Stefan's take on the philosophy of language.

[bugzysegal]

You are equivocating, preference in this context is demonstrated in the behavior.

How are you using preference?

[SamuelS]

In your basketball example, your preference to go (vs not, or anything else) was demonstrated in that it was the course of action you took.

[labmath2]

When you say there is no chairness in them, you are merely showing the limit of abstractions.

[bugzysegal]

In your basketball example, your preference to go (vs not, or anything else) was demonstrated in that it was the course of action you took.

A retreat into behaviorism "psychology should have only concerned itself with observable events"... is just that, a retreat. Sure, we may not be able to distinguish when someone else holds contradictory preferences, but we know from our own experiences that such things are possible, and frequent.  

[SamuelS]

The topic at hand is UPB, in this context preference is displayed in behavior. You can't be this thick, you are a troll and you'll get no more food from me.

[Mister Mister]

You have made an error if you try and define a chair as something that has four legs which you sit on.  As far as language acquisition, when you teach a child a word, it is their ability to use it correctly that demonstrates their acquisition. For instance a child wouldn't be wrong in calling a giant beanbag a "chair" also, may hippies do.  If you aligned all things that were chairs in the world, their would be no one single thread running through all of them. Go ahead try and give me what is common to all chairs other than "we call them chairs".

 

See, this is what I was getting at.  I had a feeling that you were just BSing, but I had to see it through to make sure.  I'm totally done with this.  I've asked you multiple times, what value there is in the principles you're putting forth, what important conclusions they lead to, and you want to argue over the definition of "chair".  If that's an important philosophical issue to you, great, but it's not for me.  Have fun with all that, thanks for the discussion.

[bugzysegal]

See, this is what I was getting at.  I had a feeling that you were just BSing, but I had to see it through to make sure.  I'm totally done with this.  I've asked you multiple times, what value there is in the principles you're putting forth, what important conclusions they lead to, and you want to argue over the definition of "chair".  If that's an important philosophical issue to you, great, but it's not for me.  Have fun with all that, thanks for the discussion.

You can directly analogize everything I'm saying to words like "good" or "bad"  Giving tangible examples is just nice and concrete...and also indisputable. Align all good behaviors in the world and there is no single element running through them because there is no special class of ethical language to which ubiquitous principles apply. The search for foundations, principles, and conclusions is mistaken.  that's what is directly implied by "anti-foundationalism" Philosophy is a mistaken endeavor.

[Mister Mister]

Philosophy is a mistaken endeavor.

 

And yet you're on a philosophy forum investing lots of time and energy arguing a position, trying to change people's mind.  Simply fascinating...Again, thanks for the discussion, it's been very instructive

[bugzysegal]

And yet you're on a philosophy forum investing lots of time and energy arguing a position, trying to change people's mind.  Simply fascinating...Again, thanks for the discussion, it's been very instructive

Your condescension isn't clever or infuriating. Holism and movement against theorizing is not itself contradictory. It's nice to realize you think your smarter than the greatest minds of the last century.  You want a neat formulaic refutation? All principles are tautological, circular, and cannot prove themselves. This undermines any theory they inspire that requires proof in all things that are meaningful, because these principles are themselves unproved and simply taken as definitions.  If you try and rescue the situation by saying that meaning only comes from language where it represents embedded logical truths, verified by experience you run into greater problems. One main one is that any formal set (let's say the set of all meaningful logical statements) is either incomplete, or inconsistent. This is Godel's incompleteness theorem. It has been verified by mathematicians and logicians since its inception.  

 I'm sure you'll dismiss this as, "I don't see how this applies to life", or "it's all woo woo" when in fact linguists and logicians have been dealing with these exact concepts for decades. If you still can't see why this should effect the decision to live your life by formalized systems of philosophy, I can only pity you. You should not ascribe to formalized philosophies, because they can't reveal anything to you, you don't already take as true. Moreover you are fooling yourself into thinking that their methodologies tell us something about the world. They don't.

[labmath2]

Your condescension isn't clever or infuriating. Holism and movement against theorizing is not itself contradictory. It's nice to realize you think your smarter than the greatest minds of the last century. You want a neat formulaic refutation? All principles are tautological, circular, and cannot prove themselves. This undermines any theory they inspire that requires proof in all things that are meaningful, because these principles are themselves unproved and simply taken as definitions. If you try and rescue the situation by saying that meaning only comes from language where it represents embedded logical truths, verified by experience you run into greater problems. One main one is that any formal set (let's say the set of all meaningful logical statements) is either incomplete, or inconsistent. This is Godel's incompleteness theorem. It has been verified by mathematicians and logicians since its inception.

