Is Metaphysics Necessary?

[Jordan Miller]

I recently watched the video on ayn rand part 2 where stef opens up with the basics of Objectivism.

 

 

Metaphysics: what's out there? Reality.

Epistemology: how do I know? Senses/reason.

Ethics: how should I live? Rational self-interest. 

 

etc. 

 

My question is this: why must we start with metaphysics? Look, doesn't epistemology take care of it? Why not just start there and leave metaphysics out of it?

 

If you have the right epistemology - you believe what you can see and what is true by definition - then you will look out at the world and say, "is this real? well I can't ever know for certain, but it seems to be real so I guess I'll go with it."

 

No need to assume something you don't know - why assume reality is "real"? Recognizing our sense data could be controlled by the matrix or by a daemon but that we have no reason to believe this bars us from rationally believing in anything other than, "I'm experiencing something, I know not where it comes from, but it is my reality simply because I'm experiencing it." Metaphysics seems therefore to me, a redundant precursor.

 

Any thoughts?

 

PS. what is reality anyway? is it atoms? Well no, those are made up of still smaller constituents. Is it pure energy? Perhaps, but what is energy? Nobody knows. What about the entire universe? Can we know what environment it lives in? no. can we know if it is all that exists? no. We don't know Anything about ultimate reality. Absolutely nothing, and assuming we do is religious.

 

Recognizing this, what can "reality" mean other than "What I'm experiencing"? Because philosophy (including natural philosophy) can say nothing about what reality really is we must use the word to mean, 'what we experience.' Choosing how to interpret that experience in the most rational way becomes therefore the base of rational philosophy in my eyes. To me it starts with epistemology.

 

Should I have this view? am I wrong?

[Carl Green]

All you really have is your experiences. But that's the most stripped down, skeptical perception of reality, which I don't think many people share.

[ParaSait]

Metaphysics is about axioms. Axioms are the core assumptions that you begin to build your philosophy on. The "ground rules" so to speak.

I'll give you a metaphor. When building a sound strategy to play chess, a great place to begin strategizing is your pawn formation. However none of anything you're strategizing about will make any sense if you don't recognize the rules of the game first. If your axioms for strategizing are that pawns are queens, rooks move diagonally, and the goal of the game is to capture the horses, your strategy won't be anything but garbage in, garbage out.

Similarly, if you don't agree as a core assumption that reality stands above consciousness, your philosophy will be entirely irrelevant.

So the purpose of metaphysics is to establish the axioms, so that you can fall back on them when needing to prove your philosophical theories.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

Great question. I'm not sure I know the answer. My best bat at it would be to say that metaphysics is necessary to make a distinction between the perceptible. There is the objectively perceptible, and then there is the subjectively perceptible. The objectively perceptible includes the physical world of matter and energy, while the subjectively perceptible includes concepts, feelings, preferences, values, numbers, the scientific method, etc. Subjective consciousness is the "observer" of the physical world, and it is part of the physical world, but it cannot be examined using methods reserved for the physical world.

[Kevin Beal]

Epistemology is metaphysics. Your definition of Metaphysics is actually incorrect. What you're referring to is Ontology. And it actually is very important and nothing to dismiss. The exact properties and functions of objects, whether material or abstract, their causal nature (objective or otherwise) requires serious accuracy. Neglect of ontology results in a lot of bad philosophy.

 

Metaphysics is an umbrella term for Ontology, Epistemology and UPB. The things necessary to develop any kind of science. Each science has a basis in ontology, epistemology and UPB. What is the nature of the objects we are observing (stars, numbers, etc), how do we come to objective knowledge about these objects, and how we ought to go about exploring this domain.

[Jordan Miller]

Epistemology is metaphysics. Your definition of Metaphysics is actually incorrect. What you're referring to is Ontology. And it actually is very important and nothing to dismiss. The exact properties and functions of objects, whether material or abstract, their causal nature (objective or otherwise) requires serious accuracy. 

