UPB, objective?

[bugzysegal]

I'll keep it short and sweet. What does "objective" mean and how does it apply to ethics? If something is objectively true, is there something about the workings of the universe that weave this truth into the very fabric of reality? 

[Will Torbald]

I'll keep it short and sweet. What does "objective" mean and how does it apply to ethics? If something is objectively true, is there something about the workings of the universe that weave this truth into the very fabric of reality? 

 

Would it bother you if UPB wasn't objective?

[bugzysegal]

Would it bother you if UPB wasn't objective?

Not at all. That would relegate it to relativity or subjectivity, would it not? Either way, is UPB some set of facts that are woven into reality?

[Will Torbald]

Not at all. That would relegate it to relativity or subjectivity, would it not? Either way, is UPB some set of facts that are woven into reality?

 

So you don't have a problem with subjective/relativistic ethics? UPB is a method for validating or invalidating moral propositions.

[WasatchMan]

I would say that the biggest thing that objectivity applies to ethics is non-contradiction.  UPB applies the logical law of non-contradiction to human behavior.

[bugzysegal]

So you don't have a problem with subjective/relativistic ethics? UPB is a method for validating or invalidating moral propositions.

For the purposes of answering the question, my beliefs are irrelevant since I'm asking about how UPB it is widely interpreted amongst the FDR community. I'm not trying to be rude, but rather keep the scope narrow, as philosophical discourse has a way of digressing to the point of being useless. 

I would say that the biggest thing that objectivity applies to ethics is non-contradiction.  UPB applies the logical law of non-contradiction to human behavior.

Excellent! What if the "law of non-contradiction" is in fact not a law, but a useful tool in some kinds of logic? Paraconsistent logic that does not observe and in fact violates this rule. Yes it is rigorous, systematic, and has been applied in mathematics, electronics, and computing.  The technical stuff is way beyond my skill set, but Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia provide some laymen explanations that I think are useful.

Edited September 23, 2015 by bugzysegal

[WasatchMan]

Excellent! What if the "law of non-contradiction" is in fact not a law, but a useful tool in some kinds of logic? Paraconsistent logic is of this sort. Yes it is rigorous, systematic, and has been applied in mathematics, electronics, and computing.  The technical stuff is way beyond my skill set, but Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia provide some laymen explanations that I think are useful.

 

It is a tool of logic.  In this context it applies to a consistent application of human behavior that can be applied universally within its context. Its not gravity, in the way that it just "is" - however I can't really think of a better standard for an ethical system than a logical approach that can be applied universally.  There is no other alternative.

[bugzysegal]

It is a tool of logic.  In this context it applies to a consistent application of human behavior that can be applied universally within its context. Its not gravity, in the way that it just "is" - however I can't really think of a better standard for an ethical system than a logical approach that can be applied universally.  There is no other alternative.

Ah, so it is not a law governing all of reality is it? So why must ethics conform to one kind of logic and not another?  Sure, the implications of ethics being paraconsistent are hard to fathom for me (and maybe you), but that doesn't mean it isn't true. The fact that this alternative kind of logic is useful in real world applications seems as though it might be deeply concerning for anyone who values the non-contradictory nature of their ethics for its law-like, or universal, applicability. Notice that the argument has shifted from being grounded in metaphysical truth, to pragmatic, epiistemic value. At the very least, this is significant I think.

Edited September 23, 2015 by bugzysegal

[SamuelS]

I don't know that it gets you any closer if paraconsistent logic is a subset of logic and using logic is UPB...

[bugzysegal]

I don't know that it gets you any closer if paraconsistent logic is a subset of logic and using logic is UPB...

 

While the Wikipedia article calls paraconsistent logic a subset, I'm going to say that it's more useful to think of it as a type of logic (specifically one which operates without the law of non-contradiction).  Where Stefan umbrellas logic under UPB, he's someone using a dialectical trick; that is, he's saying "any logical argument you make against logic being universally preferred, can only make sense if it's logical; therefore it is self contradictory" Arguments killed right? You should be suspicious of any argument that appears to be necessarily true in this fashion. It is tautological. Logic is reasonable; therefore logic is reasonable. Working strictly with arguments and two way truth values, the conversation is over. Just so you know, there are major contradictions that occur if you take this kind of stance. Russell's paradox is a good one as is the liars paradox.. What we might consider in an alternative fashion is whether there exists other meaningful methods of reasoning which call into question UPB's ubiquitous application of classical logic and the logic Stefan used to assemble his initial arguments(paraconsistent logic!), or other methods of deriving meaning that don't fit into such narrow confines.

