UPB has a Catastrophic Problem: Informal Proof

[MrLovingKindness]

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

 

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. For example, murder is the subset of killing that is against one's will (which I will substitute unwanted for brevity). Since all behaviors have this subset, all behaviors become violations of UPB when someone subject to them doesn't want them. Therefore, UPB cannot be the basis for determining moral from immoral behavior, because any behavior can be unwanted, and thus doing any behavior in an unwanted circumstance would violate UPB.

 

Elaboration:

UPB states murder is wrong because, it is universally preferable to not be murdered. Why is it universally preferable? Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological.

 

Now let's make a new compound word "unwanted-killing." Unwanted-killing = murder, so unwanted-killing is prohibited by UPB. Again, this is fine.

 

Let's make up another new word: unwanted-looking. For the same reasons that it is UPB to avoid doing unwanted-killing, it is also UPB to refrain from unwanted-looking, because in all cases unwanted-looking is by-definition unwanted, so looking when it is unwanted is a violation of UPB. 

 

We could make another word, unwanted-disagreement, and another, and another... And herein lies the catastrophic fault: doing ANY form of unwanted-behavior is a violation of UPB. Since any behavior has as a subset of circumstances in which the behavior is unwanted, all behavior is potentially a violation of UPB (dependent on whether or not someone does not want the behavior). Therefore UPB cannot be the basis for deciding moral behaviors, because any behavior if it is unwanted by anyone at the time of the behavior is prohibited under UPB.

 

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement.
 

Extra credit: 

The reason the above flaw in UPB is not more obvious is because the words murder, rape, steal, assault, "peeping" all imply the unwanted part in the definition of the word (i.e., unwanted killing, unwanted, sex, unwanted taking, unwanted touching, unwanted looking at someone undressed). The reason not doing them is universally preferable is because unwanted is in the definition. The usual discussions of UPB don't take into account all of the other unwanted behaviors that would be covered by UPB (thus exposing the flaw), because we don't have words to describe those behaviors (e.g., unwanted-disagreement).

 

[Agalloch]

"... Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological."

I struggle to take most of what you say at your word with such blatant inaccuracies. That's not a tautology, it's basic logic. I don't want you to have made this post, but that doesn't make it not universally preferable.
 

[bugzysegal]

"... Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological."

 

I struggle to take most of what you say at your word with such blatant inaccuracies. That's not a tautology, it's basic logic. I don't want you to have made this post, but that doesn't make it not universally preferable.

 

Actually "A bachelor is an unmarried man" technically carries no new information, and there is no derivation deductive or inductive....definitions are tautological....for example 2+2=4...at least in that I'm on this guy's side.

 

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

 

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. For example, murder is the subset of killing that is against one's will (which I will substitute unwanted for brevity). Since all behaviors have this subset, all behaviors become violations of UPB when someone subject to them doesn't want them. Therefore, UPB cannot be the basis for determining moral from immoral behavior, because any behavior can be unwanted, and thus doing any behavior in an unwanted circumstance would violate UPB.

 

Elaboration:

UPB states murder is wrong because, it is universally preferable to not be murdered. Why is it universally preferable? Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological.

 

Now let's make a new compound word "unwanted-killing." Unwanted-killing = murder, so unwanted-killing is prohibited by UPB. Again, this is fine.

 

Let's make up another new word: unwanted-looking. For the same reasons that it is UPB to avoid doing unwanted-killing, it is also UPB to refrain from unwanted-looking, because in all cases unwanted-looking is by-definition unwanted, so looking when it is unwanted is a violation of UPB. 

 

We could make another word, unwanted-disagreement, and another, and another... And herein lies the catastrophic fault: doing ANY form of unwanted-behavior is a violation of UPB. Since any behavior has as a subset of circumstances in which the behavior is unwanted, all behavior is potentially a violation of UPB (dependent on whether or not someone does not want the behavior). Therefore UPB cannot be the basis for deciding moral behaviors, because any behavior if it is unwanted by anyone at the time of the behavior is prohibited under UPB.

 

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement.

 

Extra credit: 

The reason the above flaw in UPB is not more obvious is because the words murder, rape, steal, assault, "peeping" all imply the unwanted part in the definition of the word (i.e., unwanted killing, unwanted, sex, unwanted taking, unwanted touching, unwanted looking at someone undressed). The reason not doing them is universally preferable is because unwanted is in the definition. The usual discussions of UPB don't take into account all of the other unwanted behaviors that would be covered by UPB (thus exposing the flaw), because we don't have words to describe those behaviors (e.g., unwanted-disagreement).