I'm sure you'll dismiss this as, "I don't see how this applies to life", or "it's all woo woo" when in fact linguists and logicians have been dealing with these exact concepts for decades. If you still can't see why this should effect the decision to live your life by formalized systems of philosophy, I can only pity you. You should not ascribe to formalized philosophies, because they can't reveal anything to you, you don't already take as true. Moreover you are fooling yourself into thinking that their methodologies tell us something about the world. They don't.

Even if this is true, granted i read the wikipedia page and it was hard to see how that his theorem applies, we still have reality with which to test theories. If you take the time to listen to David Friedman and Milton Friedman, i think they make very good cases for freedom. In the case of doctors being forced to treat patients, you will run into all kinds of problems. I am willing to go down this rabbit hole with you, i just want to understand your motive in all this.

[Mister Mister]

 If you still can't see why this should effect the decision to live your life by formalized systems of philosophy, I can only pity you. You should not ascribe to formalized philosophies, because they can't reveal anything to you, you don't already take as true. Moreover you are fooling yourself into thinking that their methodologies tell us something about the world.

 

Well thanks for your pity, but I don't understand how you are in a position to tell me or anyone else what we should or shouldn't do.  I wasn't trying to be condescending, only pointing out that your behavior isn't consistent with the content of your argument, something which I see quite a lot, and which fascinates me.  Especially because when you point this out to people, you generally encounter rage and slander.  Why do you think this is?

[bugzysegal]

Well thanks for your pity, but I don't understand how you are in a position to tell me or anyone else what we should or shouldn't do.  I wasn't trying to be condescending, only pointing out that your behavior isn't consistent with the content of your argument, something which I see quite a lot, and which fascinates me.  Especially because when you point this out to people, you generally encounter rage and slander.  Why do you think this is?

You are boxing my position in to your schema...analycity, then saying that my "argument" is nonsensical and inapplicable.  We are playing different games and you are accusing me of cheating or being too stupid to play the game. Then you take my behavior to confirm your analytic hypothesis. It's annoying to be told what I mean by someone who has less experience in the field than I do (which arguably is still very little). If you say that you were doing anything other than belittling me with your previous statement, I fail to see how that's possible. "I thought you were bsing...this has been instructive" Yeah I responded with annoyance because you were being condescending. There was a huge reformation against your entire method of inquiry in the 20th century. I'm on this philosophy board because I think you, like myself not too long ago, are under the spell of philosophy. 

"Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote all he knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment. It would of course contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true propositions that can be made. But all the facts described would, as it were, stand on the same level and in the same way all propositions stand on the same level. But what I mean is that a state of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which we can describe, is in no ethical sense good or bad. If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics." 

 The bottom line is there are no moral facts. This is why I was trying to refocus ethics on usefulness and how language (ethical or otherwise) itself gets meaning through use.

Also your koolaid is gross.  "Where's  your argument? I want to see an argument...argument! Argument!! ARGUMENTS?!!!" "Your arguments are woo woo, and flibertygibbits fitang fitang, word salad" "Therefore you have emotional deficiencies and ulterior motives for saying what you do and Libertarian ethics must be right you darn statist!"

[bugzysegal]

Even if this is true, granted i read the wikipedia page and it was hard to see how that his theorem applies, we still have reality with which to test theories. If you take the time to listen to David Friedman and Milton Friedman, i think they make very good cases for freedom. In the case of doctors being forced to treat patients, you will run into all kinds of problems. I am willing to go down this rabbit hole with you, i just want to understand your motive in all this.

Right so the theorem itself is aimed at logic systems, but it says something about the limitations of any given system of logic as a whole. Mainly that a system can't prove all propositions able to be constructed within them. Plainly, if we were to say that natural language is reducible to logical atoms of truth, there would be some construction of those atoms that wouldn't be provable in that system, or the system would seem itself inconsistent. You say "Aha, but you said it wouldn't be provable within this system, but that means you can possibly prove in it another."  True, but this system will have the same problem with another proposition,  Thus there are limits to which logical conceptions of freedom can answer questions, and they only answer questions within the larger framework of the language they are built into.  The last part of that conjunction has much wider implications, but is unnecessary for this discussion.

