FDR 3197: Fancy Words For Being An A$$h0l3 - Call In Show - February 5th, 2016; Caller #2

[David Lozes]

Request to caller: please write out your logic. I am having a difficult time understanding how an intent without action can be either moral or immoral.

Thanks.

[Boohickey11]

While I'm not the caller I think I might understand what he was getting at.

 

Imagine a woman from a very dangerous place where rape is common and defending yourself may result in harm or death. If she finds herself in a situation where a man she is dating begins to make-out with her and unclothe her she may be too afraid to say no. If he undresses her and has sex with her then has he committed rape?

 

She may feel violated but for it to have been rape would have required her expression of disapproval, correct?

 

These are sticky situations where we have to be careful with are words.

[Alvor315]

The caller spent all of his energy defining "rape" and "not rape" in the context of "opposites" drawing from Stefan's book UPB.

 

The caller's argument is as follows:

 

Stefan defines "rape" as necessarily "good" and uses the following formula:

 

"...“X” is “the good,” then the opposite of “X” must be evil. If not raping is good, then raping must be evil. Conversely, if raping is good, then not raping must be evil." UPB pg. 66

 

Where as Stefan takes the definition of "rape" as a given, the caller defines it in order to look at the constituent pieces to understand what the opposite would be.

 

So what makes "rape" different than sex?  If explicitly rape is a subset of all the actions that can be constituted as sex, then what differentiates it from sex is its inherent quality of "desire of the individuals" performing the "rape", specifically the desire to have sex, and the repulsion to have sex.  Otherwise a person who could not distinguish the "desires" of the participants would strictly say that they were having sexual intercourse, without concluding rape, or rather this person would have no concept of rape.  The caller didn't say this next part that I am adding, but I believe that in his argument with Stefan that the opposite of Bob raping Sue is not Sue raping Bob that the rapist is necessarily defined as the person performing penetration.

 

So now that the definition of rape is complete we can perform the logic of the caller.

 

If Bob rapes Sue, then Bob must have the "Desire to have sex," and Sue must have the "Repulsion to have Sex."  What then is the opposite of rape?  We now take the opposite of the constituents.

 

If Bob does "not rape" Sue, then Bob must have the "Repulsion to have sex," while Sue must have the "Desire to have sex," but Bob is still the penetrator, so by definition Sue cannot be raping Bob, neither is Bob raping Sue, in this instance.  This conclusion follows from the definition in UPB that "not rape" is the opposite of "rape" whereas the confusion might arise that "not rape" is a much larger set of events that includes the opposite of "rape" but is not limited to our definition.  I am not arguing that Sue cannot rape Bob because she does not have a penis, but if we performed the same logic with Steve instead of Sue, then Bob would still be penetrating Steve.  ( A woman could also be a rapist if she wore a strap-on dildo. )

 

I don't believe that the caller was trying to generate a moral vagueness, as in the case that a woman would be having sex but not express her "desire."  I believe the caller was trying to strengthen Stefan's argument by demonstrating this practical oddity.  One might argue that the opposite of rape would necessarily require reversing who is performing penetration, in which case Sue is now raping Bob, thus the opposite of rape is rape.  It seems to me that in either conclusion making the argument in terms of "opposites" is what causes this practically confusing result.

 

Unfortunately, I cannot read the callers mind, therefore I do not know where the caller intended to go with this argument, but assuming that he did not complete his argument, we still need a thesis statement to interpret this confusing conclusion.

 

Perhaps with this synopsis of the call we can speculate on the caller's intent, should he never fall upon this thread with his own words.

 

Regards,

Al

[thebeardslastcall]

One point he was trying to make that Molyneux seemed to be missing was that the same basic action can be sex or rape, but this is determined by desire and intent as separate from the core actions. Rape requires action, but the distinction is not the action, but the intent and desires attached to those actions. Like if I eat a piece of someone else's cake it's theft, but if they said it was okay then it is no longer theft, but in both cases I ate the cake. So it isn't the action per say, but whether or not permission is had, to perform the sexual act. Thus he was trying to separate the action as rape or not rape based not on the sexual act, but based on whether or not there was permission, which is not the sexual act itself that would thus differentiate them.

[Des]

The caller spent all of his energy defining "rape" and "not rape" in the context of "opposites" drawing from Stefan's book UPB.

 

The caller's argument is as follows:

 

Stefan defines "rape" as necessarily "good" and uses the following formula:

 

"...“X” is “the good,” then the opposite of “X” must be evil. If not raping is good, then raping must be evil. Conversely, if raping is good, then not raping must be evil." UPB pg. 66

 

Where as Stefan takes the definition of "rape" as a given, the caller defines it in order to look at the constituent pieces to understand what the opposite would be.

