We own the effects of our actions?

[Pelafina]

Stefan has said many times that we are responsible for the effects of our actions, but isn't this a consequentialist perspective?  I thought that Stefan subscribes to deontological ethics, not utilitarianism.

 

Example - A neighbor fails to maintain his house and the property value of your house drops as a result.  According to consequentialism, the neighbor is responsible for your loss.  

 

But according to the NAP and libertarian theory, one does not own the value of their property and therefore the neighbor is not responsible for the drop in price that others are willing to pay for your house.

 

So are we responsible for our actions or the effects of our actions?

[Wuzzums]

I would also take the other person's choices in account.

 

For instance:

• if I bought a house knowing I would sell it and knowing the price will depend on my neighbor's house value then I am taking a risk, i.e. my neighbor is not responsible for the price drop on my house
• if i bought a house knowing I would sell it and NOT knowing the price will depend on my neighbor's house value then I still might not be entitled to compensation because I am still responsible for the ignorant choice I made. A street merchant is selling a 30 000$ Rolex for the price of 10 000$, I buy the watch without having any guarantee of authenticity and notice later it is worthless. Am I entitled to my money back?
• if I bought a house knowing I would sell it and knowing the price will NOT depend on my neighbor's house value then I am entitled to compensation (by my neighbor or by the person I bought the house from initially), it's a breech of contract

[TheRobin]

Just cause someon is responsible for their actions doesn't mean they're responsible to compensate others for their loss as a result of those actions.

[Pelafina]

Just cause someon is responsible for their actions doesn't mean they're responsible to compensate others for their loss as a result of those actions.

If this is true, then using the word "responsible" is meaningless.  If I say that one is responsible for their actions of theft -- then you can reply -- yes, they are responsible, but they don't need to compensate the victim for their loss.

 

Why does Stefan use the word "responsible" when he says people are responsible for the effects of their actions?  I don't think he realizes that he is being a utilitarian.

[TheRobin]

so responsibility means, others owe you stuff?

 

I'm currently responsible for posting this message. Who do I owe compensation for that then?

[Pelafina]

so responsibility means, others owe you stuff?

 

I'm currently responsible for posting this message. Who do I owe compensation for that then?

You are responsible for your actions.  The action of posting doesn't violate the NAP.

 

But, according to Stefan, you are responsible for the EFFECTS of your actions, which means that even if you don't violate the NAP -- you are to be held responsible.

[TheRobin]

so the EFFECT of my action of posting here is, that this post now appears, right? Again, what would that possibly have got to do with others now being able to ask me for some sort of compensation (and for what?)?

[dsayers]

This thread confuses me. For starters, owning the effects of your actions follows self-ownership. Saying we own ourselves is no more utilitarian than saying 2+2=4. There is no reference to how useful those facts are.

 

Additionally, I'm unclear why you'd use "A neighbor fails to maintain his house" as an example since this references inaction.

 

If person A assaults person B, we don't say that person C is responsible. It's person A's assault. This is all that is meant by owning the effects of your actions.

 

I'm intensely confused on the fixation of utilitarianism as it's not present except where you've tried to inject it.

[Pelafina]

There are two types of libertarians.  Moralists and consequentialists/utilitarians.

 

Moralists believe that you're responsible for your actions and that the ends don't justify the means.

 

Consequentialists/utilitarians believe that you're responsible for the effects of your actions and that the ends justify the means.

 

Do you see the difference?  Stefan should be saying that "you're responsible for your actions" since he is a moralist.  

[TheRobin]

So if I stab someone, I'm responsible for moving my arm, but not for the wound that subsequently opened as an effect of me moving my arm? (and since, arm-moving does't violate the NAP...)

[logic32]

Here's the point Pelafina is making.Let's say you started a successful boycott in an ancap state against black people resulting in 100,000 of them starving. This would not breach the NAP. However, their starving was an effect of your actions. So you are responsible for their starving. You 'own' their starving as Stefan would put it. (An example he gives in UPB is that of 'owning a murder', i.e. being morally responsible for that murder.)But there appears to be some dissonance in saying both that you are morally responsible for their starving, and the fact that you have not violated the NAP and so have acted permissibly. The first appears to be consequentialist, the second deontological. What's the solution?

[Brentb]

There are two types of libertarians.  Moralists and consequentialists/utilitarians.

