Universally Permissible Interactions, or how I think about ethics.

[Will Torbald]

Ethics is described in UPB as the subset that deals with enforceable behavior. The kind of behavior that it enforces is negative behavior, as in not-murder. However, propositions of negative behavior carry no information regarding the actual behavior of the agent. This is confusing in the sense that our minds are conditioned to expect judgments based on positive actions, not negative 'not-actions'. This is why UPB deals only with the examination of moral principles, not of particular actions. 

 

In order to acquire information regarding positive behavior we would have to inverse the theory to find the positive side. But before doing that, let's examine the behavioral aspect of the theory. For the purposes of this conversation I will separate behavior into actions and interactions. A simple action is motion that does not escape the body that it produced it. If I swing my arm forward into the air I am performing an action. However, if I swing my arm forward and it knocks out an unsuspecting and random person I have created an interaction. Interactions are the transference of energy from one body to another. It is clear that the ethics of simple actions are understood to be amoral, while interactions are morally judgeable. It is often the case that people try to ban or make rules against simple actions like "killing", but that can never be valid. This in turn confuses people into thinking that secular ethics are impossible, or forever relegated to relativism or egoism - but the mistake is to ignore the reality of interactions. 

 

So I'd say that ethics is the subset of universally preferable behavior that deals with universally permissible interactions. 

 

With this information, the question of "was this interaction moral or immoral?" can be examined directly instead of indirectly. UPB would only argue that a moral theory that says that an aggressive interaction was good is logically invalid. Whereas it could be asked "was this interaction universally permissible?" and it could have a clear cut yes or no answer without having to jump into meta-levels of examination. 

 

By permissible I mean interactions that can have consent removed from them. For example, I wouldn't say that the gravitational effect of the Earth on my body is a permissible interaction because it is universally forced on me and I cannot escape physics. The earth doesn't care if I consent or not because it makes no difference. It is inescapable. But escapable interactions can be permissible since the escape is the removal of the consent and sufficient action against it. This doesn't mean that if I put you in a cage that you can't escape from I've created an inescapable interaction because I could have chosen not to put you in a cage. The Earth can't choose to not pull me in.     

 

If I were to remove my clothes and throw my body unto you while saying "I do not consent to your face touching my xxx" you would understand that there is a contradiction between my interactions and my words by which I would be judged by the interactions I caused versus the consent I claimed I didn't give. Therefore the factor of permission is relevant to the agent receiving the energy, not the one giving it as it is logical that if the energy was given it had the consent of the giver (barring mental health and other exceptions).  

 

Going back to our Rando that I punched earlier, he has now gotten up and is very upset at me for knocking him down. Nonetheless, I explained to him that I was just making a theoretical example, and that it wasn't personal. This convincing argument satisfied him and told me he was a also a Buddhist monk. He forgave me in the name of his god, and went on his way. So he gave me permission retroactively to assault him, and it went well. I had the luck of punching a very humble person, but if I had punched a more feisty person I don't think he would have forgiven me.  

 

This means that there are interactions that, while initially not-permitted by the receiver, can be retroactively permitted. These are retro-permissible interactions, or RPI's. This doesn't mean that RPI's are universally preferable, but that they contain the potential to be forgiven. For the sake of being brief I would summarize that theft, assault, and sexual assault are RPI's: Not universally preferable, but not universally unforgivable either. This doesn't mean that you should forgive them either, but that the probability can never reach zero either. 

 

I am leaving murder for last because it is the only aggressive interaction that can't be forgiven by empirical demonstration. If you murder me I would become incapable of giving you permission after the fact because I would be dead. Maybe other people could make nothing of it, but it can't be retroactively permitted by the victim either. It will forever remain in a state of non permission. Since it is impossible for third parties to grant permission over my life or property, no one else can retro-permit it either. 