[labmath2]

Right so the theorem itself is aimed at logic systems, but it says something about the limitations of any given system of logic as a whole. Mainly that a system can't prove all propositions able to be constructed within them. Plainly, if we were to say that natural language is reducible to logical atoms of truth, there would be some construction of those atoms that wouldn't be provable in that system, or the system would seem itself inconsistent. You say "Aha, but you said it wouldn't be provable within this system, but that means you can possibly prove in it another." True, but this system will have the same problem with another proposition, Thus there are limits to which logical conceptions of freedom can answer questions, and they only answer questions within the larger framework of the language they are built into. The last part of that conjunction has much wider implications, but is unnecessary for this discussion.

If i understood you correctly, then your argument is about the axiom upon which UPB rests on. One UPB itself is not a moral proposition, but a system of evaluating moral propositions. Even if i were to concede UPB rests on certain fundamental assumptions, you will have to point to those assumptions and ask us to prove or validate them or show us they are incorrect. So which axioms do you have problems with in particular.

[bugzysegal]

If i understood you correctly, then your argument is about the axiom upon which UPB rests on. One UPB itself is not a moral proposition, but a system of evaluating moral propositions. Even if i were to concede UPB rests on certain fundamental assumptions, you will have to point to those assumptions and ask us to prove or validate them or show us they are incorrect. So which axioms do you have problems with in particular.

“Logic” is the set of objective and consistent rules derived from the consistency of reality.

 

Reality is objective and consistent

 

 

These are actually stated as core tenants of UPB. They are also factually wrong. Well actually the first one is definitiively wrong, whereas the second is factually wrong. Logic is simply a tool useful in may realms of inquiry. For the second things see Wikipedia on "paracosistent logic" and note its applications to real world scenarios.  Regardless of the relative strength of either of these axioms, they are foundational.

[Will Torbald]

“Logic” is the set of objective and consistent rules derived from the consistency of reality.

 

Reality is objective and consistent

 

 

These are actually stated as core tenants of UPB. They are also factually wrong. Well actually the first one is definitiively wrong, whereas the second is factually wrong. Logic is simply a tool useful in may realms of inquiry. For the second things see Wikipedia on "paracosistent logic" and note its applications to real world scenarios.  Regardless of the relative strength of either of these axioms, they are foundational.

 

If there is no logic, you can't have right or wrong. If you can't have that, why are you even saying UPB is wrong? It wouldn't matter. It would just be an opinion. Therefore, you're just trying to enforce an opinion, which is very bullish. Quit wasting time trying to convince people that they are wrong in a world without truth, if you so believe it is true there is nothing true.

[bugzysegal]

If there is no logic, you can't have right or wrong. If you can't have that, why are you even saying UPB is wrong? It wouldn't matter. It would just be an opinion. Therefore, you're just trying to enforce an opinion, which is very bullish. Quit wasting time trying to convince people that they are wrong in a world without truth, if you so believe it is true there is nothing true.

More than a two way truth value system is not only reasonable, it's useful in the real world. See paraconsistent logic. The fact that this logic exists and is meaningful mean there may be many other systems of logic that reflect different aspects of "reality" as you would like to say logic does. It doesn't negate that true and false are possible, but that there are more possibilities. Also remember I was asked to list foundational axioms. I did. Your whole system is a series of axioms. http://cdn.media.freedomainradio.com/feed/books/UPB/Universally_Preferable_Behaviour_UPB_by_Stefan_Molyneux_PDF.pdfSee page 125. That is the full set.

 

Necessarily there is some state of affairs that is true and unprovable in your formal system.  It's even more damning that Stefan tries to ground the whole thing in logic.  Russell and Whitehead already tried to prove that some ideal logical language can be fully proved. After their failure Godel proved that this could never be done, such that any formal system (i.e. logic) will either be inconsistent or incomplete. On top of that, we shouldn't take any axiom as being anything other than what we use it for.  It, in itself, cannot be "reasonable" or "right" and there simply is no such thing as "self-evident axioms." Axioms serve as bedrocks for reasons. You can dig no further. You can say "these things taken to be true are easily applicable and useful in an array of situations" but that is determined after the fact.