 

Keep in mind, I don't believe in UPB, but for entirely different reasons. What if you broadened "unwanted" into "unwanted action that impedes my autonomy" Your looking at me does not impede my looking, not looking, or any other part of my ability to do what I want with my body/property. This seems to strike closer to what Libertarians strive for.  I think I've heard it called the Pareto principle : all actions are permissible so long as they are compossible with other's ability to act.  Oooh in looking up "Pareto" to double check my usage, I found this paradox https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_paradox. 

[Guest Gee]

Hi Mr LK, great topic, I've been thinking a lot about UPB myself.

 

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB.

 

If all behaviours have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB then to not avoid them is not UPB.

So as compliance with UPB is moral, failure to comply with UPB is immoral.

So by failing to comply with UPB by failing to avoid some such circumstance one is immoral.

 

Taking murder then to be one such circumstance, the avoidance of which is UPB.

Failure to avoid murder is then failure to comply with UPB.

Failure to avoid is to be murdered.

Therefore to be murdered is non UPB and murder victims are immoral.

 

 

We could make another word, unwanted-disagreement, and another, and another... And herein lies the catastrophic fault: doing ANY form of unwanted-behavior is a violation of UPB. Since any behavior has as a subset of circumstances in which the behavior is unwanted, all behavior is potentially a violation of UPB (dependent on whether or not someone does not want the behavior). Therefore UPB cannot be the basis for deciding moral behaviors, because any behavior if it is unwanted by anyone at the time of the behavior is prohibited under UPB.

 

 

It is not the unwanted suffix that makes a behaviour non UPB, it is the violent imposition of will upon another against their wishes.

Unwanted is a precondition in that if something is unwanted then it must be that the only way that something happens is against the expressed wishes of said person which can only come about through the initiation of force.

[SamuelS]

Any negative action, or refraining from doing an action, is UPB but not necessarily moral/ethics. Remember, ethics is just a subset of UPB. "Thou shall not wear blue" is a UPB-compliant rule, just nothing to do w morality.

[Koroviev]

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. 

 

I could be wrong but I don't think this is part of UPB. In other words not all "behaviors" are UPB. If I say I don't like the color blue that does not make liking the color blue immoral because me disliking something has nothing to do with the morality of that thing.

 

If I put out the theory that liking the color blue is immoral that can be dis proven using UPB because liking the color blue is a preference, liking the color blue is not universal, and disliking the color blue is not enforceable. Thus liking the color blue is dis proven by UPB and therefore not moral or immoral. As opposed to murder the opposite of which is a preference (all people prefer being not murdered), cannot be universal (when not murdering immoral), and cannot be enforced (If I'm enforcing murder I'm being immoral by not murdering). Therefore murder is immoral, thus not murdering must be moral.

[bugzysegal]

Hi Mr LK, great topic, I've been thinking a lot about UPB myself.

 

 

If all behaviours have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB then to not avoid them is not UPB.

So as compliance with UPB is moral, failure to comply with UPB is immoral.

So by failing to comply with UPB by failing to avoid some such circumstance one is immoral.

 

Taking murder then to be one such circumstance, the avoidance of which is UPB.

Failure to avoid murder is then failure to comply with UPB.

Failure to avoid is to be murdered.

Therefore to be murdered is non UPB and murder victims are immoral.

 

 

 

 

It is not the unwanted suffix that makes a behaviour non UPB, it is the violent imposition of will upon another against their wishes.

Unwanted is a precondition in that if something is unwanted then it must be that the only way that something happens is against the expressed wishes of said person which can only come about through the initiation of force.

"Unwanted" being necessary, not sufficient...in strictly logical terms.

[Will Torbald]

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement.

 

 

 

If you don't want to me to disagree with you, you want me to agree with you. You want me to believe you just because you want it. Can you enforce that? Ethics is about behaviors that can be enforced. You can enforce a "no murder" rule, but if you were to enforce an "agree with me" rule, would that be moral? Disagreement is simply aesthetically negative behavior. If X is true, it is in bad form to deny X's truth value, but in no way can you enforce the truth of X on people. For example, UPB is true, but you disagree. Can I aim a gun at a UPB disenter for his thought crime?

