Stefan's take on the philosophy of language.

[bugzysegal]

Hello FreeDomainRadio members,

 

I recently came across a Youtube video of Stefan's about free will. I am aware of the ban on free will discussion on these boards and that is not the subject matter of this post.  If I reference that video, it is only in reference to non-free will centered theses. In this video "Free Will Part 2" at around 20:52 Stefan mentions the unique ability of human beings to form "abstract, rational, consistent, objective, definitions." Perhaps I am missing some video  but it seems like this sums up Molyneux's views on how language works. More precisely I take this to outline Stefan's working theory of meaning. My position is this, meaning of language is how it is used (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Investigations#Language.2C_meaning.2C_and_use). As such, the notion that meaning necessarily is rational, consistent, objective, or that definitions like those in a dictionary are how meaning in language works is wrong.  It's overly broad in that there are aspects of meaning that don't require those conditions and simultaneously overly narrow in that there are many other ways that meaning can arise (all of them consisting of usage). "Abstract" won't do the work here unless you can formulate some version of "abstraction" that doesn't contradict "definite," "consistent," and "logical."   Mic drop.

[Wuzzums]

I always have these kinds of trouble when debating with people. Far too late do I notice they use different meaning to words than me. I try to remedy this by using concise mathematical definitions, no abstractions, no new terms, etc. When people say I'm wrong (even though how can I be wrong when I'm defining how I think) I ask them to define themselves that which I'm wrong about so as to use their definition layer on. They inevitably go into some lengthy confusing definition which boils down to how they feel about things.

 

For instance with morality. They defined it as that which is the basis of love. I asked them to define love and they said love is something you feel. Their syllogism of course implies that morality is subjective, which makes no sense and when called upon I got the usual moving the goalpost, false dichotomies, etc.

 

This one time I got called upon for not knowing what I was talking about. I proved that I was by quoting the dictionary, after which I got promptly accused of having a very narrow point of view. "Not everything in life boils down to definitions!", they said.

 

I conclude therefore that defining terms doesn't really matter, the nuances of language don't really matter either. What matters is whether or not the person you're talking to has some skin in the game, i.e. they have some ulterior motive they wanna prove you wrong. Quite recently I had a debate with someone in which I used the socratic method to find common ground. After I showed them we both agreed they quickly concluded I was wrong and ended the conversation.

[Will Torbald]

I take it by "abstract" as simply something that exists as a thought, not as a "concrete" object in the universe. If someone asks what a coconut is you can point at it, or show a picture - it's a concrete object. If someone asks what sadness is you can't do that, it's an abstract meaning.

[bugzysegal]

err *edited*

I .....conversation.

"I always have these kinds of trouble when debating with people. Far too late do I notice they use different meaning to words than me. I try to remedy this by using concise mathematical definitions, no abstractions, no new terms, etc. " 

I am going to say that's a bad move in this or any language inquiry. I imagine you didn't click on the link I included, which is totally fair.   I should have just copied and pasted what I needed, but I also wanted to show I'm not pulling this out of my butt and am actually just forwarding the philosophy of another. So here's my (Wittgenstein's) response: "A common summary of his argument is that meaning is use—words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate, nor by the mental representations one might associate with them, but by how they are used. For example, this means there is no need to postulate that there is something called good that exists independently of any good deed...This anthropological perspective contrasts with Platonic realism"  I am saying platonic realism is wrong, but it's not just me, a great number of modern philosophers and students of of philosophy would agree.  Words are not reducible to logical components that are self-evident.  I'll grant, and I don't at all think there is reason to but anyway, that language is reducible to logical or mathematical scaffolding in some-sense. In an effort to prove mathematical realism, that logic and math both map onto the world and are self-evident, Betrand Russell embarked with Alfred Whitehead on a conjoined effort in The Principia Mathematica.  Keep in mind that Russell and Whitehead were considered preeminent in their respective fields of philosophy and math.  They failed utterly.  "PM, as it is often abbreviated, was an attempt to describe a set of axioms andinference rules in symbolic logic from which all mathematical truths could in principle be proven...However, in 1931, Gödel's incompleteness theorem proved definitively that PM, and in fact any other attempt, could never achieve this lofty goal; that is, for any set of axioms and inference rules proposed to encapsulate mathematics, either the system must be inconsistent, or there must in fact be some truths of mathematics which could not be deduced from them." https://en.wikipedia...pia_Mathematica.  But what does this have to do with natural language? Well... quite a bit. "Logic", "reason", "mathematics", "truth", "provable", and any word you like that might be the example of some foundational platonic form is only going to have meaning or "be provable" in the context of its  use.  There is a marvelous discussion of this here:  https://www.quora.co...eteness-theorem. I realize there is a lot of information to grapple with here, but please take the time to at least try and comprehend it before responding.  When I say comprehend I mean try and look at it from the perspective of the person forwarding the argument.

