(Yet another) Question on UPB

[Erik_T]

This is my understanding of UPB, and where I have confusion regarding it. I will use two propositions to demonstrate my confusion. Any feedback or corrections are welcome.

In proposition A, I will use a positive action (meaning something that requires the performance of an action), murder. In proposition B, I will use another positive action, marriage.

 

Proposition A:

It cannot be universally preferable to murder, therefore, any moral proposition that claims that one should murder is invalidated.

Explanation:

We know that murder cannot be universally preferable, because the moment that it becomes universally preferable, i.e. everyone wants to kill and be killed, it is no longer murder, but something like assisted suicide. Also, it is an impossibility of reality that everyone could be killing while being killed at the same time. Understood.

Similarily, the same applies to Proposition B:

 It cannot be universally preferable to get married, therefore, any moral proposition that claims that one should get married is invalidated.

Explanation:

Clearly, not everyone can get married.  It seems highly unlikely that there will ever be a perfect 50/50 ration of men and women in the world, all of whom are of marrying age and desirability. Even considering gay populations, there is no guarantee that there will be an even number of gay males and lesbians at once. Therefore, if one could only be moral through marriage, then not everyone would be able to be moral simply through circumstance.

 

Now, let’s examine the opposite of these propositions.

 

Proposition A (passive):

It can be universally preferable to not murder, therefore, any moral proposition that claims that one should not murder is validated.

Explanation:

  Because murder cannot be universally preferable, but its opposite (not murdering) can be, then under UPB (or what I understand of it) not murdering is always the ethical choice, and can be adhered to universally. I don’t think anyone would disagree with this. Both the positive and passive follow naturally, with the inaction of it being wrong, and the non-action of it being good.

Now, we’ll try to apply it to marriage.

Propositon B (passive):

  It can be universally preferable to not get married, therefore, any moral proposition that claims that one should not marry is validated.

Explanation:

  This is where things get weird for me. By using the same criteria as murder, as in it is impossible for everyone to marry but not impossible for everyone to not get married, we see that the positive and passive do not directly follow one another. Clearly, there is nothing wrong with two people voluntarily agreeing upon a contract; that’s why Proposition B (passive) seems so ridiculous, were as Proposition A (passive) is reasonable. Is the only difference, then, between the two that force is being initiated in A and not in B? If that is true, then what purpose is there in showing the impossibility of unethical behaviors being universally applied, when ethically neutral behaviors can also prove difficult, if not impossible, in being universally applied? Could UPB then simply be summed as , “Moral propositions that require positive action cannot be universally applied and validated, and the initiation of force is wrong”? Now, I understand that UPB attempts to show how the initiation of force is wrong through its inability to be universal, but when other things like marriage cannot also be universal, it makes it difficult to understand what the distinction is between the two, other than that one requires the initiation of force and the other does not. This takes us back to square one again where all we have is the statement “the initiation of force is wrong”. When attempting to show why the initiation of force is wrong through UPB, we once again run into scenarios were ethically neutral behaviors hold the same criteria as unethical ones, except that one requires the initiation of force and the other does not. Now, as you can see through my writing, the argument seems to become circular. How can the initiation of force be shown to be objectively wrong, while at the same time leaving things like marriage, alligator wresting, or banana eating as neutral?

  Sorry for the long post, but I didn’t feel it possible to condense it any. I look forward to the destruction of my arguments

[Songbirdo]

How do you define marriage?

 

Clearly, not everyone can get married.

Why not? - polygamy.

And what about getting married then divorced immediately? You got married (if not only for five seconds) and then unmarried. Kind of a meaningless gesture, but you could still do it at birth and everyone could be moral without much of a hitch.

 

This is why defining your terms is important. Do you mean between only two people, once, and for all time? What is marriage?

[TDB]

We know that murder cannot be universally preferable, because the moment that it becomes universally preferable, i.e. everyone wants to kill and be killed,

<quibble> universally preferred != everyone wants to</quibble>

It cannot be universally preferable to get married,

No proposition about getting married counts as a moral proposition as part of UPB, because there is nothing enforceable about it. It would fall within the category of aesthetics, unless we are talking about shotgun weddings.

Could UPB then simply be summed as , “Moral propositions that require positive action cannot be universally applied and validated, and the initiation of force is wrong”?[...] How can the initiation of force be shown to be objectively wrong, while at the same time leaving things like marriage, alligator wresting, or banana eating as neutral?