 

Moralists believe that you're responsible for your actions and that the ends don't justify the means.

 

Consequentialists/utilitarians believe that you're responsible for the effects of your actions and that the ends justify the means.

 

Do you see the difference?  Stefan should be saying that "you're responsible for your actions" since he is a moralist.  

 

Not all responsibilities are moral responsibilities.

 

For example, I'm responsible for what I say to my friends because I value the relationship. Being responsible in that case is not required for morality, but for maintaining something that I value. 

 

Similarly, if someone really values the relationship with his neighbors, then he will take responsibility for the effects of his actions. He's not morally obligated to do so, but if he doesn't, then he may not like the ostracism he receives as a result.

[Pelafina]

Here's the point Pelafina is making.Let's say you started a successful boycott in an ancap state against black people resulting in 100,000 of them starving. This would not breach the NAP. However, their starving was an effect of your actions. So you are responsible for their starving. You 'own' their starving as Stefan would put it. (An example he gives in UPB is that of 'owning a murder', i.e. being morally responsible for that murder.)But there appears to be some dissonance in saying both that you are morally responsible for their starving, and the fact that you have not violated the NAP and so have acted permissibly. The first appears to be consequentialist, the second deontological. What's the solution?

 

I believe that the correct libertarian position is the deontological one.  Don't violate the NAP, that's it.  In your example the boycotter did not initiate force or theft and therefore should have no legal consequences.

 

This is what Stefan believes in, but erroneously he says "you are responsible for the effects of your actions". 

[dsayers]

Moralists believe that you're responsible for your actions and that the ends don't justify the means.

 

Consequentialists/utilitarians believe that you're responsible for the effects of your actions and that the ends justify the means.

 

Maybe the problem is that you're talking in terms of beliefs in matters of fact. To initiate the use of force is immoral. This is true. Somebody who initiates the use of force is responsible for that immorality. This is also true. You can reject that 2+2=4, but this doesn't make it my belief.

 

I still don't see the distinction you're trying to make. Going back to the scenario where person A assaults person B, that's person A's assault. If person B suffers injury such as a broken bone, person A is responsible for that, because it is an effect of their immoral action. How is this inconsistent to you?

[AustinJames]

Let's say you started a successful boycott in an ancap state against black people resulting in 100,000 of them starving. This would not breach the NAP. However, their starving was an effect of your actions. So you are responsible for their starving. You 'own' their starving as Stefan would put it.

 

No, you don't own their starving.  Rather, you own your personal boycott; you own them not receiving food by your hand only.  Their starvation is not a direct effect of the act of one's personal boycott, it's an indirect consequence, compounded by the actions of everyone else in society. No individual would have the power to single-handedly restrict the allocation of food in a free society; that power would be inevitably distributed throughout society.  Each individual is responsible only for the interactions he/she participates in.  Once the action is compounded by the action of others, the responsibility shifts.

 

To say one owns the effects of their actions is not to say that they are responsible for the ultimate consequences of their actions.  If I plant a tree, and years later someone drives into the tree and is killed, I am not responsible for their death, though it can be argued that their death was the ultimate consequence of my planting the tree.  The circumstance is compounded by the decisions made by the individual who crashed into the tree, and many other factors.

[DFPercush]

One person alone can not be responsible for a boycott, and boycotts don't usually kill people. You mention "in an ancap state" so is this a state-enforced boycott? Well then we're in the realm of coercion and none of this applies. Plus there are usually enough people who are not participating in the boycott in order for group X to continue to function. If there's not, maybe they really do deserve it (general case, not saying that's true for any particular ethnic group.) I mean, if you or your organization pisses off EVERY single damn person around you, and no one wants to interact with you - that's economic ostracism, that's how we can deal with criminals etc. Whatever heady philosophical terminology you want to give that idc, but boycotting is entirely a voluntary action (except for children of religious families, no Disney for j00).

[june]

Their starvation is not a direct effect of the act of one's personal boycott, it's an indirect consequence, compounded by the actions of everyone else in society. 

 

 

 

If I plant a tree, and years later someone drives into the tree and is killed, I am not responsible for their death, though it can be argued that their death was the ultimate consequence of my planting the tree.  The circumstance is compounded by the decisions made by the individual who crashed into the tree, and many other factors.

specifically, what is the distinction between "direct effect" and "indirect consequence"?like, the example i have in my head is an adult places a little baby on a highway, and 2 minutes later a car drives over and kills the baby. the adult didn't "directly" engage in the violent act, because the baby being run over was just an "indirect consequence", and therefore the adult holds no accountability (right?)

