You Cannot Get an "Is" Without an "Ought"

[Max Hartford]

To discover truth you need to hold truth as a value. Moral relativism is invalid. It's like saying math is dependent on cultural upbringing. No, math is universally valid. "Moral relativism lives" is not an argument. It's equivalent to saying "invalid math lives"

 

If all you're trying to say is "we don't need to be consistent when we don't want to" then you're probably speaking out of childhood trauma when you feel the need to keep pointing this out when no one said otherwise...

 

You're saying "I don't need to be moral to you guys, I'm only doing it because it benefits me at this moment" It sounds like a parental alter ego who would be a serious narcissist, sadist, and abuser who used their capacity to be immoral to others as a threat.

 

I find this post incredibly rude. You know nothing about my childhood or my parents, yet you make wild accusations about 'childhood trauma' and 'sadistic' parents, trying to use it as an ad hominem attack. Drop the psychobabble dude: it has no place in a respectful intellectual discussion.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

You must not know where you are  Did you get lost finding this site? If you don't want me to bring up your possible parents that is fine, it doesn't matter to me. I thought you brought them up first when decided to treat morality as an intellectual discussion, and find ways to completely avoid what is being said, only to reform the statements so you can say you don't have to be moral. If you don't want me to bring them up: fine. But maybe I didn't bring them up... maybe you did...

[ThomasTheIdealist]

The Hume naturalistic fallacy is an actual type of fallacy. The problem is what the nihilists/relativists try to deduce from this fact. Yes, it is a fallacy to derive an ought from an is, but  concluding from this that objective morality is nonsense is an absurdity. 

 

The Is

You can't get an ought from an Is

The Ought

Therefore, you ought not believe in this thing called "objective morality"

I don't think any moral nihilist would say this exactly. In this context, an "ought" is normative, implying some accepted moral value. No nihilist would claim it's immoral to claim that morality is objective, which is what the normative claim would entail.

 

However, if you use "ought" like "should" or some non-normative variation, then the advice is valid if the person you're speaking with has some agreed premise/goal. People here have been conflating the normative with the descriptive. Saying "if you want to stay dry in the rain, you ought to use an umbrella" is not an ethical "ought" and is irrelevant in this context. It is not implying that it's unethical to get wet if you don't want to be and therefore you have a moral imperative to keep yourself dry.

 

So a nihilist would merely say that you shouldn't claim objective morality if you want to be consistent and abide by commonly accepted criteria of logic and science (or general metaphysical stuff). But like advising them to use an umbrella to stay dry, it's not some moral claim.

[Nathan Metric]

I don't think any moral nihilist would say this exactly. In this context, an "ought" is normative, implying some accepted moral value. No nihilist would claim it's immoral to claim that morality is objective, which is what the normative claim would entail.

 

However, if you use "ought" like "should" or some non-normative variation, then the advice is valid if the person you're speaking with has some agreed premise/goal. People here have been conflating the normative with the descriptive. Saying "if you want to stay dry in the rain, you ought to use an umbrella" is not an ethical "ought" and is irrelevant in this context. It is not implying that it's unethical to get wet if you don't want to be and therefore you have a moral imperative to keep yourself dry.

 

So a nihilist would merely say that you shouldn't claim objective morality if you want to be consistent and abide by commonly accepted criteria of logic and science (or general metaphysical stuff). But like advising them to use an umbrella to stay dry, it's not some moral claim.

It makes no sense to try to convince anyone to abandon objective morality unless you believe they ought to abandon it. If you believe it is the truth that objective morality is nonsense you're presupposing that one ought to adhere to the truth. Anything else is just arbitrary. Nobody cares what you want. We are not going to change our minds just because you want us to. 

 

If you actually did consistently care about logic and science then you would act morally because "thou shall act morally" is an axiomatic proposition for the same reason the Law of Identity is an axiom. Let's say you were to ask "why should I act morally"?. Either you want a morally virtuous answer or you want a truthful answer for an arbitrary reason (you can't justify your preference for the truth less you cease to be a nihilist)

 

That would be one example of an objective moral rule that exists irrespective of subjective desires. 

 

Another example of an objective moral rule that is axiomatic is the "Truth is virtuous". Again, if you were to try to criticize this either you make your argument on the basis that the truth is virtuous (performative contradiction) or you argue for the sake of pursuing some other goal for an arbitrary reason. And we know with absolute certainty those goals are arbitrary because the nature of nihilism is to possess a bunch of arbitrary goals. 

