edwinhere Posted December 26, 2015 Posted December 26, 2015 Aren't low birth rates, women's liberation, rising divorce rates, falling marriage rates, gay marriages, premarital promiscuity unmarried adults living with their parents non-white/non-western immigration, and the consequent multiculturalism , inevitable in the post-industrial revolution western civilization, even in the absence of a cultural marxism or progressivism? Here is the entirety of my argument: In 2002, Osama bin Laden wrote in his “Letter to America”: “You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools, calling upon customers to purchase them. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women.” As this quote indicates, what al Qaeda is fighting for is a traditional understanding of the family. This is not a minor part of their program: it is at its heart. The traditional family is built around some clearly defined principles. First, the home is the domain of the woman and life outside the house is the purview of the man. Second, sexuality is something confined to the family and the home, and extramarital, extrafamilial sexuality is unacceptable. Women who move outside the home invite extramarital sexuality just by being there. Third, women have as their primary tasks reproduction and nurturing of the next generation. Therefore, intense controls on women are necessary to maintain the integrity of the family and of society. In an interesting way it is all about women, and bin Laden’s letter drives this home. What he hates about America is that it promotes a completely different view of women and the family. Al Qaeda’s view is not unique to Osama bin Laden or Islam. The lengths to which that group is prepared to go may be unique, but the issue of women and the family defines most major religions. Traditional Catholicism, fundamentalist Protestantism, Orthodox Judaism, and various branches of Buddhism all take very similar positions. All of these religions are being split internally, as are all societies. In the United States, where we speak of the “culture wars,” the battlefield is the family and its definition. All societies are being torn between traditionalists and those who are attempting to re define the family, women, and sexuality. This conflict is going to intensify in the twenty-first century, but the traditionalists are fighting a defensive and ultimately losing battle. The reason is that over the past hundred years the very fabric of human life—and particularly the life of women—has been transformed, and with it the structure of the family. What has already happened in Europe, the United States, and Japan is spreading to the rest of the world. These issues will rip many societies apart, but in the end, the transformation of the family can’t be stopped. This is not to say that transformation is inherently a good idea or a bad one. Instead, this trend is unstoppable because the demographic realities of the world are being transformed. The single most important demographic change in the world right now is the dramatic decline everywhere in birth rates. Let me repeat that: the most meaningful statistic in the world is an overall decline in birthrates. Women are having fewer and fewer children every year. That means not only that the population explosion of the last two centuries is coming to an end but also that women are spending much less time bearing and nurturing children, even as their life expectancy has soared. This seems like a simple fact, and in a way it is, but what I want to show you is the way in which something so mundane can lead to groups like al Qaeda, why there will be more such groups, and why they can’t win. It also will illustrate why the European Age, which was built on a perpetually expanding population (whether through conquering other people or having more babies), is being replaced by the American Age—a country in which living with underpopulation has always been the norm. Let’s begin with the end of the population explosion. It has been generally accepted in recent decades that the globe was facing a severe population explosion. Uncontrolled population growth would out strip scarce resources and devastate the environment. More people would require more resources in the form of food, energy, and goods, which in turn would lead to a rise in global warming and other ecological catastrophes. There was no disagreement on the basic premise that population was growing. This model no longer holds true, however. We already see a change taking place in advanced industrial countries. People are living longer, and be cause of declining birthrates there are fewer younger workers to support the vast increase in retirees. Europe and Japan are experiencing this problem already. But an aging population is only the tip of the iceberg, the first problem presented by the coming population bust. People assume that while population growth might be slowing down in Europe, the world’s total population will continue to spiral out of control because of high birthrates in less developed countries. In fact, the opposite is true. Birthrates are plunging everywhere. The advanced industrial countries are on the cutting edge of the decline, but the rest of the world is following right behind them. And this demographic shift will help shape the twenty first century. Some of the most important, advanced countries in the world, like Germany and Russia, are going to lose large percentages of their population. Europe’s population today, taken as a whole, is 728 million people. The United Nations forecasts that by 2050 it will drop to between 557 and 653 million, a remarkable decline. The lower number assumes that women will average 1.6 children each. The second number assumes 2.1 children. In Europe today, the fertility rate per woman is 1.4 children. This is why we will be focusing on the lower projections going forward. Traditionally, declining population has meant declining power. For Eu rope, this will indeed be the case. But for other countries, like the United States, maintaining population levels or finding