 

I take it by "abstract" as simply something that exists as a thought, not as a "concrete" object in the universe. If someone asks what a coconut is you can point at it, or show a picture - it's a concrete object. If someone asks what sadness is you can't do that, it's an abstract meaning.

That is one possible way he could have meant it.  I was granting "abstract" a reading that might rescue it from my criticism.  I'm not saying your wrong, but I try and give the best possible defense of a philosophical notion I am criticizing. In other words, if you're right, Stefan's position is untenable.

I take it by "abstract" as simply something that exists as a thought, not as a "concrete" object in the universe. If someone asks what a coconut is you can point at it, or show a picture - it's a concrete object. If someone asks what sadness is you can't do that, it's an abstract meaning.

That is one possible way he could have meant it.  I was granting "abstract" a reading that might rescue it from my criticism.  I'm not saying your wrong, but I try and give the best possible defense of a philosophical notion I am criticizing. In other words, if you're right, Stefan's position is untenable.

[Koroviev]

 Mic drop.

 

This doesn't make sense, to me "mic drop" is when someone picks up a microphone.

[bugzysegal]

I apologize for redundancies.  Also I'm going to broaden the scope of Stefan's position. In that video I described above. He discusses at length how there are objects in the worlds and concepts in our minds and that's how language works essentially.  This is leaving aside his views on the concreteness of definitions.  He is still sorely mistaken. Russell and Frege agreed that the world could be separated into propositions and references (see "Frege and Russell" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference) Thisleads to all sorts of paradoxes. Russell's Paradox is a good one. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-paradox/.  If anyone knows where Stefan goes into more detail about his views on language, please direct me to those videos/essays/etc.

[bugzysegal]

This doesn't make sense, to me "mic drop" is when someone picks up a microphone.

It was a joke. If you were joking in your comment, sorry it's hard to tell these things through text.

[Mister Mister]

Does any of this have any bearings on any of Stef's main arguments?  I mean, you can always point at someone and claim they're not going into enough detail in one particular area.  Academia is full of excessive terminology and analysis in every little field, but most of it doesn't lead anywhere useful.  This show is unique and popular, because it balances the analytical and rational, with the emotional and actionable.

[bugzysegal]

Does any of this have any bearings on any of Stef's main arguments?  I mean, you can always point at someone and claim they're not going into enough detail in one particular area.  Academia is full of excessive terminology and analysis in every little field, but most of it doesn't lead anywhere useful.  This show is unique and popular, because it balances the analytical and rational, with the emotional and actionable.

Are you asking if I think his theory of meaning is relevant? Yes. If you believe in "objective truth" "objective morality" or just "morality" then yes.  The extent to which these are concepts that are self-evident, definite, and certain all rests heavily upon whether you believe that words simply derive their meaning from use, or from some underlying logical properties which are the scaffolding of some objective reality.