[ThomasTheIdealist]

If you believe it is the truth that objective morality is nonsense you're presupposing that one ought to adhere to the truth.

No, I just prefer to adhere to truth. This is not normative, it's distinct from the ethical ought as commonly used in philosophy. If you don't like truth, I don't think you're immoral. Though I certainly wouldn't want to live around you.

 

you can't justify your preference for the truth less you cease to be a nihilist

I don't see why. I could be a hedonist and say that my experience has shown that truth gives me the most long-term physical pleasure.

 

Nobody cares what you want. We are not going to change our minds just because you want us to.

Not true. If you also want to adhere to truth -- and I argue that objective morality has not been proven to be true -- why would you not care about this? I'm convincing others to do what they want consistently. If they reject common science and reason, then I agree they won't care much about my arguments, but most people don't reject those things, they just mistakenly reason, as you do, that objective morality is consistent with logic.

 

If you actually did consistently care about logic and science then you would act morally because "thou shall act morally" is an axiomatic proposition for the same reason the Law of Identity is an axiom.

I agree, but "you ought to be moral" is an axiom because it's a tautology. If morality is either unknown or not real, it's a pointless sentiment. And that's exactly what nihilists argue.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

"If morality is either unknown or not real, it's a pointless sentiment. And that's exactly what nihilists argue."

 

Saying something is unknown or not real is not an argument. If you say you prefer truth, then your preference for truth is not completely arbitrary and random, but it is a universal preference. That's what a preference for truth is. Otherwise it's not a preference for truth, but for some particular preference which just happens to align with the truth. Like, if a police officer pulls you over and you only will tell the truth about your speed if it was not over the limit, then that is not a preference for truth, but it might be the case that you will tell the truth anyway if your speed was under the limit.

 

A preference for truth says that, in all cases when the truth can be ascertained, it is preferable to falsehood, regardless of the consequences. This is the very premise of any debate. If you disagree and want to treat truth as a particular, arbitrary preference based on your subjective utility, then you're just not understanding or acknowledging what a preference for truth is. It is futile to argue for a contradiction in favor of the truth and then claim that your statements should be treated as if you are searching for the truth. If you are not searching for the truth when you say morality is not objective then no one should take you seriously. This isn't against you, it's just against the statements you're making. If it's correct that you are not understanding or acknowledging what truth is (a universal preference for consistency and empirical evidence), and you continue to argue as if you do, then it sets a confusing/contradictory example for others and it's worth pointing out. 

[Nathan Metric]

Why do you prefer to adhere to the truth?

 

Why are you a hedonist?

 

Yes, I care about you disagreeing with me, but that is because you ought to agree with me. Not because I merely want you to agree with me. You want me to agree with you for a completely arbitrary reason. 

 

So what if "thou ought be moral" is a tautology. So what? The Law of Identity ("A is A") is a tautology. Does that make it wrong. No it doesn't. I also did define what virtue is. I said that "Truth is virtious" is an axiomatic proposition. Now if you can actually give us a good reason why you prefer the truth and why you are a hedonist then maybe you can upset us. but I highly doubt you will be able to do that because a nihilist by definition is someone with a bunch of arbitrary preferences and you can't invoke arbitrary preferences to refute objective preferences. 

[ThomasTheIdealist]

Saying something is unknown or not real is not an argument.

There is no evidence to demonstrate that anything has any inherent rightness or wrongness to it (which is what moral realism claims). I'm not sure what other argument you're seeking. I would agree that universal preferences (however few there may be) could be reasonably considered moral/immoral, but not due to any attribute of the action itself.

 

If you say you prefer truth, then your preference for truth is not completely arbitrary and random, but it is a universal preference. That's what a preference for truth is. Otherwise it's not a preference for truth, but for some particular preference which just happens to align with the truth. Like, if a police officer pulls you over and you only will tell the truth about your speed if it was not over the limit, then that is not a preference for truth, but it might be the case that you will tell the truth anyway if your speed was under the limit.

I think you've misunderstood. It's the reason for the preference for truth that would be arbitrary, not the level/quantity of truth preferred.

 

However, I don't think I ever said my preference for truth was arbitrary, so I'm not sure it's worth responding more than this. In fact, I never said the word "arbitrary" anywhere. My preference for truth is based on life experience, and is therefore not arbitrary. And in the case of speaking with the police, I would definitely not have a preference for being truthful lol, which is distinct from having a preference for the truth.

 

Why do you prefer to adhere to the truth?

Why are you a hedonist?