technological ways to augment a declining population will be essential if political power is to be retained in the next hundred years. An assertion this extreme has to be supported, so we must pause and drill into the numbers a bit before we consider the consequences. This is a pivotal event in human history and we need to understand why it’s happening. Let’s start simply. Between about 1750 and 1950, the world’s population grew from about one billion people to about three billion. Between 1950 and 2000, it doubled, from three billion to six billion. Not only was the popula tion of the world growing, but the growth was accelerating at an amazing rate. If that trajectory had continued, the result would have been global catastrophe. But the growth rate has not accelerated. It has actually slowed down dramatically. According to the United Nations, between 2000 and 2050 the population will continue to grow, but only by about 50 percent, halving the growth rate of the previous fifty years. In the second half of the century, it becomes more interesting. Again, the population will continue to grow, but only by 10 percent statistically, according to other forecasters. This is like slamming on the brakes. In fact, some forecasts (not by the UN) have indicated that the total human population will decline by 2100. The most dramatic effect will be seen in the advanced industrial countries, many of which will experience remarkable declines in population. The middle tier of countries, like Brazil and South Korea, will see their populations stabilize by mid-century and slowly decline by 2100. Only in the least developed part of the world, in countries like Congo and Bangladesh, will populations continue to increase until 2100, but not by nearly as much as over the past hundred years. Any way you look at it, the population explosion is ending. Let’s examine a critical number: 2.1. This is the number of children that each woman must have, on average, in order to maintain a generally stable world population. Anything above that number and the population grows; anything below, the population declines, all other things being equal. According to the United Nations, women had an average of 4.5 children in 1970. In 2000, that number had dropped to 2.7 children. Remember, this is a worldwide average. That is a dramatic drop and explains why the population continued to grow, but more slowly than before. The United Nations forecasts that in 2050, the global fertility rate will decline to an average of 2.05 births per woman. That is just below the 2.1 needed for a stable world population. The UN has another forecast, based on different assumptions, where the rate is 1.6 babies per woman. So the United Nations, which has the best data available, is predicting that by the year 2050, population growth will be either stable or declining dramatically. I believe the latter is closer to the truth. The situation is even more interesting if we look at the developed regions of the world, the forty-four most advanced countries. In these countries women are currently having an average of 1.6 babies each, which means that populations are already contracting. Birthrates in the middle tier of countries are down to 2.9 and falling. Even the least developed countries are down from 6.6 children per mother to 5.0 today, and expected to drop to 3.0 by 2050. There is no doubt that birthrates are plunging. The question is why. The answer can be traced to the reasons that the population explosion occurred in the first place; in a certain sense, the population explosion halted itself. There were two clear causes for the population explosion that were equally significant. First, there was a decline in infant mortality; second there was an increase in life expectancies. Both were the result of modern medicine, the availability of more food, and the introduction of basic public health that began in the late eighteenth century. There are no really good statistics on fertility rates in 1800, but the best estimates fall between 6.5 and 8.0 children per woman on average. Women in Europe in 1800 were having the same number of babies as women in Bangladesh are having today, yet the population wasn’t growing. Most children born in 1800 didn’t live long enough to reproduce. Since the 2.1 rule still held, out of eight children born, six died before puberty. Medicine, food, and hygiene dramatically reduced the number of infant and childhood deaths, until by late in the nineteenth century, most children survived to have their own children. Even though infant mortality declined, family patterns did not shift. People were having the same number of babies as before. It’s not hard to understand why. First, let’s face the fact that people like to have sex, and sex without birth control makes babies—and there was no birth control at the time. But people didn’t mind having a lot of children because children had become the basis of wealth. In an agricultural society, every pair of hands produces wealth; you don’t have to be able to read or program computers to weed, seed, or harvest. Children were also the basis for retirement, if someone lived long enough to have an old age. There was no Social Security, but you counted on your children to take care of you. Part of this was custom, but part of it was rational economic thinking. A father owned land or had the right to farm it. His child needed to have access to the land to live, so the father could dictate policy. As children brought families prosperity and retirement income, the major responsibility of women was to produce as many children as possible. If women had children, and if they both survived childbirth, the family as a whole was better off. This was a matter of luck, but it was a chance worth taking from the standpoint of both families and the men who dominated them. Between lust and greed, there was little reason not to bring more children into the world. Habits are hard to change. When families began moving into cities en masse, children were still valuable assets. Parents could send them to work in primitive factories