 

The concept of retroactive consent or permission sounds a little offsetting and almost an admission of subjectivity since the weight of the moral category of the interaction falls on the victim's choices. Nonetheless, the ethics of interactions require this level of open ended consensus since interactions are owned by the parties involved, not by third party judges. We as moralists or philosophers cannot interfere with the judgments of the owners of the interaction because doing so would be a violation of their property rights, rather ironically. We can only observe and influence through dialogue whether a victim condemns or forgives his assailants, but to determine the ultimate judgment by ourselves would be an act of arrogance. 

 

So, UPB has four interactions as evil: Murder, theft, rape, and assault. 

 

But UPI has only one as evil: Murder - and three as wrong but locally and retroactively permissible: Theft, sexual assault, and assault. 

 

Just because something can be locally permissible it doesn't mean it will be permitted. Depending on the circumstances the probability of forgiveness is almost zero, but the catch is that it can never actually reach zero as in the case of murder. Only murder has a zero chance of ever being permissible by which the label of true evil is guaranteed. Everything else is wrong, but not absolutely. 

 

But there is one more thing. RPI's can't be considered permissible if the interaction happened under the threat of murder. Since murder is the only evil, any permissible wrongdoing committed under the threat of murder becomes evil by association. 

 

I could steal something from you when you weren't looking, and it would be wrong, but it's a RPI nonetheless. Maybe I just took a cookie from your lunch as a joke. But I could steal the same cookie while threatening you with a loaded gun and it would not only be wrong, it would be evil.  

 

And that's the difference between something being wrong, and something being evil according to the theory of universally permissible interactions. To trespass property rights is always wrong as UPB demonstrates that it can't be right, but to trespass them with the weapon of murder is evil. This also sounds very similar to the NAP, if you were paying attention. However, the NAP would say that all incursions of property rights are abhorred and should be treated with equal moral condemnation. This leads to many arguments about flagpoles, or lifeboats, or any ridiculous objection to it. I get it. I've done the same thing myself in thought experiments, and I don't like it either. This way of thinking, on the other hand, bypasses the extremists by literally saying "Bro, interacting with the property of others without permission isn't evil per se, it's just necessary during emergencies. I'm sure they would give you permission after the fact when you explain it to them, but you're not evil for doing it". This isn't something that Stefan hasn't said before, but it isn't something explicitly described in UPB either. I think that making it part of the theory is necessary to further facilitate its understanding.           

 

To synthesize: 

 

UPI's are mutually agreed interactions, voluntary negotiations, self defense scenarios. It is 'right' to do these. 

 

RPI's are interactions without permission that hold a probability of future permission. Theft, assault, etc. It is 'wrong' to do these. 

 

Evil interactions are those which are impossible to permit after the fact, and only murder fits this category. It is evil to murder. 

 

RPI's done under the threat of murder are evil by association. It is coercion to do so. 

 

Violations of property rights are RPI's as long as they are not done under the threat of murder. 

 

At the introduction I said that UPI would examine interactions and not just principles. To do that we need to ask a series of questions and then determine the outcome like a flowchart of events. 

 

1- Was it a mutually voluntary interaction? 

• Yes) It's moral 

• No) See 2 

 

2- Were the property rights of the victim trespassed? 

• Yes) It's wrong 

• No) It's mean 

 

3- Was the victim's life threatened through force? 

• Yes) It's evil 

• No) It's still wrong 

 

4- Was it an accident? 

 

Yeah, what if it was an accident? 

 

Accidents: 

 

By the very nature of reality, accidents are impossible to eliminate from the world. It is a feature of the chaotic relativity we experience that unintended interactions will occur. To distinguish an accident from negligence we would have to prove that there was no intention from the part of the perpetrator, no intention from the receiver to receive, and no known measure to avoid it or intention to avoid it. If we know that good brakes are necessary for safe driving, a failure to have good brakes and the resulting crash wouldn't be an accident, but negligence. If we are driving and a wild goat suddenly lunges into the car, we know there wasn't any way to prevent that from our part, nor from the goat's part since it's just an animal, it is safe to call it an accident. Maybe we steer away from it and hit another car in the process. It's a series of unfortunate and chaotic events.  