[bugzysegal]

After taking a wee break I realized I erred in calling the logical argument for logic tautological, when instead it is question begging. I apologize for any confusion.  But, professors always told me confusion was good. It meant we were getting somewhere haha. That comment is still up for review so please bear with me.

[SamuelS]

...subset, I'm going to say that it's more useful to think of it as a type of logic

A distinction without a difference.

 

he's saying "any logical argument you make against logic being universally preferred, can only make sense if it's logical; therefore it is self contradictory"

I don't think so. First, I have to say I find it funny that in another post you're talking about how we use language and meaning and that...and here you've made a huge mistake in language and meaning in characterizing the argument -- it is not preferrED, but preferABLE, that behavior which it is possible (logically) to universalize, not that behavior which is universal.

 

Logic is not valid because it is logical, it is valid because it conforms to reality.

 

You should be suspicious of any argument that appears to be necessarily true in this fashion.

I agree. I would also say that those things we take for granted are things we might want to examine first... UPB is a valid methodology, whether or not it's useful is another question and what, if anything, it has to do w ethics is yet another (one I haven't figured out myself.)

 

As an aside from the main topic, you come across, to me, as belligerent toward the topic and the community. You may want to consider that as having something to do with the conflict/downvotes you're getting -- as it is you're setting up a self-fulfilling prophesy (FDR people are not open to [your] criticism) -- at least that's an aspect of the interaction that is in your control.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

It uses the objective standard you automatically accept when you asked the question and began to debate people. If you're not using an objective standard then everything you say is subjective opinion and we can ignore you. 

[Frosty]

I'll keep it short and sweet. What does "objective" mean and how does it apply to ethics? If something is objectively true, is there something about the workings of the universe that weave this truth into the very fabric of reality? 

 

Objective just means based on facts and not opinions.

 

We can consider something objectively true if we can find evidence of its truth which is not contradicted by other evidence, reason or logic. How or why that truth is established isn't really relevant as to whether it's objective or not.

 

You have to be careful with questions like "workings of the universe" and "weave this truth into the very fabric of reality" as these are metaphors and aren't talking about anything specific that we can objectively test or confirm. I sort of get where you're going but these questions are just too vague and that's probably because we don't know enough about reality and how it works to be able to even ask well formed questions about its nature. This is why I tend to value science over philosophy because it tends to increase knowledge over time by actually gathering data and making inferences, philosophy just kind of stagnates.

 

I believe that the NAP is an objective principle, it's objective because it's universal to everyone and its truth is not reliant on peoples preference or opinion, it's also not contradicted by anything I'm aware of. You can specifically rule out personal and subjective preference with a careful definition of aggression, that it has to be unwanted. It sort of just becomes a tautology, people don't want aggression against them that they don't want, and so it's pretty much true by its own definition.

 

I actually don't have a problem with that, some people do seem to, all systems of reasoning we have at some point have to reduce to certain irreducible ideas which are tautologies that the rest of the reasoning is built from. The judge of whether any particular system of ideas is accurate or useful is the degree to which it comports with reality.

 

From the NAP you can extrapolate a list of human behaviors which are violations of the NAP and these behaviors define a set of morals of how we can behave in ways which universally avoid harm. I consider this type of reasoning to be the basis for secular morality, Stefan formalized this as UPB.

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

After taking a wee break I realized I erred in calling the logical argument for logic tautological, when instead it is question begging. I apologize for any confusion.  But, professors always told me confusion was good. It meant we were getting somewhere haha. That comment is still up for review so please bear with me.

Question begging requires everyone accept an objective standard because in begging the question one is deviating from that standard. 

[bugzysegal]

Question begging requires everyone accept an objective standard because in begging the question one is deviating from that standard. 

This is what you are saying, "Using reason in objective way to evaluate what question begging is, requires that you use reason in an objective way" Circular sir.  A non-circular version of what you said might go something like this, "Any statement you employ against reason must be vacuous because reason is the only way we can determine value or meaning.  That is, you have not in making your statement, demonstrated that there is some other method of deriving value or meaning." To which my reply above still works.

A distinction without a difference.