 

Also, Labmath, are there videos or short summaries of Friedman's or Hayek's portraits of freedom? I'd love to see them.  I am actually a Libertarian but for practical reasons. Nozick gives a wonderful argument for voluntarism in "Anarchy, State, and Utopia"

[Will Torbald]

More than a two way truth value system is not only reasonable, it's useful in the real world. See paraconsistent logic. The fact that this logic exists and is meaningful mean there may be many other systems of logic that reflect different aspects of "reality" as you would like to say logic does. It doesn't negate that true and false are possible, but that there are more possibilities. Also remember I was asked to list foundational axioms. I did. Your whole system is a series of axioms. http://cdn.media.freedomainradio.com/feed/books/UPB/Universally_Preferable_Behaviour_UPB_by_Stefan_Molyneux_PDF.pdfSee page 125. That is the full set.

 

Necessarily there is some state of affairs that is true and unprovable in your formal system.  It's even more damning that Stefan tries to ground the whole thing in logic.  Russell and Whitehead already tried to prove that some ideal logical language can be fully proved. After their failure Godel proved that this could never be done, such that any formal system (i.e. logic) will either be inconsistent or incomplete. On top of that, we shouldn't take any axiom as being anything other than what we use it for.  It, in itself, cannot be "reasonable" or "right" and there simply is no such thing as "self-evident axioms." Axioms serve as bedrocks for reasons. You can dig no further. You can say "these things taken to be true are easily applicable and useful in an array of situations" but that is determined after the fact.

 

Also, Labmath, are there videos or short summaries of Friedman's or Hayek's portraits of freedom? I'd love to see them.  I am actually a Libertarian but for practical reasons. Nozick gives a wonderful argument for voluntarism in "Anarchy, State, and Utopia"

 

I'm getting tired of this "paraconsistent logic" pseudo argument. I read the wikipedia, and it makes no sense whatsoever. If you can't explain right here in this forum what 3rd pillar other than "true" or "false" there is, you are just throwing smoke at mirrors.

[labmath2]

Unfortunately, i at work now, i will fully respond to you tomorrow, but are you familiar with the three laws of logic?

[bugzysegal]

I'm getting tired of this "paraconsistent logic" pseudo argument. I read the wikipedia, and it makes no sense whatsoever. If you can't explain right here in this forum what 3rd pillar other than "true" or "false" there is, you are just throwing smoke at mirrors.

 I'd say the best example however is the liar's paradox.  "This sentence is a lie" You can't say the sentence is neither true nor false, because that is essentially saying that it is not a sentence. However, if you try and say it is either true  or false, paradox arises. Saying it is both eliminates the problem. This is a semantics issue. If you can find another way to define UPB's core tenants other than grammar and semantic relation, you avoid even needing to address this. 

 I'd say the best example however is the liar's paradox.  "This sentence is a lie" You can't say the sentence is neither true nor false, because that is essentially saying that it is not a sentence. However, if you try and say it is either true  or false, paradox arises. Saying it is both eliminates the problem. This is a semantics issue. If you can find another way to define UPB's core tenants other than grammar and semantic relation, you avoid even needing to address this. 

For further explanation as to why the liars paradox is solved by assigning both "true" and "false" truth values.... If we are going about assigning truth values in the normal way we proceed as follows: "The apple is red" we look at the apple, the apple is red so boom "True"! or the apple is green "False". Either way, no problem. When it comes to the liars paradox we evaluate "This sentence is a lie" ah, well lies are false so "False", but if it is false that's actually what the sentence told us so "True", but wait if the sentence is accurate then it is "False" etc, forever reversing the assignment of truth conditions. If it is true and false, it can be so all the way down.  There is no re-assignment of truth values. This wouldn't require that apples be both red and not red, but would issue it as a mere possibility.  Just as the possibility that an apple may not be red doesn't endanger the fact that it is red.

[Will Torbald]

 I'd say the best example however is the liar's paradox.  "This sentence is a lie" You can't say the sentence is neither true nor false, because that is essentially saying that it is not a sentence. However, if you try and say it is either true  or false, paradox arises. Saying it is both eliminates the problem. This is a semantics issue. If you can find another way to define UPB's core tenants other than grammar and semantic relation, you avoid even needing to address this. 

