exclusive control of your body and some boring jackass points out that we DON'T control AAAAALLLL of our body because you know actually the heart actually pumps blood and teeeeechnically you don't control it and you knoooow teeechnically some parts of the body control you and blahdee blah blah...

I don't know that much about Hoppe's particular view and I'll maybe read the rest of it sometime. Also at least one of the writers is a devout Christian. It kinda annoys me when when people apply such skepticism to various concepts of self-ownership but continue to believe crazy supernatural bullshit. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

I suggest you read the whole thing, even if you disagree, to at least get the full sense of arguments against the position that property rights cannot be denied without performative contradiction. Their strongest counter argument comes at the end where one could see a slave argue one position or the other, without owning (normative claim) himself/herself. The only necessary condition for said slave to argue is to control certain organs on his body, which does not grant him/her ownership anymore than animals control of their body prevents their enslavement.

 

 

[logic32]

It's best not to alter my argument and then conclude something based on that alteration. Human beings own themselves as private property. That way they have to volunteer the time/labor, etc that is all part of their private property. 

Private property ownership is a fact. I own myself. That is a fact of reality. You own yourself. That is a fact of reality. As long as we both interact in a voluntary manner then neither of us is claiming a right that we deny the other. But something like the state must necessarily interact with people in a coercive manner. 

Can you see why it is frustrating when you just repeat 'I own myself' 'you own yourself' 'that is a fact of reality' 'human beings own themselves as private property' yet when asked to give justification for this you just repeat the claim or say that we have psychological control of ourselves, which is not relevant? Whether you own yourself as private property is exactly what is under discussion and asserting it is not an argument. I do thank you for interacting though and attempting to help me get a better understanding of these issues.

 

Well it seems at the very least that you now understand what Stefan means, even if you think he is incorrect. Arguing about it's validity wasn't in the scope of the thread anyhow. Cheers.

I don't know what you mean by this, I think it is within the scope of the thread to determine whether Stefan's argument is successful, or if it isn't, whether we can rescue it by amending it in some way.

 

I am confused. Do you think their reasoning is invalid? I suggest you read the whole thing, even if you disagree, to at least get the full sense of arguments against the position that property rights cannot be denied without performative contradiction. Their strongest counter argument comes at the end where one could see a slave argue one position or the other, without owning (normative claim) himself/herself. The only necessary condition for said slave to argue is to control certain organs on his body, which does not grant him/her ownership anymore than animals control of their body prevents their enslavement.

That's the best point against argumentation ethics; if arguing requires full self-ownership rights then given that Hoppe, Rothbard et al did not enjoy full self-ownership rights then they cannot have been arguing. 

 

As Friedman puts it "2. In order to argue about the truth of proposition we must have absolute self ownership and ownership of scarce means, defined in objective, physical terms and obtained via homesteading.

...

As to 2, note that if it is literally true nobody, including Hoppe, has ever argued about the truth of propositions, since there are no completely libertarian societies in which they could do so. That is obviously not true--and neither is the proposition from which it follows. One can think of an enormous number of non-libertarian ethics and non-libertarian societies consistent with people being able to argue in their defense."

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

Can you see why it is frustrating when you just repeat 'I own myself' 'you own yourself' 'that is a fact of reality' 'human beings own themselves as private property' yet when asked to give justification for this you just repeat the claim or say that we have psychological control of ourselves, which is not relevant? Whether you own yourself as private property is exactly what is under discussion and asserting it is not an argument. I do thank you for interacting though and attempting to help me get a better understanding of these issues.

It is an argument because I have defined the terms I'm using and proven these definitions are valid by supporting them with empirical evidence. 

Self-ownership (I own myself, you own yourself) is exclusive control of of ones body. It is a fact of reality that I control my body, therefore self-ownership is a fact. The effects of my voluntary actions are owned by me. I maintain and use my body to create these effects. YOU are assigning ownership of these effects TO me when you wrongly claim that I'm just "asserting" an argument. 

It's because of these things that logically follow from having exclusive control of one's self that the term self-ownership or ownership is applied. 

As Friedman puts it "2. In order to argue about the truth of proposition we must have absolute self ownership and ownership of scarce means, defined in objective, physical terms and obtained via homesteading.

...

As to 2, note that if it is literally true nobody, including Hoppe, has ever argued about the truth of propositions, since there are no completely libertarian societies in which they could do so. That is obviously not true--and neither is the proposition from which it follows. One can think of an enormous number of non-libertarian ethics and non-libertarian societies consistent with people being able to argue in their defense."

I think Friedman meant that people are exercising self ownership and have homesteaded in order to argue the truth of propositions regardless of the society. Even slaves require self-ownership to do this. I suspect the critics think that violating self-ownership means removing it or part of it; like if someones is forcibly claiming ownership of you, you can't have full self-ownership. It might be a bit like arguing that if a woman is repeatedly being raped then she no longer has a full vagina.