 

mmm, I must still not understand what metaphysics is.

 

I'm thinking metaphysics is a model of what the universe actually is fundamentally or ultimately  

 

Is that definition wrong? if its not a model (an idea in our heads) then would it be accurate to say metaphysics is the universe? If so how is that helpful? its like saying, a car is a car, there's no informational content.

 

If it is a model, then is it a theoretical thing? or is it certain? if it is certain how can this be? (given the fact that we don't actually know what created (or if anything did create) the universe).

 

If it is a theoretical model, is it not created by us according to our epistemology? So does not everything start with epistemology and metaphysics is only one model of our world like the model we have about the house we live in and the car we drive?

[Kevin Beal]

Is that definition wrong?

Actually, yes.

 

Metaphysics is the area of philosophy that is most fundamental: epistemology, ontology and ethics (or, more accurately UPB). Epistemology is more fundamental than mathematics, for example. UPB is more fundamental than political theory. Ontology is more fundamental than biology, physics.

 

Epistemology: How do we know?

Ontology: What is it's nature?

UPB: How ought we act?

 

Mathematics is a formal science. It is a domain that examines very particular kinds of truth claims. Within mathematics are methodologies for determining truth from falsehood. The basis of these methodologies is epistemic. By saying that it is epistemic, I'm basically saying that it conforms to a standard called: logical consistency (as well as many others).

 

When a new science is being developed, this is a philosophical concern. How do we know what is true within this domain? What is the nature of the objects in this realm? How ought we go about applying this new science?

 

There is a philosophy of economics, a philosophy of psychology, etc. Working from first principles is starting from what we know for certain, the most basic principles and building on that. Having a science to explore a particular domain is possible because that first principles philosophical basis has been established and when I ask a question about beaver taxonomy, I don't have to start again from "A is A", to non-contradiction to the excluded middle until I make my way up to biology each time I want to arrive at new, true conclusions.

 

That's the incredibly condensed version. Does that make more sense?

[luxfelix]

In addition; though the branches of Mathematics, Economics, Psychology, etc. must be consistent with the trunk and roots of first principles in order to be considered valid, the branches often, but need not always, remain consistent with one another (or finding such consistency is difficult and/or irrelevant?)?

[Kevin Beal]

In addition; though the branches of Mathematics, Economics, Psychology, etc. must be consistent with the trunk and roots of first principles in order to be considered valid, the branches often, but need not always, remain consistent with one another (or finding such consistency is difficult and/or irrelevant?)?

Within psychology, there are different approaches to psychoanalysis with different and even mutually exclusive premises. The model of subselves in the IFS model is different from Jung's ideas around multiple centers of consciousness and Active Imagination. They do not overlap very well at all, and yet both are valuable in terms of developing a much stronger sense of self, and awareness of what could be called the "shadow". There are logical inconsistencies in every science, even mathematics. I can't find the Numberphile video right now (I don't remember what it's called), but they were claiming that there was a math problem with at least two right answers based on the methodology you employed, but it was the same math problem and both answers were correct. Something like that. I'm terrible at math, if someone knows what I'm talking about, please correct me.

 

Is that sort of what you mean?

[luxfelix]

Yeah!

 

The example you gave of different approaches to psychoanalysis would then be like the various stems and leaves on the branch of psychology (which is then connected to the trunk and roots of first principles).

 

My guess then is that a similar relationship would exist between the branches:

 

So if a factory manager wanted to improve the output of their factory, for example, they could approach this goal from an engineering field and focus on the machinery with all of its inherent physics, mathematics, and geometry, and/or they could approach the goal from a praxeological stance by focusing on the workers with fields such as psychology, statistics, and economics. Regardless of the approach(es) used, the factory manager will know they have reached their goal of improved output by the effects of their actions (based on first principles).

[Jordan Miller]

Metaphysics is the area of philosophy that is most fundamental: epistemology, ontology and ethics (or, more accurately UPB).

 

...

 

Epistemology: How do we know?

