Question about UPB, and truth as an APA (?)

[sdavio]

In the video "Ethics Redux!", Molyneux states that truth is an APA (Aesthetically Preferrable Action) and not a UPB (Universally Preferable Behavior). This is in the context of an example where someone is being threatened by someone with a gun, and lies to save the potential victim. Since "UPB trumps APA", the value of nonaggression trumps the value of truth.

 

As I understand it, one of Molyneux's main arguments is that, since any theory claims itself as true, it therefore makes a UPB claim and thus contradicts itself if it contradicts UPB. For instance, "UPB doesn't exist" is said to mean, "It is UPB not to believe in UPB."

 

However, if truth is an APA (which would make sense to me since the difference is defined as APA being preferable but not inflicted, while UPB is initiation of force, and lying isn't initiating force,) (..also because "You must tell the truth" or "You must hold true beliefs" would not pass the coma test,) then could not the Is/Ought problem ("You can't get an ought from an is") be restated as an APA/UPB problem? ("You can't get a UPB from an APA.")

 

In other words, when someone denies UPB, why does it necessarily follow that they're saying that "It's UPB to deny UPB" rather than that "It's APA to deny UPB"? And if it's the latter, where is the contradiction?

[NotDarkYet]

You're confusing "truth" with "sharing information".

 

Truth is universally preferable (by definition).

 

Positive actions (massaging somebody, telling the truth, giving to charity, etc) can't be universally preferable.

[sdavio]

Truth is universally preferable (by definition).

 

But truth isn't a universal behavior, right? I thought UPB only applies to behaviors.

 

Also, doesn't UPB only apply to refraining from initiating force? I don't think falsity could be seen as initiating force.

[NotDarkYet]

Truth exists (by definition) and is preferable over falsehood.

 

Speaking the truth (or any other positive action) can't be universalized.

 

Only negative behaviors can be UBP (thou shall nots).

 

Lie if you want to lie.  But don't initiate force.

[sdavio]

Truth exists (by definition) and is preferable over falsehood.

 

Speaking the truth (or any other positive action) can't be universalized.

 

Only negative behaviors can be UBP (thou shall nots).

 

Lie if you want to lie.  But don't initiate force.

 

I'm glad you agree. So, when I argue (which implies that I prefer truth over falsehood) this doesn't imply 'preferring truth' as UPB, because that isn't a negative behavior, and because preferring falsehood isn't violent, right? If that's the case, then I'm not contradicting UPB by arguing against it.

[NotDarkYet]

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Correct?

[sdavio]

bklasdfjklasdufiodvjj

 

Correct?

 

So you're just spamming my thread or what? I'm really interested if there's an answer to what I said.

[sdavio]

Part of my confusion seems to be coming from the fact that the term "UPB" is used in two different ways:

 

"UPB" as the general term which embraces the scientific method, APA, and so on.

 

And then "UPB" as the specific standard within the book which applies only to actions involving violence.

 

I would agree that if I argue, we could assume I'm asserting UPB in the first, broad sense. However, I can't see how it implies the second version. So, it seems like what appears to be a contradiction between asserting and denying UPB, is really asserting UPB1 while denying UPB2, which would not be a fallacy.

 

If I say "I cannot make a statement", this would contradict itself because it's a statement.

 

On the other hand, if I say "There is no moral principle about violence", I am not asserting a moral principle about violence, so I can't see any contradiction.

[Merrifield]

I think you're confusing truth (which is not an action or behavior) with the action of "telling the truth".

[sdavio]

I think you're confusing truth (which is not an action or behavior) with the action of "telling the truth".

 

I'm aware of this difficulty, but let's take 'truth itself'. Could denying truth itself be considered a contradiction to UPB in the strict sense? Molyneux makes it very explicit in the book that the only thing that UPB as a moral principle is concerned with is actions which violate the NAP. So, if we're talking about 'truth' not as an action, but as an idea, then okay, but then I don't see how that does anything but make it even more irrelevant from UPB.

"It is not true that violent actions are universally immoral."

 

"That is self-contradictory because you implied the validity of truth."

 

Is this rebuttal not a non-sequitur?

Unless you are prepared to argue that denying objective truth is a directly violent action, then denying the immorality of violence does not seem the same as denying the objectivity of truth.

 

If the distinction between 'speaking truth as an action' and 'truth as truth' is important with regard to my OP, it must be that while 'truth as an action' is APA, 'truth as truth' is UPB. That implies that denying truth is violent, which it isn't. So my OP still applies regardless of the distinction.

 

After all, it's "Universally Preferable Behavior", so the distinction seems to solidify my point. If anything, I think my interpretation of truth in terms of an action was a charitable reading.

[sdavio]

I'd still be genuinely interested if someone could clarify for me the relationship between 'truth' and UPB. This seems to be one of the main things holding me from understanding the philosophy properly.