 

 

I don't think so. First, I have to say I find it funny that in another post you're talking about how we use language and meaning and that...and here you've made a huge mistake in language and meaning in characterizing the argument -- it is not preferrED, but preferABLE, that behavior which it is possible (logically) to universalize, not that behavior which is universal.

 

Logic is not valid because it is logical, it is valid because it conforms to reality.

 

 

I agree. I would also say that those things we take for granted are things we might want to examine first... UPB is a valid methodology, whether or not it's useful is another question and what, if anything, it has to do w ethics is yet another (one I haven't figured out myself.)

 

As an aside from the main topic, you come across, to me, as belligerent toward the topic and the community. You may want to consider that as having something to do with the conflict/downvotes you're getting -- as it is you're setting up a self-fulfilling prophesy (FDR people are not open to [your] criticism) -- at least that's an aspect of the interaction that is in your control.

I made the distinction for a reason.  Imagine if you will, that a much larger portion of the world is governed by paraconsistent logic as opposed to classical logic. Imagine if it applies in the realm of ethics. If you say UPB deals strictly in classical logic, fine, but note there now non-universal aspects of UPB. As far as "preferred" vs. "preferable" you are absolutely right.  The circular nature of Stefan's reasoning still seems tangible to me and that was my motive for forwarding the argument.  I will be more careful in the future. I will keep my arguments on point and try not to make adversaries. Thanks for the pointers.

It uses the objective standard you automatically accept when you asked the question and began to debate people. If you're not using an objective standard then everything you say is subjective opinion and we can ignore you. 

I will refer you to my other response to you.

Objective just means based on facts and not opinions.

 

We can consider something objectively true if we can find evidence of its truth which is not contradicted by other evidence, reason or logic. How or why that truth is established isn't really relevant as to whether it's objective or not.

 

You have to be careful with questions like "workings of the universe" and "weave this truth into the very fabric of reality" as these are metaphors and aren't talking about anything specific that we can objectively test or confirm. I sort of get where you're going but these questions are just too vague and that's probably because we don't know enough about reality and how it works to be able to even ask well formed questions about its nature. This is why I tend to value science over philosophy because it tends to increase knowledge over time by actually gathering data and making inferences, philosophy just kind of stagnates.

 

I believe that the NAP is an objective principle, it's objective because it's universal to everyone and its truth is not reliant on peoples preference or opinion, it's also not contradicted by anything I'm aware of. You can specifically rule out personal and subjective preference with a careful definition of aggression, that it has to be unwanted. It sort of just becomes a tautology, people don't want aggression against them that they don't want, and so it's pretty much true by its own definition.

 

I actually don't have a problem with that, some people do seem to, all systems of reasoning we have at some point have to reduce to certain irreducible ideas which are tautologies that the rest of the reasoning is built from. The judge of whether any particular system of ideas is accurate or useful is the degree to which it comports with reality.

 

From the NAP you can extrapolate a list of human behaviors which are violations of the NAP and these behaviors define a set of morals of how we can behave in ways which universally avoid harm. I consider this type of reasoning to be the basis for secular morality, Stefan formalized this as UPB.

Thank you. I actually used those terms after someone had done so in another thread. If we take what is objectively true to be what is the most reliable (most testable) and most useful, I think we are on the same page.  Whether or not there is some state of affairs that is absolutely objective is something I am suspicious of. Just like it is reasonable to say something is circular, but we never think that anything really is or could be absolutely circular. 

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

This is what you are saying, "Using reason in objective way to evaluate what question begging is, requires that you use reason in an objective way" Circular sir.  A non-circular version of what you said might go something like this, "Any statement you employ against reason must be vacuous because reason is the only way we can determine value or meaning.  That is, you have not in making your statement, demonstrated that there is some other method of deriving value or meaning." To which my reply above still works.

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying your question and argument depends on an objective standard which you accept. UPB uses that objective standard. If you don't accept the objective standard then you can't claim to be right. It's not circular, it's self-evident. 

[bugzysegal]

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying your question and argument depends on an objective standard which you accept. UPB uses that objective standard. If you don't accept the objective standard then you can't claim to be right. It's not circular, it's self-evident. 

