Shouldn't we divide concepts into those with abstract instances and those with concrete ones?

[Premysl Bosak]

In this video (28’28’’) “What is Existence?” Stefan used an example of a tree as a concrete object and a forest as an abstract concept, which exists only in our head not in reality.

I’m quite bewildered with this explanation because e.g. in podcast #95 Stefan uses an example of rock as a concept and states: “concepts are mental organization of discrete sensual information based on common structure of atoms and matter”.

 

 

Moreover, even in this video (35’30’’) he states that concept is “when you take an attribute and extrapolate it to include all like instances” which I’m both happy with, but in that sense the tree is also a concept – “e.g. wooden plant with roots and treetop” but it exists in reality.

I understand that all concepts exist only in mind not in reality but there are concepts, which have its instances existing in reality like trees and those, which do not like forest or government.

 

So I would suggest dividing concepts into two groups those with concrete instances in reality (e.g. tree, rock) and those which have abstract instances (crowd, forest).

 

Any thoughts on that?

[apples and grapes]

In Objectivist Epistemology, which to my knowledge is on par with Molyneux's approach, this distinction is already made. The concept of a tree would be one that identifies perceptual concretes, from which we can abstract towards "wider integrations" as Rand put it (Rand, Ayn, pg 19, Abstraction from Abstractions, "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology").

 

From the existing concept of a tree, we can abstract to the concept of a forest, which exists as a mental entity to be used as a single unit of thought. 

So we need not divide the concepts into different groups, as they are already divided into the perceptual concrete and the abstraction within O'ist epistemology.

 

Understanding that, I'm not sure how dividing "Perceptual Concrete Concepts" and "Abstracted Concept", would help us out too much. If the person you were speaking with understood what you meant by these terms, they'd probably understand you if you just used the term "Concept". If they did not understand, then you'd need to explain this aspect of O'ist epistemology, after which they'd understand what you meant by the term "Concept" anyway. 

 

I hope this helps

[Premysl Bosak]

Thanks for reply. 

 

I think proposed division could help because it was misleading when Stefan used that example of instance of perceptual concrete concept (tree) and abstract concept (forest) and then said that all concepts do not exist in reality.

 

I think that when Stefan said "government does not exist" and justified this statement by saying that no concepts exist in reality then this justification is not appropriate.

 

I think that when we want to justify nonexistence of government we should say: "there are no concrete perceptual instances of concept government". And although it is true that no concepts exist in reality their instances can and it depends on which type of concept we are talking about.

[apples and grapes]

Perceptual concrete concepts don't exist in reality though, as they too are mental integrations. The only difference is the level of abstraction. A tree possesses specific distinguishing characteristics, such as it being a solid rather than a liquid, however there is no "tree-ness". The "tree-ness" of the tree is only an epistemological category, rather than a metaphysical one, a la Aristotle's essences. It is correct to say that a forest is an abstraction from the concept tree, and so doesn't exist in empirical reality, as long as we understand that the concept tree is too an abstraction and so too does not exist in empirical reality. 

 

So when Stef says "Government does not exist", he is correct as by definition a concept is a "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted" (Introduction to O'ist Epistemology again). The "Government" is another highly abstract concept, like a forest, as so does not exist in perceptual reality, like a forest. 

 

Given that Stef's justification stands, I'm not sure why a new justification is needed.

 

 

I think that when we want to justify nonexistence of government we should say: "there are no concrete perceptual instances of concept government". 

 

 

The issue I have with this is that it doesn't prove the concept Government only existing as a concept, which is Stef's position, but rather that the concept "Government" is invalid and has no meaning. To explain, let's replace the concept "Government" with "Mathematics". Now we say there are no concrete perceptual instances of concept mathematics. This is obviously incorrect, 2+3=5 would be an example of an instance of the concept "Mathematics". If there were not such an instance, we haven't determined that "Mathematics" only exists as a concept but instead that the term is meaningless, as if it lacks any instances, it's not a valid concept. Similarly, if there were no instances of the concept "Government", then the term would not even exist in conceptual reality (like the concept Durj987, which I just made up and which lacks any instances) but would be meaningless. 

 

If I've made a mistake, please correct me

[Pepin]

I am going to attempt to not go into essay mode and to not be super technical, but this is a complex subject.

 

Concepts are formed by perceptual concretes. The concept of tree for instance is formed by perceiving many discrete entities with similar properties, and putting all of those perceptual measurements into a conceptual container. To identify a tree, we employ the measurements given by the definition, and if they fit, we call it a tree. On a perceptual level, we are very capable of saying that a tree exists.