Ontology: What is it's nature?

...

 

 

I think I understand now what you meant earlier by, I'm "referring to ontology." you're saying I'm describing ontology rather than metaphysics right? Metaphysics includes both how we think and what we think. while ontology describes what we think. Is this right?

 

I think I get confused when people say things like 

 

 

Working from first principles is starting from what we know for certain, the most basic principles and building on that.

 

Is this technically correct? I ask because if you really mean this precisely then you have a different epistemology than I do, but I suspect you would agree with me if I said we could add one word to make it more accurate.

 

 "Working from first principles is starting from what we know for most certain, the most basic principles and building on that." 

 

Would you agree that we can't know anything, (literally anything) at all for absolutely certain? Or are first principles actually certain, not in a relative sense (as certain as anything can be) but in an absolute sense? 

 

I think this is an important distinction because I take it as my underlying assumption to arrive at the conclusion that metaphysics ontology must grow out from epistemology, but if first principles are certain in an absolute sense then we could get epistemology from first principles. 

 

In other words, are first principles inside ontology? if so epistemology must determine what we consider to be first principles since it determines all of ontology.

 

That's how I see it anyway. 

[Kevin Beal]

Would you agree that we can't know anything, (literally anything) at all for absolutely certain? Or are first principles actually certain, not in a relative sense (as certain as anything can be) but in an absolute sense?

I would disagree.

 

Even the most radical existential nihilist and solipsist has to accept that there are things we can know for absolutely certain. Because many things are true by definition, or are axiomatic. There is no possible way that "A is A" (The first law of logic, the law of identity) can be false, for example.

 

But consider what the logical consequence is of making your statement a rule: we can't know anything for absolutely certain. If it is a rule, then the rule also applies to the statement itself, right? Which means that the statement is false, since it is an absolute statement. If it's not an absolute statement, what you would be saying is that it's only some things that we cannot know for absolutely certain, in which case, I'd absolutely agree

 

Ontology and epistemology rely on each other. It's more complicated than saying that one is more fundamental than the other. The reason that we can know anything about the world is because of the properties of matter and energy (ontology) which produce logically consistent, observable conditions that we can independently arrive at true conclusions because of (epistemology). But there are also many ontological questions that require an understanding of epistemology. They are different categories of questions, rather than stages in the questioning process.

 

First principles are principles that go all the way back to the beginning. The 3 Laws of Logic are first principles:

 

Law of Identity:

"Whatever is, is": A = A

 

Law of non-contradiction:

"two or more contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time": NOT(A = NOT-A)

 

Law of Excluded Middle:

In accordance with the law of excluded middle or excluded third, for every proposition, either its positive or negative form is true: FOR ALL A: A OR ~A

 

These are first principles, and principles we accurately derive from these are also first principles. First principles is getting confused or not knowing where to start and going back to the drawing board. It's starting from what we know to be true, rather than having a result we want and making everything else conform to that.

 

When the company Tesla Motors was building their electric car they had to make the battery last for as long as they could make it, but also be able to have the throttle needed to accelerate quickly. Instead of looking at the batteries in other electric cars, they started from first principles. Elon Musk (the man behind the company) said this:

 

“First principles” is a physics way of looking at the world. What that really means is that you boil things down to the most fundamental truths and then reason up from there. That takes a lot more mental energy.

 

Someone could – and people do — say battery packs are really expensive and that’s just the way they will always be because that’s the way they have been in the past. They would say it’s going to cost $600 / KWhour. It’s not going to be much better than that in the future.

 

[...]

 

So, from first principles, we say: what are the material constituents of the batteries? What is the spot market value of the material constituents? It has carbon, nickel, aluminum, and some polymers for separation, and a steel can. Break that down on a materials basis, if we bought that on a London Metal Exchange, what would each of these things cost? Oh geez, it’s $80 / KWhour. Clearly, you need to think of clever ways to take those materials and combine them into the shape of a battery cell, and you can have batteries that are much cheaper than anyone realizes.

