Call follow up. Oct 3rd.

[bugzysegal]

So in my conversation with Stefan I enumerated certain positions that I did not clarify well enough.  I would like to remedy that here and I will perhaps revisit these in a follow up call. When I noted that certain axioms are immune to considerations of "True" or "False" and I sited "a way of life" as an alternative approach, what I meant was something like the following:

 

When we look at certain base assumptions, we make them, not because we know they are true. If "knowing" is the kind of thing that requires verification and the assignment of truth value (T or F) then these fundamental principles simply cannot be known. That doesn't weaken their use however. It's useful to look at words like "this" or "that" or logical operators like "+" to realize that these things aren't themselves correspondent to reality, but we use them in meaningful ways.  The "essence" of "+" comes from how we practice addition. Similarly the usefulness in pointing to particular things to have a child understand the word "this" is very limited. In the case of ordinary nouns, ostensive teaching (pointing too) is quite useful. Outside these bounds, shared practices and social conventions are determinate to a great extent. To say that only things which can be said to be "true" or "false" have meaning is inaccurate.

 

Why is this important? The foundations of our language are of no singular nature. There are bounds of true and false, beyond which important notions lie. 

 

This directly has barring on Stefan's example of Wittgenstein's response to Moore. He noted that Wittgenstein questioned whether we can know or be certain of "that I have a hand." Wittgenstein's response was something nuanced and reflective of the ideas above: To doubt that one has a hand is non-sense. It can be neither true nor false that we are victims of a Cartesian demon, because doubt requires a background with which to be embedded in. In this way statements like "I have a body" are as indubitable as existence. 

 

A further distinction from the call I will quickly cover is the private language or Robinson Caruso thought experiment. Stefan seems to dismiss it as absurd that one should develop language because it is too sophisticated(this is highly likely). We can think about a much simpler notion though. Could it ever be the case that a child alone develops a single symbol? The answer is no for the verification reasons I sited in the discussion. That is, one would never be able to truly know they are using the symbol consistent with past uses. This is where the "shared practice" evolves out Wittgenstenian philosophy.

[dsayers]

You haven't provided a frame of reference, so I have no idea what you're talking about.

 

only things which can be said to be "true" or "false" have meaning

 

In isolation, this is almost a meaningless claim. Are you omitting context? Is it deliberate?

 

I noted that certain axioms are immune to considerations of "True" or "False"

 

The definition of axiom is "a premise so evident as to be accepted as true without controversy." How can something that is accepted as truth be void of having truth value? ALL objective claims are either true or false because they either accurately describe the real world or they do not.

[bugzysegal]

You haven't provided a frame of reference, so I have no idea what you're talking about.

 

 

In isolation, this is almost a meaningless claim. Are you omitting context? Is it deliberate?

 

 

The definition of axiom is "a premise so evident as to be accepted as true without controversy." How can something that is accepted as truth be void of having truth value? ALL objective claims are either true or false because they either accurately describe the real world or they do not.

The context is in the call. This message was directed towards those who heard it and were curious as to my reactions and interpretation of that call.

That being said your definition of axiom is erroneous in the ways I described. We accept axioms, but to assign them truth value is meaningless. We use certain ways of thinking, certain axioms, but their correspondence to some physical state of affairs is non-sensical. Where is the thing that makes 2+2 actually =4? Can you point to it? The rules of addition are things we follow, not things we call true.  In the same way we follow methods of reasoning.

[Will Torbald]

The context is in the call. This message was directed towards those who heard it and were curious as to my reactions and interpretation of that call.

That being said your definition of axiom is erroneous in the ways I described. We accept axioms, but to assign them truth value is meaningless. We use certain ways of thinking, certain axioms, but their correspondence to some physical state of affairs is non-sensical. Where is the thing that makes 2+2 actually =4? Can you point to it? The rules of addition are things we follow, not things we call true.  In the same way we follow methods of reasoning.