The second question assumes an answer to the first. I wouldn't exactly say I'm a hedonist, but I do gauge my decisions based on how things will effect me, and I consider that to be the only real important factor to consider, "moral values" merely being an egoistic extension of things I consider beneficial to myself.

 

Yes, I care about you disagreeing with me, but that is because you ought to agree with me. Not because I merely want you to agree with me. You want me to agree with you for a completely arbitrary reason.

Well, I want you to agree with me because it benefits me to have like-minded people in the world in the sense that people will eventually cease to levy harms on me as society does today in the form of governments and other coercive entities.

 

So what if "thou ought be moral" is a tautology. So what? The Law of Identity ("A is A") is a tautology. Does that make it wrong.

No, but you certainly can't use that to assert the validity of A.

 

You said: If you actually did consistently care about logic and science then you would act morally because "thou shall act morally" is an axiomatic proposition

 

This is like me saying that if you really care about science and logic, you would do A, because A = A. And then I can substitute just about anything as A. This is not sound logic, just circular reasoning.

[Nathan Metric]

The Law of Identity is a tautology. Despite the fact it is a tautology it is still true and it still has meaning. It means things are what they are and not what they are not.

 

"Thou shall act morally" is also tautology. Obviously it doesn't define what "morally" is. There is however a point to the axiom. The point is whatever is virtuous you ought to pursue it. In order for objective morality to exist you have to prove that

a)That there is a single prime virtue.

b)That one ought to pursue that virtue. 

 

Proving that "thou shall act morally" is a axiom is part of what is necessary albeit it is not sufficient to prove objective morality. 

 

"Well, I want you to agree with me because it benefits me to have like-minded people in the world in the sense that people will eventually cease to levy harms on me as society does today in the form of governments and other coercive entities."

 

 

So what? Why does that matter? What is the moral significance of you wanting to change my mind? See when I want to change your mind it is based on some sense of moral duty. The truth is the prime virtue so therefore I am pursuing virtue by trying to get you to agree with me. You're desire to change my mind is based on no moral principle whatsoever. It's an arbitrary preference and I know it's an arbitrary preference because a nihilist by definition is a person with arbitrary preferences. 

 

 

 

The second question assumes an answer to the first. I wouldn't exactly say I'm a hedonist, but I do gauge my decisions based on how things will effect me, and I consider that to be the only real important factor to consider, "moral values" merely being an egoistic extension of things I consider beneficial to myself.

But you are an egoist. Why are you an egoist?

 

 

 

However, I don't think I ever said my preference for truth was arbitrary, so I'm not sure it's worth responding more than this. In fact, I never said the word "arbitrary" anywhere. My preference for truth is based on life experience, and is therefore not arbitrary. And in the case of speaking with the police, I would definitely not have a preference for being truthful lol, which is distinct from having a preference for the truth.

Naturalistic fallacy. Saying that your preference for the truth is justified because of your life experience is trying to get an ought from an is.

 

I'm afraid you do not understand the implications of nihilism. If morality is nonsense than all preferences are arbitrary.

[ThomasTheIdealist]

In order for objective morality to exist you have to prove that

a)That there is a single prime virtue.

b)That one ought to pursue that virtue.

I don't see why the latter is necessary. If virtue or morality is inherently something you ought to do, then it sufficient to simply prove moral realism. In other words, A implies B.

 

So what? Why does that matter? What is the moral significance of you wanting to change my mind?

There is none, that's my whole point. Why do my actions need moral significance?

 

See when I want to change your mind it is based on some sense of moral duty. The truth is the prime virtue so therefore I am pursuing virtue by trying to get you to agree with me. You're desire to change my mind is based on no moral principle whatsoever. It's an arbitrary preference and I know it's an arbitrary preference because a nihilist by definition is a person with arbitrary preferences.

I'm talking about moral nihilism, not really epistemological or ontological nihilism. I have preferences based on real things and are therefore not arbitrary.

 

Perhaps you're using some other definition of arbitrary. By most definition, if your decision follows some sort of rules or system, it's not arbitrary. But if you want to arguing that my desire for that system (e.g. egoism) is arbitrary, or that my desire for physical and psychological wellness based on evolutionary biological instinct is arbitrary, then I suppose I can't argue against that. You would necessarily think everything is arbitrary in that case.

 

I'm afraid you do not understand the implications of nihilism. If morality is nonsense than all preferences are arbitrary.

If that's the case, why do you think it's not arbitrary to decide to pursue a "prime virtue"? Don't you still have to ask why you should want to do what you "ought" to? Why is your preference for what you ought to do less arbitrary than mine. You're arbitrarily doing what you ought to.