[ProfessionalTeabagger]

 

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

 

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. For example, murder is the subset of killing that is against one's will (which I will substitute unwanted for brevity). Since all behaviors have this subset, all behaviors become violations of UPB when someone subject to them doesn't want them. Therefore, UPB cannot be the basis for determining moral from immoral behavior, because any behavior can be unwanted, and thus doing any behavior in an unwanted circumstance would violate UPB.

 

 

All behaviors do not become violations of UPB because someone subject to them does not want them. Being unwanted is an aspect of it but it's the break with universality that's required. You are just wrong.

 

 

Elaboration:

UPB states murder is wrong because, it is universally preferable to not be murdered. Why is it universally preferable? Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological.

 

Murder is not defined as unwanted killing. That would make self-defense, murder. Is you making a joke of some kind?

This critique is almost like a satire of those "Massive laughable errors in UPB" or "UPB: The spectacular flaw that ruins it all!!!!" type posts or you tube videos. Absolutely chronic. 

[Des]

It is rational for a non-suicidal person to desire a minimum standard of behaviour from others, and to be willing to trade compliance with that standard [by himself] for compliance with that standard [by others].

 

This leads to the idea of a pact between a man and his neighbours, to agree to that minimum standard.

 

I don't expect opposition to the assertion that murder has to be banned, for the minimum standard to be high enough to have rational value to the pact members. I assert that the other aggressions, and also fraud, have to be banned, for the pact to have value.

 

This leads to a definition of evil as: all acts which must be banned for the pact to have rational value.

 

Not that you cannot ban some non-evils (not that you could not ban being unreasonably late), but that the definition of evil is limited to those actions which have to be banned, failing which the pact becomes worthless.

[dsayers]

Before anti-biotics were known, not prescribing anti-biotics wasn't evil. During a seizure, somebody's flailing arm striking you is not assault. In these examples, the perpetrators of the behaviors aren't responsible because they didn't know or didn't have control.

 

Humans have the capacity for reason. That is the ability to conceptualize self, the other, formulate ideals, compare behaviors to those ideals, calculate consequences, etc. Our capacity for reason means we own ourselves and therefore the effects of our actions because we're aware of and in control of them.

 

Barring malities such as brain damage, humans are not fundamentally different in such a way that would preclude us from universalizing this. So generally speaking, everybody owns themselves. Theft, assault, rape, and murder are the four behaviors a human could engage in that simultaneously accept and reject property rights.

 

There you have it. A simple proof for objective morality. Hopefully OP will share how this doesn't accurately describe the real world.

[MysterionMuffles]

I love UPB calls, I'm only starting to understand it after a re-read, and the discussions over it on the show help a lot!

[Matthew Ed Moran]

From what I have heard (I've yet to read the book), UPB is about defining universally preferable behavior, in distinction from universally preferred behavior. So if I didn't want someone to look at me, then looking at me could not be universally preferred, but it could still be universally preferable.

 

I don't know how helpful that is, and I think there might be more to your question - so please call in!

[MagnumPI]

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement. 

 

 

But in not wanting someone to disagree with you, you are disagreeing with them, proving UPB. They don't want to agree with you and you don't want to agree with them. Agreeing to disagree, as it were. We can see definitively that your preference for agreement is not universal.

 

Murder would follow from I want you to die, but you don't want to die, ergo, it becomes immoral. If someone wants to die, and you want to kill them, it's not murder.

[WasatchMan]

I think that the problem with this analysis, while rather well thought out, is that it puts the cart before horse. Murder is in fact the concept that describes a killing that cannot be universally preferable, however the reason this concept exists is because it describes an action that truly does exist, not just an abstraction. In other words, the killing has to not be universally preferable (by tests like the two men in a room test) to be put in the murder category, not the other way around. The concept of murder has been shown that it cannot be unverisally preferable by the type of behavior it represents.

 

So in a way you are right if you turn the analysis on its head and predetermine that every behavior has a subset that is unwanted. However, what you first need to do is determine whether the behavior cannot be universally preferable through tests like those provided in upb. You are actually doing what you accuse upb of doing and being tautological in your analysis instead of looking at the logical proofs in how you can determine if behavior cannot be upb.

[KallanDaMan]

I also love UPB shows. I must admit that while I definitely feel UPB is the most rational system of ethics I've ever heard, it hasn't fully "clicked" with me. 