 

I'm just trying to understand your reasoning. If we assign a T value to an axiom it is meaningless. Is the opposite true? To say that axioms are false is meaningful? Meaningless to whom, by the way? Your mathematical example would have been interesting if it used math without real numbers where an empirical test with grouping two pairs of chairs together lead to the magical trasformation of the two pairs of chairs into a group of four chairs. I think I can point a finger to that. The numbers and symbols are just ways of representing that experiment.

[bugzysegal]

I'm just trying to understand your reasoning. If we assign a T value to an axiom it is meaningless. Is the opposite true? To say that axioms are false is meaningful? Meaningless to whom, by the way? Your mathematical example would have been interesting if it used math without real numbers where an empirical test with grouping two pairs of chairs together lead to the magical trasformation of the two pairs of chairs into a group of four chairs. I think I can point a finger to that. The numbers and symbols are just ways of representing that experiment.

The opposite would not be true. "False" would also be meaningless. Just as it would be equally meaningless to assign the color red the label "positive integer" or "negative integer" The practice of adding is conventional. When you ask why do 2 and 2 make 4, the answer is "because this is how we add"...pushing the chairs together and saying "this is addition" is only meaningful because those are the rules we've accepted when it comes to math and addition. 

Also if it jives better, think about words like "this" or "that" we use them to point things, but they do not point to anything in themselves. There is no "this" to hold up. We simply use the word and it carries just as much meaning as the word "chair."

[Will Torbald]

The opposite would not be true. "False" would also be meaningless. Just as it would be equally meaningless to assign the color red the label "positive integer" or "negative integer" The practice of adding is conventional. When you ask why do 2 and 2 make 4, the answer is "because this is how we add"...pushing the chairs together and saying "this is addition" is only meaningful because those are the rules we've accepted when it comes to math and addition. 

Also if it jives better, think about words like "this" or "that" we use them to point things, but they do not point to anything in themselves. There is no "this" to hold up. We simply use the word and it carries just as much meaning as the word "chair."

 

We accept those rules because they are evidently true, it is not an arbitrary decision. I could decide that 2+2=1 but when I try it out I always get 4 chairs. In the same way, we don't say axioms are true because we accept them, it's because they are evidently true every time we put them in practice.

[bugzysegal]

From Wittgenstein's "On Certainty":

 

What sort of proposition is this: "We cannot have miscalculated in 12x12=144"? It must surely be a proposition of logic. - But now, is it not the same, or doesn't it come to the same, as the statement 12x12=144?

44. If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can't have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate.

45. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate.

46. But then can't it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so. - But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough.

We accept those rules because they are evidently true, it is not an arbitrary decision. I could decide that 2+2=1 but when I try it out I always get 4 chairs. In the same way, we don't say axioms are true because we accept them, it's because they are evidently true every time we put them in practice.

Nothing makes it true that we don't mean to divide the first number by the second number when we use "+" or "addition" other than that is what we learn. The rules regarding "addition" are themselves grounded only in practice, not logic. Another way to approach this is that logic doesn't prove itself(that would be circular!). It is used and in this use there is meaning.

[Will Torbald]

From Wittgenstein's "On Certainty":

 

What sort of proposition is this: "We cannot have miscalculated in 12x12=144"? It must surely be a proposition of logic. - But now, is it not the same, or doesn't it come to the same, as the statement 12x12=144?

44. If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can't have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate.

45. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate.

46. But then can't it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so. - But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough.

Nothing makes it true that we don't mean to divide the first number by the second number when we use "+" or "addition" other than that is what we learn. The rules regarding "addition" are themselves grounded only in practice, not logic. Another way to approach this is that logic doesn't prove itself(that would be circular!). It is used and in this use there is meaning.

 

Because we use mutually agreed symbols to define what we mean. We don't argue the symbols, we argue what the symbols represent. The truth is not in the symbols, but in the message we agreed would be transmitted through them. In this way, by saying that symbols are arbitrary you are are saying that truth is arbitrary - but it's a false analogy.

[dsayers]

The context is in the call.