[Nathan Metric]

I don't see why the latter is necessary. If virtue or morality is inherently something you ought to do, then it sufficient to simply prove moral realism. In other words, A implies B.

 

 

 

No, because a nihilist can just ask "Why should I pursue virtue at all?" and simply saying something is a virtue doesn't actually answer the question.

 

 

.

 

There is none, that's my whole point. Why do my actions need moral significance?

 

 

Let's say I claim proposition X is an axiom. The way to prove it is not an axiom is to mount a logical argument against it. 

 

Example:

Moralist: "Survival is the virtue" is an axiom.

Anti-Moralist: No it's not. I only have to conditionally value my survival in order to argue against it. I don't have to make survival my most important goal in life in order to argue against the proposition. So therefore, what you're saying is not an axiom.

 

Counter-Example

Realist: A is A

Nihilist: No it's not.

Realist: Ah, so you're agreeing with me! (the realist is not treating the nihilist's argument (A) as an argument (A).

 

Now, I have asserted that pursuing virtue is axiomatic and pursuing the truth is axiomatic. So that means you have to mount a logical argument against it. You could for instance say that "I contest the axiom because it goes against my self-interest" which presupposes that pursuing your self-interest is a logical goal. However, there is nothing logical about egotism whatsoever. If you ask an egotist why one should be egotist he will not be able to justify their egotist lifestyle logically. So therefore, their objections against these axioms are arbitrary and illogical.

 

 

 

I'm talking about moral nihilism, not really epistemological or ontological nihilism. I have preferences based on real things and are therefore not arbitrary.

 

Perhaps you're using some other definition of arbitrary. By most definition, if your decision follows some sort of rules or system, it's not arbitrary. But if you want to arguing that my desire for that system (e.g. egoism) is arbitrary, or that my desire for physical and psychological wellness based on evolutionary biological instinct is arbitrary, then I suppose I can't argue against that. You would necessarily think everything is arbitrary in that case.

 

 

 

I don't even know what it even means to have preferences "based on real things". There are only two categories: preferences that can be justified with logic or preferences that cannot be justified with logic. Your preferences are either in one category or the other. There is no in between.

 

It is not true that everyone pursues physical and psychological wellness because of instinct. That doesn't explain why people commit suicide. That doesn't explain why people risk going to prison. That which can negated by choice can't be an instinct.

And even if it was an instinct then why would you be a moral nihilist then? If there are preferences that exist because of instinct and you had no choice but to follow those instincts then any moral maxim (if this then this) involving those preferences would be functionally no different than an objective moral rule.

 

 

 

If that's the case, why do you think it's not arbitrary to decide to pursue a "prime virtue"? Don't you still have to ask why you should want to do what you "ought" to? Why is your preference for what you ought to do less arbitrary than mine. You're arbitrarily doing what you ought to.

Because acting consistent with an axiom is acting in a logical (non-arbitrary) manner.

[ThomasTheIdealist]

No, because a nihilist can just ask "Why should I pursue virtue at all?" and simply saying something is a virtue doesn't actually answer the question.

Yes, but that wouldn't change the alleged fact that you "ought" to do it. Whether you have a reason to do what you ought is a different question. Explain how you can prove that a prime virtue exists without proving you ought to live by it? It's inherent to what you meant by "prime virtue," is it not?

 

Now, I have asserted that pursuing virtue is axiomatic and pursuing the truth is axiomatic. So that means you have to mount a logical argument against it.

I can't think of any reason I would be against those assertions. While I'm unsure that it's axiomatic that pursuing truth is desirable, I can agree that it is desirable to me.

 

You could for instance say that "I contest the axiom because it goes against my self-interest" which presupposes that pursuing your self-interest is a logical goal.

Why does this presuppose anything is logical? Maybe I have deluded myself that a demon spirit told me to pursue my self-interest.

 

However, there is nothing logical about egotism whatsoever. If you ask an egotist why one should be egotist he will not be able to justify their egotist lifestyle logically.

I am my own highest value (my subjective valuation) and should therefore prioritize my own desires and well-being over others'. Where is the logical misstep? In my subjective valuation? Are there objective values for things?

 

So therefore, their objections against these axioms are arbitrary and illogical.

I understand that you just attempted to explain how it was illogical, how did you leap to the conclusion that it's arbitrary here? Not everything illogical is arbitrary. If it was derived from a specific set of rules/criteria, it's not arbitrary.

 

I don't even know what it even means to have preferences "based on real things".

