One more attempt the problem with UPB

[labmath2]

I called into the show to discuss this and i am not sure people listened to it since i did not see any comments on the podcast. I am considering calling into the show again to finish what i think is an unresolved conversation, but i want to be sure there is no mistake on my part.

 

Stefan defines universally preferable (universal preference) twice in the book (page 30 and page 33-34). During the conversation, Stefan seems to imply that the first one on page 30 is simply a more complete verson of the other. The conversation breaks down when we get to the statement truth is universally preferable to falsehood (in the list of the 8 things you must accept before engaging in debate, cant remember the exact page right now).

 

I admit on my part the initial question was poorly phrased.

 

I think that statement (truth is universally preferable to falsehood) exemplifies the major problem in the book, and that is meaning shift. Once you read page 30 of UPB, all instances of the phrase universally preferable or universal preference must not be interpreted normally, you must apply the definition on page 30. This is important because every use of the word is a call back to every argument that lead up to it. If the definition provided when you were building up to the conclusion is not retained, then those arguments no longer apply.

 

If universally preferable is defined as required for or necessary to achieve a particular goal, example you need to eat to live restated as, to live eating is universally preferable, then all future uses must adhere to this definition.

 

The statement truth is universally preferable to falsehood is difficult to understand if we apply the previous meaning. We would get some version of truth is necessary to falsehood or truth is required for falsehood. If i am being generous, i will accept truth is required or necessary as oppposed to falsehood. Even that leaves the question of what its required or necessary for.

 

Now while the intended meaning of the statement, which is that to engage in debate is to prefer truth to falsehood and to believe the other person also prefers truth to falsehod, is true, it is not what the statement actually mean (edit: actually people engage in debate for all sorts of reasons besides truth, but for the purposes of this i will concede the point)

 

By the time you get to murder cannot be universally preferable behavior, universally preferable has completely changed meaning. Now if Stefan had started by arguing that immorality is that which everyone cannot prefer at the same time, he is free to do that, but then he would have to show a very different proof of validity.

 

While that is the fundamental reason for the call, i will go even further here. Now i want you to consider the first argument (which i have made so far) separately from the one i am about to make.

 

I haven't thought about this as much as the previous one, but even the statement murder cannot be universally preferable (universally preferable used in a standard way) is questionable.

 

Take person A the perpetrator and person B the victim and consider their perspectives. What does it mean to prefer murder? It can mean two things (if we parse the language), it can mean to prefer to be a perpetrator or a victim. The second preference isn't actually to prefer murder, but to prefer be the victim of murder (which is certainly a contradiction). The minute you prefer to be a victim of something (compared to prefering to not be a victim), then you can no longer be a victim of that thing.

 

Is it possible for everyone to prefer to be perpetrator of murder? I think the answer to this determines if murder is universally preferable (standard definition) or not.

 

If the counter argument is that everyone cannot engage in murder at the same time i would agree. Thus it would mean it is immoral to do what everyone cannot do at the same time. To end with a snarky, half joking half serious, comment, it is immoral to do what babies cannot do (if babies count as persons).

 

Edit: when fixing the typos it occured to me i actually conceded at least one point.

 

Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behavior that is universal, objective, consistent - and binding.

 

Naturally, preferential behavior can only be binding if the goal is desired. - page 30.

 

Can some preferences be objective, i.e universal? - page 33

 

That is the question. Combining these two quotes (if preferences are merely pathways to goals), are there goals that should be desired?

[Wuzzums]

Look at it this way.

 

We define morality not that which is good or not evil, but that which can be applied universally.

With this new rule we can easily conclude that murder is not moral/universally applicable. This applies to theft, rape, or any other action which humans considered imoral since before phylosophy.

 

We don't start from the get go with "murder" as an evil act. We start with the definition, which is taking someone's life against their will. The definition alone implies it cannot be universally applicable, otherwise what is going on is not murder but something else.

 

 

Make abstraction of everything Stefan said in his book. Do you agree that my completely original "universally applicable" principle for morality is sound?

[Sima]

english is not my native language, but i will try to explain like this: ask everyone, if they want to be killed: they dont want. Universal preferable behaviour: dont kill.  If you would like to kill, but others dont want to be killed, then its kinda not universal anymore. If you like to lie, but dont want to be lied, then its also not universal. 

Hope that helps! Good luck.

[labmath2]

I get the sense you guys did not understand this

 

Take person A the perpetrator and person B the victim and consider their perspectives. What does it mean to prefer murder? It can mean two things (if we parse the language), it can mean to prefer to be a perpetrator or a victim. The second preference isn't actually to prefer murder, but to prefer be the victim of murder (which is certainly a contradiction). The minute you prefer to be a victim of something (compared to prefering to not be a victim), then you can no longer be a victim of that thing.

Is it possible for everyone to prefer to be perpetrator of murder? I think the answer to this determines if murder is universally preferable (standard definition) or not.

If the counter argument is that everyone cannot engage in murder at the same time i would agree. Thus it would mean it is immoral to do what everyone cannot do at the same time. To end with a snarky, half joking half serious, comment, it is immoral to do what babies cannot do (if babies count as persons).

 

segment. If you still do not think your point is addressed, then please restate it as clear as possible. Think about the way you are using your words (e.x. applied universally or what people don't want) and what they actually mean. Do the conclusion you are doing from them follow, if so how?

[Wuzzums]

I cannot prefer murder in the same way I cannot enjoy not having fun.

[vahleeb]

Hey, labmath2, let's work on the definitions for a second and break down universally preferable because this is how it all made sense to me. Also I don't have any kind of emotional charge attached to UPB which I hope will keep our conversation from degenerating.

 

In order to define universally preferable we need to define the following two principles first which are completely separate from the concept of UPB and ethics. It is possible that Stefan slides over this step in the book because both definitions are mainstream references to the English language.

 

A preference or to prefer means to desire some thing more than another.

 

This can naturally apply to behaviour and we do it all the time. The realm of possible behaviours that we exhibit at a certain time is virtually limitless and yet we only exhibit one at a time (two, three if we're really into multitasking), like for instance I prefer writing this answer to all the other possible actions I could have done right now, and you prefer to read this answer to all the other possible activities. Because we have an infinite pool of behavioural options but we can only enact one or a few behaviours at a time, then we are automatically exhibiting preference. Even non-activity involves a preference for non-activity. The only literal reason for you not to exhibit preference is to be in a catatonic state akin to a computer that's stuck.