at the age of six and collect their pay. In early industrial society factory workers didn’t need many more skills than farm laborers did. But as factories became more complex, they had less use for six-year olds. Soon they needed somewhat educated workers. Later they needed managers with MBAs. As the sophistication of industry advanced, the economic value of children declined. In order to continue being economically useful, children had to go to school to learn. Rather than adding to family income, they consumed family income. Children had to be clothed, fed, and sheltered, and over time the amount of education they needed increased dramatically, until today many “children” go to school until their mid-twenties and still have not earned a dime. According to the United Nations, the average number of years of schooling in the leading twenty-five countries in the world ranges from fifteen to seventeen. The tendency to have as many babies as possible continued into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many of our grandparents or great-grandparents come from families that had ten children. A couple of generations before, you’d be lucky if three out of ten children survived. Now they were almost all surviving. However, in the economy of 1900, they could all head out and find work by the time they reached puberty. And that’s what most of them did. Ten children in eighteenth-century France might have been a godsend. Ten children in late-nineteenth-century France might have been a burden. Ten children in late-twentieth-century France would be a catastrophe. It took a while for reality to sink in, but eventually it became clear that most children wouldn’t die and that children were extremely expensive to raise. Therefore, people started having a lot fewer children, and had those children more for the pleasure of having them than for economic benefits. Medical advances such as birth control helped achieve this, but the sheer cost of having and raising children drove the decline in birthrates. Children went from being producers of wealth to the most conspicuous form of consumption. Parents began satisfying their need for nurturing with one child, rather than ten. Now let’s consider life expectancy. After all, the longer people live, the more people there will be at any given time. Life expectancy surged at the same time that infant mortality declined. In 1800, estimated life expectancy in Europe and the United States was about forty years. In 2000 it was close to eighty years. Life expectancy has, in effect, doubled over the last two hun dred years. Continued growth in life expectancy is probable, but very few people anticipate another doubling. In the advanced industrial world, the UN projects a growth from seventy-six years in 2000 to eighty-two years in 2050. In the poorest countries it will increase from fifty-one to sixty-six. While this is growth, it is not geometric growth and it, too, is tapering off. This will also help reduce population growth. The reduction process that took place decades ago in the advanced industrial world is now under way in the least developed countries. Having ten children in São Paolo is the surest path to economic suicide. It may take several generations to break the habit, but it will be broken. And it won’t return while the process of educating a child for the modern workforce continues to become longer and costlier. Between declining birthrates and slowing increases in life expectancy, population growth has to end. THE POPULATION BUST AND THE WAY WE LIVE What does all this have to do with international power in the twenty-first century? The population bust affects all nations, as we will see in later chapters. But it also affects the life cycles of people within these nations. Lower populations affect everything from the number of troops that can fight in a war to how many people there are in the workforce to internal political conflicts. The process we are talking about will affect more than just the number of people in a country. It will change how those people live, and therefore how those countries behave. Let’s start with three core facts. Life expectancy is moving toward a high of eighty years in the advanced industrial world; the number of children women have is declining; and it takes longer and longer to become educated. A college education is now considered the minimum for social and economic success in advanced countries. Most people graduate from college at twenty-two. Add in law or graduate school, and people are not entering the workforce until their mid-twenties. Not everyone follows this pattern, of course, but a sizable portion of the population does and that portion includes most of those who will be part of the political and economic leadership of these countries. As a result, marriage patterns have shifted dramatically. People are putting off marriage longer and are having children even later. Let’s consider the effect on women. Two hundred years ago, women started having children in their early teens. Women continued having children, nurturing them, and frequently burying them until they themselves died. This was necessary for the family’s well-being and that of society. Having and raising children was what women did for most of their lives. In the twenty-first century this whole pattern changes. Assuming that a woman reaches puberty at age thirteen and enters menopause at age fifty, she will live twice as long as her ancestors and will for over half her life be incapable of reproduction. Let’s assume a woman has two children. She will spend eighteen months being pregnant, which is roughly 2 percent of her life. Now assume a fairly common pattern, which is that the woman will have these two children three years apart, that each child enters school at the age of five, and that the woman returns to work outside the home when the oldest starts school. The total time the woman is engaged in reproduction and full-time nurturing is eight years of her life. Given a life expectancy of eighty years, the amount of time exclusively devoted to having