Edited September 22, 2015 by bugzysegal

[bugzysegal]

Great. No one takes this subject seriously.  Theories of meaning, when it comes to philosophy, are fundamental to every argument.  It's a huge deal if you are arguing from a standpoint that relies on logical principles as being fundamental, that you do not address holism and anti-foundationalism.  I would think that "the #1 philosophy" followers might have at least something to say on the topic.  But that's right, academic philosophy is just what the man says is legitimate. I would love to see a pole of this website on how many of you have read philosophical texts or neutral summations of texts, of philosophies competing with Libertarian and Empiricist thought. Real philosophers don't go to school though, right? A thread above this asked the definition of tautology. Of all the responses only one actually answered the poor posters question. Meanwhile, literally anything said in dissent of Stefan's views has been down voted on other threads. If anything you should welcome challenges.  If the challengers are misinformed, it presents an opportunity to make your theories more robust, educate, or both. So much for welcoming discourse. 

Edited September 23, 2015 by bugzysegal

[SamuelS]

You failed to communicate why you think this should even be important until three days into the conversation. You ended your first post with the cocksure mic drop...three days in and you've demonstrated no curiosity about the responses but rather have gotten passive aggressive and condescended to the participants as though they're insolent children. But yeah, we're the jerks.

 

 

If you feel we're all such dullards, perhaps you could be so kind as to explain it like we are, as it is you're saying "I can't believe you idiots don't understand this complex argument.", which is not only insulting but insane.

[bugzysegal]

You failed to communicate why you think this should even be important until three days into the conversation. You ended your first post with the cocksure mic drop...three days in and you've demonstrated no curiosity about the responses but rather have gotten passive aggressive and condescended to the participants as though they're insolent children. But yeah, we're the jerks.

 

 

If you feel we're all such dullards, perhaps you could be so kind as to explain it like we are, as it is you're saying "I can't believe you idiots don't understand this complex argument.", which is not only insulting but insane.

As I clarified, "mic drop" was a joke. Perhaps this is a poor medium for humor, I'll grant you that. I don't feel you are dullards. I've just found this community generally hostile to dissent, especially that which is far from what's considered orthodoxy here. I am getting downvoted for non-hostile posts (the above one excluded).  I was venting in this particular post after experiencing this. Should I edit it? The brunt of the argument I presented in the second post applies to my alternative depiction of Stefan's views.  Shame on me for not making that explicit.

[Mister Mister]

Are you asking if I think his theory of meaning is relevant? Yes. If you believe in "objective truth" "objective morality" or just "morality" then yes.  The extent to which these are concepts that are self-evident, definite, and certain all rests heavily upon whether you believe that words simply derive their meaning from use, or from some underlying logical properties which are the scaffolding of some objective reality.

  No, I am asking if your "clarification" on the philosophy of language has any bearing on any important issues.

[bugzysegal]

  No, I am asking if your "clarification" on the philosophy of language has any bearing on any important issues.

Love the RATM/Bob Dylan quote, by the way. Umm, yes if some system of ethics, let's say UPB, should be touted and spread to the masses, if that overlooks a major hurdle in thinking and is unknowingly and fundamentally flawed, then it is important.

[Mister Mister]

Love the RATM/Bob Dylan quote, by the way. Umm, yes if some system of ethics, let's say UPB, should be touted and spread to the masses, if that overlooks a major hurdle in thinking and is unknowingly and fundamentally flawed, then it is important.

 

Okay, well like most people I am not well versed on the nuances of epistemology that you were explaining before, so can you distill down to me in common English what is the flaw or hurdle in thinking you are talking about, and how it affects conclusions like the NAP, property rights, anarchism, parenting, and so on?

[Koroviev]

It was a joke. If you were joking in your comment, sorry it's hard to tell these things through text.

 

Yes it was a joke, but I think it embodies a point. Would you not agree that in order to have any meaningful, logical, and/or rational conversation there has to be some agreement on the meaning of words?

[bugzysegal]

Yes it was a joke, but I think it embodies a point. Would you not agree that in order to have any meaningful, logical, and/or rational conversation there has to be some agreement on the meaning of words?

Agreement... well I would agree that language must be shared.  If you are thinking of it in terms of giving assent to something I would disagree.

[Koroviev]

Agreement... well I would agree that language must be shared.  If you are thinking of it in terms of giving assent to something I would disagree.