 

Universality (in this particular meaning of the word) is simply the extension to all subjects of analysis at all times.

 

When applying concept of universality to behaviour it has the effect to exclude all those behaviours or acts that have a clear division between actor and the one acted upon in their very definition. (A perpetrator and a "victim" if you will). And I would like to give you a harmless and non charged example of this: initiating philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because only one person can initiate the conversation while the other can only join it, conversely joining philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because if everyone is just waiting for a conversation to join, no conversation can be initiated. Naturally, the universal behaviour is having a philosophical conversation.

 

When applying the concept of universality to preference it means that everyone and at all times would exhibit the exact same preference in a given scenario.

 

The problem in your reasoning, from what I can see, is that you seem to bind universality only to one of the terms and not the other and switch it around when Stefan's going the other way. But the way to read Universally Preferable Behaviour is universally preferable universal behaviour. You do understand why that is not a book title nor an appealing title for a philosophy, but it is an acceptable language construct in order to avoid repetition to remove one of the duplicate adjectives and simply bind the first instance to both nouns and make it evident so in the text?

 

I will stop here and invite you to comment if you feel I am misrepresenting anything.

[labmath2]

I cannot prefer murder in the same way I cannot enjoy not having fun.

Since its obious you either did not read or did not understand my content, i will restate it once more.

 

To prefer murder is to prefer killing someone without their consent. You insist on confusing that with prefering to be a victim of murder (to prefer to be killed without your consent) which is a contradiction.

[labmath2]

On preference: to desire something more than another (just reposting your definition).

Preference is not a all or none. When you use the phrase prefered behavior it can be in 2 different ways.

1. I prefer eating a tomato over eating an apple.
2. I prefer eating a tomato over all other possible actions.


3. I prefer eating an apple to all else except eating a tomato.

Can three be true and if so, what implication does that have on guessing my preference based on my behavior?



On universality: there is a lot of problems with using this term. The simpest being it can only be applied by definition unless you select a category that can be empirically verified.

If i say all cats are mammals, i would be right because that is true by definition. If i say all cats have one head (assuming a 2 headed cat is still a cat by definition), i would have to check across the entire universe across all time to say if that claim is factually accurate.

Leaving that (probem with universality) aside as its not needed to show the probem with your final claim, lets get to the final claim of universally preferable universal behavior.

What does universal behavior mean?
Is there such a thing as universal sitting? I am guessing what yiu are trying to communicate is performace by all. I can't say everyone at the stadium is universal sitting, but i can say everyone at the stadium os sitting.

What does universally preferable mean?
The use of universal here is very difficult to discern.
1. It can be prefered at all times.
2. It can be prefered by all people,
3. It can be prefered by everyone at all times
4. It can be prefered by everyone at the same time.

For 5, 6, 7, 8, sibstitute prefered with prefered above all else in 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively.

I am guessing you are going for 8 (it can be preffered above all else by everyone at the same time).

The thing Stefan seems to be trying to say is action that everyone can perform at the same time.

Going back to murder. We can all prefer to murder at the same time. No person can prefer to be murdered (as it he would no longer be a victim of murder since he prefered it, its just assisted suicide). We cannot all murder (perform the behavior) at the same time.

If ethics are things you must do (that which is necessary or required) if you have certain desired goals, then its not binding if you are not required to have specific desired goals.

 

 

Cleaning up the response.

 

Hey, labmath2, let's work on the definitions for a second and break down universally preferable because this is how it all made sense to me. Also I don't have any kind of emotional charge attached to UPB which I hope will keep our conversation from degenerating.

 

In order to define universally preferable we need to define the following two principles first which are completely separate from the concept of UPB and ethics. It is possible that Stefan slides over this step in the book because both definitions are mainstream references to the English language.

 

A preference or to prefer means to desire some thing more than another.

 

This can naturally apply to behaviour and we do it all the time. The realm of possible behaviours that we exhibit at a certain time is virtually limitless and yet we only exhibit one at a time (two, three if we're really into multitasking), like for instance I prefer writing this answer to all the other possible actions I could have done right now, and you prefer to read this answer to all the other possible activities. Because we have an infinite pool of behavioural options but we can only enact one or a few behaviours at a time, then we are automatically exhibiting preference. Even non-activity involves a preference for non-activity. The only literal reason for you not to exhibit preference is to be in a catatonic state akin to a computer that's stuck.

 

This was addressed first.

 

Universality (in this particular meaning of the word) is simply the extension to all subjects of analysis at all times.

 

When applying concept of universality to behaviour it has the effect to exclude all those behaviours or acts that have a clear division between actor and the one acted upon in their very definition. (A perpetrator and a "victim" if you will). And I would like to give you a harmless and non charged example of this: initiating philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because only one person can initiate the conversation while the other can only join it, conversely joining philosophical conversations cannot be a universal behaviour because if everyone is just waiting for a conversation to join, no conversation can be initiated. Naturally, the universal behaviour is having a philosophical conversation.

 

Then this.

 

When applying the concept of universality to preference it means that everyone and at all times would exhibit the exact same preference in a given scenario.

 

The problem in your reasoning, from what I can see, is that you seem to bind universality only to one of the terms and not the other and switch it around when Stefan's going the other way. But the way to read Universally Preferable Behaviour is universally preferable universal behaviour. You do understand why that is not a book title nor an appealing title for a philosophy, but it is an acceptable language construct in order to avoid repetition to remove one of the duplicate adjectives and simply bind the first instance to both nouns and make it evident so in the text?

 

Then the rest sort of brings it together.

 

If you simply define ethics as actions which can be performed by everyone at the same time, its not clear why it would be binding.

 

His definition hinges on the fact that it is binding to eat if you want to live (which is just a conditional). The shift in meanings allow him to maintain that fact of conditional validity, without the condition itself (so that he can just say "it is necessary to eat/breathe or it is UPB to eat/breathe"). This creates the illusion of factual claim when in fact it stops being a factual claim the moment the condition is removed.

Edited March 26, 2016 by labmath2

[labmath2]

Since i am not seeing any valid refutation of my arguments, i guess i should get ready to call in.

[vahleeb]

What arguments, labmath2? You seem to have issues with the meaning of words.

 

 

When I assign preference to behaviour I am clearly speaking of actions (which is WHY I say that at any given time you can only EXHIBIT one or at most 2-3 such preferences/behaviours). Your three examples of preference are theoretical only. That's not an argument that's changing the conversation.

 

Then, there's this:

I am guessing you are going for 8 (it can be preffered above all else by everyone at the same time).