and raising children will be reduced to an astounding 10 percent of her life. Childbearing is reduced from a woman’s primary activity to one activity among many. Add to this analysis the fact that many women have only one child, and that many use day care and other mass nurturing facilities for their children well before the age of five, and the entire structure of a woman’s life is transformed. We can see the demographic roots of feminism right here. Since women spend less of their time having and nurturing children, they are much less dependent on men than even fifty years ago. For a woman to reproduce without a husband would have created economic disaster for her in the past. This is no longer the case, particularly for better-educated women. Marriage is no longer imposed by economic necessity. This brings us to a place where marriages are not held together by need as much as by love. The problem with love is that it can be fickle. It comes and goes. If people stay married only for emotional reasons, there will inevitably be more divorce. The decline of economic necessity removes a powerful stabilizing force in marriage. Love may endure, and frequently does, but by itself it is less powerful than when linked to economic necessity. Marriages used to be guaranteed “till death do us part.” In the past, that parting was early and frequent. There were a great many fifty-year marriages during the transition period when people were having ten surviving children. But prior to that, marriages ended early through death, and the survivor remarried or faced economic ruin. Europe practiced what we might call serial polygamy, in which widowers (usually, since women tended to die in childbirth) remarried numerous times throughout their lives. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, habit kept marriages together for extraordinarily long periods of time. A new pattern emerged in the later twentieth century, however, in which serial polygamy reasserted itself, but this time the trend was being driven by divorce rather than death. Let’s add another pattern to this. Whereas many marriages used to take place when one or both partners were in their early teens, people are now marrying in their late twenties and early thirties. It was typical for men and women to remain sexually inactive until marriage at age fourteen, but today it is, shall we say, unrealistic to expect someone marrying at age thirty to re main a virgin. People would be living seventeen years after puberty without sexual activity. That’s not going to happen. There is now a period built into life patterns where people are going to be sexually active but not yet able to support themselves financially. There is also a period in which they can support themselves and are sexually active, but choose not to reproduce. The entire pattern of traditional life is collapsing, and no clear alternative patterns are emerging yet. Cohabitation used to be linked to formal, legal marriage, but the two are now completely decoupled. Even reproduction is being uncoupled from marriage, and perhaps even from cohabitation. Longer life, the decline in fertility rates, and the additional years of education have all contributed to the dissolution of previous life and social patterns. This trend cannot be reversed. Women are having fewer children be cause supporting a lot of children in industrial, urban society is economic suicide. That won’t change. The cost of raising children will not decline, nor will there be ways found to put six-year-olds to work. The rate of infant mortality is also not going to rise. So in the twenty-first century the trend toward having fewer, rather than more, children will continue. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES The more educated segments of the population are the ones where life patterns have diverged the most. The very poorest, on the other hand, have lived in a world of dysfunctional families since the industrial revolution began. For them, chaotic patterns of reproduction have always been the norm. However, between the college-educated professional and business classes on the one side and the underclass on the other, there is a large layer of society that has only partially experienced the demographic shifts. Among blue- and pink-collar workers there have been other trends, the most important of which is that they have shorter educations. The result is less of a gap between puberty and reproduction. These groups tend to marry earlier and have children earlier. They are far more dependent on each other economically, and it follows that the financial consequences of divorce can be far more damaging. There are nonemotional elements holding their marriages together, and divorce is seen as more consequential, as are extramarital and premarital sex. This group comprises many social conservatives, a small but powerful social cohort. They are powerful because they speak for traditional values. The chaos of the more highly educated classes can’t be called values yet; it will be a century before their lifestyles congeal into a coherent moral system. Therefore social conservatives have an inherent advantage, speaking coherently from the authoritative position of tradition. However, as we have seen, traditional distinctions between men and women are collapsing. As women live longer and have fewer children, they no longer are forced by circumstance into the traditional roles they had to maintain prior to urbanization and industrialization. Nor is family the crit ical economic instrument it once was. Divorce is no longer economically catastrophic, and premarital sex is inevitable. Homosexuality—and civil unions without reproduction—also becomes unextraordinary. If sentiment is the basis of marriage, then why indeed is gay marriage not as valid as heterosex ual marriage? If marriage is decoupled from reproduction, then gay marriage logically follows. All these changes are derived from the radical shifts in life patterns that are part of the end of the population explosion. It is no accident, therefore, that traditionalists