 

A lethal accident is categorically different from murder because it had no intention from either party, and no reasonable preventability. So you cannot escape the chaotic nature of reality that creates accidental interactions, therefore these do not fall under a category of wrongdoings. You cannot also forgive, or retro-permit, an accident because there is no voluntarily inflicted trespass of property rights. You can't turn it into a voluntary association since the person causing the accident had no intention in the first place to do it. It would be like trying to ascribe volition from me to you, and that's mind control, which doesn't work. So accidents fall in the category of universally permissible interactions because to not-permit accidents goes against the very nature of reality, that chaos is inevitable. However, you cannot encourage an accident to happen because to do it would no longer create an accident, but a moral interaction. If you were to say that you could cause "accidental murder" it would be a logical contradiction. You could ask for reparations of an accident, but you cannot ascribe immorality to the causing person since it was outside his volition.  

 

I said that murder is unforgivable by the victim since the victim is literally unable to do so, but what if they were accidentally killed? Wouldn't that be unforgivable too? Well, not from a certain perspective. When we agree to interact with reality we are consenting to its chaotic nature. We realize that a lightning could strike us, a falling piano could smash us, an earthquake could kill us. Accidents are already part of the consent we partake in when we interact with our chaotic reality.  

 

4) Was it an accident? 

• There's nothing to forgive nor to condemn. 

 

The Question: Why should I be moral? 

 

Under the framework of UPI this question has some interesting repercussions. Let's remember that ethics concerns itself with interactions, not simple actions. That is, not all behaviors are considered in ethics, only those actions that exchange energy between at least two agents. A simple action is owned by the actor, but an interaction is owned by at least two agents - a giver and a receiver. If you as a giver ask the question "why should my caused interactions be moral or universally permissible?" you would be asking "why can't I judge my interactions by myself?". This is because if you could judge your given interactions then victims could be blamed for the perpetrator's actions. The two agents involved own the interaction, not just the giver or perpetrator. It falls on the receiver's end to permit or retro-permit interactions with perpetrators. In other words, you have to behave in universally permissible ways because you cannot be your own judge. If you want to declare immunity from moral judgments you would have to deny the agency of the other person, ascribe it to yourself, and absolve yourself of any violation.  

 

So, from the giver's side there is a negative answer: Because you cannot give yourself permission to interact with another person's property by yourself. This would imply that there is a positive answer from the receiver's end instead if we follow the symmetry of the equation. 

 

The question of "Why should I behave morally" looks different from the side of the receiver. What the receiver would ask is "Why should other people respect my property rights and my agency?". Another way of putting it is "Why shouldn't you murder me?". This reveals a contradiction in the logic of attempting to question morality. If you allow people to murder you, then it wouldn't be a murder. And the same from any other question of property rights. If you allow the trespassing of your property then it is not a trespassing. This is explained in UPB repeatedly already. The only way of escaping this logical trap would be to state that you have no self awareness, by which you would have no agency, by which you would have no causality, by which you would have no property rights. Well, if I were to believe your argument against your self awareness, I would have no choice but to consider you mentally incapable, and call a professional to assist you. 

 

It is then that if the receiver asks "Why should other people initiate universally permissible interactions with me?" the positive answer is: Because I have self awareness, and that grants me the agency to give or take permissions over my property as I wish. To deny this would be to plead insanity to the judge. The catch-22 is that declaring yourself insane proves that you have the reason to realize it, and thus you are sane. 

 

The question of why should we be moral cannot be answered without the context of a moral theory, and in this case UPI. If you tried to answer it without context, you would just say "because!" and you'd have fallen into the trap of the nihilist. That is because it is impossible for a person to be alone in the world, and be good or evil at the same time. To be good is to be good to others. To be evil is to be evil to others. And when you ask "Why should I be good?" it can only be answered in two ways, from the giver and from the receiver - not from a third and uninvolved party trying to troll a philosopher. In UPB, however, a person alone in the universe would be considered good because it is not-stealing, or not-murdering. In this sense UPI does deviate from UPB, but I wouldn't mourn this difference at all. I think it is a better interpretation of what being moral means at all, if you ask me, but I'm biased anyway.