This wasn't even remotely cryptic, so I'm not sure what you don't understand. My preferences are based on things that are real (e.g. neural activity and physical consequences) as opposed to non-real things (i.e. gods and natural rights). Though I misspoke, because even preferences based on non-real things like gods aren't arbitrary. For my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing.

 

There are only two categories: preferences that can be justified with logic or preferences that cannot be justified with logic. Your preferences are either in one category or the other. There is no in between.

I agree.

 

It is not true that everyone pursues physical and psychological wellness because of instinct. That doesn't explain why people commit suicide. That doesn't explain why people risk going to prison. That which can negated by choice can't be an instinct.

And even if it was an instinct then why would you be a moral nihilist then? If there are preferences that exist because of instinct and you had no choice but to follow those instincts then any moral maxim (if this then this) involving those preferences would be functionally no different than an objective moral rule.

Well, I would say there are egoistic reasons to commit suicide and take on big risks, but regardless I agree with your sentiment that it is indeed possible for people to go against their instinctual urges, I didn't mean to imply otherwise. My point was that I don't think following your instincts is inherently arbitrary.

 

I don't think it's moral to follow your instincts. I don't condemn people as immoral for not following their own instincts or self-interest. There are merely things I don't like (for varying reasons) and other things I do like. Like I already said, for my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing.

 

Because acting consistent with an axiom is acting in a logical (non-arbitrary) manner.

But nihilists aren't acting inconsistently with any axiom you posited. They follow the axiom "thou shall act morally," but having rejected the existence of a moral category, for whatever reason, the axiom leads nowhere. If I propose that "all shiny unicorns are shiny" you would have to agree that is indeed a true tautology just like the former. But of no consequence...

[Nathan Metric]

1) Yes, but that wouldn't change the alleged fact that you "ought" to do it. Whether you have a reason to do what you ought is a different question. Explain how you can prove that a prime virtue exists without proving you ought to live by it? It's inherent to what you meant by "prime virtue," is it not?

 

2)I can't think of any reason I would be against those assertions. While I'm unsure that it's axiomatic that pursuing truth is desirable, I can agree that it is desirable to me.

 

3)Why does this presuppose anything is logical? Maybe I have deluded myself that a demon spirit told me to pursue my self-interest.

 

4)I am my own highest value (my subjective valuation) and should therefore prioritize my own desires and well-being over others'. Where is the logical misstep? In my subjective valuation? Are there objective values for things?

 

5)I understand that you just attempted to explain how it was illogical, how did you leap to the conclusion that it's arbitrary here? )Not everything illogical is arbitrary. If it was derived from a specific set of rules/criteria, it's not arbitrary.

 

6)This wasn't even remotely cryptic, so I'm not sure what you don't understand. My preferences are based on things that are real (e.g. neural activity and physical consequences) as opposed to non-real things (i.e. gods and natural rights). Though I misspoke, because even preferences based on non-real things like gods aren't arbitrary. For my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing.

 Well, I would say there are egoistic reasons to commit suicide and take on big risks, but regardless I agree with your sentiment that it is indeed possible for people to go against their instinctual urges, I didn't mean to imply otherwise. My point was that I don't think following your instincts is inherently arbitrary.

 

I don't think it's moral to follow your instincts. I don't condemn people as immoral for not following their own instincts or self-interest. There are merely things I don't like (for varying reasons) and other things I do like. Like I already said, for my preferences to be arbitrary, they would have to be based on nothing.

7) But nihilists aren't acting inconsistently with any axiom you posited. They follow the axiom "thou shall act morally," but having rejected the existence of a moral category, for whatever reason, the axiom leads nowhere. If I propose that "all shiny unicorns are shiny" you would have to agree that is indeed a true tautology just like the former. But of no consequence...

 

1)Please watch for Molyneux's video "How Not to Fight Evil" for a reason as to why simply outlining what is virtue is not enough. Believe it or not there are actually some people in this world that don't even know why you should pursue virtue in the first place.  The caller in that show agreed there was such a thing as objective virtues and vices, but he didn't understand WHY you should pursue virtue.

 

 

2)"Truth is virtuous" is axiomatic because any argument against it involves either a)the person tacitly accepting that truth is something to be pursued or b)it involves them invoking arbitrary preferences. It's the same reason Molyneux believes UPB exists. UPB exists because any argument against UPB either a)requires invoking standards of UPB or b)expecting Stefan to adhere to X or Y standard for an arbitrary reason.