 

Ah, but see that is exactly the issue. Without some external "agreed" upon meaning of words you cannot converse at all. This is why we have dictionaries, and also why dictionaries are living documents that change over time. It is safe to assume when people are having conversations they are using the "dictionary" meaning of the word, if not then the parties involved come to an agreement on the definition that suites the context they are speaking in. If you climb into a cab and purposely say take me to North 25th st when you mean West 54th st that's just rude (and in that circumstance even if you tried to explain your definition of north and 25 the cabby would just end up kicking you out). I'd also argue that it's rude to knowingly go into a conversation with a definition of something that is contrary to what everyone else is assuming.

[bugzysegal]

Ah, but see that is exactly the issue. Without some external "agreed" upon meaning of words you cannot converse at all. This is why we have dictionaries, and also why dictionaries are living documents that change over time. It is safe to assume when people are having conversations they are using the "dictionary" meaning of the word, if not then the parties involved come to an agreement on the definition that suites the context they are speaking in. If you climb into a cab and purposely say take me to North 25th st when you mean West 54th st that's just rude (and in that circumstance even if you tried to explain your definition of north and 25 the cabby would just end up kicking you out). I'd also argue that it's rude to knowingly go into a conversation with a definition of something that is contrary to what everyone else is assuming.

"rudeness" in your alternate definition bit seems inappropriate. When I call someone "rude" I mean that they are being unnecessarily hostile or intentionally ignoring social norms i.e. Looking right at someone and laughing as the elevator door shuts before they can get on, instead of holding the elevator. Maybe "ignorant" is better suited for your example? What I mean when I say its not agreement like a contractual agreement is we don't both go "Lets take "pain" to mean this ouchy feeling" "yeah that sounds good to me" Specifically its not that we are agreeing to some laundry list of propositions.  Why? because language can be infinitely reassembled for infinitely numbered sentences and meanings. We use words in the same way because those are the customary ways in which these words are used. Dictionaries are shorthand guides for the customs of a given language, but they fall far short of capturing the extent of meaning. 

[Djoop]

The logical picture of the facts is the thought...

 

Just as a spatial picture represents things in physical space, a logical picture represents things in logical space. A logical picture represents possible states of affairs: it is the most general kind of picture because logical form is the most general kind of form. However, a logical picture cannot represent logical space or logical form itself, in the same way that a spatial picture cannot represent physical space itself. Rather, it displays its form by depicting facts (2.172)

(Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico)

 

There need not be any agreement on the meaning of words, we simply need to be able to communicate our logical pictures. That being said, language is of course very important when we're trying to communicate abstract ideas. But it's not that difficult to imagine how you would use different words trying to explain the same logical picture to two different family members.  In your mind, the idea doesn't change, the picture(s) remains the same.

 

  

[Koroviev]

"rudeness" in your alternate definition bit seems inappropriate. When I call someone "rude" I mean that they are being unnecessarily hostile or intentionally ignoring social norms i.e. Looking right at someone and laughing as the elevator door shuts before they can get on, instead of holding the elevator. Maybe "ignorant" is better suited for your example? What I mean when I say its not agreement like a contractual agreement is we don't both go "Lets take "pain" to mean this ouchy feeling" "yeah that sounds good to me" Specifically its not that we are agreeing to some laundry list of propositions.  Why? because language can be infinitely reassembled for infinitely numbered sentences and meanings. We use words in the same way because those are the customary ways in which these words are used. Dictionaries are shorthand guides for the customs of a given language, but they fall far short of capturing the extent of meaning. 

 

No, rude is exactly what I meant. If I'm giving directions to someone and tell them to go south because to me south means north, when I know that to them south means south it falls right in line with your (and my) definition of rude. I agree that there are different perceptions people have or different images that come to mind when people use words (like when I think of a dog I'm thinking of a different dog than you are) but that does not change the definition of the word dog which we "agree" on through the dictionary. I highly recommend checking out Stef's intro to philosophy series he covers a lot of this and other things in way more detail.