[Carl Green]

Is metaphysics necessary for what?

[Jordan Miller]

 

... many things are true by definition, or are axiomatic....

 

 

Ah, you're right, of course! Anything true by definition must be true. I was only considering the question of "what can we know for certain?" in terms of empiricism.

...

 

The reason that we can know anything about the world is because of the properties of matter and energy (ontology) which produce logically consistent, observable conditions that we can independently arrive at true conclusions because of (epistemology).

...

 

 

But isn't it true that we're assuming matter and energy are real? 

 

What if we're all simulated in some matrix or in the mind of some devil? Is Descartes right to say we can't know for certain that what we perceive as reality is ultimate reality? Isn't the question of ontology about answering "What is ultimate reality?" If so isn't any ontological answer folly (being based on the assumption that energy is real)? 

 

Perhaps I'm mistaken on my definition of ontology. Perhaps it is answering the question of "What is real according to logic and evidence?" which is a different question than "What is ultimate reality?"

[Kevin Beal]

But isn't it true that we're assuming matter and energy are real?

You are assuming that matter and energy are real when you responded to my post.

[Jordan Miller]

You are assuming that matter and energy are real when you responded to my post.

of course I am. but that doesn't mean that I'm right.

 

Furthermore, that's not the issue. my issue with ontology is that it asserts that matter and energy are the whole story, but it is ultimately an assertion. we cannot say for certain that the world we observe isn't embedded in some larger multi-verse or super reality. 

 

It pretends to know something about ultimate reality. I want to make sure it is not the rational philosopher's opinion that we can know what ultimate reality is for certain. is that something the rational philosopher asserts and calls it ontology?

[shirgall]

...my issue with ontology is that it asserts that matter and energy are the whole story, but it is ultimately an assertion. we cannot say for certain that the world we observe isn't embedded in some larger multi-verse or super reality. 

 

It pretends to know something about ultimate reality. I want to make sure it is not the rational philosopher's opinion that we can know what ultimate reality is for certain. is that something the rational philosopher asserts and calls it ontology?

 

I think the point is that it makes sense to suppose what we do experience, and it makes no sense to suppose what we don't experience. The starting point has to be empiricism.

 

Our assertion that philosophy has to be universal is also an assumption, but it enables a useful conversation nonetheless (lifeboat scenarios notwithstanding).

[Kevin Beal]

It pretends to know something about ultimate reality. I want to make sure it is not the rational philosopher's opinion that we can know what ultimate reality is for certain. is that something the rational philosopher asserts and calls it ontology?

How is this not just another way of saying "there may be things that we don't understand about matter and energy"?

 

If you are talking about anything in particular then we can talk about that particular thing, but as far as I can glean from your challenge is that there may be things we don't understand, which is obviously true.

 

Empirically reasoning about things in the world is portrayed as presumptive here, but asserting that there are things that cannot be measured empirically in any way, but which still exist is far more presumptive. So, if your issue is with presuming things, then to focus on the empiricist is irrational.

[Mike Larson]

But consider what the logical consequence is of making your statement a rule: we can't know anything for absolutely certain. If it is a rule, then the rule also applies to the statement itself, right? Which means that the statement is false, since it is an absolute statement. If it's not an absolute statement, what you would be saying is that it's only some things that we cannot know for absolutely certain, in which case, I'd absolutely agree

 

Kevin, I think I get what you are saying here. But I think it really depends on how we apply the word absolute. I think the statement being discussed is not absolute in terms of certainty, but is absolute in terms of scope (in other words it is intended to be a universal statement about human knowledge).

 

The assertion is that "we can not know anything with 100% certainty". Applying the rule, we can only say that there is a chance (and the implication is that the probability is very small) that the statement, itself, is not true. But that doesn't necessarily mean that the statement is false.

 

Your argument about the assertion being self-detonating would be true only if the original statement was "I'm absolutely certain that we can not know anything for certain".