The thing Stefan seems to be trying to say is action that everyone can perform at the same time.

Going back to murder. We can all prefer to murder at the same time. No person can prefer to be murdered (as it he would no longer be a victim of murder since he prefered it, its just assisted suicide). We cannot all murder (perform the behavior) at the same time.

 

 

We cannot all prefer to murder at the same time, because we cannot all act upon that "preference" because if we all murder at the same time, who will be murdered??? Again, this comes from the dissociation that you have in regards to the meaning of preference that is actually employed here and the way it relates to behaviour.

 

Let me sum it up: what you prefer in your own mind and as a hypothetical is irrelevant to the discussion because we can only be concerned with what you do. That is why Stefan is talking about actions, because thoughts are not immoral, it is only actions that can have a moral value.

 

Now, back to universal. I said, all the people and at all times. Sitting is an action that is not excluded by the definition of universality, but you can't say that everyone is universally sitting in your example because you're talking about just the people in the stadium instead of "all the people all of the time".

 

What does all of this mean when we tie it back to UPB?  (which mind you wasn't even addressed in my original post but you pushed my hand here)

- preferred behaviour: to do one thing out of all the possible options available

- universal behaviour: everyone can do this thing all the time

- universally preferred behaviour: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time.

 

PS: This reply might have been worded a little differently had you not pushed for a reply ASAP.

[Nathan Metric]

Page 30 "When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required or necessary assuming a particular goal"

 

In this case for the rest of the book the goal is being moral.

 

Page 33-34  "Thus when I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer. To use a scientific analogy, to truly understand the universe, people should use the scientific method – this does not mean that they always do so, since clearly billions of people consult ancient fairy tales rather than modern science for“answers.”

 

He is talking about what is universally preferable to be moral. Now Stefan could add the clause "to be moral" at the end of every use of "universally preferable" but that would just make the book unnecessarily tedious. It's frankly obvious what goal Stefan had in mind.

 

 

If the counter argument is that everyone cannot engage in murder at the same time i would agree. Thus it would mean it is immoral to do what everyone cannot do at the same time. To end with a snarky, half joking half serious, comment, it is immoral to do what babies cannot do (if babies count as persons).

 

Wrong! Murder isn't wrong because not everyone can do it at the same time. It's wrong because the the moral theory "murder is universally preferable" will always force someone into the status of evil. A valid rule does not force anyone into the status of evil. A baby who is incapable of doing what an adult can do is not by any means in the status of evil so there is nothing wrong with an adult doing what a baby cannot do.

 

[labmath2]

What arguments, labmath2? You seem to have issues with the meaning of words.

 

When I assign preference to behaviour I am clearly speaking of actions (which is WHY I say that at any given time you can only EXHIBIT one or at most 2-3 such preferences/behaviours). Your three examples of preference are theoretical only. That's not an argument that's changing the conversation.

 

Then, there's this:

 

 

We cannot all prefer to murder at the same time, because we cannot all act upon that "preference" because if we all murder at the same time, who will be murdered??? Again, this comes from the dissociation that you have in regards to the meaning of preference that is actually employed here and the way it relates to behaviour.

 

Let me sum it up: what you prefer in your own mind and as a hypothetical is irrelevant to the discussion because we can only be concerned with what you do. That is why Stefan is talking about actions, because thoughts are not immoral, it is only actions that can have a moral value.

 

Now, back to universal. I said, all the people and at all times. Sitting is an action that is not excluded by the definition of universality, but you can't say that everyone is universally sitting in your example because you're talking about just the people in the stadium instead of "all the people all of the time".

 

What does all of this mean when we tie it back to UPB? (which mind you wasn't even addressed in my original post but you pushed my hand here)

- preferred behaviour: to do one thing out of all the possible options available

- universal behaviour: everyone can do this thing all the time

- universally preferred behaviour: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time.

 

PS: This reply might have been worded a little differently had you not pushed for a reply ASAP.

Let me start by conceding the first point. I have do have issues with meaning of words.

 

Let me start with your definition of preferred behavior

Preferred behavior - to do one thing out of all possible options available

 

I find it bizzare to use preffered behavior when you could use the simpler version "to do". Istead of saying my preferred behavior is typing this message, it would be more clear and precise to say i am typing this message.

 

Universally prefered behavior: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all possible options available all the time.

 

By your definition there is no universally prefered behavior, if it existed, then everyone will be doing it all the time. If you staying alive, then dead people are not doing it. If you say eating, then i will simply point to people who aren't eating (at the moment).

 

I expressed the first argument in my earlier post and stefan expressed the second in his book. I am getting the sense you are not paying close attention to the content, you are interpreting the content (which is not necessary).

 

To end with my earlier point, to say sitting is universally preferred behavior will be semantically identical (using your meaning of universally preffered behavoir) to saying everyone is sitting all the time.

Page 30 "When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required or necessary assuming a particular goal"

 

In this case for the rest of the book the goal is being moral.

 

Page 33-34 "Thus when I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer. To use a scientific analogy, to truly understand the universe, people should use the scientific method – this does not mean that they always do so, since clearly billions of people consult ancient fairy tales rather than modern science for“answers.”

 

He is talking about what is universally preferable to be moral. Now Stefan could add the clause "to be moral" at the end of every use of "universally preferable" but that would just make the book unnecessarily tedious. It's frankly obvious what goal Stefan had in mind.

 

 

 

Wrong! Murder isn't wrong because not everyone can do it at the same time. It's wrong because the the moral theory "murder is universally preferable" will always force someone into the status of evil. A valid rule does not force anyone into the status of evil. A baby who is incapable of doing what an adult can do is not by any means in the status of evil so there is nothing wrong with an adult doing what a baby cannot do.

If you are right and Stefan is using to be moral as the goal, then his definition is at best circular. If ethics is what is required to be moral, then you have to define morality. If you use standard definition, then what is moral is what is good and what is good is what is ethical. So ethics is what is required to be ethical (circular).

 

On the second point, i cannot address it till i know what you mean by universally preferable. If i use standard definition, then murder is universally preferable means murder can be preferred by everyone at the same time, i've already addressed that point. If you are using stefans definition, then murder is universal means murder is required if you have unspecified goal in mind. I would have to know what the goal is. I would also have to know what you mean by evil.

[vahleeb]

Hi labmath2, I did pay attention to your original argument, and I would have gotten to it within the next two (at most) posts. What I did was trying to lead you down the path in a way that when we would get to your argument we wouldn't have to backtrack all over the place.