Stef bases the separation of ethics from aesthetics on the idea of avoidance. I would try to explain, but I also do not really understand that yet myself. At first glance, it seems random, ad hoc, arbitrary. "Aesthetics applies to situations that may be unpleasant, but which do not eliminate your capacity to choose." How does capacity to choose relate to the UPB derivation? We can't argue if we have no capacity to choose? I like it, but where does this come from?

[square4]

If that is true, then what purpose is there in showing the impossibility of unethical behaviors being universally applied, when ethically neutral behaviors can also prove difficult, if not impossible, in being universally applied?

 

There are three possibilities: a behavior is always required, sometimes required, or never required. If we make sure we do not generalize away ethically relevant aspects of the behavior, the category "sometimes required" is empty. Then we can say, if something is not always required, it must be never required. If something is only a personal preference, then everyone else can have a legitimate opposite preference.

 

So the violent action amounts to imposing unavoidably a non-required preference on another. How can we show that this is not morally neutral? If it is not wrong for me to violently impose my preference on you, then it is not wrong for you to violently impose your (possibly opposite) preference on me. Based on the reasonable assumption that if two persons attack each other, at least one must be wrong, then it follows that enforcing a non-required preference is morally wrong.

 

Another approach could be this: The violent action could be interpreted as a message. When someone uses violence against another, this could be seen as enforcing a rule that the victim "must" move in this or that way. We could try to test if the imposed rule can be a valid moral rule or not.

[TDB]

Based on the reasonable assumption that if two persons attack each other, at least one must be wrong, then it follows that enforcing a non-required preference is morally wrong.

I think this needs unpacking, but I am having trouble. Maybe I can paraphrase:If a violent conflict breaks out between two persons, one of them must be morally in the wrong. The person who causes the transition from non-violent to violent interaction is in the wrong.This needs some tidying up, to cover cases such as theft that may not be strictly violent. We also have to deal with the case of a boxing match, in which 2 persons attack each other but no one is morally in the wrong.How does UPB show us that one of the persons must be wrong? Perhaps when he tries to justify his attack, he somehow contradicts himself? So argument presupposes a norm of non-violence, or perhaps non-initiation? This is because using violence to "win" a debate actually transforms it from a debate into a brawl, and a brawl has none of the truth-seeking aspects of debate.Am I close?

[square4]

I think this needs unpacking, but I am having trouble. Maybe I can paraphrase:If a violent conflict breaks out between two persons, one of them must be morally in the wrong.

 

Or both are in the wrong.

 

The person who causes the transition from non-violent to violent interaction is in the wrong.

 

This is not part of the assumption I was proposing. Otherwise, that would be assuming the NAP, and it is of little use to prove NAP using NAP as assumption.

 

This needs some tidying up, to cover cases such as theft that may not be strictly violent.

 

In the situation I was describing, I assumed it was already established using some other means that one party was violently enforcing something non-required on another. Because refraining from theft is required, my argumentation does not apply to theft.

 

The more formalized argumentation is: Suppose person X imposes a non-required preference on person Y (e.g. that X murders Y), and Y tries to impose the negation of the preference on X (e.g. that X does not murder Y). The preference of Y cannot be banned, because that would make the negated preference, which X has, required, but we know it is not required. So the preference of Y is either neutral or required. Then use the assumption that one or both must be in the wrong when they are using violence against each other. If Y is in the wrong, this means it is wrong to violently impose a preference that is either neutral or required. But then it follows that X is also in the wrong, because what X is doing is equivalent or worse. So based on this assumption, it follows that X is in the wrong, and consequently that violently imposing a non-required preference is morally wrong.

 

How does UPB show us that one of the persons must be wrong? Perhaps when he tries to justify his attack, he somehow contradicts himself? So argument presupposes a norm of non-violence, or perhaps non-initiation?

 

I think argumentation ethics is not a convincing argument, because it relies on other assumptions that are less certain than what it seeks to prove, but maybe I don't fully grasp the argument. It is very difficult to show what is right and wrong, starting from zero, without relying implicitly on some basic values or assumptions. What we can do is try to make the assumptions explicit and as little contentious as possible. Even a statist could agree that if two people attack each other, one of them must be in the wrong. So it could be a useful assumption to use among those that agree with it.

[TDB]

  This is not part of the assumption I was proposing. Otherwise, that would be assuming the NAP, and it is of little use to prove NAP using NAP as assumption.