 

"the call" is undefined. Stef has fielded many calls.

 

This message was directed towards those who heard it

 

Which might include me. I don't know because you provided no frame of reference. If you look at what I quoted, it doesn't seem like a complete idea, so it's hard to reconcile what you posted with any of the calls I've heard. I'ts like having a single puzzle piece with no idea of what the finished picture looks like.

 

I do know this: People who when asked for a frame of reference for a conversation THEY started are hesitant to provide one, it's usually an indication that they're not looking for the truth.

 

We accept axioms

 

...because they're true. You've just used a different word than true to avoid using the word true.

 

Maybe it's my bias, but your first two posts definitely seem to be trying to ride the "it is certain that nothing can be certain" fallacy.

 

I don't get the 2+2=4 tangent. Numbers are concepts. Valid and valuable ones at that. It seems like all you're doing is saying "how do we know that the concept forest describes an aggregate of trees?" In other words, "how do we know that a = a?" This is a first principle. You cannot engage in rational discourse or logical debate if you reject first principles.

[bugzysegal]

Because we use mutually agreed symbols to define what we mean. We don't argue the symbols, we argue what the symbols represent. The truth is not in the symbols, but in the message we agreed would be transmitted through them. In this way, by saying that symbols are arbitrary you are are saying that truth is arbitrary - but it's a false analogy.

I never said truth was arbitrary. 

"the call" is undefined. Stef has fielded many calls.

 

 

Which might include me. I don't know because you provided no frame of reference. If you look at what I quoted, it doesn't seem like a complete idea, so it's hard to reconcile what you posted with any of the calls I've heard. I'ts like having a single puzzle piece with no idea of what the finished picture looks like.

 

I do know this: People who when asked for a frame of reference for a conversation THEY started are hesitant to provide one, it's usually an indication that they're not looking for the truth.

 

 

The call is the name of the post.   I am the first caller on that date.

"the call" is undefined. Stef has fielded many calls.

 

 

Which might include me. I don't know because you provided no frame of reference. If you look at what I quoted, it doesn't seem like a complete idea, so it's hard to reconcile what you posted with any of the calls I've heard. I'ts like having a single puzzle piece with no idea of what the finished picture looks like.

 

I do know this: People who when asked for a frame of reference for a conversation THEY started are hesitant to provide one, it's usually an indication that they're not looking for the truth.

 

 

...because they're true. You've just used a different word than true to avoid using the word true.

 

Maybe it's my bias, but your first two posts definitely seem to be trying to ride the "it is certain that nothing can be certain" fallacy.

 

I don't get the 2+2=4 tangent. Numbers are concepts. Valid and valuable ones at that. It seems like all you're doing is saying "how do we know that the concept forest describes an aggregate of trees?" In other words, "how do we know that a = a?" This is a first principle. You cannot engage in rational discourse or logical debate if you reject first principles.

We accept axioms because they are useful. We respect science, because it is useful. That doesn't mean we take it as "True" in some Cartesian sense. That is, the roots of science are not grounded in some sort of mathematical reality, but it is useful to proceed as though they are. Also I havn't made any claims about "uncertainty" being the only thing that is certain. I'm not trying to jerk you around. This is one of the hardest and most debated philosophical bodies of work.

[dsayers]

The call is the name of the post.   I am the first caller on that date.

 

Link? Is it that you reject that communication is the responsibility of the communicator?

 

https://www.youtube.com/user/stefbot/videos

 

Nothing here says Oct. 3rd. No frame of reference.

 

We accept axioms because they are useful.

 

...because they accurately describe the real world. See? I can say true without saying true too

 

By the by, "useful" is subjective and therefore CANNOT be a standard. Axioms are objective.

[Will Torbald]

I never said truth was arbitrary.

 

You said "Nothing makes it true that we don't mean to..." so, if nothing makes it true and we are just deciding that it is true, that is the definition of being arbitrary.

[bugzysegal]

You said "Nothing makes it true that we don't mean to..." so, if nothing makes it true and we are just deciding that it is true, that is the definition of being arbitrary.