 

 

(I needed to break up your post in order to post my reply, hope it doesn't bother you.)

 

*text moved below*

I find it bizzare to use preffered behavior when you could use the simpler version "to do". Istead of saying my preferred behavior is typing this message, it would be more clear and precise to say i am typing this message.

 

It might be simpler (more succinct), yes, but it is a less accurate (therefore not more clear and precise) description of the process because "in the moment" you have a virtually unlimited number of actions you can do, yet you still choose to do one of them, thusly you indicate preference for it.

 

By your definition there is no universally prefered behavior, if it existed, then everyone will be doing it all the time.

 

 

First of all, you saying that by my definition UPUP doesn't exist is wrong. UPUB might not exist but that's not from my definition, that's from juxtaposing the behaviour of all human beings on top of the definition. The fact that humanity is imperfect doesn't disprove the possibility of perfection. And I will concede to you the point that without going into the "goals" factor that Stefan is speaking about, it becomes harder to explain and understand, but I will ask for leniency on your part for this and ask you to read the definition (for now) as: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time.

 

 If you staying alive, then dead people are not doing it.

 

Dead people don't exist (they're dead!!!), you can't use them as counter examples. 

 

If you say eating, then i will simply point to people who aren't eating (at the moment).

 

 

Agreed. This is why I would ask for the concession from your side on the definition I quoted above. I admit that it didn't occur to me that I was presuposing a "goal" when I gave you that definition and it was your answer that pointed it out, but I do promise to tie "will" back in by the end.

 

Page 30 "When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required or necessary assuming a particular goal"

 

This is just another way of saying that if there is a prerequisite behaviour for achieving a goal, then you naturally will engage in this behaviour in order to meet that goal. You have no problem in understanding this: eat to live, breathe to live, drink to live, train to play ball, etc. The question is why would we call these preferences universal? Because in the given scenario (my goal is X) they represent the best and sometimes only action that will lead to the achievement of the goal. If I don't wanna die of hunger, I'm gonna eat something. If I wanna get my free throw percentage up, I'm gonna practice shooting free throws. And it's not just me, it's everyone. The fact that everyone would choose this action in this scenario, then it is a choice that is objectively (universally) advantageous.

 

The next question that will occur to anybody who is willing to examine the question of universally preferable behaviour within certain scenarios, is: "can there be universally preferable universal behaviour?" Again, you have to look at this only on a theoretical level. Is the definition put forward consistent? Yes it is. Can it be achieved in theory? Yes it can. Can it be achieved practically? Who knows, maybe. Has it been achieved so far? Definitely not, because the only reason why we even have a term for a behaviour is that someone at a certain point in time did it (so even not doing something has been broken at least once in history). 

 

Tangent here to prevent another dispute on the meaning of words: to achieve means "to begin pursuit of" at a moment in time and to "realise the condition" at a later moment in time. This has the the following different effect on positive and negative actions. For a positive action everything can be achieved in the future if is situated in the realm of possibility and achievement is complete in a singular moment in time when the condition is realised. For a negative action (the absence of something, "thou shall not kill") everything can be achieved in the future, constantly, through each moment of time if, from the singular moment when pursuit begins, the opposing positive action is not instanced.

 

The third question, however, that will occur to the student of behaviour in this scenario, is that once he/she has agreed that, in theory, there can be such a thing as universally preferred universal behaviour is: "wouldn't such behaviour by definition have to be moral?" The reason for this is that human beings are hardwired for morality, we need to justify everything we do from a moral standpoint and no human being can commit an immoral act while simultaneously holding the knowledge that it is immoral (they will deflect, they will justify, they may come about and regret it the next day, condemn it, but IN THE MOMENT it cannot be committed if you recognise it as being immoral).

 

This is basically the reasoning that happens between pages 30 and 34, but the relationship that is described on page 30 is a little different than the one on page 34 because the situation isn't that UPUB is subordinated to the goal of morality/ethics (like on page 30), but rather that UPUB is equivalent to morality/ethics. And at this point we can tie back "will" into the definition because we have a goal (intrinsically stated).

[B0b]

Valheeb, would you mind giving me examples of:

- preferred behaviour
- universal behaviour
- universally preferred behaviour

[vahleeb]

Valheeb, would you mind giving me examples of:

- preferred behaviour

- universal behaviour

- universally preferred behaviour

 

Hi B0b,

 

1. writing this text

2. breathing, eating, drinking, thinking, selecting ( or any negative action - see definition above - that is obtained through the negation of a positive action that is, in turn, divisive between actor and acted upon).

3. the non initiation of force

[Nathan Metric]

If you are right and Stefan is using to be moral as the goal, then his definition is at best circular. If ethics is what is required to be moral, then you have to define morality. If you use standard definition, then what is moral is what is good and what is good is what is ethical. So ethics is what is required to be ethical (circular).

 

On the second point, i cannot address it till i know what you mean by universally preferable. If i use standard definition, then murder is universally preferable means murder can be preferred by everyone at the same time, i've already addressed that point. If you are using stefans definition, then murder is universal means murder is required if you have unspecified goal in mind. I would have to know what the goal is. I would also have to know what you mean by evil.

Morality is what you should do.

What you should do is what is necessary to acquire virtue.

Virtue is whatever transcends

And what transcends everything is the truth.

 

Truth = Virtue = The Goal of Morality

Where is the circularity?

[labmath2]

Morality is what you should do.

What you should do is what is necessary to acquire virtue.

Virtue is whatever transcends

And what transcends everything is the truth.

 

Truth = Virtue = The Goal of Morality

Where is the circularity?

If universally preferable behavior is what you should do if you want to be moral, and morality is what you should do to acquire virtue, and virtue is whatever transcends, and what transcends is truth, then universally preferable behavior is what you should do to acquire truth. I think i will let you figure out what is wrong with that definition of morality.

 

Truth: that which is in accordance with fact or reality.

 

Hint: Becoming a good scientist is not what stefan was referring to.

[labmath2]

Hi labmath2, I did pay attention to your original argument, and I would have gotten to it within the next two (at most) posts. What I did was trying to lead you down the path in a way that when we would get to your argument we wouldn't have to backtrack all over the place.

 

 

(I needed to break up your post in order to post my reply, hope it doesn't bother you.)

 

 

It might be simpler (more succinct), yes, but it is a less accurate (therefore not more clear and precise) description of the process because "in the moment" you have a virtually unlimited number of actions you can do, yet you still choose to do one of them, thusly you indicate preference for it.