 

Does this make any sense to you, or am I missing something fundamental?

[TheRobin]

 

But isn't it true that we're assuming matter and energy are real? 

 

If you accept that you are real and you're experiencing both matter and energy, then what further proof do you require?

 

And/or what do you mean with the word "real" then?

[Matthew Ed Moran]

"Ah, you're right, of course! Anything true by definition must be true. I was only considering the question of "what can we know for certain?" in terms of empiricism."

 

It sure didn't seem like you were only asking the question "in terms of empiricism." At least, you surely didn't make that clear. If you were only asking in terms of empiricism, why did you say this: 

 

"Would you agree that we can't know anything, (literally anything) at all for absolutely certain? Or are first principles actually certain, not in a relative sense (as certain as anything can be) but in an absolute sense?"

 

I'm not trying to say "gotcha," but it really, really seems like you just moved the goal posts once Kevin pointed out how you were incorrect.

 

So before moving onto how reality is just an "assumption," and how we can't really know "ultimate reality" which could be "inside the mind of a demon" or whatever; how about you confront the fact that there are things we can know for certain pertaining to what a valid methodology for truth is, compared to, say, a self-contradictory methodology, such as skepticism?

[Kevin Beal]

Your argument about the assertion being self-detonating would be true only if the original statement was "I'm absolutely certain that we can not know anything for certain".

Certainty is a subjective experience describing confidence in a conclusion. I'm responding to the suggestion that we can't know anything at all because we may be in the matrix, or a brain in a vat, or whatever. I'm talking about the possibility of knowledge, rather than the confidence one has in their own conclusions.

 

Put another way: if you can't know anything, you can't know that you can't know anything.

 

Does that help?

[Sal9000]

Are the logical laws (law of identity, law of the excluded third) true independent of the senses or not? When you say they are, you put them on a pedestal, they cannot falsified nor tested. They serve as a building of a system that exists independent of physical reality (maths is one example of that). When you say that those logical laws are true a priori and that they give an accurate description of reality and that those laws can be tested you run into a bunch of problems. A major one is, that you need additional restrictions for those logical laws to be true in reality. However, you could not come up with those restrictions on your own, hence these laws cannot be true independent of the senses. They are subject to falsification like any other statement.

Lets have a look at a concrete example: There is an apple on your table. You leave your room for a minute and find the apple still at your desk. You conclude from the law of identity that it is the same apple. But is this a factual correct statement? I would argue it is not, since the properties of this apple changed. There were redox processes, sugar oxidized, the atoms moved around, the apple lost a bit of water, the energy level of electrons is different or so. What you find is that there is a connection between apple from a minute ago, but since the properties of that apple changed it is not the same apple. So for the law of identity to be true you would have to restrict it, using a posteriori knowledge (like the laws of physics and chemistry) for it to be true, thus rendering your axiom useless.

[Kevin Beal]

Are the logical laws (law of identity, law of the excluded third) true independent of the senses or not? When you say they are, you put them on a pedestal, they cannot falsified nor tested. They serve as a building of a system that exists independent of physical reality (maths is one example of that). When you say that those logical laws are true a priori and that they give an accurate description of reality and that those laws can be tested you run into a bunch of problems. A major one is, that you need additional restrictions for those logical laws to be true in reality. However, you could not come up with those restrictions on your own, hence these laws cannot be true independent of the senses. They are subject to falsification like any other statement.

There are two parts to this that are important.

 

The first is that these laws of logic only make sense because matter and energy behave in a consistent manner. If the physical laws that govern the universe were random, or didn't allow for consistency in behavior, for whatever reason, the 3 laws of logic wouldn't really describe anything real.

 

The second thing is that it depends on what you mean by "verification" and "testing". In terms of the scientific method, no, because it's prior to that. The scientific method requires that the 3 laws of logic be true. To require this kind of verification as a standard would be circular reasoning. But if you mean that we can evaluate them logically for consistency in logic and that they be free from contradiction, then hell yea, they can!