[Brentb]

Maybe the problem is that you're talking in terms of beliefs in matters of fact. To initiate the use of force is immoral. This is true. Somebody who initiates the use of force is responsible for that immorality. This is also true. You can reject that 2+2=4, but this doesn't make it my belief.

 

I still don't see the distinction you're trying to make. Going back to the scenario where person A assaults person B, that's person A's assault. If person B suffers injury such as a broken bone, person A is responsible for that, because it is an effect of their immoral action. How is this inconsistent to you?

 

Building off of the above, I understand it as:

 

If one party is using force, or is in a position that is supported by force (such as a parent, or a government agent), that party is not only responsible for their actions but the effects of their actions.

 

Force is automatic for parents & governments since the children and citizens don't have the power to make their own choices about the relationship.

 

So when Stefan is saying that certain people are morally responsible for the effects of their actions, then it's probably in the context of some forced relationship. 

[dsayers]

If one party is using force, or is in a position that is supported by force

 

You know, those in power are able to fool as many people as they do as effectively as they do by using obfuscation. While maybe not deliberately, you are obfuscating the discussion in ways that are not necessary or useful. Here, you speak of force as if it is enough information. A rapist uses force, but so do the people that stop them. One is righteous, the other is violent. It's like talking about somebody starting a fire. Are they committing arson or cooking a life-sustaining meal? All the difference in the world.

 

I've made deliberate efforts to keep the conversation clear and concise. Could you please address the scenario I provided and answer my question as to where you feel the inconsistency lies? I'm several posts in and do not feel I have any better a grasp on what you're trying to accomplish.

[Marblemarrow]

I think there needs to be a distinction of deliberate consequence and accidental consequence. Let's consider a scenario where I stroll on a hill and I kick a rock that detaches from the rest of the stony body, rolls down the hill, hits a person in the neck and kills him/her. I'm going to use the word "guilty" as a subset of responsible and by guilty I mean something that is morally responsible and therefore the one to compensate for the loss of the victim and all the rest of that jazz.Now first of all, if there's no connection between sentience and consequence in moral responsibility then the rock would be guilty for killing the guy directly among other things that have caused the rock, physically, to ultimately kill the guy. So, empirically, there is some connection in sentience, consequence in responsibility in the moral context because the rock is not penalized for the death of the given person. Also, given that the rock physically caused the death of this person, everything physically connected to the rock ultimately rolling down the hill would be equally guilty.

 

Science tells us that everything is physically connected to everything: Gravitation field among other fields cover everything, also, in general everything in the whole timeline of the universe would've made this event possible since the end state of things (the death of this guy) would not have been in the same universe, ergo same in general, were the universe's past even slightly different. Moreover you could say that the guy is responsible for coming to the place where he was killed and thus guilty of his/her own death. If that were the case the whole concept of being guilty of something would be completely obsolete, since the whole concept of guilt is meant to differentiate the victim and the perpetrator in order to establish who is to pay whom the compensation etc. I think this sides Stefan's argument against determinism.In the case where I kick the rock down the hill accidentally, I would be in the equivalent situation as the rock; physically connected to the event but not sentient in regard to the consequences, and me being guilty in that case would be absolutely meaningless following the logic of the previous paragraph. So I might be called responsible for the effect (killing the guy), if by responsibility you mean a mere physical connection to the situation and not necessarily a moral responsibility.

 

However, if I kick the rock deliberately in an attempt to kill the guy, I'd argue I'm guilty for killing the guy. In that case I can't say that I was like the rock in that I was unaware of the situation and thus indistinguishable from the rest of the universe in the context of moral responsibility, and so I think that makes me single-handedly morally responsible for the death of this guy. This also implies that weren't there a special connection between sentience and responsibility, morality in general would be obsolete.

 

Regardless, OP, you raised an immensely important issue of ethics. This could be turned into determinism vs free will too. Ironically, I tend to incline towards determinism and the argument I just made was not necessarily my own belief but an interpretation of what the statement Stef made about responsibility might have meant.