 

 

First of all, you saying that by my definition UPUP doesn't exist is wrong. UPUB might not exist but that's not from my definition, that's from juxtaposing the behaviour of all human beings on top of the definition. The fact that humanity is imperfect doesn't disprove the possibility of perfection. And I will concede to you the point that without going into the "goals" factor that Stefan is speaking about, it becomes harder to explain and understand, but I will ask for leniency on your part for this and ask you to read the definition (for now) as: everyone can and will choose to do this thing out of all the possible options available all the time.

 

 

Dead people don't exist (they're dead!!!), you can't use them as counter examples.

 

 

Agreed. This is why I would ask for the concession from your side on the definition I quoted above. I admit that it didn't occur to me that I was presuposing a "goal" when I gave you that definition and it was your answer that pointed it out, but I do promise to tie "will" back in by the end.

 

 

This is just another way of saying that if there is a prerequisite behaviour for achieving a goal, then you naturally will engage in this behaviour in order to meet that goal. You have no problem in understanding this: eat to live, breathe to live, drink to live, train to play ball, etc. The question is why would we call these preferences universal? Because in the given scenario (my goal is X) they represent the best and sometimes only action that will lead to the achievement of the goal. If I don't wanna die of hunger, I'm gonna eat something. If I wanna get my free throw percentage up, I'm gonna practice shooting free throws. And it's not just me, it's everyone. The fact that everyone would choose this action in this scenario, then it is a choice that is objectively (universally) advantageous.

 

The next question that will occur to anybody who is willing to examine the question of universally preferable behaviour within certain scenarios, is: "can there be universally preferable universal behaviour?" Again, you have to look at this only on a theoretical level. Is the definition put forward consistent? Yes it is. Can it be achieved in theory? Yes it can. Can it be achieved practically? Who knows, maybe. Has it been achieved so far? Definitely not, because the only reason why we even have a term for a behaviour is that someone at a certain point in time did it (so even not doing something has been broken at least once in history).

 

Tangent here to prevent another dispute on the meaning of words: to achieve means "to begin pursuit of" at a moment in time and to "realise the condition" at a later moment in time. This has the the following different effect on positive and negative actions. For a positive action everything can be achieved in the future if is situated in the realm of possibility and achievement is complete in a singular moment in time when the condition is realised. For a negative action (the absence of something, "thou shall not kill") everything can be achieved in the future, constantly, through each moment of time if, from the singular moment when pursuit begins, the opposing positive action is not instanced.

 

The third question, however, that will occur to the student of behaviour in this scenario, is that once he/she has agreed that, in theory, there can be such a thing as universally preferred universal behaviour is: "wouldn't such behaviour by definition have to be moral?" The reason for this is that human beings are hardwired for morality, we need to justify everything we do from a moral standpoint and no human being can commit an immoral act while simultaneously holding the knowledge that it is immoral (they will deflect, they will justify, they may come about and regret it the next day, condemn it, but IN THE MOMENT it cannot be committed if you recognise it as being immoral).

 

This is basically the reasoning that happens between pages 30 and 34, but the relationship that is described on page 30 is a little different than the one on page 34 because the situation isn't that UPUB is subordinated to the goal of morality/ethics (like on page 30), but rather that UPUB is equivalent to morality/ethics. And at this point we can tie back "will" into the definition because we have a goal (intrinsically stated).

Preferred behavior : to do one thing out of all possible options available.

 

By definition what you do is out of all options available. No one has virtually unlimited options, you have options and then you do one (or two or three depending on how many verbs are applicable to you) of them. Its fine if you want to use preference to mean performance (since by your definition, preference and performance are sematically identical, you cannot perform actions that are unavailable). Then all subsequent use of preference should allow me to susbstitute perform (ex. I prefer eating = i perform eating). I prefer responding to you right now= i perform responding to you right now. Since you can simply use perform in its standard form to mean the same thing, then why use prefer by your definition?

 

There is factually nothing that everyone can do all the time (to my knowledge). Everyone cannot eat all the time, at some point you will either regurgitate the excess or simply fall asleep. Then what about those who currently have no food? This is why using the appropriate word really matters (universally performable behavior).

 

What do you mean dead people do not exist?

 

The rest of your post is indecipherable. Here is what would really help this conversation, using words in their standard form. The only reason you should have to define things is if its a new word or i do not seem to know the definition of the word (standard definition). We really don't need to reinvent language.

[vahleeb]

Preferred behavior : to do one thing out of all possible options available.

 

By definition what you do is out of all options available. No one has virtually unlimited options, you have options and then you do one (or two or three depending on how many verbs are applicable to you) of them. Its fine if you want to use preference to mean performance (since by your definition, preference and performance are sematically identical, you cannot perform actions that are unavailable). Then all subsequent use of preference should allow me to susbstitute perform (ex. I prefer eating = i perform eating). I prefer responding to you right now= i perform responding to you right now. Since you can simply use perform in its standard form to mean the same thing, then why use prefer by your definition?

 

There is factually nothing that everyone can do all the time (to my knowledge). Everyone cannot eat all the time, at some point you will either regurgitate the excess or simply fall asleep. Then what about those who currently have no food? This is why using the appropriate word really matters (universally performable behavior).

 

What do you mean dead people do not exist?

 

The rest of your post is indecipherable. Here is what would really help this conversation, using words in their standard form. The only reason you should have to define things is if its a new word or i do not seem to know the definition of the word (standard definition). We really don't need to reinvent language.

 

I find it rather sad that the one part of my post where I agreed you had a point is indecipherable... Maybe I'm using too many big words, maybe I don't know how to use them... Maybe I'm just stupid... Maybe my being stupid is not an argument? Nevertheless I will endeavour to restate it in a clearer fashion below. But before I do that...

 

I do have a problem with you substituting preference for performance wile repeatedly asking to use words in their standard form even though I have explained to you before that preference to do something is a more accurate description of doing something. Thank god for a thesaurus that we can come up with performance. But your using performance instead of "preference to" is akin to removing want from any human being. It's like saying humans act independent of them wanting to act (it is a less complete definition of the actual behaviour). The wanting to act is the actual preference, everything that happens after that is the performance you speak of. And the preference that does occur even then, is the preference to continue the performance. You seem to have no problem with using the word preference with regards to the realm of the mind (as you have done with your 3 examples before) but why there is a line that cannot be crossed between mind and action, I can't understand. 