I don't know where you were going with this, I thought we were already assuming UPB? I've been trying to understand why Stef uses avoidance to distinguish between ethics and aesthetics. Or rarther, where he derives that distinction, and how. Maybe that lured me off the path.

I think argumentation ethics is not a convincing argument, because it relies on other assumptions that are less certain than what it seeks to prove,

Link to details?Would I be in the ballpark if I paraphrased it as, argumentation ethics is complicated and rubegoldbergy?

[square4]

Perhaps when he tries to justify his attack, he somehow contradicts himself? So argument presupposes a norm of non-violence, or perhaps non-initiation? This is because using violence to "win" a debate actually transforms it from a debate into a brawl, and a brawl has none of the truth-seeking aspects of debate.

 

I see the following problem with this: It assumes there is no fundamental difference between the debate situation and the debated situation. In the debate situation, we should try to find out what is justice (truth-seeking), in the debated situation, we should do what is justice.

 

Actually, argumentation ethics, as advocated by Hoppe, is something different. An interesting analysis of it and its problems can be found here.

[TDB]

I see the following problem with this: It assumes there is no fundamental difference between the debate situation and the debated situation.

Assumes, or derives elsewhere?My paraphrase of your objection is, why can't someone conform to the premises and norms of debate during the debate, and abandon them in other circumstances? Is that like saying "2 + 2 = 4 only when it is convenient to me?" Or is it more like saying, "when I want truth I debate, when I want safety I use overwhelming force?" Either you accept the premises and norms of debate, or you don't, at least, according to UPB. With premises this seems clear, a proposition is either true or false. (We can quibble about facts about particular times, circumstances, and places, but I doubt the premises of debate contain those.) With norms, maybe not. Stef has a strong position on universality of norms, but we might be able to convince ordinary people that the norms of argumentation are like rules of a game, they can change when you decide to play a different game, or stop playing. So we need an argument establishing universality, which I have made a feeble attempt at elsewhere. ( http://brimpossible.blogspot.com/2014/02/strong-universality-in-upb.html)Why does arguing require me to obey the norms in the first place? Take non-initiation of force as an example. If I win an argument by threatening or attacking another participant, I lose credibility. It is no longer a debate, but a brawl, no longer about discovering truth, but about dominance. Winning the debate no longer establishes the truth of anything, even in a weak sense. It may be that I argue on weekdays and brawl on weekends, but (according to UPB) if I argue for initiation of force, that is always a contradiction. Change the identity of the person making the argument, or the time of day, or day of the year, or year, or location, still it contradicts itself. So I can do what I wish, I just can't justify it using argument if it supports initiation of force.Do I really contradict myself if I argue that someone else, in some context other than debate, is justified in initiating force for some purpose other than seeking truth? Must I embrace a very broad norm in order to be able to argue consistently? So, to restate your objection again, we can imagine narrow or broad norms of debate, how does Stef argue for his embrace of universal norms of debate?For example, say I wanted to argue that Obama can justify droning Kim Dotcom. Ignore the justification, am I contradicting myself merely by using argument to justify an act of aggression? The narrow interpretation says no, since Obama is not debating with Dotcom or trying to establish truth, the norms of debate do not apply. The broad interpretation says the norms of debate always apply, as if we are all debating at all times and places, and all our actions are part of this debate.If an argument works for me, it should work for Obama. If it works against you, it should work against Dotcom. So we can imagine a debate where Obama uses my words to justify killing Dotcom, with Dotcom as his opponent. Is Obama contradicting the norms of debate by saying effectively, "After the debate is over, I will kill you, and I justify this with the following reasons?" For now, I am not comfortable with either position. maybe you guys can help me out.

Actually, argumentation ethics, as advocated by Hoppe, is something different. An interesting analysis of it and its problems can be found here.

That link is quite a rabbit hole. Searching around, I found a link that refers to the critique of Hoppe coauthored by. Bob Murphy, is that what you had in mind? https://mises.org/journals/jls/20_2/20_2_3.pdf Hoppe uses a similar performative contradiction move, but he tries to prove the NAP and property rights directly, while Stef maybe is more modest. When I read Hoppe way back when, he did not convince me. But Murphy's critiques don't convince me either. I should probably blog about that.

[square4]

My paraphrase of your objection is, why can't someone conform to the premises and norms of debate during the debate, and abandon them in other circumstances? Is that like saying "2 + 2 = 4 only when it is convenient to me?" Or is it more like saying, "when I want truth I debate, when I want safety I use overwhelming force?"