 

The concept of a forest is measured through identifying large number trees in some particular space. What is important is that the unit, that is the discrete entity that is necessary for the further abstraction, remains consistent regardless of the quantity or packing. This isn't to say that each individual tree will not behave differently with respect to neighboring trees and their quantity, but rather that the identify of each tree is preserved.

 

A way to think about this is in terms of emergence. A forest has no emerging properties, rather all of the properties which make it up are preserved. Though a tree is made up atoms, the combination of all those atoms give the tree its emerging properties. One way to formulate this is to say that a tree is made of atoms bound by physical law, but atoms obeying physical law are not trees.

 

When we refer to any particular entity, we are not referring to any fundamental unit, but rather the conceptual unit. This is not because the behavior and properties are not dependent on molecules, but rather because it is only the particular configuration of those molecules in the form of a tree which cause the properties and behaviors of a tree. It is also good to point out that an understanding of physics at the molecular level is not needed to define a tree.

 

To say trees exist but a forest does not is to say that a tree meets the criteria for a discrete entity, while a forest does not.

 

I do agree with you that the language is not very good in differentiating concepts with direct perceptual references from those which are built upon hundreds of concepts, but tracing back the dependency to the concrete is usually easy to do. In the instance of a tree and a forest, the concept of forest is obviously dependent on the concept of a tree. which is dependent upon the perceptual concrete of particular trees.

 

It is also confusing to refer to tree as both a perceptual concrete and as a concept, which I think you are pointing out. I would say that the concept of a tree is close enough to the perceptual level to be considered real, and that it isn't so much a problem so long as you differentiate between the concept and the entity... Though I wonder if there is a way to make it less confusing.

 

There are certain concepts like that of "justice" which are very difficult to trace back to perceptual concretes. I believe Ayn Rand did so in a couple of steps in her Epistemology book.

[Premysl Bosak]

I totally understand and agree that all concepts resides only in our heads. But when you say "government" it can be "an instance of a concept" or "a concept" the same we can say for "tree". There can be an "abstract concept tree" or a "concrete perceptual instance of tree".

 

That is the reason why I think that that justification was not appropriate and should have been specifally related to "instance" rather than to "concept". Otherwise it did not imply.

 

 

 

The issue I have with this is that it doesn't prove the concept Government only existing as a concept, which is Stef's position, but rather that the concept "Government" is invalid and has no meaning. To explain, let's replace the concept "Government" with "Mathematics". Now we say there are no concrete perceptual instances of concept mathematics. This is obviously incorrect, 2+3=5 would be an example of an instance of the concept "Mathematics". If there were not such an instance, we haven't determined that "Mathematics" only exists as a concept but instead that the term is meaningless, as if it lacks any instances, it's not a valid concept. Similarly, if there were no instances of the concept "Government", then the term would not even exist in conceptual reality (like the concept Durj987, which I just made up and which lacks any instances) but would be meaningless. 

 

 

I think that you are interchanging validity and existence. Math is valid (because logical, empirically verified) but exists only in our minds. Existence in reality is matter and energy and its effects which math has neither. Math has instances but only abstract ones. e.g. Podcast#743 Do numbers exists?

 

I think that validity of concept government is another lets say "layer". We first acknowledge that it exist only in our head and then we can examine the validity. I think that Stefan argued that it is invalid because no instances of concept can have the opposite characteristics, but since in government are people that have opposite characteristics (like "it is moral for soldier to murder") that other people which it consists of, then it is invalid.

[apples and grapes]

 

I totally understand and agree that all concepts resides only in our heads. But when you say "government" it can be "an instance of a concept" or "a concept" the same we can say for "tree". There can be an "abstract concept tree" or a "concrete perceptual instance of tree".

 

That is the reason why I think that that justification was not appropriate and should have been specifally related to "instance" rather than to "concept". Otherwise it did not imply.

 

 

So the proposition is: The Government does not exist as it is a concept, and concepts are only mental integrations. 

However: There is a difference between the concept Government and instances of the concept Government. 

Therefore: To say that the Government doesn't exist because it is a concept and concepts don't exist is not appropriate. 

 

I don't know what "not appropriate" means, if you could explain that'd be great. If you meant incorrect, I'm then not sure how it logically follows. Obviously there is a difference between the concept and the instance, like the difference between Maths and the particular instance of 2+3=5, I don't see how this difference makes the argument invalid. 

 

I'm not sure what you mean by saying Mathematics only has abstract instances. All instances of concepts are abstract, as in order to speak of them we are required to separate the particular aspects of the instances which relate to the concept. 