It's a little bit late at night for me to place any faith in my own rational analysis here, but on a glance it seems that your argument would not be enforceable through violence. But could it be aesthetically preferable? Not sure. Been a while since I read the book!



 

[dja732]

From what I have heard (I've yet to read the book), UPB is about defining universally preferable behavior, in distinction from universally preferred behavior. So if I didn't want someone to look at me, then looking at me could not be universally preferred, but it could still be universally preferable.

 

I don't know how helpful that is, and I think there might be more to your question - so please call in!

Agreed. This is the solution to the dilemma. Preferable behavior means behavior that is 'able to be preferred'. Behavior that is possible for two people in the same room to simultaneously prefer. Along this vein...'unwanted looking' is not a proper unit of analysis, whereas 'looking' is. Since it's possible for two people in a room to simultaneously want 'looking' to occur...it is UPB. 

[dja732]

 

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

 

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. For example, murder is the subset of killing that is against one's will (which I will substitute unwanted for brevity). Since all behaviors have this subset, all behaviors become violations of UPB when someone subject to them doesn't want them. Therefore, UPB cannot be the basis for determining moral from immoral behavior, because any behavior can be unwanted, and thus doing any behavior in an unwanted circumstance would violate UPB.

 

Elaboration:

UPB states murder is wrong because, it is universally preferable to not be murdered. Why is it universally preferable? Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological.

 

Now let's make a new compound word "unwanted-killing." Unwanted-killing = murder, so unwanted-killing is prohibited by UPB. Again, this is fine.

 

Let's make up another new word: unwanted-looking. For the same reasons that it is UPB to avoid doing unwanted-killing, it is also UPB to refrain from unwanted-looking, because in all cases unwanted-looking is by-definition unwanted, so looking when it is unwanted is a violation of UPB. 

 

We could make another word, unwanted-disagreement, and another, and another... And herein lies the catastrophic fault: doing ANY form of unwanted-behavior is a violation of UPB. Since any behavior has as a subset of circumstances in which the behavior is unwanted, all behavior is potentially a violation of UPB (dependent on whether or not someone does not want the behavior). Therefore UPB cannot be the basis for deciding moral behaviors, because any behavior if it is unwanted by anyone at the time of the behavior is prohibited under UPB.

 

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement.

 

Extra credit: 

The reason the above flaw in UPB is not more obvious is because the words murder, rape, steal, assault, "peeping" all imply the unwanted part in the definition of the word (i.e., unwanted killing, unwanted, sex, unwanted taking, unwanted touching, unwanted looking at someone undressed). The reason not doing them is universally preferable is because unwanted is in the definition. The usual discussions of UPB don't take into account all of the other unwanted behaviors that would be covered by UPB (thus exposing the flaw), because we don't have words to describe those behaviors (e.g., unwanted-disagreement).

 

Looking at this again...this is a great challenge to UPB.

[Des]

 

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

Avoiding thinking a thought which disagrees with the thought of another person is "thought" and not "behaviour", therefore avoidance of unwanted-disagreement cannot be an UPB, because it is not the B part of UPB.

If someone proposes the moral standard that unwanted-mentioning-of-disagreement is evil, we can dispose of that by saying he has violated his own standard by mentioning his disagreement with my understanding of standards of good and evil.

 

"Avoiding looking" is behaviour, and unless someone can show otherwise, it is theoretically possible for avoidance of unwanted-looking to be universally preferred, so it is universally preferable.

Now, if someone proposes the moral standard that unwanted-looking is evil, then what practical people will ask is:

• How will I know he does not want me to look?
• How do I know he is not preparing to kill me with some type of missile?
• What harm does he suffer if I look, and how much of the harm is attributable to my looking, and how much is attributable to unnecessary social standards like not picking noses, for example.

So, since I construct a definition of evil based on the preference for life, I will not accept that unwanted-looking is evil, because that runs counter to my preference for not dying by being struck by any type of missile.

Preference for life gets a mention in UPB.

I can't see how to make ethics/morality relevant to person who is truly without a preference for life. Tell me if you can.

Preference for life, as a [primary, I estimate] support pillar of morality/ethics, is the resolution of the lifeboat scenarios: When a person acts consistently with that preference for being alive, then I ask: why would you expect them to act otherwise in order to achieve moral behaviour, the fruits of which they can never pick when dead?

 

My conclusion is that you rate the problem severe, when it is not severe at all, and is easily resolved.