[bugzysegal]

No, rude is exactly what I meant. If I'm giving directions to someone and tell them to go south because to me south means north, when I know that to them south means south it falls right in line with your (and my) definition of rude. I agree that there are different perceptions people have or different images that come to mind when people use words (like when I think of a dog I'm thinking of a different dog than you are) but that does not change the definition of the word dog which we "agree" on through the dictionary. I highly recommend checking out Stef's intro to philosophy series he covers a lot of this and other things in way more detail.

Ok I thought you meant otherwise with the taxi example. What you think of and what I think of are irrelevant.  It's the shared practice of linguistic acts that makes them meaningful. I've taken plenty intro philosophy classes, so I'll probably pass for now. Thinking of meaning as stemming from a definition at all is not quite right.  Obeying a rule, or using a word correctly, is viewed in light of generally shared practices. When you are cut and exhibit pain behavior and say you are in pain....I don't reference some internal approximation of a definition. We look at what we would generally call "pain" and say yes your are using this word correctly.

The logical picture of the facts is the thought...

 

Just as a spatial picture represents things in physical space, a logical picture represents things in logical space. A logical picture represents possible states of affairs: it is the most general kind of picture because logical form is the most general kind of form. However, a logical picture cannot represent logical space or logical form itself, in the same way that a spatial picture cannot represent physical space itself. Rather, it displays its form by depicting facts (2.172)

(Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico)

 

There need not be any agreement on the meaning of words, we simply need to be able to communicate our logical pictures. That being said, language is of course very important when we're trying to communicate abstract ideas. But it's not that difficult to imagine how you would use different words trying to explain the same logical picture to two different family members.  In your mind, the idea doesn't change, the picture(s) remains the same.

 

  

Wittgenstein abandoned his picture theory of meaning.  Typically the tractatus and Philosophical Investigations are viewed as entirely distinct (and sometimes contradictory) works. I'm running with the late Wittgenstein.  Good pull though.

[Koroviev]

Ok I thought you meant otherwise with the taxi example. What you think of and what I think of are irrelevant.  It's the shared practice of linguistic acts that makes them meaningful. I've taken plenty intro philosophy classes, so I'll probably pass for now. Thinking of meaning as stemming from a definition at all is not quite right.  Obeying a rule, or using a word correctly, is viewed in light of generally shared practices. When you are cut and exhibit pain behavior and say you are in pain....I don't reference some internal approximation of a definition. We look at what we would generally call "pain" and say yes your are using this word correctly.

 

Right, but the whole point I'm making is that we have to have some semblance of a shared meaning of pain to have any conversation at all. Generally, that comes from the dictionary but it doesn't have to, and if you have a completely different meaning of the word that should be made when the discussion begins. For example everyone has a different meaning of god therefore if by god you mean quantum physics as opposed to lightning bolt slinging guy in the sky then parties involved can come to that understanding from the get-go. 

 

Also, I doubt your intro to philosophy professors laid the entire groundwork for UPB, so rather than trying to figure out what Stef's thoughts are second hand I'd recommend going straight to the horse's mouth as they say, but suite yourself.

[bugzysegal]

Right, but the whole point I'm making is that we have to have some semblance of a shared meaning of pain to have any conversation at all. Generally, that comes from the dictionary but it doesn't have to, and if you have a completely different meaning of the word that should be made when the discussion begins. For example everyone has a different meaning of god therefore if by god you mean quantum physics as opposed to lightning bolt slinging guy in the sky then parties involved can come to that understanding from the get-go. 

 

Also, I doubt your intro to philosophy professors laid the entire groundwork for UPB, so rather than trying to figure out what Stef's thoughts are second hand I'd recommend going straight to the horse's mouth as they say, but suite yourself.

I've listened to UPB through twice. There was nothing baffling. The "shared meaning" more closely represents what I was getting at than "agreement" in that agreement could simply hinge on similar evaluations of some fact or another, whereas "shared meaning" ties into how words are commonly used, shared experience, context, etc.

[Koroviev]

I've listened to UPB through twice. There was nothing baffling. The "shared meaning" more closely represents what I was getting at than "agreement" in that agreement could simply hinge on similar evaluations of some fact or another, whereas "shared meaning" ties into how words are commonly used, shared experience, context, etc.