 

3)If pursuing your self-interest is illogical then the argument that involves invoking that preference is illogical as well. That which invokes something illogical is by definition illogical.

 

4)The logical misstep is you are expecting us who believe in objective morality to logically justify our beliefs when you have no logical justification for your own beliefs and values. That is hypocrisy. That is irrational. That is illogical.

 

5)"Arbitrary" and "illogical" are two words for the same thing.

 

6)But you weren't talking about egotism. You were talking about pursuing physical and psychology health. Two completely different things.

 

Why do you mean by "egoistic" reasons to commit suicide or take on big risks? Are you talking about egoism in the sense that they are motivated by the pursuit of pleasure or do you mean egoistic in the sense that they are pursuing their own goals?

 

If you mean egoistic in the former sense that wouldn't be an instinct. Not everyone is motivated to pursue pleasure above all else. Some of us wish to pursue the truth even if the truth might not give us pleasure.

If you mean egoistic in the latter sense that would be a rather lame justification because the fact is you can make anything your own goal. Saying that humans are instinctively bound to pursue their own goals is a trivial claim that doesn't actually justify any particular goals or set of behaviors.

 

I am not against people pursuing self-interest either. Self-interest by itself isn't bad. It is acting without thinking that is wrong.

 

7)Let's recap the first three premises of my moral theory

 

1)Thou shall pursue virtue (Virtue Axiom)

2)Truth is the prime virtue (Truth Axiom)

3)Therefore, you should pursue the truth,

 

Let's say I nihilist accepts the validity of the Virtue Axiom but not the validity of the Truth Axiom. That is an absurd position. The only reason a nihilist would accept the validity of the Virtue Axiom is if they cares about being logical and avoiding contradictions. If they care about being logical then there is no good reason to oppose the Truth axiom because the Truth Axiom is an axiom for the same reason the Virtue axiom is an axiom: because a)it's a basic (coherent and concise) proposition and b)there is no way to mount a logical argument against it. 

 

I agree that the Virtue Axiom is a tautology by itself but it is not true that it leads nowhere. The Law of Identity for instance is a tautology but it does lead to Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle even despite the fact it is a tautology.

[chromanin]

It is a false dichotomy. There is no such thing as 'ought'. There are only realities (is) which can be manipulated by actors to achieve different realities. The 'ought' as it is imagined, is really the supposed knowledge an actor has about how to fulfill a specific result, and so can be measured as more or less correct by the efficacy of the method in achieving said result. Values are a synthesis of preference and knowledge. Morality is a real calculation. 

[labmath2]

Merriam webster online dictionary.

Is: references be.

Be: used to indicate the identity of a person or thing, used to describe the qualities of a person or thing, used to indicate the condition of a person or thing.

 

Ought: used to express obligation, advisability, natural expectation or logical consequence.

 

Conditional: showing that something is true or happens only if something else is true or happens.

 

The argument put forward in this thread goes something like this, we can only discover what is if we have a desire/obligation to do so. To which i will ask, is that a factually accurate statement? My answer is no. We know the sun exists, gravity exists, and sky is blue not because of a desire/obligation to know it, but by virtue of our daily experiences. I hope this is even more clear than my earlier post.

[labmath2]

It makes no sense to try to convince anyone to abandon objective morality unless you believe they ought to abandon it. If you believe it is the truth that objective morality is nonsense you're presupposing that one ought to adhere to the truth. Anything else is just arbitrary. Nobody cares what you want. We are not going to change our minds just because you want us to.

 

If you actually did consistently care about logic and science then you would act morally because "thou shall act morally" is an axiomatic proposition for the same reason the Law of Identity is an axiom. Let's say you were to ask "why should I act morally"?. Either you want a morally virtuous answer or you want a truthful answer for an arbitrary reason (you can't justify your preference for the truth less you cease to be a nihilist)

 

That would be one example of an objective moral rule that exists irrespective of subjective desires.

 

Another example of an objective moral rule that is axiomatic is the "Truth is virtuous". Again, if you were to try to criticize this either you make your argument on the basis that the truth is virtuous (performative contradiction) or you argue for the sake of pursuing some other goal for an arbitrary reason. And we know with absolute certainty those goals are arbitrary because the nature of nihilism is to possess a bunch of arbitrary goals.

Preference: a feeling of wanting or liking one person or thing more than another person or thing.

 

Preferences derive from the individual. A nihilist could prefer truth and also prefer that everyone else prefers truth. He doesn't have to prefer it for any particular reason other than his feeling.