 

The final word: UPB & UPI & NAP 

 

When you use UPB to prove the NAP you find that there is a gap in the process. UPB is a meta-ethical theory of all behaviors, and the NAP is a moral rule against aggressive behaviors, but the moral theory in the middle of the equation seems to be missing. UPB is the grandfather and the NAP is the grandson, but where's the father? UPB only deals with moral theories, not moral actions. In that way, UPI is a theory of moral interactions that fills the gap between both the larger theory of behaviors, and the lower ground of rules to moderate behaviors between moral agents. The argument when there is only UPB and NAP looks like this: 

 

-Why should people follow the NAP?  

Because it's the only principle that passes the test of UPB 

-Why should I believe in UPB? 

Because denying it confirms UPB 

-Why should I be moral then? 

Because UPB is true 

-That doesn't answer my question 

I don't care. If it's true, you should follow it 

-Just because something is true doesn't mean that I have to follow it 

Right, but that doesn't invalidate the theory 

-I know, I'm just asking why I should change my behavior to follow it 

I don't know, it's up to you to choose to be virtuous, and have justice, and it will save the world... 

 

Suffice to say that the moral doubter is left unsatisfied and devolved into nihilism or egoism, and has no answer as to why he shouldn't be a jerk to other people. But let's try it with UPI and see what comes out. And if I rigged the conversation, well, I came up with it so I'm biased. We can try it for real later.  

 

-Why should people follow the NAP? 

Because you, as a receiver of moral interactions, cannot avoid having the capacity to deny people access to your property, or give them permission. 

-But what if I want them to trespass my property? 

That would be a voluntary, or universally permissible interaction instead. 

-Yeah, but what if they violate my property, but I don't complain about it? 

Then that's just a forgiveness, or retro-permission. It's part of the UPI theory. 

-Ok, but what about what I personally should do? Why should I follow the NAP? Why shouldn't I steal? 

Whether you follow or not the NAP isn't for you to judge. Other people, the receivers of your interaction, are the ones who judge whether you are violating them or not. 

-That's a bit confusing, can you explain it to me a little simpler? 

Sure, what I mean is that even if you were to violate the NAP in the absolute, wait, do you follow me there? 

-On the absolute? 

Yeah. 

- You mean, if I were to break the NAP in theory over any little thing? 

Right, so every single tiny violation of property rights that you do is technically wrong. 

-Ok, and then? That's what I'm saying! Even if I touch you, or do something you don't like, or take your shoes, or step on your lawn, you could shoot me for trespassing your property! How crazy is that? 

I know, I know, that's what I am trying to explain. It doesn't have to be like that. There's leniency. 

-What do you mean by leniency?  

I mean that not all incursions into property are evil. All interactions between agents occur when their private property comes into contact with each other, right? 

-Right. So my body would be my property, and your lawn yours. 

Yes, ok. That is not an evil interaction. To trespass into my lawn is technically wrong, I didn't let you in, but it's not unforgivable either. There's reasonable ways of letting things pass. 

-So you're not going to shoot me if I overstep, or if I take something, or if I (etc)? 

No, it's not like that. If you were to initiate lethal force against me I would have no choice but to defend myself. Don't you agree? 

-Yeah, I don't want to argue against self defense, that as much I understand. 

Sure, I'm glad we understand each other at least on that. 

-What if I stole money from you? Would you shoot me then? 

Steal money how? 

-Like, if I were to take your wallet when you weren't looking. 

I'd like to have my wallet back. 

-Yeah, but I took it, and then I ran away.

Ok, so if I were to find you, and ask for my wallet back, would you give it to me, with all the money intact? 

-I guess I would... 

Right, so you were just pulling a practical joke on me. It's a prank. Nobody has to get shot for that. 

-On second thought, I won't give it back 

What are you going to do with it? 

-I'm not giving it back 

I'm assuming then that you would use force to protect the wallet from me taking it back 

-Yes 

In that case you have initiated the use of force against me, and I can use force to get it back 

-No! 

Yes I can! You agreed on self defense. 

-Darn, you win this time. 

All in a day's work. 