[dja732]

If anybody wants to call in - just email me and I'll set it up.

Hey Michael, I'd be willing to call in with this question, if it hasn't already been tackled. I also have another one that has been on my mind as well. Regarding the first...have you guys addressed it yet? If not, I can perhaps call in and paraphrase (or direct quote) this challenge to UPB if you'd be interested (with credit due to MrLovingKindness, if necessary). Thoughts?

Hopefully the poster will call in so Stefan can explain why it isn't.

Awesome! Glad to hear that's already been made clear at least on your end. Hopefully he does. But if not, see above. I'm still working through the challenge myself, reviewing UPB...which I'm still in the process of learning.

[Armitage]

 

I believe there is a rather severe problem with UPB that has not been addressed. Comments welcome.

 

The Problem in a Nutshell:

All behaviors have a subset of circumstances for which avoiding them is UPB. For example, murder is the subset of killing that is against one's will (which I will substitute unwanted for brevity). Since all behaviors have this subset, all behaviors become violations of UPB when someone subject to them doesn't want them. Therefore, UPB cannot be the basis for determining moral from immoral behavior, because any behavior can be unwanted, and thus doing any behavior in an unwanted circumstance would violate UPB.

 

Elaboration:

UPB states murder is wrong because, it is universally preferable to not be murdered. Why is it universally preferable? Because murder is defined as unwanted killing. So far, so good, albeit tautological.

 

Now let's make a new compound word "unwanted-killing." Unwanted-killing = murder, so unwanted-killing is prohibited by UPB. Again, this is fine.

 

Let's make up another new word: unwanted-looking. For the same reasons that it is UPB to avoid doing unwanted-killing, it is also UPB to refrain from unwanted-looking, because in all cases unwanted-looking is by-definition unwanted, so looking when it is unwanted is a violation of UPB. 

 

We could make another word, unwanted-disagreement, and another, and another... And herein lies the catastrophic fault: doing ANY form of unwanted-behavior is a violation of UPB. Since any behavior has as a subset of circumstances in which the behavior is unwanted, all behavior is potentially a violation of UPB (dependent on whether or not someone does not want the behavior). Therefore UPB cannot be the basis for deciding moral behaviors, because any behavior if it is unwanted by anyone at the time of the behavior is prohibited under UPB.

 

Example:

If you disagree with me when I don't want you to, then you have violated UPB by committing unwanted-disagreement, which is logically (from the reasoning of UPB) the same as unwanted-killing (murder). Obviously, we can't base morally correct behavior on  a criterion that prohibits unwanted-disagreement.

 

Extra credit: 

The reason the above flaw in UPB is not more obvious is because the words murder, rape, steal, assault, "peeping" all imply the unwanted part in the definition of the word (i.e., unwanted killing, unwanted, sex, unwanted taking, unwanted touching, unwanted looking at someone undressed). The reason not doing them is universally preferable is because unwanted is in the definition. The usual discussions of UPB don't take into account all of the other unwanted behaviors that would be covered by UPB (thus exposing the flaw), because we don't have words to describe those behaviors (e.g., unwanted-disagreement).

 

The problem with UPB is not, that unwanted is unwanted. The problem is that unwanted is non-universal. Non-universal things can still be moral, but we need an ad-hoc, empirical evidence to prove that is the case. And it won't apply in other cases. Usually, the ad-hoc empirical circumstance simply is that we have consent of the other person. It's called voluntarism. Sometimes there is a scientific circumstance.

 

For example, cutting people is generally evil, but if you are a doctor and have x-ray of the patient with a tumor on it, then you can cut him quite a great deal in a certain way and still be moral. But it won't do for other people or even other patients.

 

Why are immoral things immoral? An involuntary behavior that is not UPB (let's call it evil) divides individuals with the same philosophical identity (individuals) onto two completely arbitrary categories, the evil-doers and evil-victims. 

There is no rational (or scientific) way to objectively determine who should be an evil-doer and who evil-victim, when, where, for how long, in what way, shape and form. UPB does not need these details, because it is universal and negative. Surgical medicine gets these details scientifically case by case. But evil is not backed up by any evidence or equation.

It is decided by the evil-doer. And yet the evil-doer chooses to use universally accepted mathematics and laws of grammar and physics, it is only in the small area of evil-doing that he acts non-universally and non-consensually. That is the reason, not the non-consensuality itself.