 

The normal course of action is that during a debate, we exchange ideas, and honestly try to find out what is the truth, and what is the right thing to do. Then after the debate, we deliberate it (but not endlessly), and if we are convinced, then we act on it. Those actions might effect other people, even our debate opponents. When we decide to act (instead of remaining idle), then those actions can no longer be influenced by new insights or information. Does this mean we have abandoned the search for truth? No, it is the normal rational procedure, first deliberation, then action. If we have the correct opinion, then acting on it means doing justice.

 

Suppose someone has stolen something from you non-violently (without initiating force). You talk to him, but fail to convince him to give it back peacefully. After the conversation, is it inconsistent and unjustified to grab his arm (initiate force) and recover your property? So even if you could prove it, it would imply a total ban on force applied to another human being, even non-violent force.

 

Searching around, I found a link that refers to the critique of Hoppe coauthored by. Bob Murphy, is that what you had in mind? https://mises.org/journals/jls/20_2/20_2_3.pdf

 

I had not yet read it. It is better and more rigorous than the article I linked to.

[Erik_T]

Stef bases the separation of ethics from aesthetics on the idea of avoidance.

Ah, right. I had completely forgotten how important the concept of avoidance is to UPB.

For instance, if a person calls up another individual and threatens to rape that individual, of course the potential victim will take action to ensure this does not occur. If the potential victim, however, tells his or her potential rapist where to find the hidden key to open the door, then lies naked in bed, I think the definition of this situation would change from rape to consensual sex. As soon as one purposefully aids in facilitating an act done against him or herself, that person can no longer be deemed a victim (as long as he or she is considered to have the ability to make decisions for him or herself and can be responsible for them).

[labmath2]

Ah, right. I had completely forgotten how important the concept of avoidance is to UPB.

For instance, if a person calls up another individual and threatens to rape that individual, of course the potential victim will take action to ensure this does not occur. If the potential victim, however, tells his or her potential rapist where to find the hidden key to open the door, then lies naked in bed, I think the definition of this situation would change from rape to consensual sex. As soon as one purposefully aids in facilitating an act done against him or herself, that person can no longer be deemed a victim (as long as he or she is considered to have the ability to make decisions for him or herself and can be responsible for them).

 

That is tricky because it creates the situation where we blame victim for doing certain things that aids the criminal. 

Examples: If you were not dressed like that you would not have been raped. If you were not stupid enough to invest in a fraudulent business you would not have been duped. If you had moved out of the bad neighborhood, your wife and daughter might still be alive. IF you lived in the wilderness by yourself, then other people's actions would minimally impact you.

 

Lets just say it is not a good road to go down.

[Erik_T]

That is tricky because it creates the situation where we blame victim for doing certain things that aids the criminal. 

Examples: If you were not dressed like that you would not have been raped. If you were not stupid enough to invest in a fraudulent business you would not have been duped. If you had moved out of the bad neighborhood, your wife and daughter might still be alive. IF you lived in the wilderness by yourself, then other people's actions would minimally impact you.

 

Lets just say it is not a good road to go down.

I understand there is a fine line. When I said "purposefully aids in facilitating an act done against him or herself", I should have been more specific in defining this as contractual agreements between consenting adults. I understand my first example did not seem to indicate this, but let's look at some examples from this new perspective :

A man or woman who participates in pornography cannot turn around the next day and accuse the studio of rape (as long as the sex acts performed were mutually agreed upon in advance). Consent was shown, and there was no attempt for avoidance.

What would make this situation unethical, obviously, would be if the man or woman performing in this porn attempted avoidance, or wanted to avoid, but was forced to engage regardless.

 

A woman who willingly works at Hooters cannot sue her employer for sexual harassment for making her wear skin-tight shirts.

 

A man who agrees, by contract, to make millions of dollars by battering his helmeted skull into another man's skull, cannot then turn around and sue his employers for brain damage.

Oh wait, this actually happens...

[Hoppriori]

It seems to me that UPB is a useful argumentative 'tool' to disprove positive theories of morality. That is, it disproves the belief that someone could be morally compelled to act in some positive fashion in what Stefan calls "the coma test". Let's assume there is one individual who is still a rational agent who exhibits preferences and to whom morality applies, but who is completely incapable of action. He's entirely paralyzed (except for his eyelids, let's say, just so he can still communicate - in case you're a Hoppean and the communicative aspect might get complicated). Obviously, a moral statement like "every human being has to make a pilgrimage to Mecca" can't be universalized, then.