 

Just because you can write nonsense it doesn't mean that the binary of true and false aren't valid. I could say "It is true that the smell of 4 is shy" and it has no answer or validity because all the parameters aren't related. When you say "this sentence is a lie" you are not making a claim at all. It's like saying "I am dead" but I am alive while I type it. It's just not true, and the paradox doesn't mean that it is both at once, it means that it is neither. It is neither false nor true because it doesn't make any claim on objective reality.

[bugzysegal]

Just because you can write nonsense it doesn't mean that the binary of true and false aren't valid. I could say "It is true that the smell of 4 is shy" and it has no answer or validity because all the parameters aren't related. When you say "this sentence is a lie" you are not making a claim at all. It's like saying "I am dead" but I am alive while I type it. It's just not true, and the paradox doesn't mean that it is both at once, it means that it is neither. It is neither false nor true because it doesn't make any claim on objective reality.

Ah the difference is that your example is a categorical mistake. 4 has no smell nor an attitude. Here we are dealing with truth values. Calling it nonsense is not an argument but a conclusion. Some would say conflict is due to the nature of assertions. G.E. Moore looks at the statement "It is raining and it is true that it is raining" and says that this sentiment strikes us as odd; that this oddness is due to redundancy.

 

If assertions carry with them the declaration of truth, then reflective sentences such as "this sentence is false" strike us as contradictory, not as a category mistake. One could then frame the liar's paradox when viewed vacuously as being inherently contradictory. You might conclude that any statement that isn't grounded on tangible facts, like this one, can't be meaningful. I would counter that the weight assertions carry varies contextually. Some are statements of belief, reasonable belief, mere belief, etc. Each of of these is weaker than truth and the paradox arises. 

 

What's curious is why being able to assert something like this might be useful in computing. What does that say about the possible meaning content of "liar" like statements?

[Matthew Ed Moran]

 

Was that you who recently called in to chat about ol' Wittgenstein and the nature of language with Stef? If so, I want to say I really appreciate that call. It was one of the most enjoyable and informative philosophy discussions I've listened to since a call several months back. Have you changed any of your positions on this topic directly as a result of that call? If so, I'd be interested to hear about that.

 

Btw, just to share how I am understanding the "liar's paradox" is that the sentence actually has no truth value because it is just made up. It doesn't actually refer to any empirical reality and is just a statement purposefully constructed to be nonsensical. I find it really interesting you think it has such profound philosophical implications.

[bugzysegal]

Was that you who recently called in to chat about ol' Wittgenstein and the nature of language with Stef? If so, I want to say I really appreciate that call. It was one of the most enjoyable and informative philosophy discussions I've listened to since a call several months back. Have you changed any of your positions on this topic directly as a result of that call? If so, I'd be interested to hear about that.

 

Btw, just to share how I am understanding the "liar's paradox" is that the sentence actually has no truth value because it is just made up. It doesn't actually refer to any empirical reality and is just a statement purposefully constructed to be nonsensical. I find it really interesting you think it has such profound philosophical implications.

My concerns are twofold. One, using common language it's easy to uncover problems about the limitations of grammar and philosophical statements. The liars paradox and Russell's paradox are two clear cut examples of this. It is curious that you can start with logical elements that are both reflective of the nature of reality, and combine them to arrive at a contradiction.

 

Wittgenstein actually views things like these as only meaningful as far as they are useful; suggesting that if one might find some application of the principles therein as usable in mathematics or some other sense, then and only then should they be regarded as telling us anything. I'm actually going to follow up with another call to Stefan about the nature of truth and "I have a hand" statements. Wittgenstein's take is far more nuanced that I believe Stefan gave credit. Certain notions (I exist, the world did not pop into existence last Thursday, I have a hand, I've never been to the moon) aren't knowledge(T or F) and yet they are indubitable. In order to doubt these things, an entire litany of things must be true in order for me to doubt at all. This closes off the door to the most radical forms of skepticism, but doesn't tell us much about the nature of Truth.

 

Russell's paradox is particularly sinister. Imagine the set of all round objects. Is the set of all round objects round? No. So you can say "the set of all round objects is not a member of itself" Imagine a set of all sub-sets of this nature: the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Is this set a member of itself? 