 

So from that highly biased towards me conversation you can see that if you argue against UPI you don't have to immediately jump in the argument of performative contradictions because arguing against UPI doesn't confirm UPI in the way it happens with UPB. Yes, technically a debate is a universally permissible interaction, but the fact that you chose a UPI to argue doesn't mean that RPI and evil interactions exist either. It could be that evil doesn't exist and all interactions are universally permissible, but as we've seen in the theory, that can't be validated (I hope) - but the act of debating it doesn't prove it either. However, as the debate above showed, there is an unavoidable annoyance that I like to call The Asshole Zone. The ASZ is the zone of interactions were it is just too much work to restitute property and assholes can take advantage of people's patience or leniency. This is why trolling exists, and 4chan exists, but I don't know how to get rid of it in any sensible way other than "don't be an asshole".

 

Epilogue:  

 

If you're already someone who is convinced of the validity of UPB you might be wondering why you should care about another theory on top of it. UPB was never intended to be a theory of ethics, but a method, like the scientific method, to validate or invalidate moral hypothesis. In science you would propose a scientific hypothesis, run it through the scientific method, and then either validate it is a scientific theory or discard it. UPB is only the method, not the theory. What I propose with UPI is the ethical theory itself. Not the method to validate it. It is not my intention to discredit or reject UPB, on the contrary. It is an effort to build something that actually guides behavior and provides answers to people hell bent on erasing any and all moral idea from planet Earth. And that includes my own nihilistic tendencies as well. This essay is the direct result of trying to cope with UPB and understand it. In that process I also caught up on its criticisms that could almost be called arguments, but ultimately end up being nothing more than whining. It is totally unproductive to try to discredit or disavow any theory without trying to find the answers to the gap it would leave by its absence. In science it would be a waste of time to go into a lecture only to complain that maybe Einstein was wrong about General Relativity without any reason why and just yell like a monkey that science is based on assumptions. In that sense, this is the result of my personal struggle with secular ethics, and I hope it can either be improved or discarded. But please, if you want to say it's wrong, also tell me what is right instead.

[Guest Gee]

I hate to be that guy but you have created a theory in which rape is permissible so long as the victim has Stockholm syndrome. 

[Will Torbald]

I hate to be that guy but you have created a theory in which rape is permissible so long as the victim has Stockholm syndrome. 

 

And how did the victim get the stockholm syndrome if not from being kidnapped in the first place through force? We would understand that such mental health conditions would exempt a person from being a moral agent in the first place, thus her consent or permission of the rape isn't actually a valid consent, and the rapist would be acting without permission. That on top of it being an interaction that happened after a previous violation which was her kidnapping.

[Guest Gee]

And how did the victim get the stockholm syndrome if not from being kidnapped in the first place through force? We would understand that such mental health conditions would exempt a person from being a moral agent in the first place, thus her consent or permission of the rape isn't actually a valid consent, and the rapist would be acting without permission. That on top of it being an interaction that happened after a previous violation which was her kidnapping.

The kidnapping is your assumption, not mine. More generally then, your theory permits rape "forgiven" by the victim after the fact to be classified as not rape.

So the same act may exist in two different points in time as both rape and not rape.

[Will Torbald]

The kidnapping is your assumption, not mine. More generally then, your theory permits rape "forgiven" by the victim after the fact to be classified as not rape.

So the same act may exist in two different points in time as both rape and not rape.

 

Stockholm Syndrome happens after a person has been held hostage or kidnapped enough time to have their mind develop pathological affection to their kidnappers. It is you who brought up SS, so you can't blame me for making that assumption, and I find that very dishonest.

 

On the second part, if you define rape as a sexual interaction without permission from the receiver that happens under coercion of lethal force or murder as in "I will kill you if you don't comply" then I clearly stated that it is evil and is not a forgivable interaction because it invokes murder into the equation.