"self-evident" is nonsense. If you want to track down the philosophical history of "apriori" and "synthetic" as opposed to "analytic apriori," you'll find that the philosophical community has found that what can be said of even the most fundamental "truths" is very little.  Kant said space, time, and causality are among this class. I would not lump "logic" in with this group as his treatise "A Critique of Pure Reason" is widely respected in a relevant sense. I'm saying questions don't necessarily depend exclusively on some objective standard, that the objective standard is only part of some larger context which is not itself "objective" or "logical."

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

"self-evident" is nonsense. If you want to track down the philosophical history of "apriori" and "synthetic" as opposed to "analytic apriori," you'll find that the philosophical community has found that what can be said of even the most fundamental "truths" is very little.  Kant said space, time, and causality are among this class. I would not lump "logic" in with this group as his treatise "A Critique of Pure Reason" is widely respected in a relevant sense. I'm saying questions don't necessarily depend exclusively on some objective standard, that the objective standard is only part of some larger context which is not itself "objective" or "logical."

It's not nonsense. It makes complete sense. You are holding me and everyone else to an objective standard by which our propositions and arguments can be found to be right or wrong. This is self-evidently the case. It's the alternative that's "nonsense"

If you are not using an objective standard then by what standard do you claim to be right?

[NotDarkYet]

If there are no universal oughts/ought nots, why are you trying to correct a (possible) error in others thinking?

 

You need UPB to (try) to argue against UPB

[bugzysegal]

We we OUGHT to believe that there are no oughts?

Sorry, to clarify do you mean "ought" in the moral sense or "ought" in the sense that something is necessarily true? Does that meaning change from the beginning of your sentence to the end thereby creating something that looks contradictory but isn't? I forget the fallacy name here, someone help me out.

[Kevin Beal]

I'll keep it short and sweet. What does "objective" mean and how does it apply to ethics? If something is objectively true, is there something about the workings of the universe that weave this truth into the very fabric of reality? 

There are two different senses in which something can be "objective". What "objective" means is that the manner in which a proposition is true, or object is real is real or true independent of the observer.

 

To say that a rock objectively exists is a different question than whether or not a statement is objectively true. The way we determine each is different.

 

To say that ethical arguments are valid, statements are true, does not refer to existing objects. Existence is not anymore relevant to objectivity here than the existence of numbers is to mathematics.

 

Existence of ethics is as nonsensical as talking about the existence of numbers.

 

Sorry, to clarify do you mean "ought" in the moral sense or "ought" in the sense that something is necessarily true? Does that meaning change from the beginning of your sentence to the end thereby creating something that looks contradictory but isn't? I forget the fallacy name here, someone help me out.

You're thinking of an equivocation, but UPB is not ethics. UPB is a superset of objective ethics. To conflate the two here would actually mean that you were the one equivocating. It's a common mistake, so no antagonism intended.

 

You already accept the validity of objective oughts, so accepting objective oughts concerning moral statements is just one more step.

[bugzysegal]

There are two different senses in which something can be "objective". What "objective" means is that the manner in which a proposition is true, or object is real is real or true independent of the observer.

 

To say that a rock objectively exists is a different question than whether or not a statement is objectively true. The way we determine each is different.

 

To say that ethical arguments are valid, statements are true, does not refer to existing objects. Existence is not anymore relevant to objectivity here than the existence of numbers is to mathematics.

 

Existence of ethics is as nonsensical as talking about the existence of numbers.

 

You're thinking of an equivocation, but UPB is not ethics. UPB is a superset of objective ethics. To conflate the two here would actually mean that you were the one equivocating. It's a common mistake, so no antagonism intended.

 

You already accept the validity of objective oughts, so accepting objective oughts concerning moral statements is just one more step.

This is nice and close to what I was getting at. Notice that I have avoided formal arguments of the sort that are quaintly dealt with.  Just as you are claiming this is meta-ethical argument, I'm saying metaethics are only are intelligible contextually, if at all. MY position is distinctly anti-foundational. Numbers themselves simply are not examples of things that must be true about the world in a relevant sense. Mathematical truth fall under the category of analytic apriori truths, meaning they are true by meaning alone. It is no more significant to say 2+2=4 than bachelors are unmarried men, unless there is a dissimilarity that math is embedded metaphysics somehow. I contend that regardless of what definitions you personally hold as relevant, they only make sense in a larger context, not in a vacuum. 