 

The second concern is backwards looking from the point of observable and useful phenomenon that operate outside the bounds of binary truth values. These include the list of those listed on Wikipedia, but are certainly not limited to that list. In fact there may be many applications of paraconsistency that we have not discovered or do not yet understand(things either we know we don't know, or don't know that we don't know). My contention is this, if a way of reasoning is entirely founded upon non-contradiction and there is evidence suggesting blind spots in that kind of reasoning, one should approach conclusions made prior to the discovery of the blind spots with a renewed sense of skepticism. I will be calling back to form my argument on this particular issue after I formulate my position and have some materials and sources. 

 

BOTTOM LINE: consider conclusions about mathematics prior to the understanding of the concept of "0" Might these conclusions have been dramatically misguided or woefully incomplete and might UPB suffer similar ailments without addressing alternate forms of reasoning?

[Kevin Beal]

BOTTOM LINE: consider conclusions about mathematics prior to the understanding of the concept of "0" Might these conclusions have been dramatically misguided or woefully incomplete and might UPB suffer similar ailments without addressing alternate forms of reasoning?

Wait wait wait. Do you mean that in a relevant sense, or an irrelevant sense?

[bugzysegal]

Wait wait wait. Do you mean that in a relevant sense, or an irrelevant sense?

Solid criticism bro. Yeah undermining the foundations of your entire belief system is irrelevant. There's no way that could have any implications for actual real life scenarios right?

[Kevin Beal]

Solid criticism bro. Yeah undermining the foundations of your entire belief system is irrelevant. There's no way that could have any implications for actual real life scenarios right?

Hey man. You're the one who's always qualifying your statements with "in a relevant sense", as if, when you don't say it, you might mean that what you're saying is true in a sense which is irrelevant. I had to make sure

 

I don't have a belief system. If I did, then yes, please threaten it!

[bugzysegal]

Hey man. You're the one who's always qualifying your statements with "in a relevant sense", as if, when you don't say it, you might mean that what you're saying is true in a sense which is irrelevant. I had to make sure

 

I don't have a belief system. If I did, then yes, please threaten it!

So you don't believe in UPB? Don't give me that "It's simply the rules of reasoning" bullshit, because I'm questioning the very rules of reasoning(or at least the classical ones that compose UPB). I'm getting annoyed at your use of emoticons. Are the genuine or simply poorly veiled passive aggression? What would you even mean by "winkey face"? 

[Kevin Beal]

So you don't believe in UPB? Don't give me that "It's simply the rules of reasoning" bullshit, because I'm questioning the very rules of reasoning(or at least the classical ones that compose UPB). Also "you had to make sure"? No, you had to take an opportunity to pat yourself on the back, for being able to step back from the conversation and declare it "irrelevant." Enough with the emoticons. They are great for flirting and other surreptitious behavior. If you want to fuck me send me a private message, otherwise speak like a human being.

Ok that was harsh, but honest.

That was very refreshing. Thank you.

 

It was way more satisfying than hearing what Wittgenstein or Derrida or Kant have concluded about stuff.

 

I'm honestly not looking for reasons to dismiss you. My previous comment was not meant as a criticism of your position or whatever. I don't feel at any threat of becoming disillusioned or any of the other psychological motives you've got me pegged for.

[Koroviev]

I have to be honest this, and a lot of your other posts are feeling very trollish. Just want to put that out there and a lot of it has to do with the tone of your replys. However, I feel like you're trying to make a good point and I did enjoy your conversation with Stef so thanks for that. 

 

It seems like you know a lot more about this that most of us amateurs so I wanted to try to simplify your main argument to make sure we're all on the same page. Please let me know if I misunderstood or missed anything.

 

[bugzysegal]

I have to be honest this, and a lot of your other posts are feeling very trollish. Just want to put that out there and a lot of it has to do with the tone of your replys. However, I feel like you're trying to make a good point and I did enjoy your conversation with Stef so thanks for that. 

 

It seems like you know a lot more about this that most of us amateurs so I wanted to try to simplify your main argument to make sure we're all on the same page. Please let me know if I misunderstood or missed anything.

 

Capture.PNG

That's about right. You've correctly represented my views (well almost perfectly I would say those reasons may endanger UPB so my claim is a bit weaker). I really am not trying to troll. Wittgenstein was literally the bane of my existence for quite a time and it is extremely difficult to articulate, mostly because he tends to avoid straightforward dogmas. 

[bugzysegal]

That was very refreshing. Thank you.

 

It was way more satisfying than hearing what Wittgenstein or Derrida or Kant have concluded about stuff.