[AustinJames]

specifically, what is the distinction between "direct effect" and "indirect consequence"?like, the example i have in my head is an adult places a little baby on a highway, and 2 minutes later a car drives over and kills the baby. the adult didn't "directly" engage in the violent act, because the baby being run over was just an "indirect consequence", and therefore the adult holds no accountability (right?)

 

Wrong.  There is no ambiguity in my comment, and I don't know why you're trying to inject some.  The terms are self-defining.  A direct effect of an action can be inevitably and mathematically connected to the action itself.  An indirect consequence of an action is not inevitably connected solely to the action, and requires more factors to come about than the original action.  The direct effect of placing a baby on a road is: the baby becomes endangered.  If the baby is harmed, the adult is accountable for it because it was a direct consequence of the adult's actions.  If there was someone driving drunk that hits the baby that might have otherwise avoided it, they are also accountable.  If an adult places a baby on a swing-set that subsequently is struck by lightening, they are not accountable for the baby being harmed, because the harm would be an indirect consequence of the adult's actions.

[cynicist]

Stefan has said many times that we are responsible for the effects of our actions, but isn't this a consequentialist perspective?  I thought that Stefan subscribes to deontological ethics, not utilitarianism.

 

Example - A neighbor fails to maintain his house and the property value of your house drops as a result.  According to consequentialism, the neighbor is responsible for your loss.  

 

But according to the NAP and libertarian theory, one does not own the value of their property and therefore the neighbor is not responsible for the drop in price that others are willing to pay for your house.

 

So are we responsible for our actions or the effects of our actions?

 

We are, but not every action falls into the 'moral' category, which is what you are implying in your argument when you bring up "consequentialist perspective". (which deals specifically with moral action) Just because you are responsible for lowering the value of your neighbor's house indirectly, through for example not taking care of your own property, doesn't mean there is an obligation on you to do anything about it. Contrast this with one neighbor destroying another neighbor's yard and lowering the value that way, and now you have something that is morally actionable. (ethics specifically deals with enforceable preferences)

[june]

A direct effect of an action can be inevitably and mathematically connected to the action itself.  An indirect consequence of an action is not inevitably connected solely to the action, and requires more factors to come about than the original action. 

but my point is: where do you draw the line between the two? at what point specific point does the consequence become "indirect" from the persons action, and thus morally permissable? 

The direct effect of placing a baby on a road is: the baby becomes endangered.  If the baby is harmed, the adult is accountable for it because it was a direct consequence of the adult's actions.  

you saying it is a "direct consequence" is just a statement. you havent qualified the distinctions youre making. one could just as easily make the counter-argument that: the direct effect of placing a baby on a road is that the baby gets placed a road. an indirect consequence of placing a baby on a road may be that the baby gets run over.so what is your specific distinction between "direct" and "indirect"?

[AustinJames]

 

but my point is: where do you draw the line between the two? at what point specific point does the consequence become "indirect" from the persons action, and thus morally permissable? 

the direct effect of placing a baby on a road is that the baby gets placed a road. an indirect consequence of placing a baby on a road may be that the baby gets run over.so what is your specific distinction between "direct" and "indirect"?

 

 

The distinction is made by the level of control had by the actor in any given situation.  I have no control over lightning, and I have no control of the actions of others.  If I have control over the placement of a baby, and if I place it in the middle of a road, I am accountable for placing the baby in that endangered position.  If I have no reason to believe that I am endangering the baby, and it is harmed by the actions of others, or by some act of nature, I am not accountable for the harm brought to the child.

 

I have control over the allocation of my financial resources.  If I choose not to do business with a person, I cannot be held accountable for the subsequent misfortune that may negatively effect that person; I can only be held accountable for the interaction in which I was involved.

[june]

The distinction is made by the level of control had by the actor in any given situation.

and what amount of control separates "direct" from "indirect"?you still haven't made this distinction, and your arguments can't advance until they are properly qualified. 

 I have no control over lightning, and I have no control of the actions of others.

but you have control over the choice to put yourself in more vulnerable positions to lightening or not. is it still an "indirect consequence" if you go outside and hold your baby beside a large metal rod? there is no answer to this question because you have yet to make the distinction between "direct" and "indirect".

[AustinJames]

and what amount of control separates "direct" from "indirect"?you still haven't made this distinction, and your arguments can't advance until they are properly qualified.

 

I have made this distinction, but I'll make it again, more succinctly.