 

In one important way, the 3 laws of logic are really just different ways of saying the same thing: you can't say that a thing is both true and not true simultaneously and in the same respect. If something is a contradiction, you yourself are the one who's saying it is not true, because you are simultaneously asserting and rejecting that claim, whatever it is. That's what a contradiction is.

 

(More on that below)

 

Lets have a look at a concrete example: There is an apple on your table. You leave your room for a minute and find the apple still at your desk. You conclude from the law of identity that it is the same apple. But is this a factual correct statement? I would argue it is not, since the properties of this apple changed. There were redox processes, sugar oxidized, the atoms moved around, the apple lost a bit of water, the energy level of electrons is different or so. What you find is that there is a connection between apple from a minute ago, but since the properties of that apple changed it is not the same apple. So for the law of identity to be true you would have to restrict it, using a posteriori knowledge (like the laws of physics and chemistry) for it to be true, thus rendering your axiom useless.

Whether or not it's the same apple depends on what exactly you are "identifying". If by "apple" you mean to describe an exact configuration of atomic, molecular or chemical structure, then, yea, it's a different apple. If the object you are identifying is that piece of fruit that came from an apple tree and wasn't switched out with a replica apple, out there on the table, then yes, it is the same apple.

 

But more importantly, you agree with the second, in direct opposition to your claim. You are assuming the truth value of the law of identity in order to reject it, because what is different, or changed, or not the same? The very fact that there is an answer to this question is proof that you accept the laws of logic in identifying the apple, and not even in the first description I gave, but of the second, common sense description.

 

What logic is is reasoning about things by avoiding contradiction. By avoiding asserting and rejecting a claim simultaneously and in the same respect. By not claiming that you yourself are wrong about what you are right about.

 

The representation of this simple truth are those three laws of logic. If you cannot argue against them without accepting them, then it is you who is saying that you are wrong, not me.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

"Are the logical laws (law of identity, law of the excluded third) true independent of the senses or not? When you say they are, you put them on a pedestal, they cannot falsified nor tested."

 

The laws of logic define the validity of a proposition, not the truth of a proposition. But any true proposition must be valid. Therefore, the laws of logic do tell us something about the real world, but in terms of a standard of "truth." It doesn't make sense to "test" a law of logic, because the idea that you'd even need to "test" something must be in comparison to a standard of "truth," and for anything to be true, it must also be valid.

 

"There is an apple on your table. You leave your room for a minute and find the apple still at your desk. You conclude from the law of identity that it is the same apple. But is this a factual correct statement? I would argue it is not, since the properties of this apple changed."

 

Once again, the law of identity would only judge the validity of your proposition. And notice even in the opinion you gave, you referred to it as if it were still the same apple. You said "the properties of this apple have changed," which seems reasonable and does not seem to indicate it is another apple. If you switched the apple with another apple, then I think it would be valid to say the apple is not the same - because it is another apple. But if you think running water over an apple somehow makes it another apple or not an apple, then I fail to see how your concept of an apple is a discrete, identifiable entity.

[Mike Larson]

Certainty is a subjective experience describing confidence in a conclusion. I'm responding to the suggestion that we can't know anything at all because we may be in the matrix, or a brain in a vat, or whatever. I'm talking about the possibility of knowledge, rather than the confidence one has in their own conclusions.

 

Put another way: if you can't know anything, you can't know that you can't know anything.

 

Does that help?

 

Kevin, I appreciate your defining the term "certainty".  It helped to clarify how I was thinking about things. Amazing how simple definitions can do that

 

I think my intention was to express the idea of the fallibility of the human mind (something that I don't think anyone here would argue with).  And I thought that this idea somehow contradicted the notion that we could truly know anything. But, of course, the possibility of error and the possibility of correct knowledge are not mutually exclusive. And looking at it from this perspective, the concept of certainty becomes kind of irrelevant... like you said, it's just a subjective experience.

 

Thanks