 

We could also imagine a scenario in which a man is alone, naked on an island without any natural resources. Principle: "everyone is required to wear a kippah" is just as absurd, because there exist conditions under which nobody could fulfill that principle.

 

Morality implies choice, and if there exists a scenario in which a human being could not make the "moral choice" (in which he has to be 'immoral' by this UPB standard, not because the consequences for being moral are bad - "You'll be shot if you don't cooperate with the Nazis" - but because it's literally materially impossible for him to do so), then clearly the moral premise of that dilemma is wrong. So UPB clearly disproves moral theories that require unconditional positive obligations.

 

What I think is problematic about UPB is that I don't see how it disproves:

A) Conditional positive obligations (insofar as one is able to do X, one should should do X. Example: "Insofar as you are able to feed your child, you must feed your child." Clearly the inability to feed your child because your on an island without resources excuses you from this obligation, but the moral imperative is contingent to your particular circumstances). Stefan clearly believes that some of these are true, and there's a logical justification for positive obligations (contract - you have entered into a contract, so you are obligated to fulfill your end of the bargain. Your inability to fulfill your end of the bargain for reasons outside of your control means that you are not morally responsible, even though it might not practically excuse you from the contract itself, as in the above case of a parent and child on a desert island).

 

So this isn't a massive contradiction for Stef, I just think it means UPB isn't as useful as one would first think. Because if we sub in "the poor" for "your child", we get an essential justification of the welfare state/obligatory charity that is the same syllogism as the starving child scenario. The reason why the obligation to the poor is wrong is just that there's no rational reason why it's the case (you haven't contracted with the poor or anything), so there's just no justification for this conditional obligation.

 

I guess the way UPB advocates could get out of this is just to say that the conditional positive obligations are induced by contract, so they really aren't positive obligations, because breaking this obligation through your own volition is an act of aggression. So it's not that I'm obligated to feed my child, it's that I'm obligated to not deny my child food (because this is breaking my implicit contract with the child - sub in "obligated not to murder", etc.). But I think this falls into the same problem as the "obligation to the poor" analogy (sub in "obligated not to deny poor assistance") - the reason why that scenario is wrong is just that there's no contractual obligation, not because of UPB.

 

 

2) I agree with OP that I don't think this proves a positive theory of morality. That murder is not UPB just means that one could never justify the claim that it is a universally preferred ("morally good" instead of bad/neutral) behavior to murder. That not murdering can conceivably be UPB (that it conforms to the standards of UPB) does not mean that not murdering is morally good. This is just an instance in which one can disprove a positive moral obligation that is internally contradictory ("You should murder" is obviously wrong - fails coma test; not everyone can do it without collapsing into voluntary euthanasia/Kant theft analogy; results in everyone being dead, so it can't practically be the result of 'good philosophy' because 'good philosophy' requires a set of behaviors to sustain life as a prerequisite to thinking, etc. etc.).

 

NAP as a derivative of UPB, I think, is ultimately just begging the question - we establish a moral standard to which justifiable actions must conform called "universally preferable behavior", and actions that do not conform to that standard are rejected as "not universally preferable". When asked why we are obligated to conform to this standard, the only answer is because it is "universally preferable" to do so, and when we ask why the universality of our actions matter, we get either answers:

A) Answer that we are exhibiting universal preference now (for truth as opposed to falsehood - but this doesn't prove a consistent standard for judging our actions based on universality)

B) Because the opposite is not universally preferred.

 

 

I don't think Molyneux is wrong on this because he is stupid or dishonest, it's just an honest disagreement I have with him (I think that building the requirements of ethics into its definition is a logical step he hasn't justified, because there's no standard beyond "universal preference" to justify it). This is sort of a pedantic disagreement, because my own theory of ethics (a variant of argumentation ethics) is very similar to this, and most of the differences could probably be corrected with some semantic changes and nuances. Molyneux's argument is sophisticated and comes very close to proving a consistent theory of ethics - I just think its premises need to be tweaked just a bit, then it's perfect (just like I think Hoppe needs to tweak his syllogisms just a little bit for clarity's sake, then it's perfect).