 

Any amount of control renders the separation.  The amount of control determines the level of accountability.  If one has no control, there can be no accountability.  If one has complete control, they are fully accountable.  If one has control, there is direct effect.  If one has no control, there can only be indirect consequence; this is the distinction.

 

 

 

but you have control over the choice to put yourself in more vulnerable positions to lightening or not. is it still an "indirect consequence" if you go outside and hold your baby beside a large metal rod? there is no answer to this question because you have yet to make the distinction between "direct" and "indirect".

 

I have provided answer to this circumstance, and your failure to acknowledge it leads me to question your intentions in this conversation.  

 

If you are holding a baby beside a large metal rod during a lightning storm, you are putting the baby in an endangered position, for which you are accountable (excluding any ridiculous caveats you may concoct).  You have a responsibility to know what is safe and what is unsafe in regard to the child.  If you do not ascertain the appropriate and available knowledge, you are neglectful, and are responsible for being neglectful.  If you have the appropriate and available knowledge, and still put the baby in an endangered position, you are responsible for deliberately putting the child in danger.  You have control over the child, so what happens to the child in result to your actions is a direct consequence.

 

I'm interested to know what your childhood was like, and if you have children.

[june]

If you are holding a baby beside a large metal rod during a lightning storm, you are putting the baby in an endangered position, for which you are accountable.  You have a responsibility to know what is safe and what is unsafe in regard to the child. 

so now because you stood next to a metal pole, you are in some control of the lightening? but what separates this metal pole from walking in the street, from standing beside a car, a tree or a barn?with this line of reasoning it can be argued that you unless you stand in an area that has the lowest possibility of being hit by lightening (some underground bunker made from special material), then you do have some control over the baby being hit by lightening, because you didn't take the absolute 100% best precautions against it. anything less than 100% means you had some control over the consequence.you arguments need to specifically define "control", because as of now this vague usage is muddling your claims. 

[AustinJames]

so now because you stood next to a metal pole, you are in some control of the lightening? 

 

No.  You are in control of the baby.

 

 

 

with this line of reasoning it can be argued that you unless you stand in an area that has the lowest possibility of being hit by lightening (some underground bunker made from special material), then you do have some control over the baby being hit by lightening, because you didn't take the absolute 100% best precautions against it. anything less than 100% means you had some control over the consequence.you arguments need to specifically define "control", because as of now this vague usage is muddling your claims. 

 

Non sequitur.  You're talking about two different things: my having control over lightning, and my having control over the baby being hit by lightning.  I have no control over lightning.  I have some degree of control over the baby being hit by lightening.  The degree of control determines the degree of accountability.  I get the idea that you're not making an attempt to understand ownership, but rather more interested in argumentum ad absurdum in attempt to debunk the reality of accountability; these seem like thinly veiled arguments for determinism.  I'm tired of repeating myself. I recommend you reread these posts once you've had some time to absorb the meaning.  I won't be continuing on this thread until I see some curiosity, or at the very least your own arguments and proofs.  You keep moving the goal posts, and you continue to ignore the valid counterpoints I have offered.

[june]

Non sequitur.  You're talking about two different things: my having control over lightning, and my having control over the baby being hit by lightning.  I have no control over lightning.  I have some degree of control over the baby being hit by lightening.  The degree of control determines the degree of accountability. 

lets take a look at two statements you made earlier:

 

 

 

If an adult places a baby on a swing-set that subsequently is struck by lightening, they are not accountable for the baby being harmed, because the harm would be an indirect consequence of the adult's actions.

If you are holding a baby beside a large metal rod during a lightning storm, you are putting the baby in an endangered position, for which you are accountable.  You have a responsibility to know what is safe and what is unsafe in regard to the child.  

both scenarios, you are in control of the baby.

both scenarios, the baby is struck by lightening.

you claim the 2nd parent is accountable, whilst the 1st is not.

 

so how can you claim that the 2nd parent is accountable whilst the 1st is not? what is your distinction between the two? are both not exerting control in this scenario, and therefore are accountable? 

 

it has been made explicitly clear that this distinction is what your argument is lacking, and yet you continue with these vague disruptive comments where you play the victim, throw ad-homs, and show general behaviours that radiate a reluctance to actually stick to the argument. that's all i ask: stick the argument.