 

I'm honestly not looking for reasons to dismiss you. My previous comment was not meant as a criticism of your position or whatever. I don't feel at any threat of becoming disillusioned or any of the other psychological motives you've got me pegged for.

Squared.

 Have you changed any of your positions on this topic directly as a result of that call? If so, I'd be interested to hear about that.

 

 

Also, to this yes. It is perhaps reasonable that Wittgenstein's conclusions are limited in the way Stefan described, that they cannot outpace the millions of years of evolution that resulted in our brains. Science, which is collective thought of some of the best minds, might be better suited to tell us about language acquisition and its implications.

 

It is interesting to note, however that as of yet science has not outpaced or disproved Wittgenstein's main tenants. I would be fascinated to see that it does. Some "experimental philosophy" has attempted to test these claims, but these efforts have been criticized widely as being unscientific and poor philosophy.

 

The"fuzzy edges" is a fantastic metaphor to get across the transience of language. It somewhat avoids the contextual and social notions I re framed the argument to reflect later in the call. I was mistaken about the usefulness of "family resemblance" in this regard. This is something I kind of realized over the course of this thread as well.

[Koroviev]

That's about right. You've correctly represented my views (well almost perfectly I would say those reasons may endanger UPB so my claim is a bit weaker). I really am not trying to troll. Wittgenstein was literally the bane of my existence for quite a time and it is extremely difficult to articulate, mostly because he tends to avoid straightforward dogmas. 

 

Ok, great! I was hoping not and after your conversation with Stef I'd assumed not but I just wanted to make sure you were aware of how it was coming off from the other side of the interwebs.

 

Is that argument fundamentally different from saying that the argument for UPB is weakened because people may interpret different words in different ways? In other words the meaning of words is neither abstract nor rational, consistent, etc. and can only be derived from the way they are used by other people.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

"The liars paradox and Russell's paradox are two clear cut examples of this. It is curious that you can start with logical elements that are both reflective of the nature of reality, and combine them to arrive at a contradiction."

 

I don't think it's curious. It just proves that when you are claiming something to be a lie, you must be referencing something other than the very claim you are making, otherwise it is self-referential and there is no way of testing it. This does not mean that the concept of a "lie" is universally not very useful and unable to be defined according to some essential characteristics and tested empirically.

 

"My contention is this, if a way of reasoning is entirely founded upon non-contradiction and there is evidence suggesting blind spots in that kind of reasoning, one should approach conclusions made prior to the discovery of the blind spots with a renewed sense of skepticism. I will be calling back to form my argument on this particular issue after I formulate my position and have some materials and sources."

 

There is nothing practical about your conclusion; it changes nothing. If I have a valid scientific hypothesis and I am running an experiment to test it, whether I have a "renewed sense of skepticism" or not will change not change the outcome of the experiment, nor will it make my theory valid or invalid. If you have evidence that a theory is untrue or invalid, then you actually have to make a claim and not just say "your theory could be wrong because of blind spots, and you should have a renewed sense of skepticism." anything can potentially be proven wrong or at least refined, and there are blind spots all over science but we have a method for dealing with this, which includes not violating occam's razor. 

[bugzysegal]

"My contention is this, if a way of reasoning is entirely founded upon non-contradiction and there is evidence suggesting blind spots in that kind of reasoning, one should approach conclusions made prior to the discovery of the blind spots with a renewed sense of skepticism. I will be calling back to form my argument on this particular issue after I formulate my position and have some materials and sources."

 

There is nothing practical about your conclusion; it changes nothing. If I have a valid scientific hypothesis and I am running an experiment to test it, whether I have a "renewed sense of skepticism" or not will change not change the outcome of the experiment, nor will it make my theory valid or invalid.

 

A scientific hypothesis, is different than science as a whole. Questioning the validity of the first is different than questioning the foundations of the second, so your analogy fails.

 

If you have evidence that a theory is untrue or invalid, then you actually have to make a claim and not just say "your theory could be wrong because of blind spots, and you should have a renewed sense of skepticism." anything can potentially be proven wrong or at least refined, and there are blind spots all over science but we have a method for dealing with this, which includes not violating occam's razor. 

 

"blind spots" was a poor choice of words on my part. It's not whether there are new theory like things ready to be tested by the scientific method, but as if there is an entirely new branch of inquiry not encapsulated within the terms of science. Korioviev actually has a pictorial depiction of my criticism above. It's quite good.