 

If we just changed "universally preferable" to "justifiable" and fit Stef's argument into a Hoppean mold, I think it's golden. Because then we can prove an unconditional (well, contingent upon the acceptance of justification, which is the premise of our moral debate anyway, so it's necessarily presupposed in this discussion; essentially unconditional) obligation to not break "UPB/argumentatively justified behavior" (AJB?). This is a really small change from Stef's current "you accept universal preference because truth>falsehood, consistency>inconsistency".

[TDB]

What I think is problematic about UPB is that I don't see how it disproves:A) Conditional positive obligations (insofar as one is able to do X, one should should do X.

Conditional isn't universal, right? For Stef, universal means it applies to everyone everywhere for all time.Actually, if you go along with his refutation of unconditional obligations, the same works for conditional obligations, that is, one would need to be fulfilling them every instant, to the exclusion of all else. A person can fulfill an infinite number of negative obligations at the same time while also doing something else, but could never fulfill a universal positive obligation, because you have to stop to eat or sleep. Letting poor people off the hook doesn't make this doable for rich people. So I think what you really want to do is understand and criticize Stef's derivation of his version of strong universality. At first it seems like this ought to be easy, because no one takes universality to the lengths that Stef does, it almost qualifies as argumentum ad absurdum, as in, if that is the conclusion, there's got to be something wrong with the argument. I'm not sure it is really so easy.I don't think Stef actually argues for his interpretation of universality in the UPB book. I've managed to come up with two attempts at justifying it:1) positive and negative obligations are otherwise the same. Negative obligations apply at all times, there is never a split-second where violating a negative obligation is justifiable as UPB. So there is never an instant where a positive obligation is not in effect.2) strong universality comes from the abstractness of the act of argument. When I claim a statement is true, unless the statement contains references to contingent truths ("it is eight o'clock now") it is true without regard to who is saying it, when it was said, or where. If the argument succeeds here, now, when I say it, it will succeed in other times and places, coming out of other mouths. So it will be true with respect to all persons, times, and places unless it refers to specific persons, times or places. So any moral principle we can express in this abstract way inherits strong universality.A good way to attack it would be to come up with a strong counterexample, a moral principle that applied to only a subset of moral agents, or applied differently to different subsets of moral agents. When I try to do this, I only come up with ridiculously bad examples, but this may have to do with the psychological framing.

NAP as a derivative of UPB, I think, is ultimately just begging the question -

That depends on the derivation of UPB, not of NAP. I've always suspected it has to so with the distinction between ethics and aesthetics being defined by avoidance, but I can't quite grab it.

When asked why we are obligated to conform to this standard, the only answer is because it is "universally preferable" to do so,

This jargon also annoys me. My preferred answer would be, you cannot justify violating the standard without contradicting yourself.

most of the differences could probably be corrected with some semantic changes and nuances. Molyneux's argument is sophisticated and comes very close to proving a consistent theory of ethics - I just think its premises need to be tweaked just a bit, then it's perfect

Maybe you could hint at the tweaks? I hope I can say this in a sympathetic way, but I don't think you understand Stef's idea well enough to fix it. My sympathy comes from wanting to understand Stef's idea well enough to explain it to someone simply or fix it if it needs fixing or abandon it if it is hopeless. I've spent a lot of time trying to understand what UPB is and how Stef thinks it can be derived, but I have failed. I think I have a good grip on what it is, but I can't quite grok the derivation.

If we just changed "universally preferable" to "justifiable" and fit Stef's argument into a Hoppean mold, I think it's golden. Because then we can prove an unconditional (well, contingent upon the acceptance of justification, which is the premise of our moral debate anyway, so it's necessarily presupposed in this discussion; essentially unconditional) obligation to not break "UPB/argumentatively justified behavior" (AJB?). This is a really small change from Stef's current "you accept universal preference because truth>falsehood, consistency>inconsistency".

Maybe smaller than you think. I very much like the idea of swapping "justifiable" for "preferable." I think that every reference to preference in the UPB book confuses the reader with jargon. I am in a small minority around here, however. UPB, if it succeeds, distinguishes between behaviors that violate justified moral principles and behaviors that conform to justified moral principles, there is no ordering of choices as preference would imply. It's all "If you want X then it is preferable that you do Y," but then that makes my head hurt. OTOH I don't think we can call it justified or justifiable, since moral behaviour is only indirectly justified, in that it lacks self-contradictions. Okay, I am overthinking it again.