The final part of that sentence carries all the weight "other than that is what we learn" Mathematical realism, the idea that the world is reducible to math, is basically "the Platonic forms 2.0". Stefan rejects Platonism, as should you. I shouldn't have started with the abstract. How do you know you are using the words "tree" correctly? You follow certain rules. These rules are not themselves true. You say nothing of them. Axioms are rules.  To them, there is no truth or falsity. What we do when we speak, is we play language games. Games have rules and they are either followed properly or they are not. The rules themselves are not "true" or "false."

 

"So evident as to be True without controversy" smuggles "True" into the debate without adding anything to it. We use axioms uncontroversially. The mistake is to say that "truth" is the only way they could be meaningful. 

[Will Torbald]

The final part of that sentence carries all the weight "other than that is what we learn" Mathematical realism, the idea that the world is reducible to math, is basically "the Platonic forms 2.0". Stefan rejects Platonism, as should you. I shouldn't have started with the abstract. How do you know you are using the words "tree" correctly? You follow certain rules. These rules are not themselves true. You say nothing of them. Axioms are rules.  To them, there is no truth or falsity. What we do when we speak, is we play language games. Games have rules and they are either followed properly or they are not. The rules themselves are not "true" or "false."

 

"So evident as to be True without controversy" smuggles "True" into the debate without adding anything to it. We use axioms uncontroversially. The mistake is to say that "truth" is the only way they could be meaningful. 

 

Meaningful in what way? If something is true that's all there is to it. It's just a fact. Axions are not rules, just self evident facts.

[bugzysegal]

Meaningful in what way? If something is true that's all there is to it. It's just a fact. Axions are not rules, just self evident facts.

"self-evident" is meaningless. From my professor many years ago:

 

The terminus of a chain of reasons is not a self-evident principle or experience (1969, §131) , but shared

contexts of ordinary life and habitual, non-ratiocinative activity, characterized

by unreflective confidence and the absence of doubt or hesitation. `[T]he

end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting’

(1969, §110) or a practice into which a form of life habituates its participants

through training and education (e.g. 1969, §§472, 476) .

[Will Torbald]

"self-evident" is meaningless.

 

Can you give an example of something that is meaningfu, then? I'm really not following why truth and facts and axioms are meaningless. What's the consequence of being meaningless? You argue that they are still useful, so what's the point?

[bugzysegal]

Can you give an example of something that is meaningfu, then? I'm really not following why truth and facts and axioms are meaningless. What's the consequence of being meaningless? You argue that they are still useful, so what's the point?

Refer to my edited statement and then see if you still need to ask this question. I often hit "post" before thinking of the best answer lol.

[bugzysegal]

Can you give an example of something that is meaningfu, then? I'm really not following why truth and facts and axioms are meaningless. What's the consequence of being meaningless? You argue that they are still useful, so what's the point?

"The terminus of a chain of reasons is not a self-evident principle or experience (1969, §131) , but shared

contexts of ordinary life and habitual, non-ratiocinative activity, characterized

by unreflective confidence and the absence of doubt or hesitation. `[T]he

end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting’

(1969, §110) or a practice into which a form of life habituates its participants

through training and education (e.g. 1969, §§472, 476) ."

[Will Torbald]

 

"The terminus of a chain of reasons is not a self-evident principle or experience (1969, §131) , but shared

contexts of ordinary life and habitual, non-ratiocinative activity, characterized

by unreflective confidence and the absence of doubt or hesitation. `[T]he

end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting’

(1969, §110) or a practice into which a form of life habituates its participants

through training and education (e.g. 1969, §§472, 476) ."

 

 

Is this the example of something meaningful?

[bugzysegal]

Is this the example of something meaningful?