 

When you say "the same act" you are invoking actions, not interactions. It is the interaction between two moral agents that is the element of the theory. When you say "action" you are referring to "sex", but the interaction is either "love making" or "rape" depending on the permissions given by the receiver of the energy. The action is what is transferred, but the interaction is the moral event. Since permission can be given or revoked, to give permission after an interaction is to forgive - that is, to transform the moral value of the interaction - but that doesn't change the fact of the simple action that was the "sex". It stays as sex in the past and the present, but the moral value changes.

[Guest Gee]

Stockholm Syndrome happens after a person has been held hostage or kidnapped enough time to have their mind develop pathological affection to their kidnappers. It is you who brought up SS, so you can't blame me for making that assumption, and I find that very dishonest.

 

Stockholm syndrome can be seen as a form of traumatic bonding, which does not necessarily require a hostage scenario, but which describes "strong emotional ties that develop between two persons where one person intermittently harasses, beats, threatens, abuses, or intimidates the other.

-wiki

 

It doesn't matter though.

 

On the second part, if you define rape as a sexual interaction without permission from the receiver that happens under coercion of lethal force or murder as in "I will kill you if you don't comply" then I clearly stated that it is evil and is not a forgivable interaction because it invokes murder into the equation.

 

 

Again, the threat of lethal force is your assumption, not mine. Rape could be not lethal force, date rape, blackmailed to rape or the rape of an unconscious person. This doesn't matter though.

 

When you say "the same act" you are invoking actions, not interactions. It is the interaction between two moral agents that is the element of the theory. When you say "action" you are referring to "sex", but the interaction is either "love making" or "rape" depending on the permissions given by the receiver of the energy. The action is what is transferred, but the interaction is the moral event. Since permission can be given or revoked, to give permission after an interaction is to forgive - that is, to transform the moral value of the interaction - but that doesn't change the fact of the simple action that was the "sex". It stays as sex in the past and the present, but the moral value changes.

 

If we are going to be using physics then every action involving transfer of energy is by definition of conservation of energy a interaction because energy is a conserved quantity but that doesn't matter, the point is this.

 

If a child is abused by a parent we can absolutely say the abuse was immoral. Now, if the child grows up and then forgives the parent then the child has forgiven the parent for the immoral act. What the child has not done is go back in time and make the immoral act a moral act.

 

History has not been rewritten.

This is not 1984.

Ethics is not run by the Ministry of Truth.

 

You claim universal moral theory which is not universal in time.

It is not universal in time because it may be at two different points in time that it is objectively true that the very same action is moral and immoral.

 

You claim an objective moral theory which is subjective.

It is subjective because the very same action may be moral or immoral based upon subjective opinion ex post facto.

[Des]

 

 

The Question: Why should I be moral? 

 

 

I see ethics/morality in the context of a trade [my non-aggressive behaviour for your non-aggressive behaviour], and I would like to have most humans sign up to a contract (I'm compressing and omitting detail) to do that trade.

 

I have proposed a definition of evil such that of every category of action which would have to be prohibited in that trade (by have to I am referring to the logical effect on the attainment of the purpose [higher odds of survival] of doing the deal, were one to fail to prohibit the category of act) - one can say that such act is evil and say that this standard is objective. Of any other prohibitions anyone wishes to include in the deal, they may say they such an act seems evil to me, making it clear that this is a subjective standard (which may be widely accepted and get many people signed up [i.e. it may be popular]).

 

I was really interested in your set of classifications (UPI, etc), and will re-read it another day and reflect on it. Even statist systems use pragmas to deal with the preferences of the victim of what they define as a crime.

 

I am not sure how to advise people on the use of the word pairs good/evil, nice/nasty, right/wrong, and I am interested in getting suggestions. What will communicate ideas better, for the sake of not getting me killed by people with faulty moral compasses? I prefer is evil / is not evil for the objective standard, and seems evil / seems good for the subjective standard, wrong/right to denote presence or absence of some detected error (i.e. not related to ethics or morality), and nasty/nice would be in side comments, not part of the philosophical logic flow.

 

Above, I quoted a question you asked. I link up the answer to that, with the resolution to the lifeboat and flagpole scenarios: I only agreed to act morally as a way to have lower odds of dying (by [your] immoral actions), So I will definitely not choose to die to keep my end of the deal (and this pragma gets written into the deal before we sign, so I'm not even [you are not even] breaching the deal in that event).