[SamuelS]

absurdum is not a fallacy, it doesn't mean that an argument is flawed...it's a way to illustrate the absurdities that would result from following an argument or course of action...not the best example, but saying that a moral subjectivist (law==morality people) would support slavery in 1850 united states is an example, and it's correct.preferable is the right term, justification only confuses the issue, IMO. it is the preference of the individual being acted upon that determines the difference between rape and love making, for example, not whether or not it can be justified. justification I think would invite examination of absurd lifeboat scenarios wherein choice is removed in the first place and thus morality isn't an issue.to me the only confusing things about UPB is that there's an entire book -- the phrase is self-explanatory, to me -- and that it equates to morality. It's clear that the test validates our "instincts" regarding rape/theft/murder/assault, that they're only immoral because the person being acted upon does not have a choice (otherwise we'd call it sex/giving/euthanasia/boxing), but it's not clear to me how this proves that UPB is morality, since there have obviously been many moral systems setup with conflicting ideas about what's moral for the master and what's moral for the slave (eye for an eye vs turn the other cheek.)

actually, I'm also confused on the "other" categories and classifications...what I can say with a high level of confidence is "it is not immoral to engage in UPB", and "it is immoral to engage in behaviors which do not comply with UPB"...also, in relation to NAP, I don't see how UPB and NAP aren't exactly the same thing -- NAP says don't act on the property of another without their consent, except in self-defense...any proposed action that violates UPB, as far as I can figure, is a NAP violation, they share the same ground regarding the preference of the individual (or their property) that is being acted upon.

[TDB]

preferable is the right term, justification only confuses the issue, IMO.

Stef's not interested in opinions.

it is the preference of the individual being acted upon that determines the difference between rape and love making,

You are thinking of "consent." Or possibly "permission." Preference is an ordering of choices. The rape victim need not make a choice in order to be raped. Preferring rape to death would not make it lovemaking. Also, we are discussing "preferable" not preference. It sneaks in as part of "if you want X it is preferable for you to do Y." This threw me off for a long time.

the phrase is self-explanatory, to me -- [...]actually, I'm also confused on the "other" categories and classifications...[...] I don't see how UPB and NAP aren't exactly the same thing -- .

perhaps you are very fortunate, or perhaps your self has not explained it in a way that Stef would recognize. Maybe you can explain it all to me.

[SamuelS]

Stef's not interested in opinions.

should I get the smelling salts? he's all for having you speak for him though, eh? I sense a lot of hostility / passive aggression, kinda makes me not want to continue but I'll give it a shot because I think you're pretty close to at least understanding my interpretation, whether or not that aligns w/ Stef's. maybe I'm just projecting, but I do feel annoyed when reading your response, "perhaps you are very fortunate" comes across real "cunty" to me, maybe that's just me though. 

 

Preference is an ordering of choices. The rape victim need not make a choice in order to be raped. Preferring rape to death would not make it lovemaking.

 

 

preference with regard to the proposed instance of action, not with regard to all possible actions. In the case of rape, the preference of the victim with regard to sex, in that instance, is to NOT have sex. the victim would prefer not to have sex, their preferences are ignored and their body acted upon anyway and that's why it's not love-making. if you remove the instance of action, and expand preference to include all other possibilities you're going to end up lost, a rape victim preferred not to have sex in the rape instance, that doesn't mean the rape victim never wants to have sex ever.

[TDB]

I sense a lot of hostility / passive aggression,

Guilty as charged. I should've waited to post, sorry. Let me try to be a bit more empathetic. If I summarize your point this way, "UPB is basically the NAP", is that reasonably accurate?That leaves out the objective basis or justification for the NAP. Plenty of people have endorsed the NAP without providing that.

This book is the story of my personal assault on just such a beast.This “beast” is the belief that it is impossible to define an objective, rational, secular and scientific ethical system. This “beast” is the illusion that morality must forever be lost in the irrational swamps of gods and governments, enforced for merely pragmatic reasons, but forever lacking logical justification and clear definition.

[SamuelS]

Guilty as charged. I should've waited to post, sorry.

 

thanks for that, no worries...I used "opinion" because I'm not aware of your position on the "justifiable" angle but my initial reaction was that it'd lead to problems...one can always (try to) justify an immoral action in order to avoid a worse outcome. 

 

If I summarize your point this way, "UPB is basically the NAP", is that reasonably accurate?That leaves out the objective basis or justification for the NAP. Plenty of people have endorsed the NAP without providing that.