It is the summation of the argument. I'm not just throwing around the word "meaningful" or "meaningless." I think you should consider those words carefully. When I say "'self-evident' is meaningless" what I mean is you haven't demonstrated anything about axioms or made any arguments for them supporting themselves(to do so would be circular). The whole notion of "self-evidence" is nonsensical. We use evidence to get us to a destination, but the practice of retreating to evidence isn't proved by evidence. It is useful to us none-the-less. For an example of any sentence with meaning, think of any you would use in daily life. "This is a tree" or "12x12=144" or "When we say 'this' we use it in the following way"

[Will Torbald]

It is the summation of the argument. I'm not just throwing around the word "meaningful" or "meaningless." I think you should consider those words carefully. When I say "'self-evident' is meaningless" what I mean is you haven't demonstrated anything about axioms or made any arguments for them supporting themselves(to do so would be circular). The whole notion of "self-evidence" is nonsensical. We use evidence to get us to a destination, but the practice of retreating to evidence isn't proved by evidence. It is useful to us none-the-less. For an example of any sentence with meaning, think of any you would use in daily life. "This is a tree" or "12x12=144" or "When we say 'this' we use it in the following way"

 

Yeah, I get that. What I don't get is what would be something meaningful after defining evidence as meaningless. If everything is meaningless, it can't be meaningless because it can't be compared to something meaningful - thus meaninglessness requires something to be meaningful. What is something meaningful in a world where axioms are meaningless?

[bugzysegal]

Yeah, I get that. What I don't get is what would be something meaningful after defining evidence as meaningless. If everything is meaningless, it can't be meaningless because it can't be compared to something meaningful - thus meaninglessness requires something to be meaningful. What is something meaningful in a world where axioms are meaningless?

Your not quite representing my views accurately. Evidence is useful...to say the scientific method is "self-evident" is meaningless. Science works by evaluating evidence, no? But you can't say that the scientific method is proved by evidence, because that sort of investigation is one of science! Obviously it's useful though. Bridges stand and that is enough. To require science to prove it's own foundations as "true" or "false" is not only non-sense, it's circular. 

[Will Torbald]

Your not quite representing my views accurately. Evidence is useful...to say the scientific method is "self-evident" is meaningless. Science works by evaluating evidence, no? But you can't say that the scientific method is proved by evidence, because that sort of investigation is one of science! Obviously it's useful though. Bridges stand and that is enough. To require science to prove it's own foundations as "true" or "false" is not only non-sense, it's circular. 

 

Alright, what I understand is that you're saying that you can't prove science with science. Or evidence with evidence. Or axioms with axioms. That you need an external agent to validate something. So you would say science is not validated by science, but it's a useful method. If you wanted to validate science you would need something else. Let's call that something else super science. Super science proves science to be true. But what proves super science to be true? We need something else to prove super science for it to be true. Let's call that something else Ultra Super Science. Ultra Super Science proves Super Science to be true to prove Science. But what proves Ultra Super Science? Let's call it Mega Ultra Super Science. In this way Mega Ultra Super Science proves Ultra Super Science proevs Super Science proves Science. But what proves Mega Ultra Super Science? To be honest, I don't know what comes after that. Maybe there is, maybe there isn't.

[bugzysegal]

 

Alright, what I understand is that you're saying that you can't prove science with science. Or evidence with evidence. Or axioms with axioms. That you need an external agent to validate something. So you would say science is not validated by science, but it's a useful method. If you wanted to validate science you would need something else. Let's call that something else super science. Super science proves science to be true. But what proves super science to be true? We need something else to prove super science for it to be true. Let's call that something else Ultra Super Science. Ultra Super Science proves Super Science to be true to prove Science. But what proves Ultra Super Science? Let's call it Mega Ultra Super Science. In this way Mega Ultra Super Science proves Ultra Super Science proevs Super Science proves Science. But what proves Mega Ultra Super Science? To be honest, I don't know what comes after that. Maybe there is, maybe there isn't.

 

Yes it does seem as though an infinite regress might be started. I don't, nor do I necessarily in the future(I'm looking into this now), suggest that one should seek to evaluate their axioms. "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'"  At the bottom of our reasoning is action, action unreflective and certain.