[AustinJames]

lets take a look at two statements you made earlier: 

both scenarios, you are in control of the baby.

both scenarios, the baby is struck by lightening.you claim the 2nd parent is accountable, whilst the 1st is not. 

so how can you claim that the 2nd parent is accountable whilst the 1st is not? what is your distinction between the two? are both not exerting control in this scenario, and therefore are accountable? 

 

Correct.  They are both accountable for their actions, and the effects of their actions, but not for all the consequences of their actions.  Placing a baby on a swing-set during a lightning storm is either a neglectful or malicious thing to do.  Placing a baby on a swing-set in calm weather conditions is not neglectful nor malicious. The level of control is also related to the knowledge 

possessed by the individual.

 

Your proposition is akin to:

 

1) A man invites another man on a hiking trip, and the man who was invited is mauled by a bear.

2) A man ties another man to a tree, who is then mauled by a bear.

 

Do you really not see the difference between the two, or are you just being obtuse?  If you do see a difference, how would you articulate it, that is different from how I have?  If you do not see the distinction at all, there's not much I can do for you.

 

 

 

it has been made explicitly clear that this distinction is what your argument is lacking, and yet you continue with these vague disruptive comments where you play the victim, throw ad-homs, and show general behaviours that radiate a reluctance to actually stick to the argument. that's all i ask: stick the argument.

 

I have made the distinction.  The reason you are unable to comprehend it may be buried in some past trauma, and I think this is well worth addressing.  Your interpretation of my comments as 'ad hominem' is evidence of this, as is your assertion that I "play the victim;" they are blatant projections, not arguments.

[june]

Correct.  They are both accountable for their actions, and the effects of their actions, but not for all the consequences of their actions.

you still are not actually making a distinction! you are just making statements that things are different, but not explaining why! when a person makes an action, they invariably have an effect on every action from then until forever. there is no separation between these effects in the material world. it is you who is attempting to make a distinction in the moral world by differentiating between accountability, but you are not describing the process by which you do this. you're just saying it is so.how you distinguish between holding someone accountable for 'the effects of their actions' and 'all the effects of their actions'? what are your qualifiers? 

[AustinJames]

Apparently my answers are not satisfying to you.  I guess I'll bow out.

[cynicist]

Christ that was painful to read. If you need to have it explained to you why placing a baby in the middle of a road is a direct and malicious act then you seriously need help. That's like saying if you put a baby in front of a pack of lions you are not responsible for the baby being eaten because the lions are the ones who did the mauling. The child would not have been in that dangerous situation without your DIRECT INTERVENTION.

 

Brb, just having a brain aneurysm...

[june]

Apparently my answers are not satisfying to you.  I guess I'll bow out.

you have failed to provide an answer for how "direct" and "indirect" effects are to be distinguished from one and another.

 

If you need to have it explained to you why placing a baby in the middle of a road is a direct and malicious act then you seriously need help. 

it needs to be explained within the context of "we own (the effects of?) our actions", which is what this thread is about.

 

That's like saying if you put a baby in front of a pack of lions you are not responsible for the baby being eaten because the lions are the ones who did the mauling. The child would not have been in that dangerous situation without your DIRECT INTERVENTION.

the direct action is the placing of a baby in a certain area.

an indirect (or direct?) effect of that action is lions mauling the baby.

 

AustinJames failed to specify how the mauling is to be defined as an indirect or direct effect of the action of placing the baby. 

 

to look at it another way, here is your quote edited into a more grey scenario:

 

That's like saying if you put a baby on the ground you are not responsible for the baby being struck by lightening because the lightening is the one who did the killing. The child would not have been in that dangerous situation without your DIRECT INTERVENTION.

is the parent still responsible for the effects of their direct action? if not, why, what distinguishes this example from your lion example, specifically?

[cynicist]

AustinJames failed to specify how the mauling is to be defined as an indirect or direct effect of the action of placing the baby. 

 

The fact that the situation could not occur without your direct intervention is what makes it direct. Accidents, where you did not or could not know and subsequently act accordingly, are different.

 

is the parent still responsible for the effects of their direct action? if not, why, what distinguishes this example from your lion example, specifically?

 

Are there storm clouds? Do you see streaks of lightning? Then that opens up the possibility of being electrocuted and makes the situation dangerous. Don't knowingly and willingly put your baby in dangerous situations when you have the choice not to do so. You are trying to make this complicated when it is not...