 

Yes, I agree with our shared meaning of the idea shared meaning vs  the meaning of agreement.   I have also listened through UPB twice and the intro to Philosophy sheds way more light on what he was getting at and how he got there as well as everything we're talking about here. Obviously you don't have to and I really don't care if you do, but arguing against Stef's ideas based on someone else's understanding of them doesn't seem to make sense to me.

 

A good alternative to listening through the series would be to call in.

[labmath2]

I have considered this topic, though without realizing it. A good place to start is to define moral or good in an objective way. The standard use of good seems to rely on collective preference.

[bugzysegal]

Yes, I agree with our shared meaning of the idea shared meaning vs  the meaning of agreement.   I have also listened through UPB twice and the intro to Philosophy sheds way more light on what he was getting at and how he got there as well as everything we're talking about here. Obviously you don't have to and I really don't care if you do, but arguing against Stef's ideas based on someone else's understanding of them doesn't seem to make sense to me.

 

A good alternative to listening through the series would be to call in.

But the list is so long! Or at least it was last time I checked.y

[Koroviev]

But the list is so long! Or at least it was last time I checked.y

Yeah I know and definitely agree but it's soo worth it!

[bugzysegal]

Okay, well like most people I am not well versed on the nuances of epistemology that you were explaining before, so can you distill down to me in common English what is the flaw or hurdle in thinking you are talking about, and how it affects conclusions like the NAP, property rights, anarchism, parenting, and so on?

Ok Im going to refer you to the following http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#Mea

The reason I do so is there is no way I would equivently represent these views. Thats why philosophers get paid the big bucks. It's all pretty layman, but if you need clarification I'll be happy to answer any questions (to the best of my ability, I only took one class on this subject). You don't need to read the whole thing. Just sections 3.3 and 3.4 are of particular importance. Especially the "family resemblance" portion of colideas relating to one another. So instead of generalizing ideas to broad swaths of other ideas, instead ideas relate to one another in a group like fashion... Like family resemblance. This bears particular importance on the idea of universalization. If we shouldn't generalize concepts to all other concepts...the methodology of UPB and the principle of universalization seem deficient.

[Mister Mister]

Ok Im going to refer you to the following http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#Mea

The reason I do so is there is no way I would equivently represent these views. Thats why philosophers get paid the big bucks. It's all pretty layman, but if you need clarification I'll be happy to answer any questions (to the best of my ability, I only took one class on this subject). You don't need to read the whole thing. Just sections 3.3 and 3.4 are of particular importance. Especially the "family resemblance" portion of colideas relating to one another. So instead of generalizing ideas to broad swaths of other ideas, instead ideas relate to one another in a group like fashion... Like family resemblance. This bears particular importance on the idea of universalization. If we shouldn't generalize concepts to all other concepts...the methodology of UPB and the principle of universalization seem deficient.

Yes I think I get the general idea, but it doesn't answer my question, you've just alluded to something about universalization.  Sorry, again, this is somewhat new to me, and I'm asking you to walk me through it, so I can see the value in it.  Otherwise, this stuff is no different to me than any other obscure academic pursuit, like the history of hydraulics, crystallography, or the anthropology of French Polynesian island tribes.  Maybe it's interesting, but I don't see what bearing it has on widely communicable and accesible, actionable, essential, moral philosophy.

[bugzysegal]

Yes I think I get the general idea, but it doesn't answer my question, you've just alluded to something about universalization.  Sorry, again, this is somewhat new to me, and I'm asking you to walk me through it, so I can see the value in it.  Otherwise, this stuff is no different to me than any other obscure academic pursuit, like the history of hydraulics, crystallography, or the anthropology of French Polynesian island tribes.  Maybe it's interesting, but I don't see what bearing it has on widely communicable and accesible, actionable, essential, moral philosophy.

Ok so "universalizability" from Kant via Wikipedia: the maxim(principle) of your action could become one that everyone could act upon in similar circumstances. If the action could be universalized (i.e., everyone could do it), then it is morally acceptable.