 

The claim objective morality exists is either true or false. The nihilist engages you in the conversation assuming you also prefer the truth. Should he find out you do not, he can give you reasons he prefers the truth to try and you to change your mind, but he has to walk away if you remain unconvinced.

[Aspiring Skywriter]

Hume would actually agree with Harris, is the interesting bit. He basically outright said we can't really know the truth about reality for 100% certain. 

 

Harris and Hume would then probably agree that morality isn't certain, but that we can tell something about what people want based on what they say they want and don't want. People don't want to be robbed, and interpret that as wrong,  so we can make the practical judgement that it's bad to rob people. Unfortunately, though, this isn't enough to allow for universal principles without relativism, since consistency can be achieved through multiple solutions. 

[chromanin]

Merriam webster online dictionary.

Is: references be.

Be: used to indicate the identity of a person or thing, used to describe the qualities of a person or thing, used to indicate the condition of a person or thing.

 

Ought: used to express obligation, advisability, natural expectation or logical consequence.

 

Conditional: showing that something is true or happens only if something else is true or happens.

 

The argument put forward in this thread goes something like this, we can only discover what is if we have a desire/obligation to do so. To which i will ask, is that a factually accurate statement? My answer is no. We know the sun exists, gravity exists, and sky is blue not because of a desire/obligation to know it, but by virtue of our daily experiences. I hope this is even more clear than my earlier post.

 

I'd go even further and suggest that obligations are nothing other than the deference to actual consequences, the degree to which one understands those consequences notwithstanding. Advisability & expectations must be proven accurate, logic must be performed, and so they are also 'is' as in they are real information which can be falsified. Information deserves no special category of 'ought'. This is the problem with using dictionaries in philosophy and the analytical approach in general: Unless you allow those analytical definitions to to be revised in process, prior assumed collateral knowledge will prevent you from pushing deeper into actual knowledge.  

[labmath2]

I'd go even further and suggest that obligations are nothing other than the deference to actual consequences, the degree to which one understands those consequences notwithstanding. Advisability & expectations must be proven accurate, logic must be performed, and so they are also 'is' as in they are real information which can be falsified. Information deserves no special category of 'ought'. This is the problem with using dictionaries in philosophy and the analytical approach in general: Unless you allow those analytical definitions to to be revised in process, prior assumed collateral knowledge will prevent you from pushing deeper into actual knowledge.  

 

There are two concerns about your comment. First, advisability and expectations are things in people's minds. I would lump them together under preference (or desire). What the conditional does is allow you to say "if you desire/prefer X, then Y (Y being the factual claim)." Are  preference (desire,expectations,obligations,advisability) real? We know they are not facts like it is raining outside, which are empirically verifiable. They are also not true by definition (mathematical model), like 2+2=4. So when you say they are real, i have no way of understanding the statement, at least without assuming you mean subjectively real (if i believe it is advisable/expected then it is). 

 

The second problem is the one that permeates all attempts at ethics (objective moral philosophy). If meanings are flexible, then communications about objective things also becomes flexible. This flexibility weakens the logical validity of arguments (since slightly different interpretations built up over a lengthy logical sequence makes the conclusion one possible outcome and not the necessary outcome). Even science runs into this problem. Its what is colloquially referred to as grey areas. Short of me beaming my ideas into your head, the easiest way to avoid confusion and inaccuracy is to use language as precisely and accurately as possible. Where current words fail, simply invent new ones.

[chromanin]

There are two concerns about your comment. First, advisability and expectations are things in people's minds. I would lump them together under preference (or desire). What the conditional does is allow you to say "if you desire/prefer X, then Y (Y being the factual claim)." Are  preference (desire,expectations,obligations,advisability) real? We know they are not facts like it is raining outside, which are empirically verifiable. They are also not true by definition (mathematical model), like 2+2=4. So when you say they are real, i have no way of understanding the statement, at least without assuming you mean subjectively real (if i believe it is advisable/expected then it is). 

 

The second problem is the one that permeates all attempts at ethics (objective moral philosophy). If meanings are flexible, then communications about objective things also becomes flexible. This flexibility weakens the logical validity of arguments (since slightly different interpretations built up over a lengthy logical sequence makes the conclusion one possible outcome and not the necessary outcome). Even science runs into this problem. Its what is colloquially referred to as grey areas. Short of me beaming my ideas into your head, the easiest way to avoid confusion and inaccuracy is to use language as precisely and accurately as possible. Where current words fail, simply invent new ones.