 

My point of bringing up Mathematics was to show that with the removal of a connection to instances, a concept is invalid. I was trying to show that your proposed argument for disproving the existence of Government did not disprove the existence of it but rather invalidated the concept. I wasn't saying that an invalid concept could not exist in out minds, ergo, I was not intending to interchange validity and existence. I thought that was clear given my criticism of your argument on the basis that it invalidated rather than disproved the existence of the concept, I apologise if it was not though. 

 

I was under the impression that your argument was to show that the concept "Government" does not exist, a la forests, though now I'm thinking it was to show how the concept was invalid. If that's the case, I apologise for my misunderstanding. 

 

 

I think that validity of concept government is another lets say "layer". We first acknowledge that it exist only in our head and then we can examine the validity. I think that Stefan argued that it is invalid because no instances of concept can have the opposite characteristics, but since in government are people that have opposite characteristics (like "it is moral for soldier to murder") that other people which it consists of, then it is invalid.

 

I completely agree to the first half. 

 

I don't see, though, what Stef's argument against the validity of the concept "Government" has to do with his argument regarding the existence of the concept "Government". 

[Premysl Bosak]

I think that you turned to be unnecessary sarcastic and find it unpleasant and that I presented my point clear enough.

 

My argument was neither to invalidate nor to disprove existence of concept "Government" as you can read above. My goal was how to better present/understand concepts. 

 

What concerns my term "abstract instance", what is then an instance of the crowd, forest? Such instances are not concrete so I can say they are abstract.

 

I don't agree with your point with "All instances of concepts are abstract" since tree has a concrete instance with particular aspects shared with other trees.

 

I agree that invalid concepts like "square circles" or "government" have no instances, but they still can "exist" in our mind so they should be at first invalidated through logic. Because you cannot know up front that they do not have any instances.

 

[apples and grapes]

It honestly was not my intention to come across as sarcastic.Could you show me were I did come across in that way for future reference?  Also, I never said you didn't present yourself clear enough, hence me fully accepting responsibility for my misunderstanding and apologising. 

 

My contention that all instances are abstract stems from it requiring an act of isolation, in which the particular aspects of the instance of a tree are differentiation from those aspects of instance rock, cup etc. This act requiring a process of abstraction, ergo me saying that all instances are abstract. Abstract in so far as it requires a process of abstraction, isolation, to recognise the instance. 

 

 

 

I agree that invalid concepts like "square circles" or "government" have no instances, but they still can "exist" in our mind so they should be at first invalidated through logic. Because you cannot know up front that they do not have any instances.

 

 

I completely agree. Though I would add the caveat that it can be difficult to prove the invalidity of the concept Government to some who don't understand how the Government is a concept. Say those who would respond to us saying it is with "But what about the Government building, surely they exist. Therefore it's silly to say Governments don't exist". This is were the "Government is a concept, concepts only exist as mental integrations, therefore Government exists only as a mental integration" argument comes in, which then can follow into the argument invalidating the concept. 

[RestoringGuy]

The isolation is what I call a boundary, things must be inside and outside.  To meaningfully say something "is a cup" seems to require implicitly defining what are non-cups.  Eventually you can find a physical rule, a cup is that which can do X, now it no longer requires an instance or example.  Once X is decided, "cup" is maybe just a jargon handle, same as the letter X, a short representative of some bigger action.  Anything constructed or 3d printed that does X would seem to be a cup.  In general X might be distinguished by other methods besides recognizing it first-hand.  Imagine you're running a coin-sorter machine, and now extend that idea to the many things around us, trees, etc.  In a way things are being mechanically sorted relative to your concepts, of course leaving room for uncertain results.  I don't mean our naming of a concept does any controlling.  The real concept is just a physical reference point, and the name of that concept is the mental reference point, an abbreviation.

I think a concept which is "only in the mind" fails to even be a concept because even saying "the mind" supposes some particular container-mind is an instance of a mind, and now we're just using concept of "mind" to draw boundaries around all concept-makers.  This seems to just postpone reality, and bury it a level.  Physical conditions that distinguish a mind from a non-mind would fix the problem, almost nobody seems to be disputing that initial step.  So we seem to be allowed a physical requirement applied to concept of the mind, if for no other reason than to get things started. 

 

So why not skip that mysterious step, and make all concepts essentially physical in nature?  Suppose there's a vast periodic table of concepts with unconstructed instances.  Not like Plato's ideal forms, but instead with their potential for instances as a metric.  A concept is real just as oxygen is real, even when it may by chance be physically absent from some volume of space.  The concept is just physical parameters based on predictions, internal cycles, interaction with other potential things, inside or outside the mind, inside or outside past instances.  Once some instance achieves your goal, the instance is truly new.  The concept was simply valid all along and instances are just testing grounds.  Abstract without concrete just means there's BS around the corner.