 

Hence evil is fundamentally inconsistent and irrational, i.e. immoral.

 

As for unwanted-looking, a case could be made for that too. Creepy peeping Toms are not unknown. 

Unwanted disagreement? Can you reverse that? If I can't disagree with you, then you can't disagree with me about my disagreement with what you call "unwanted disagreement". The book UPB covers that too, even before the actual test of universality.

 

I've seen very similar points from a person who agreed with conclusions of UPB, but not with the logic. After a thorough debate I discovered that this person lacked basic abilities to think logically. He'd require me to define most of basic epistemology or ontology on spot, or he wouldn't accept an argument. I had to remind him of what I already defined. And then I discovered he doesn't understand the difference between a set and a subset, or a principle and a specific limited instance of it. And he is a holder of a prestigious degree in mathematics. I kid you not.

[MrNlul77]

Hey Michael, I'd be willing to call in with this question, if it hasn't already been tackled. I also have another one that has been on my mind as well. Regarding the first...have you guys addressed it yet? If not, I can perhaps call in and paraphrase (or direct quote) this challenge to UPB if you'd be interested (with credit due to MrLovingKindness, if necessary). Thoughts?

Awesome! Glad to hear that's already been made clear at least on your end. Hopefully he does. But if not, see above. I'm still working through the challenge myself, reviewing UPB...which I'm still in the process of learning.

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[Shaeroden]

i could be wrong, but i think if unwanted is implied in the definition with words such as rape, theft, assault and murder, then the behavior is classified as morally negative.

if the word does not contain "unwanted" in the definition, the corresponding behavior executed against another's will can be classified as aesthetically negative.

if i'm mistaken about this, i'd like to know, but that would be my understanding of that distinction.

[dsayers]

i could be wrong, but i think if unwanted is implied in the definition with words such as rape, theft, assault and murder, then the behavior is classified as morally negative.

 

if the word does not contain "unwanted" in the definition, the corresponding behavior executed against another's will can be classified as aesthetically negative.

 

if i'm mistaken about this, i'd like to know, but that would be my understanding of that distinction.

The thing you have to look at in terms of moral consideration is whether the behavior is voluntary, whether it is binding upon others, and if they have given consent. If it's not binding on others, then there is no moral consideration. However, both murder and euthanasia are binding upon another, so neither form of these mechanically identical behaviors could be classified as having no moral consideration (amoral; aesthetic). The difference is in the presence of consent (wanted/unwanted). 

[Shaeroden]

The thing you have to look at in terms of moral consideration is whether the behavior is voluntary, whether it is binding upon others, and if they have given consent. If it's not binding on others, then there is no moral consideration. However, both murder and euthanasia are binding upon another, so neither form of these mechanically identical behaviors could be classified as having no moral consideration (amoral; aesthetic). The difference is in the presence of consent (wanted/unwanted). 

so is looking at someone or insulting or disagreeing with them not binding then?

[dsayers]

so is looking at someone or insulting or disagreeing with them not binding then?

If they are free to decline, it is not binding upon them.

[Lykourgos]

And he is a holder of a prestigious degree in mathematics. I kid you not.

 

Reminds me of this section from Plato:

 

"You surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician? Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning." Republic Book 7

[Des]

It is rational for a non-suicidal person to desire a minimum standard of behaviour from others, and to be willing to trade compliance with that standard [by himself] for compliance with that standard [by others].

 

This leads to the idea of a pact between a man and his neighbours, to agree to that minimum standard.

 

I don't expect opposition to the assertion that murder has to be banned, for the minimum standard to be high enough to have rational value to the pact members. I assert that the other aggressions, and also fraud, have to be banned, for the pact to have value.

 

This leads to a definition of evil as: all acts which must be banned for the pact to have rational value.

 

Not that you cannot ban some non-evils (not that you could not ban being unreasonably late), but that the definition of evil is limited to those actions which have to be banned, failing which the pact becomes worthless.

So, to emphasise the significance of how I derive, above, the definition of evil: If an act in a given category ("writing", "talking" and "looking" are good examples of such categories of action) - if an act does not have to be banned for the pact to have value (to not be rationally pointless), then by this definitional process, it would be incorrect to say that the act "is evil", and one should rather say that we agree that unwanted-looking of such-and-such specifics "is distasteful to us".

 

The key question is: Why would you have to ban any of the subsets of writing, talking or looking, for the do-no-evil pact to retain value?