 

Certainly preference is real, it's a synthesis of objective physical differences in the perceiver (how your senses and brain actually perform) and assumed knowledge. The problem comes when the knowledge is left as assumed and not reviewed critically. What exists in people's minds that is not an actual part of the physical universe? For instance, I could experience a hallucination of something external to me which isn't actually there, but it still actually exists as some kind of biochemical dysfunction in my brain.

 

Meanings are not flexible if we require them to converge on an empirical standard. When inventing new words you still are making an attempt to describe something real. I think the central problem is that instead of allowing for imperfect knowledge in some reasonable way, we actually encourage it with the invention of a subjective barrier!

[labmath2]

Certainly preference is real, it's a synthesis of objective physical differences in the perceiver (how your senses and brain actually perform) and assumed knowledge. The problem comes when the knowledge is left as assumed and not reviewed critically. What exists in people's minds that is not an actual part of the physical universe? For instance, I could experience a hallucination of something external to me which isn't actually there, but it still actually exists as some kind of biochemical dysfunction in my brain.

 

Meanings are not flexible if we require them to converge on an empirical standard. When inventing new words you still are making an attempt to describe something real. I think the central problem is that instead of allowing for imperfect knowledge in some reasonable way, we actually encourage it with the invention of a subjective barrier!

I am getting the sense that we mostly agree, and our way of thinking about these concepts are just different.

[WasatchMan]

The argument put forward in this thread goes something like this, we can only discover what is if we have a desire/obligation to do so.

 

No, the argument being put forward in this thread is, we can only discover what "is" with specific methodologies.  Nothing to do with desire or obligation. 

 

Example: If you want to know what the square root of 933 is you ought to use math.

It is a false dichotomy. There is no such thing as 'ought'. There are only realities (is) which can be manipulated by actors to achieve different realities. The 'ought' as it is imagined, is really the supposed knowledge an actor has about how to fulfill a specific result, and so can be measured as more or less correct by the efficacy of the method in achieving said result. Values are a synthesis of preference and knowledge. Morality is a real calculation. 

 

The ought is the goal of a being with cognition, which exists.

[sb23rd]

Double post.

[sb23rd]

Another double post.

[sb23rd]

If according to Hume human knowledge or epistemological theories are a product of custom and imagination, does he not proceed to reach his conclusion by a process he claims is unknowable? Am I missing something here? Seems self detonating. Hume also states that we connect our ideas (a priori from another realm) to our impressions received via the senses. This suggests concepts do not form from sense perception (induction) of the external world. Like Descartes, this bothers me somewhat because the mind is assumed to be some sort of conduit part of the body but not really.   

[ObserveandReport]

Is it that you're misrepresenting the material? Reality is objective while values are subjective. Therefore there could be no specific value that could help discover anything about reality.

 

You would not deny that values exist, I think? Consciousness is subjective, but objective in that it exists (I feel like I'm missing an important distinction here). Other than that I agree with your take on this.

 

Otherwise, the argument presented in the OP is a bit distorted from the original. Hume points out that in laying the groundwork for a moral schema, people often list a number of facts ("is" statements) but will then begin speaking about how things should be ("ought" statements) and he sees no reason why they can do this without explanation. Hume may have though that this means there are no principles which bridge this gap. I did my senior thesis on this exact subject. One philosopher, (I forget his name) suggests that most modern theories themselves contain either explicit or implicit bridge principles. These theories include Utilitarianism, Deontolgy, and strong Pareto principles (think Stefan's two guys in a room). Others (Charles Pidgen) suggest that such principles are either nonexistent or trivial. If I am recalling correctly he asserts that deonotological requirements (universality) are not what bridge "is" and "ought" but are necessary conditions of morality if it is coherent. 

[labmath2]

No, the argument being put forward in this thread is, we can only discover what "is" with specific methodologies. Nothing to do with desire or obligation.

 

Example: If you want to know what the square root of 933 is you ought to use math.

The problem with that proposition is that you can arrive at the right answer even with a wrong methodology (guessing for example). Some things can be discovered with multiple methods.

 

To take your example, i can arrive at the square root of 933 by using a calculator, using some equation, or just guessing 30.5.

[ObserveandReport]

The problem with that proposition is that you can arrive at the right answer even with a wrong methodology (guessing for example). Some things can be discovered with multiple methods.

 

To take your example, i can arrive at the square root of 933 by using a calculator, using some equation, or just guessing 30.5.

I know it's going back some, but an "ought" with an "is" and an "if" doesn't resemble a moral statement(to me), but one of pragmatism. While these perhaps aren't mutually exclusive, I don't think it gets you any closer to a moral framework.