In saying that ethics are universalizabile necessarily, you say that in order for something to be moral, it must also be universalizeable. Family resemblance strikes against the idea that there is some common thread that runs through all uses of a word. In defining a word, you are limiting the potential uses of a word erroneously.  That means to say that ethics are definitively universalizeable, is incorrect in a meaningful way. What ramifications does this have on the day to day application of ethics? Well we no longer take for granted that each moral edict always applies to everyone all the time. 

[SamuelS]

And what value comes from that? It certainly helps you avoid hypocrisy if you can put yourself in another moral category. But there must be some non-arbitrary fundamental distinction between members of one moral class and another...how do you propose that be dealt with? Maybe we put on a funny hat and give one another permission to murder? Sounds like the state.

 

I'm still wondering about an example of when a person has one preference and the opposite preference, at the same time.

[Mister Mister]

I don't quite follow.  As I understand, UPB is similar but fundamentally different from Kant's categorical imperative.  Have you ever spent time around children?  You teach them a word, like say, "guitar", and they will quickly get that, other, similar objects are "guitar".  In a similar way, when you give them a moral command, like, "don't hit", or "share", they will then apply that to others.  For example, older siblings often model the parents behavior for younger siblings, repeating the commands that their parents have given them.  In particular, when they see parents violating the "rules" they have inflicted on the children, they get very upset.  So I think there is a strong argument to be made, that UPB is how we naturally process moral arguments, and only through corruption do we become confused, as so many people are.  But I still don't understand what you are saying outside of abstractions, in any practical sense.  Can you just get to the point already?  What exceptions do you think should be made, as a result of this "clarification" in the philosophy of meaning, to the NAP, private property, free trade, peaceful parenting, etc..?

In particular I don't get this sentence - "In defining a word, you are limiting the potential uses of a word erroneously."  Can you give an example?  If I call things with for legs that you sit on, "chair", I have made some error?

[bugzysegal]

And what value comes from that? It certainly helps you avoid hypocrisy if you can put yourself in another moral category. But there must be some non-arbitrary fundamental distinction between members of one moral class and another...how do you propose that be dealt with? Maybe we put on a funny hat and give one another permission to murder? Sounds like the state.

 

I'm still wondering about an example of when a person has one preference and the opposite preference, at the same time.

Value? There is certainly value in realizing that there are times when you would call something ethical that have nothing to do with a respect for property rights. Why are you asking for a preference and an opposite preference?  I'd prefer to go to the basketball game(as I love basketball), but also I'd prefer not to (because I value they money the ticket would cost). At one time I both prefer and prefer not to go the basketball game and until I take a course of action, I maintain both as relevant.

 

 

I don't quite follow.  As I understand, UPB is similar but fundamentally different from Kant's categorical imperative.  Have you ever spent time around children?  You teach them a word, like say, "guitar", and they will quickly get that, other, similar objects are "guitar".  In a similar way, when you give them a moral command, like, "don't hit", or "share", they will then apply that to others.  For example, older siblings often model the parents behavior for younger siblings, repeating the commands that their parents have given them.  In particular, when they see parents violating the "rules" they have inflicted on the children, they get very upset.  So I think there is a strong argument to be made, that UPB is how we naturally process moral arguments, and only through corruption do we become confused, as so many people are.  But I still don't understand what you are saying outside of abstractions, in any practical sense.  Can you just get to the point already?  What exceptions do you think should be made, as a result of this "clarification" in the philosophy of meaning, to the NAP, private property, free trade, peaceful parenting, etc..?

 

In particular I don't get this sentence - "In defining a word, you are limiting the potential uses of a word erroneously."  Can you give an example?  If I call things with for legs that you sit on, "chair", I have made some error?

You have made an error if you try and define a chair as something that has four legs which you sit on.  As far as language acquisition, when you teach a child a word, it is their ability to use it correctly that demonstrates their acquisition. For instance a child wouldn't be wrong in calling a giant beanbag a "chair" also, may hippies do.  If you aligned all things that were chairs in the world, their would be no one single thread running through all of them. Go ahead try and give me what is common to all chairs other than "we call them chairs".

[SamuelS]

You are equivocating, preference in this context is demonstrated in the behavior.