 

Because I am a human being, if I do something (outside of the autonomous nervous system) then I must WANT to do it first and while I'm doing it I must WANT to continue doing it. I can't just BE doing it like you suggest by removing and replacing preference wherever you get the chance. What I am saying is a more accurate description of the phenomenon of behaviour as it pertains to both mind and body. Of course you can reduce that for convenience to a smaller language construct, but you can do so only after you have agreed that preference is implied in every action that is executed (unless, of course, we are in a case of overwhelming external force).

 

Then there's this:

 

No one has virtually unlimited options, you have options and then you do one

 

There are unlimited options between the numbers two and three when dealing with the REAL realm of numbers, and yet you say that there are only a limited amount of options available to someone at one time without even imposing any sort of constraint? That's literally saying that in a realm of infinite possibility there's a finite number of possibilities. Hello square-circle. I hope you see the mistake in that line of reasoning.

 

There is factually nothing that everyone can do all the time (to my knowledge).

 

I think you're wrong about that. Just to name one off the top of my head: thinking. And just because your sentence begs the question: why wouldn't there ever exist something that is possible for everyone to do (or not do - because we are including negative actions in this definition) all the time? How could you even prove its exclusion from existence?

 

What do you mean dead people do not exist?

 

Dead people do not exist. How more plain do I need to make it? They were (as in existed - past tense) and now all we have left is their remains (which is why we call them dead). The people no longer exist. If you think this is arguable, please let's open a new thread on it, because I'd love to see what arguments you can come up with.

 

I will try to restate the last part of my post now to make it more "decipherable" (it might help to go back and forth between that post and this one and see how the clarifications apply):

 

Does objective preferred behaviour exist within the confines of given scenarios? Yes. Prerequisite behaviour is something that is objectively (universally - by everyone all the time) preferable when aspiring to a goal.

 

Derived question from this statement: is it possible that universally preferable behaviour exist without the constraints of a scenario (in a state of nature)? There is nothing in the definition that is inconsistent, therefore it can exist. Has real life validated it thus far? No. Could it validate it from now on (say we call the time we begin the analysis moment zero) ? There is nothing in this proposition that is inconsistent, therefore it could. Will it? We'll see. What is the criteria for disproval? A single instance of preferred behaviour that differs from what we state as universally preferable.

 

Second derivation: If universally preferred behaviour can exist without the constraints of a scenario, wouldn't that behaviour by definition have to be moral? Yes. Is there an equivalence between universally preferred behaviour and morality? If the first exists, then yes. Why? Because nothing can be committed if, in the moment, knowledge is held of its immorality, therefore if something can be committed then the actor must think it moral or ascribe to it no moral value (which means it is not in the sphere of our analysis) and if something can be committed all the time by everyone then everyone and at all times must regard that as moral thusly acquiring a common to all (objective) definition of morality. 

 

By submitting UPB as prerequisite behaviour to the goal of morality, you are breaking the very definition that states its equivalence. Which is funny because then you complain about circular logic.

 

A is equivalent to B means that A implies B and B implies A.

 

To paraphrase your chain of thought/reasoning:

You say: Morality implies UPB (B implies A). But why then do you define UPB as morality? (because A implies B). Isn't that circular logic? (No. It is the very definition of equivalence.)

 

This is the shift that occurs between the definition of UPB within a given scenario on page 30 and the definition of UPB outside of any scenario on page 33-34, it is the shift from B => A to A <=> B. This is why you have a problem with the book, because you do not see this change from unidirectional implications to bidirectional equivalence.

 

From there on, the rest of the book is just a couple of case studies of wether or not tenements of what we call morality ad hoc remain valid under the scope of UPB. He is looking for that single instance where something that we resoundingly ascribe to as being moral today will contradict the principle stated. And nothing does.

[B0b]

Hi B0b,

 

1. writing this text

2. breathing, eating, drinking, thinking, selecting ( or any negative action - see definition above - that is obtained through the negation of a positive action that is, in turn, divisive between actor and acted upon).

3. the non initiation of force

Thank you for the examples. Why isn't drinking non UPB?

[vahleeb]

Thank you for the examples. Why isn't drinking non UPB?

 

Physical limitations. You can't drink "all the time". I assume the question was why isn't drinking UPB.

[B0b]

Yes, sorry for the typos, (which i corrected now).

Then, raping is NOT UPB because I cannot rape all the time.

[Nathan Metric]

If universally preferable behavior is what you should do if you want to be moral, and morality is what you should do to acquire virtue, and virtue is whatever transcends, and what transcends is truth, then universally preferable behavior is what you should do to acquire truth. I think i will let you figure out what is wrong with that definition of morality.

 

Truth: that which is in accordance with fact or reality.

 

Hint: Becoming a good scientist is not what stefan was referring to.

 

You're wrong. All moral debates are debates about the truth. Any moral debate that isn't about the truth is just a bunch of subjective nonsense.

 

The first presupposition of all true philosophers is that the truth matters. If you do not agree with this then you are not a philosopher. The very word philosopher means one who loves the truth.

 

Since truth is the highest virtue then rationality is a virtue.

Since rationality is a virtue then meaningful cooperation/competition between rational beings is a virtue.

If meaningful cooperation/competition between rational beings is a virtue then universal morality is preferable to non-universal morality.

[vahleeb]

Yes, sorry for the typo.

Then, raping is UPB because I cannot rape all the time.

First up that's a false dichotomy. Second I have provided the definition of UPB in a post above. Third i have no ideea under what universe the fact that you cannot drink all the time precludes drinking from being UPB. but the fact that you cannot rape all the time defines rape as UPB.

 

I count 3 errors in your post. Are there more?

 

LE: ok, two of them you have edited out. You're still left with a false dichotomy. It will help if you read the post above where I define UPB as UPUB. Rape is not universal behaviour (Not UB). The all the time is the UP part of UPUB.

[labmath2]

I find it rather sad that the one part of my post where I agreed you had a point is indecipherable... Maybe I'm using too many big words, maybe I don't know how to use them... Maybe I'm just stupid... Maybe my being stupid is not an argument? Nevertheless I will endeavour to restate it in a clearer fashion below. But before I do that...

 

I do have a problem with you substituting preference for performance wile repeatedly asking to use words in their standard form even though I have explained to you before that preference to do something is a more accurate description of doing something. Thank god for a thesaurus that we can come up with performance. But your using performance instead of "preference to" is akin to removing want from any human being. It's like saying humans act independent of them wanting to act (it is a less complete definition of the actual behaviour). The wanting to act is the actual preference, everything that happens after that is the performance you speak of. And the preference that does occur even then, is the preference to continue the performance. You seem to have no problem with using the word preference with regards to the realm of the mind (as you have done with your 3 examples before) but why there is a line that cannot be crossed between mind and action, I can't understand.