[Kevin Beal]

This is nice and close to what I was getting at. Notice that I have avoided formal arguments of the sort that are quaintly dealt with.  Just as you are claiming this is meta-ethical argument, I'm saying metaethics are only are intelligible contextually, if at all. MY position is distinctly anti-foundational. Numbers themselves simply are not examples of things that must be true about the world in a relevant sense. Mathematical truth fall under the category of analytic apriori truths, meaning they are true by meaning alone. It is no more significant to say 2+2=4 than bachelors are unmarried men, unless there is a dissimilarity that math is embedded metaphysics somehow. I contend that regardless of what definitions you personally hold as relevant, they only make sense in a larger context, not in a vacuum. 

You are using a lot of terms that I don't understand in the context you used them. If you could speak simply, that would help me a lot. To be honest, I don't know what in the world you are arguing here, and I am familiar with all of the terms you used. It's disorienting.

 

There's a metaphysics (regarding objects, properties, functions) to UPB insofar as we are describing behavior, but the objectivity that UPB means to evaluate is purely epistemic (regarding truth statements, not objects).

 

I made the distinction for a reason.  Imagine if you will, that a much larger portion of the world is governed by paraconsistent logic as opposed to classical logic. Imagine if it applies in the realm of ethics. If you say UPB deals strictly in classical logic, fine, but note there now non-universal aspects of UPB. 

You're equivocating between different senses of "universal". You seem to be familiar with the history of philosophy, so you should be familiar with the distinction between a "universal" and a "particular". The difference between the two is the difference between the question "what do you want for dinner tonight?" and "what should we eat to stay healthy?"

 

"Universal" in this sense is synonymous with "principle". It's not the same thing as saying that there are never any exceptions to a rule.

 

All of the objections you raised that I've read so far are covered in the book. Have you not read it? If not, it seems premature to be critiquing it.

[Will Torbald]

For the purposes of answering the question, my beliefs are irrelevant since I'm asking about how UPB it is widely interpreted amongst the FDR community. I'm not trying to be rude, but rather keep the scope narrow, as philosophical discourse has a way of digressing to the point of being useless.

 

They are not irrelevant. I don't want to argue about objectivity with someone who doesn't believe in logic. It would be a tremendous waste of words.

[bugzysegal]

You are using a lot of terms that I don't understand in the context you used them. If you could speak simply, that would help me a lot. To be honest, I don't know what in the world you are arguing here, and I am familiar with all of the terms you used. It's disorienting.

 

There's a metaphysics (regarding objects, properties, functions) to UPB insofar as we are describing behavior, but the objectivity that UPB means to evaluate is purely epistemic (regarding truth statements, not objects).

 

You're equivocating between different senses of "universal". You seem to be familiar with the history of philosophy, so you should be familiar with the distinction between a "universal" and a "particular". The difference between the two is the difference between the question "what do you want for dinner tonight?" and "what should we eat to stay healthy?"

 

"Universal" in this sense is synonymous with "principle". It's not the same thing as saying that there are never any exceptions to a rule.

 

All of the objections you raised that I've read so far are covered in the book. Have you not read it? If not, it seems premature to be critiquing it.

Specifically principles are fundamental to their respective fields.  If some principle is of the field of ethics, then it can't be incompatible with the field in part or in whole. You don't start with a foundation of potassium and build upwards with water. Paraconsistency allows for the violation of the law of non contradiction, this law which is built into UPB.  You could open the door and say maybe there are separate principles for paraconsistent ethics that UPB would entail, but that's a whole other argument and one that would necessitate the understanding of the implications of paraconsistency.

This is not about exceptions and its not about universality per se. "A superset of objective ethics" means nothing by itself. Any proposition, stand point, term, idea, notion, experience, or any definition or principle only has meaning within a larger context. How does this apply to formal theories? When regarding Godel's incompleteness theorem Wittgenstein had this to say,

I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says: ‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. Must I not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that it is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.”

 

Just as we ask: “‘provable’ in what system?”, so we must also ask: “‘true’ in what system?” ‘True in Russell’s system’ means, as was said: proved in Russell’s system; and ‘false in Russell’s system’ means: the opposite has been proved in Russell’s system. —Now what does your “suppose it is false” mean? In the Russell sense it means ‘suppose the opposite is proved in Russell’s system’; if that is your assumption, you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. And by ‘this interpretation’ I understand the translation into this English sentence. —If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is true in the Russell sense, and the interpretation “P is not provable” again has to be given up. If you assume that the proposition is true in the Russell sense, the same thing follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false in some other than the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to be proved in Russell’s system. (What is called “losing” in chess may constitute winning in another game.) 