 

So what makes "rape" different than sex?  If explicitly rape is a subset of all the actions that can be constituted as sex, then what differentiates it from sex is its inherent quality of "desire of the individuals" performing the "rape", specifically the desire to have sex, and the repulsion to have sex.  Otherwise a person who could not distinguish the "desires" of the participants would strictly say that they were having sexual intercourse, without concluding rape, or rather this person would have no concept of rape.  The caller didn't say this next part that I am adding, but I believe that in his argument with Stefan that the opposite of Bob raping Sue is not Sue raping Bob that the rapist is necessarily defined as the person performing penetration.

 

So now that the definition of rape is complete we can perform the logic of the caller.

 

If Bob rapes Sue, then Bob must have the "Desire to have sex," and Sue must have the "Repulsion to have Sex."  What then is the opposite of rape?  We now take the opposite of the constituents.

 

If Bob does "not rape" Sue, then Bob must have the "Repulsion to have sex," while Sue must have the "Desire to have sex," but Bob is still the penetrator, so by definition Sue cannot be raping Bob, neither is Bob raping Sue, in this instance.  This conclusion follows from the definition in UPB that "not rape" is the opposite of "rape" whereas the confusion might arise that "not rape" is a much larger set of events that includes the opposite of "rape" but is not limited to our definition.  I am not arguing that Sue cannot rape Bob because she does not have a penis, but if we performed the same logic with Steve instead of Sue, then Bob would still be penetrating Steve.  ( A woman could also be a rapist if she wore a strap-on dildo. )

 

I don't believe that the caller was trying to generate a moral vagueness, as in the case that a woman would be having sex but not express her "desire."  I believe the caller was trying to strengthen Stefan's argument by demonstrating this practical oddity.  One might argue that the opposite of rape would necessarily require reversing who is performing penetration, in which case Sue is now raping Bob, thus the opposite of rape is rape.  It seems to me that in either conclusion making the argument in terms of "opposites" is what causes this practically confusing result.

 

Unfortunately, I cannot read the callers mind, therefore I do not know where the caller intended to go with this argument, but assuming that he did not complete his argument, we still need a thesis statement to interpret this confusing conclusion.

 

Perhaps with this synopsis of the call we can speculate on the caller's intent, should he never fall upon this thread with his own words.

 

Regards,

Al

The distinctions are "raping" and "abstaining from rape".

If I am very focussed on stealing something, and no other actions are included in my current theft, then the theft is an evil I am doing at the same time that the "abstaining from rape" aspect of my current action represents an aspect of my current behaviour that happens to be good (as in not evil).

 

UPB explains how "abstaining from rape" can be good, whereas "raping" cannot be good (against the standard of universality).

[Alvor315]

Des,

 

I don't understand what you are trying to tell me.  I will explain:

 

First, I don't understand your intent with the new term "abstaining."  "Abstaining" hasn't been defined in the context of the caller's problem, or in the body of UPB.  I looked, and found no instance of the term abstinence.  I have tried to make a definition of "abstinence" that includes two moral actors.  But abstinence seems to be committed solely by a single actor.  The argument from UPB is "If it is morally good to be a rapist, and one can only be a rapist by sexually assaulting a victim, then

clearly the victim must be morally good by resisting the sexual assault..." ( UPB pg. 66 )  While certain instances of not raping fall into the same category of single actor, "abstinence" is solely a single actor action, and therefore does not fit the terms of the "rape is a moral virtue" argumentum ad absurdum from UPB.

 

Second, I don't understand how making a black and white argument in your postulate and then adding the grey area of a sexually abstinent thief adds anything to the argument.

 

Thirdly, UPB asserts that Virtues are universally preferable, and that the opposite of those virtues are universally banned.  Everything thing in between is an aesthetic.  Therefore abstaining from rape is not a virtue, and it's opposite has no meaning in the context of the argument.

 

Please clarify.

[Des]

My adaptation of what I looked up: To abstain is to refrain from doing what one has some inclination to do.

 

So I modify my thief example: The thief has some inclination to also rape his victim, but he does not. His theft is evil, but his abstention from rape is virtuous.

 

The caller is correct in so far as the desire or inclination has some relevance to the virtue or vice of the act, but the muddle comes in by not examining the virtue in restraining oneself from an act, versus the evil in not restraining oneself from the desired act, when the circumstance or context or the act (no consent), makes the act evil.

 

We would look at the actor's desire, and the "acted upon's" consent (which is not desire - the "acted upon" may desire the act, but refuse consent to morally uphold a prior contract for fidelity).