 

Because I am a human being, if I do something (outside of the autonomous nervous system) then I must WANT to do it first and while I'm doing it I must WANT to continue doing it. I can't just BE doing it like you suggest by removing and replacing preference wherever you get the chance. What I am saying is a more accurate description of the phenomenon of behaviour as it pertains to both mind and body. Of course you can reduce that for convenience to a smaller language construct, but you can do so only after you have agreed that preference is implied in every action that is executed (unless, of course, we are in a case of overwhelming external force).

 

Then there's this:

 

 

There are unlimited options between the numbers two and three when dealing with the REAL realm of numbers, and yet you say that there are only a limited amount of options available to someone at one time without even imposing any sort of constraint? That's literally saying that in a realm of infinite possibility there's a finite number of possibilities. Hello square-circle. I hope you see the mistake in that line of reasoning.

 

 

I think you're wrong about that. Just to name one off the top of my head: thinking. And just because your sentence begs the question: why wouldn't there ever exist something that is possible for everyone to do (or not do - because we are including negative actions in this definition) all the time? How could you even prove its exclusion from existence?

 

 

Dead people do not exist. How more plain do I need to make it? They were (as in existed - past tense) and now all we have left is their remains (which is why we call them dead). The people no longer exist. If you think this is arguable, please let's open a new thread on it, because I'd love to see what arguments you can come up with.

 

I will try to restate the last part of my post now to make it more "decipherable" (it might help to go back and forth between that post and this one and see how the clarifications apply):

 

Does objective preferred behaviour exist within the confines of given scenarios? Yes. Prerequisite behaviour is something that is objectively (universally - by everyone all the time) preferable when aspiring to a goal.

 

Derived question from this statement: is it possible that universally preferable behaviour exist without the constraints of a scenario (in a state of nature)? There is nothing in the definition that is inconsistent, therefore it can exist. Has real life validated it thus far? No. Could it validate it from now on (say we call the time we begin the analysis moment zero) ? There is nothing in this proposition that is inconsistent, therefore it could. Will it? We'll see. What is the criteria for disproval? A single instance of preferred behaviour that differs from what we state as universally preferable.

 

Second derivation: If universally preferred behaviour can exist without the constraints of a scenario, wouldn't that behaviour by definition have to be moral? Yes. Is there an equivalence between universally preferred behaviour and morality? If the first exists, then yes. Why? Because nothing can be committed if, in the moment, knowledge is held of its immorality, therefore if something can be committed then the actor must think it moral or ascribe to it no moral value (which means it is not in the sphere of our analysis) and if something can be committed all the time by everyone then everyone and at all times must regard that as moral thusly acquiring a common to all (objective) definition of morality.

 

By submitting UPB as prerequisite behaviour to the goal of morality, you are breaking the very definition that states its equivalence. Which is funny because then you complain about circular logic.

 

A is equivalent to B means that A implies B and B implies A.

 

To paraphrase your chain of thought/reasoning:

You say: Morality implies UPB (B implies A). But why then do you define UPB as morality? (because A implies B). Isn't that circular logic? (No. It is the very definition of equivalence.)

 

This is the shift that occurs between the definition of UPB within a given scenario on page 30 and the definition of UPB outside of any scenario on page 33-34, it is the shift from B => A to A <=> B. This is why you have a problem with the book, because you do not see this change from unidirectional implications to bidirectional equivalence.

 

From there on, the rest of the book is just a couple of case studies of wether or not tenements of what we call morality ad hoc remain valid under the scope of UPB. He is looking for that single instance where something that we resoundingly ascribe to as being moral today will contradict the principle stated. And nothing does.

Preference: a greater liking for one alternative over another or others e.x. "a preference for long walks and tennis over jogging."

 

Behavior: the way in which one acts or conduct oneself, especially toward others.

 

Act: take action; do something.

 

 

I realize now i have not been as vigilant against imprecise language as i hoped to be and as a result have engaged in it myself. I have been using behavior to mean act, when it is in fact slightly different.

 

Now lets resolve the confusion around preference. Assume i give three options of activity, sleeping, eating or reading, what does it mean to say you prefer reading over the two others? Using standard definition, it simply means you like reading over sleeping or eating. This does not mean you chose reading. What if instead you did in fact choose to read? I can imply from that choice that you prefer reading (minus a few exceptions which we will leave for now). Extending the notion that action implies preference, but preference does not imply action, it would be more accurate to use action. You must accept that action implies preference if you are to derive preference from action.

 

Going back to the examples, two guys in a room cannot murder each other, but two guys in a room can prefer murder (greater liking for murder over not murder). Preference only occurs in someone's mind.

 

I will conclude this argument by ending on this note, "preference to do something is a more accurate description of doing something." I'll let you think on that.

 

 

On the point of unlimited options, the constraints are biology, experience and situation. I do not need to impose it, it is a fact of reality.

 

On the point of what we can all do all the time, thinking doesn't qualify since people sleep, get into coma. I admit i did not think about negative actions, i will give you all the negative actions (not doing x). Since all positive actions cannot be performed by everyone at all times, then i fail to see the value of UPB (as defined by you) then.

 

On death and existence.

Exist: 1. Have objective reality or being. 2. Alive, especially under adverse condition.

 

If you are using definition 2, then you are right, dead people by definition do not exist, but that is not an argument for why they do not count. Unless you mean dead people are unpersons and should be treated like inanimate objects.

 

When i get home on saturday i will respong to the rest of the post. I am too exausted and not a computer.

[vahleeb]

Look labmath2, we can go on back and forth about this a thousand ways from Sunday, but if instead of rebutting (with arguments) the definitions that I provide, you just come up with different definitions then it will not be a productive conversation.

 

I will quote again my very first post with regards to preference:

 

 

A preference or to prefer means to desire some thing more than another.     <- definition right here

 

This can naturally apply to behaviour and we do it all the time. The realm of possible behaviours that we exhibit at a certain time is virtually limitless [explained in some post above which I won't quote now] and yet we only exhibit one at a time (two, three if we're really into multitasking), like for instance I prefer writing this answer to all the other possible actions I could have done right now, and you prefer to read this answer to all the other possible activities. Because we have an infinite pool of behavioural options but we can only enact one or a few behaviours at a time, then we are automatically exhibiting preference. Even non-activity involves a preference for non-activity.