 

I should not have said metaphysics when we were in the realm of ethics, meta ethics would have sufficed. That is neither here nor there though.  Yes I've listened to the book twice and not once did Stefan address Wittgenstein's philosophy.  He sidestepped Hume by constructing his arguments pragmatically, but nowhere did he address who is widely considered the greatest thinker of the 20th century.  It seems like he at least deserves a footnote. 

They are not irrelevant. I don't want to argue about objectivity with someone who doesn't believe in logic. It would be a tremendous waste of words.

Logic can be very useful.

[NotDarkYet]

Sorry, to clarify do you mean "ought" in the moral sense or "ought" in the sense that something is necessarily true? Does that meaning change from the beginning of your sentence to the end thereby creating something that looks contradictory but isn't? I forget the fallacy name here, someone help me out.

 

UPB and Truth and Morality are all tied together.

 

A moral judgment implies "ought not do".

A logical judgement implies "ought not believe"

 

All of this implies (requires) the acceptance of objectivity.

[Will Torbald]

 

Logic can be very useful.

 

Until you can prove that human actions in the world behave in paraconsistent ways, you cannot justify the use of paraconsistency for ethics since all human actions have consistent consequences.

[SamuelS]

None of this negates the law of non contradiction, if something is "true" in one system and "false" in another that just means you're not unifying the language in such a way as to have meaningful discourse.

[NotDarkYet]

In my experience people who don't WANT to believe in objective morality will go to great lengths to avoid moral certainty, no matter what you throw at them.

 

Finding moral truth would mean actually having to judge their family/friends...and themselves.  

 

That's scary.

 

So so so much safer to lock yourself in the ivory tower and throw clouds of mist at waves of abstraction.  You get to avoid personal responsibility and as a bonus you get to look smart on the internet.  

 

Very very tempting. 

 

But these aren't the people who are going to affect change in the world. 

 

They are more dead weight we have to pull up the mountain to a liberated humanity.

[Kevin Beal]

nevermind

[bugzysegal]

Until you can prove that human actions in the world behave in paraconsistent ways, you cannot justify the use of paraconsistency for ethics since all human actions have consistent consequences.

 Please expand the last component of your statement.  I am a bit overtired at this point, so I apologize for sluggishness. Christopher Hitchens said that burning the candle at both ends produces a beautiful glow.  I like that sentiment.

This is unbearably pretentious.

 

Name drop > buzzword > word salad > repeat

 

You like to talk around philosophy a lot. Actually doing philosophy,... eh, not so much.

 

This is a philosophy forum, not a dick measuring contest.

Hmm. Let me be explicit. If I use a word, it's not because I'm trying to be misleading or obtuse.  I actually prefer discussion that is plain language and not even syllogistic. I was name dropping and quoting Wittgenstein, because it is my understanding of his philosophy that I am trying to defend and this is the plane and simple truth. If you wish, we can hash out the meaning of each word. I thought in the age of google, we can come to an understanding of terms we don't know quickly. I actually had to look up "pretentious" because I sometimes use this word wrong. I wasn't trying to impress anyone. You weren't entirely wrong when you said I was talking around philosophy.  Wittgenstein's position in his Philosophical Investigations was that (literally it doesn't matter what I say here scholars will furiously debate, but I'm giving you my best conjecture given the circumstances) philosophy is itself a mistake, a sort of defective method of thinking or problem solving; that language, when taken out of context and held to scrutiny, brakes down and loses meaning. Meaning is derived from our shared use of language. I was a philosophy major and when I heard this as the introduction to the class, I scoffed thinking that this was not rigorous philosophy. This was not the product of a keen analytical mind. The longer you grapple with Wittgenstein, the more elegant and pervasive his ideas become, however. All that being said, I get that I am doing a poor job of convincing you. For that I am eternally sorry. Otherwise I thought that Godel's theorem would be a good parallel to our discussion, but again I was apparently wrong. After a few minutes of walking to get the first meal I've had in 18 hours, I think your criticisms are more on point than I initially let on.  As someone trying to explain a foreign notion, it's my job to unpack and simplify to the best of my ability.  To not do so is lazy. 

Edited September 23, 2015 by bugzysegal

[Will Torbald]

 Please expand the last component of your statement.  I am a bit overtired at this point, so I apologize for sluggishness. Christopher Hitchens said that burning the candle at both ends produces a beautiful glow.  I like that sentiment.