 

In favour of the trade view of ethics: Nihilists and theists can trade.

[Will Torbald]

 

 

Stockholm syndrome can be seen as a form of traumatic bonding, which does not necessarily require a hostage scenario, but which describes "strong emotional ties that develop between two persons where one person intermittently harasses, beats, threatens, abuses, or intimidates the other.

-wiki

 

It doesn't matter though.

 

 

It does matter. It matters because you have created a trauma through aggressions and abuses. It would be like saying that a woman who has been drugged has the capacity to consent, which isn't true. In the same way, a pathological emotional state cannot be considered a platform for sound moral judgment. If you continue to dissent on this issue you have not understood the concepts of moral agency and permissions, and you'd be arguing from a misunderstanding.

 

 

Again, the threat of lethal force is your assumption, not mine. Rape could be not lethal force, date rape, blackmailed to rape or the rape of an unconscious person. This doesn't matter though.

 

 

This does matter. To claim that something doesn't matter is not proof that it doesn't. None of those scenarios are moral in any way, shape or form, but they are not situations were life was endangered either. If you cannot make distinctions between wrong behavior and murderous behavior, you need to keen your senses and use a finer and sharper knife. Not all interactions are murderous, and murder is the only action without the capability of forgiveness. To conflate two different kinds of interactions into one sole and undifferentiated category is a categorical mistake. It would be like saying that cat and dogs are of the same species, but they really don't mate together. They are of the same larger group called mammals, but not of the same subset of mammals.

 

 

If we are going to be using physics then every action involving transfer of energy is by definition of conservation of energy a interaction because energy is a conserved quantity but that doesn't matter, the point is this.

 

If a child is abused by a parent we can absolutely say the abuse was immoral. Now, if the child grows up and then forgives the parent then the child has forgiven the parent for the immoral act. What the child has not done is go back in time and make the immoral act a moral act.

 

History has not been rewritten.

This is not 1984.

Ethics is not run by the Ministry of Truth.

 

Yes, you can absolutely say the interaction was immoral. Yes, the grown up can forgive the immoral act, but it truly depends on the kind of immoral act that was committed. The point of the theory is to differentiate two different categories of immoral acts that were once conflated into one, which is why there are so many objections and difficulties when it comes to the understanding and application of UPB in the real world. Now, what I have said a few times now is that coercion is in a separate category to the basic wrongdoings because it is a threat to your life. The parents are the lifeline of a child, which means that parents have an infinite probability to inflict coercion on their children because they would die without them. Parental abuse under threats of neglect, malnutrition, abuse, violence, and so on, are understood to be a threat to the very life of the child. A parent need not literally threat with murder, but to even say "if you don't do what I say I will abandon you on the street" is equal to being threatened with death, it is coercion because the life of the child is in the hands of the parent. It is even much more a delicate situation than one between two morally capable adults, which is where the basic theory is developed, but applications on more complicated cases are also possible to derive from it. I know that I only explained the basic premises, and objections based on more complicated scenarios are perfectly acceptable. So, since it is established that parental abuse is equal to in most cases to lethal coercion, to have a child that grows up, and returns to forgive such abuse would be to side with coercion, with evil, with death threats. That is not an encouraged behavior in the theory, but it's true that I might have implied that by not explaining the relationship between parents and children. There are however other interactions that do not involve life endangering coercions, and while it does sound distasteful to say that they are forgivable, they nonetheless cannot be claimed to have a zero probability either. Maybe, just maybe, imagine a scenario where a mother who is otherwise a peaceful parent has received a very traumatic and enraging interaction. She would be temporarily hysterical and out of control, and in the collateral damage she hits her child. This would be hurtful to a child who doesn't understand the situation in the moment, but after growing up and learning about why the mother lost her mind in that time, the child could come to forgive her in that particular and local interaction. The child would have carried with him resentment, hate, a grudge within him for years towards the mother, but after realizing the local circumstances of the event, the adult is now willing to lift the curse towards her.