 

^^ application of preference to behaviour, which is how preference will be used in the conversation ^^

 

also first ever use by me of a verb derived from "to act"   (enact). this is still the very first post.

 

And a quote from a later post that is meant to further clarify that.

 

Because I am a human being, if I do something (outside of the autonomous nervous system) then I must WANT to do it first and while I'm doing it I must WANT to continue doing it. I can't just BE doing it

 

This means that when I am discussing preference I am only referring to exhibited preference and not about theoretical preference. If you cannot understand that (your last post is literally giving me another example of theoretical preferences) then I don't know how we're going to go forward. If I am wrong with linking preference to behaviour in this way for the purpose of this conversation then you need to tell me why that's wrong.

 

Just to state the point again with another 2 quotes:

 

When I assign preference to behaviour I am clearly speaking of actions (which is WHY I say that at any given time you can only EXHIBIT one or at most 2-3 such preferences/behaviours).   ** Look at that! I mention the noun derived from the verb "to act" like 3 posts before you "brought it up".

 

Let me sum it up: what you prefer in your own mind and as a hypothetical is irrelevant to the discussion because we can only be concerned with what you do.

 

And just so I don't have a post for just quoting myself, you say:

 

Preference only occurs in someone's mind.

 

First of all, nowhere do I contradict that. I even go into some lengths to explain that an action is a combination of both mind and body. But that type of preference (mind only and not exhibited) cannot be measured, cannot be related to behaviour and thus it is irrelevant to the conversation. Why? Because we are ultimately discussing about morality and morality is an attribute of actions not of thoughts.

[labmath2]

Look labmath2, we can go on back and forth about this a thousand ways from Sunday, but if instead of rebutting (with arguments) the definitions that I provide, you just come up with different definitions then it will not be a productive conversation.

 

I will quote again my very first post with regards to preference:

 

 

And a quote from a later post that is meant to further clarify that.

 

 

This means that when I am discussing preference I am only referring to exhibited preference and not about theoretical preference. If you cannot understand that (your last post is literally giving me another example of theoretical preferences) then I don't know how we're going to go forward. If I am wrong with linking preference to behaviour in this way for the purpose of this conversation then you need to tell me why that's wrong.

 

Just to state the point again with another 2 quotes:

 

 

 

And just so I don't have a post for just quoting myself, you say:

 

 

First of all, nowhere do I contradict that. I even go into some lengths to explain that an action is a combination of both mind and body. But that type of preference (mind only and not exhibited) cannot be measured, cannot be related to behaviour and thus it is irrelevant to the conversation. Why? Because we are ultimately discussing about morality and morality is an attribute of actions not of thoughts.

So you are not going to use standard form of words, and completely ignore arguments which i put forward. At this point either i cannot understand most of your content (when i read them i get very different meanings from what you mean) or you cannot understand most of my content. Either way we will not get anywhere.

[vahleeb]

So you are not going to use standard form of words, and completely ignore arguments which i put forward. At this point either i cannot understand most of your content (when i read them i get very different meanings from what you mean) or you cannot understand most of my content. Either way we will not get anywhere.

What arguments, labmath2? Point me to one argument you have made.

 

Here's the one I've been making (maybe the example will serve you by pointing out the difference between an assertion and an argument):

 

This is an overarching discussion about morality. Morality is something that can only be applied to actions. THEREFORE whatever terms we use in this conversation, their definitions will have to be linked to actions. THIS IS WHY we might end up with restrictions of the "standard meaning" of words.

[labmath2]

I do have a problem with you substituting preference for performance wile repeatedly asking to use words in their standard form even though I have explained to you before that preference to do something is a more accurate description of doing something. Thank god for a thesaurus that we can come up with performance. But your using performance instead of "preference to" is akin to removing want from any human being. It's like saying humans act independent of them wanting to act (it is a less complete definition of the actual behaviour). The wanting to act is the actual preference, everything that happens after that is the performance you speak of. And the preference that does occur even then, is the preference to continue the performance. You seem to have no problem with using the word preference with regards to the realm of the mind (as you have done with your 3 examples before) but why there is a line that cannot be crossed between mind and action, I can't understand. 

If you do not see the problem with the red part, then all my effort was wasted and i should move on to avoid wasting any more time.

[vahleeb]

If you do not see the problem with the red part, then all my effort was wasted and i should move on to avoid wasting any more time.

 

First the argument:

 

There is no problem with the red part because "This is an overarching discussion about morality. Morality is something that can only be applied to actions. THEREFORE whatever terms we use in this conversation, their definitions will have to be linked to actions. THIS IS WHY we might end up with restrictions of the "standard meaning" of words."   <- from the post above you just ignored. 

 

So I guess we're gonna have to go from effect here.

 

If you cannot convey your (A) argument across to me (who hasn't invested 30 years in coming up with this system and do not have any of the emotional attachments to the theory that Stefan might have) and you close out the debate after tuning out all of my last few posts, what entitles you to believe that "calling in" won't be just a waste of time (yours, Stefan's and the listeners')?

[labmath2]

First the argument:

 

There is no problem with the red part because "This is an overarching discussion about morality. Morality is something that can only be applied to actions. THEREFORE whatever terms we use in this conversation, their definitions will have to be linked to actions. THIS IS WHY we might end up with restrictions of the "standard meaning" of words."   <- from the post above you just ignored. 

 

So I guess we're gonna have to go from effect here.

 

If you cannot convey your (A) argument across to me (who hasn't invested 30 years in coming up with this system and do not have any of the emotional attachments to the theory that Stefan might have) and you close out the debate after tuning out all of my last few posts, what entitles you to believe that "calling in" won't be just a waste of time (yours, Stefan's and the listeners')?

 

I do not know that the call will not be a waste of time. I realize not everyone is as obsessed with precision in language use as i am, and that is perhaps the greatest difficulty in engaging in any meaningful discussion about morality (or maybe i am the one using language incorrectly). If i run into the same problem with Stefan again, then i will move on and that will be the end of it. 

[vahleeb]

For someone "as obsessed with precision in language use" you sure don't seem to have that obsession when the question is what entitles you to believe that X and you answer I don't know if X or not but I'll go ahead anyway.

[Libertus]

labmath2, for what it's worth, I, for one, understand and greatly appreciate your argument put forward, your attempt of precise use of language and the way you conduct yourself in this thread. If I knew you'd be calling in to the show, I'd make sure to tune in.