Hmm. Let me be explicit. If I use a word, it's not because I'm trying to be misleading or obtuse.  I actually prefer discussion that is plain language and not even syllogistic. I was name dropping and quoting Wittgenstein, because it is my understanding of his philosophy that I am trying to defend and this is the plane and simple truth. If you wish, we can hash out the meaning of each word. I thought in the age of google, we can come to an understanding of terms we don't know quickly. I actually had to look up "pretentious" because I sometimes use this word wrong. I wasn't trying to impress anyone. You weren't entirely wrong when you said I was talking around philosophy.  Wittgenstein's position in his Philosophical Investigations was that (literally it doesn't matter what I say here scholars will furiously debate, but I'm giving you my best conjecture given the circumstances) philosophy is itself a mistake, a sort of defective method of thinking or problem solving; that language, when taken out of context and held to scrutiny, brakes down and loses meaning. Meaning is derived from our shared use of language. I was a philosophy major and when I heard this as the introduction to the class, I scoffed thinking that this was not rigorous philosophy. This was not the product of a keen analytical mind. The longer you grapple with Wittgenstein, the more elegant and pervasive his ideas become, however. All that being said, I get that I am doing a poor job of convincing you. For that I am eternally sorry. Otherwise I thought that Godel's theorem would be a good parallel to our discussion, but again I was apparently wrong.

 

If you agree that words don't have meaning then you are contradicting yourself by using words to explain your ideas. Try dancing, I think bees have a great solution for that.

 

On the actual question, my point is that since each human action is always consistent in its reactions, using paraconsistent logic is wrong. If human actions were inconsistent, say, only 50% of the time a murder is a murder and the other 50% it's a fondue party, then using contradicting and weird "logic" would make sense. Until we live in a universe where stealing equals gifting and taking at the same time, regular old non contradicting logic is enough.

[bugzysegal]

If you agree that words don't have meaning then you are contradicting yourself by using words to explain your ideas. Try dancing, I think bees have a great solution for that.

 

On the actual question, my point is that since each human action is always consistent in its reactions, using paraconsistent logic is wrong. If human actions were inconsistent, say, only 50% of the time a murder is a murder and the other 50% it's a fondue party, then using contradicting and weird "logic" would make sense. Until we live in a universe where stealing equals gifting and taking at the same time, regular old non contradicting logic is enough.

I said words lose meaning viewed in isolation. That they themselves are meaningless without context. If I was saying that there is no such thing as meaning, you would have a point, but I'm not, so you don't. 

To your second point, I concede that I have no clue how paraconsistent logic might apply to ethical decisions. I don't know for certain that it could. What I do know is that counterintuitve notions have supplanted mainstream ideas in the past and that common sense intuitions can be useful but aren't necessarily so. If it doesn't at least make you scratch your chin, I'm sorry. Penn Gillette said that "I know in my heart I could be wrong about Libertarianism." It's that kind of brazen uncertainty that I respect.

nevermind

"Antiphilosophy is anti-theoretical, critical of a priori justifications, and sees philosophical problems as misconceptions that are to be therapeutically dissolved." This is a good summation of Wittgenstein and is a direct quote from wikipedia. Also if this is your pronouncement that you have given up on the discussion and that it has been wasted effort and time, two things: 1. You're being a snob in that you assume that something which seems so unreasonable to you, could only be uttered by an idiot. 2. I use to be a lot like you and I assure you I'm not an idiot. (also if that is not what you meant not only will I edit in an apology, but I'll announce to the world that I was being an oversensitive dick)

[Will Torbald]

I said words lose meaning viewed in isolation. That they themselves are meaningless without context. If I was saying that there is no such thing as meaning, you would have a point, but I'm not, so you don't. 

To your second point, I concede that I have no clue how paraconsistent logic might apply to ethical decisions. I don't know for certain that it could. What I do know is that counterintuitve notions have supplanted mainstream ideas in the past and that common sense intuitions can be useful but aren't necessarily so. If it doesn't at least make you scratch your chin, I'm sorry. Penn Gillette said that "I know in my heart I could be wrong about Libertarianism." It's that kind of brazen uncertainty that I respect.

 

Part 1_ on words: Fair enough. Completely useless in practice.

 

Part 2_ on that: Are you certain that uncertainty is better than certainty?