within all religious groups— Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and others—have focused on returning to traditional patterns of reproduction. They all argue for, and many have, large families. Maintaining traditional roles for women in this context makes sense, as do traditional expectations of early marriage, chastity, and the permanence of marriage. The key is having more children, which is a traditionalist principle. Everything else follows. The issue is not only cropping up in advanced industrial societies. One of the foundations of anti-Americanism, for example, is the argument that American society breeds immorality, that it celebrates immodesty among women and destroys the family. If you read the speeches of Osama bin Laden, this theme is repeated continually. The world is changing and, he argues, we are moving away from patterns of behavior that have traditionally been regarded as moral. He wants to stop this process. These issues have become a global battleground as well as an internal political maelstrom in most advanced industrial countries, particularly the United States. On one side there is a structured set of political forces that have their roots in existing religious organizations. On the other side, there is less a political force than an overwhelming pattern of behavior that is indifferent to the political consequences of the actions that are being taken. This pattern of behavior is driven by demographic necessity. Certainly there are movements defending various aspects of this evolution, like gay rights, but the transformation is not being planned. It is simply happening. SUMMING UP Falling populations are re structuring the pattern of families and daily lives. Old institutions have shattered, but new ones have not yet emerged. The twenty-first century will be a period in which a range of new institutions, moral systems, and practices will begin their first tentative emergence. Waves of Feminisms, SJWs are just first manifestations of a neo-puritan religion that is taking shape to cater to modern needs of a post-industrial society. 1
Coonage Posted December 26, 2015 Posted December 26, 2015 My "pre-coffee" skim, wants me to say: #1 through 8, were only made possible due to the success of the 'traditional family' unit. As this unit goes, so follows it's success'. I see it as more of a cycle, and at the very least a sort of pending 'market correction' in the works. "Exploit" is a funny word. If we establish a definition and treat it as sort of an "ethical yardstick," is it not true, that women themselves, are the greatest "exploiters" of womanhood? I'll give this a thorough read later this am. Thanks for the share
AccuTron Posted December 26, 2015 Posted December 26, 2015 Thanks for the entire text. The very last paragraph especially got me thinking (a neighbor's behavior being compared to your template). I am curious to read it all again later, with the letters MGTOW in mind, to see where they may fit.
edwinhere Posted December 27, 2015 Author Posted December 27, 2015 Here is the summary of my argument: PAST: Children used to be a source of wealth in agricultural and early industrial society. More hands meant more hands to work in fields and companies. And labour was unskilled. So children could start working in early teens. Children also got married in their teens, and went on to multiply. e.g. Most of the Founding Fathers of USA were Founding Teenagers and Founding Twentysomethings. High infant mortality and low life expectancy meant people had to have more children keep the wealth flowing and pay for old age, and women spent their entire lives making children. Women used to die during pregnancy, and men used to be serial monogamists e.g. Cinderella's dad. Women couldn't work because they spend their entire lives making and raising children. A woman/widow who chose to avoid this role intentionally/circumstantially, was shunned (1 Timothy 5:3) & even murdered (e.g. Sati) because high infant mortality meant everybody had to keep making children so as to make more wealth and pay for old age. So women were eager to get married to any man they could find. Men would work and provide for women's and children's welfare. Monogamy aided in determining paternity which was needed when men were paying the bill for ~10 children and 1 woman. Since marriages were based on economic necessity instead of sentiment, marriages lasted longer which wasn't much because life expectancy was low. Divorce rates were low, and also shunned upon. Children also married in their teens when started earning, so they were virgins during their first marriage and premarital/extramarital promiscuity was not allowed. PRESENT: Children need 30 years of consumption before they earn a dime. Until then they are net consumers, and a drain on the family's wealth. Labour is skilled so, children need a lot of training to be able to say write computer programs. Children are unable to support themselves financially until they are 30, so they do not get married in their teens, and put away marriage longer. Low infant mortality, high life expectancy, and government welfare meant that people do not need children to keep the wealth flowing and pay for old age. So women do not need spent their entire lives making children. Women are allowed to work like men, because they have free time, and there is not enough children to meet the labour shortage. Women are not eager to get married. Windows and single mothers are accepted in society. DNA based paternity testing meant an alternative to monogamy for determining paternity. Since marriages are based on sentiment more than economic necessity, marriages last less longer even though people live longer. Divorce rates become higher, and other sentiment based relationships like gay marriages become acceptable. Children put away marriages until their 30s when they started earning, and we cannot expect them to spend their libidinous lives until then as virgins, so premarital promiscuity became acceptable. Extramarital promiscuity is acceptable because of DNA based paternity testing.