Yes! And that's why I'm confused as to how this proves morality. In other words, "it feels right, I like it", but I'm quite confused as to how anything has been proven.I've heard Stef say that UPB proves NAP, but I don't see it, the "two men in a room" is identical to the NAP test as I understand it.

[TDB]

absurdum is not a fallacy, it doesn't mean that an argument is flawed...

Absurdum also includes proof by contradiction, as in, if your argument concludes A and not A, then you know at least one of your assumptions is false. If you only made one assumption, then you have proved that assumption is false. In the case of Stef's derivation of strong universality, I'd say it's more a case of knowing that we either must accept his use of strong universality or reject his assumptions. He complicates this for me by not explicitly deriving strong universality in the text. He treats it as uncontroversial.

[SamuelS]

either must accept his use of strong universality or reject his assumptions. He complicates this for me by not explicitly deriving strong universality in the text. He treats it as uncontroversial.

I'm with you there, I thought maybe I'd missed it -- I listened to the audio rather than reading, sometimes this can lead me to running off w/ my own thoughts without pausing the recording, whereas with a book I'd just put it down until I can focus again.

Perhaps universality is derived from an analysis of rape. I don't have the exact quote but early on in the book he says something like "Aristotle said any system of morality that justifies rape is wrong" or something like that, right? Ignoring the appeal to authority, majority, etc....a quick analysis of rape reveals that what makes it immoral (different from consensual sex) is the preference for one party not to be engaged.It still doesn't explain why there seems to be a near-universal acceptance of "rape is immoral/wrong", but it does show derivation from a noncontroversial starting point, yes?

[TDB]

Yes! And that's why I'm confused as to how this proves morality.

I was trying to say, that's why he wrote a book, instead of just saying "me too." He wanted to provide the foundation. Whether or not he succeeded in making it clear is another question.

In other words, "it feels right, I like it", but I'm quite confused as to how anything has been proven.I've heard Stef say that UPB proves NAP, but I don't see it, the "two men in a room" is identical to the NAP test as I understand it.

NAP is just "Is anyone initiating force?", 2 guys in a room tests to see whether they can obey the same rule at the same time.

Perhaps universality is derived from an analysis of rape. ?

I did some review, found something:

Since all human beings share common physical properties and requirements, proposing one rule for one person and the opposite rule for another is invalid – it is like proposing a physics theory that says that some rocks fall down, while others fall up.

An analogy can illustrate a point, but hardly counts as an argument. The real question is does the analogy necessarily fit? Might not there be something about morality of persons that is not as consistent as mass and gravity? Making the analogy does not prove anything.Human beings share common physical properties and requirements, therefore strong universality. I am not sure this follows. Also, assume someday we will encounter aliens or transhumans, and hence must interact with moral agents that do not necessarily share these properties and requirements, is strong universality defeated?Seems to me he ought to derive universality from the experience of arguing, as one of the premises he claims follows from the act of debating.

If I choose to debate, I have implicitly accepted a wide variety of premises

[SamuelS]

NAP is just "Is anyone initiating force?", 2 guys in a room tests to see whether they can obey the same rule at the same time.

Whether or not an act initiates force, in context of NAP, depends on the preference of the individuals involved...if you punch me in the face *out of the blue*, violation, if we agree to engage in boxing, then you punch me in the face, no violation.

[TDB]

Whether or not an act initiates force, in context of NAP, depends on the preference of the individuals involved...if you punch me in the face *out of the blue*, violation, if we agree to engage in boxing, then you punch me in the face, no violation.

And, that relates to the 2 guys in a room test in what way?

[SamuelS]

in what way does it NOT?

Whether or not an act initiates force is immoral, in context of NAP UPB, depends on the preference of the individuals involved...if you punch me in the face *out of the blue*, violation, if we agree to engage in boxing, then you punch me in the face, no violation.

[TDB]

in what way does it NOT?

I could repeat my comment from above, but If it didn't make sense the first time, it won't help now. Hmm, that seems a bit like "How is it not blue?" Not sure how to answer, it seems too obvious. NAP is a moral principle. The 2 guys test is a test used to evaluate moral principles. How about the coma test, I don't need to explain how that is different from the NAP, right? That is also a test used to evaluate moral principles. It is not a moral principle.Maybe the 2 guys test represents a meta-ethical principle, "if it is impossible for two moral agents in the same room to obey a moral principle, that principle is false."