 

 

You claim universal moral theory which is not universal in time.

It is not universal in time because it may be at two different points in time that it is objectively true that the very same action is moral and immoral.

 

You claim an objective moral theory which is subjective.

It is subjective because the very same action may be moral or immoral based upon subjective opinion ex post facto.

 

History has not been rewritten. Two people interacted and exchanged energy. One gave, and one received. It is, however, a matter of decision and permission. In the same way it is possible to retroactively permit an interaction, aka forgiving, it is also to possible to retroactively revoke the permission. If you were dating a woman, and six months later she tells you that she's HIV positive, and the she knew about it before dating you, and she didn't want to tell you - you would immediately understand that you would have never consented to have sex with her (well, in most cases, maybe you would I don't know why) and that every interaction that you had with her is now a rape. She lied and raped you, and every permission that you gave her would now be available for invalidation. You could, like I said I don't know why, but you could say that you understand her and that you want to be with her anyway, and not revoke the consent - but I think that has a very low probability of happening. Anyway, it is categorically possible to curse her with raping you because of the invalid consent that you gave her. Consent exists in the present, and in the past, and in the future. It is not an act of supernatural abilities to realize you've been cheated, when it comes to revoking consent, nor an act of sacrificial altruism to forgive someone after acquiring a higher understanding of the situation.

[Will Torbald]

I see ethics/morality in the context of a trade [my non-aggressive behaviour for your non-aggressive behaviour], and I would like to have most humans sign up to a contract (I'm compressing and omitting detail) to do that trade.

 

I have proposed a definition of evil such that of every category of action which would have to be prohibited in that trade (by have to I am referring to the logical effect on the attainment of the purpose [higher odds of survival] of doing the deal, were one to fail to prohibit the category of act) - one can say that such act is evil and say that this standard is objective. Of any other prohibitions anyone wishes to include in the deal, they may say they such an act seems evil to me, making it clear that this is a subjective standard (which may be widely accepted and get many people signed up [i.e. it may be popular]).

 

I was really interested in your set of classifications (UPI, etc), and will re-read it another day and reflect on it. Even statist systems use pragmas to deal with the preferences of the victim of what they define as a crime.

 

I am not sure how to advise people on the use of the word pairs good/evil, nice/nasty, right/wrong, and I am interested in getting suggestions. What will communicate ideas better, for the sake of not getting me killed by people with faulty moral compasses? I prefer is evil / is not evil for the objective standard, and seems evil / seems good for the subjective standard, wrong/right to denote presence or absence of some detected error (i.e. not related to ethics or morality), and nasty/nice would be in side comments, not part of the philosophical logic flow.

 

Above, I quoted a question you asked. I link up the answer to that, with the resolution to the lifeboat and flagpole scenarios: I only agreed to act morally as a way to have lower odds of dying (by [your] immoral actions), So I will definitely not choose to die to keep my end of the deal (and this pragma gets written into the deal before we sign, so I'm not even [you are not even] breaching the deal in that event).

 

In favour of the trade view of ethics: Nihilists and theists can trade.

 

Right, so I think you're not far from what UPB and the NAP already are. To break a voluntary and explicit contract is immoral under those terms if I understand them correctly. When it comes to dichotomies like good/evil and right/wrong, I deviate from the polarity of two judgments, and create three categories. Einstein said that theories need to be as simple as possible, but not simpler that they wouldn't work properly. It really is a puzzle I can't solve with just right/wrong behavior or interactions, but by separating them with right/wrong/evil I think I have reached a system that satisfies my own personal skepticisms, and I hope it reaches someone else I guess. With evil I mean wrongdoings that can't be forgiven, and only murder fits that category. All other wrongdoings are also immoral, but not in the absolute sense of murder. It's difficult to accept, as seen on the comments above where I continue debating it, but I also debated it within myself a lot before writing or posting it. To me, it's the only system I can live with that counters my own inertia towards nihilism. UPB didn't do it for me as much as I tried, but my solution wasn't to discard it, but to expand it.