Donnadogsoth Posted December 28, 2015 Posted December 28, 2015 Worth reading, edwinhere. Thoughts: (1) A "post-industrial society" was planned. Depopulation was and is planned. The derailing of the economy, switch to floating exchange rate, removal of the Glass-Steagal protections for the physical economy, neglecting the soft and hard infrastructure needed as a platform for wealth, and the utter corruption of the education system from an intention to create humans into an intention to create workers, all of this was planned for by the elites. We are reaping what they have sown. (2) The reduction of increases in life-expectancy aren't a problem. The low fertility rate is, but could be nudged back above 2.1 given sufficient education, consumerist de-programming, religious revival, a shutdown of immigration, a shutdown of the Environmentalist movement, and economic incentive. (3) Population growth is associated with renaissances. We are clearly entering a dark age. (4) The solution is to raise more individuals as culturally optimistic humans, so that they will rationally decide to bring more children into the world, exchanging small-scale economic benefits for large ones.
Des Posted December 28, 2015 Posted December 28, 2015 Um - longer life expectancy - I think if you are doing predictions of really long-term futures - you need to consider really ridiculously long life expectancies. If a person lives 1000 years, what percentage of those are spent raising children? How much incentive does a person have, to make children, if he is unlikely to be old or sick for any length of time, and will die when murdered or accidentally extinguished? How much incentive does he have, when the voluntary family concept is accepted (I predict it will be accepted because compulsory family ties are immoral). How much incentive does anyone have, to make the effort to control sexuality, when technology controls disease regardless of sexual behaviour? Does "Sorry, that option is immoral" win out in the end? I say it will, because trading moral behaviour for moral behaviour is the most efficient way to stay alive, when it is only accident or aggression/murder that can kill me. If a person has lived 1000 healthy years, will he still be swayed by irrational thoughts? Can a person live 1000 healthy years with other people living as long, and still not think clearly?
edwinhere Posted December 29, 2015 Author Posted December 29, 2015 Um - longer life expectancy - I think if you are doing predictions of really long-term futures - you need to consider really ridiculously long life expectancies. If a person lives 1000 years, what percentage of those are spent raising children? How much incentive does a person have, to make children, if he is unlikely to be old or sick for any length of time, and will die when murdered or accidentally extinguished? How much incentive does he have, when the voluntary family concept is accepted (I predict it will be accepted because compulsory family ties are immoral). How much incentive does anyone have, to make the effort to control sexuality, when technology controls disease regardless of sexual behaviour? Does "Sorry, that option is immoral" win out in the end? I say it will, because trading moral behaviour for moral behaviour is the most efficient way to stay alive, when it is only accident or aggression/murder that can kill me. If a person has lived 1000 healthy years, will he still be swayed by irrational thoughts? Can a person live 1000 healthy years with other people living as long, and still not think clearly? I was attempting a description of societies prior to industrial revolution and after industrial revolution. I do not posses prescriptions for human behavior in societies. This is because I think most prescriptions are incomplete or inconsistent or both. As of now progressivism is inevitable in industrialized societies even in the absence of a political force that accelerates it. When life expectancies become 1000 years certainly there would be changes in our values. Unfortunately it has been 30 years since we invented an antibiotic, and bacterial evolution is catching up resistance to best antibiotics we have. Once common bacterial infections become resistant, infant mortality will rise up to pre-industrial levels and bring back the traditions that we invented to survive in such times.
Waffles Posted December 31, 2015 Posted December 31, 2015 Great post edwinhere Very clear and thorough I remember reading eragon, the fantasy saga, and I found the elvish society very interesting. I think it is very applicable to our post industrial society as we become more like elves, freer from death, and able to use technology, like magic to fulfill our needs and desires. For one, they lived indefinitely, making reproduction rare, to avoid over population. Secondly, they had no concept of binding marriage, because with indefinite life spans, things change. And thirdly, and possibly most interestingly their use of the magic language made it so that they could not speak lies, physically couldn't, making their culture infinitely more subtle, because everything they said was binding. Since we humans don't have such a language, this is less similar, but I think as privacy becomes impossible to keep, such an effect could impact human behavior. Anyway, I find the similarities quite striking.
edwinhere Posted January 15, 2016 Author Posted January 15, 2016 I have created two flowcharts to make my argument simple:
Recommended Posts