A brief critique of UPB

[csekavec]

I have made every effort to be laconic but exceedingly precise. If I have made an error in grammar please forgive. If it is in reasoning, please be explicit. Thank you.

 

An opinion.

 

Proof is a high standard. The book righteously compares its effort to physics. In physics true data that contradicts old data results in a revision of the theory. But first that theory must be known, in order to test the new data against it. UPB doesn't state upon what foundation it is built.  It is true that these foundation principles may be inferred by testing the set of all principles against UPB. This is awkward. Foundation, then structure.  UPB does it backwards.

 

The first criticism

 

 

Simply put, morals are a set of rules claiming to accurately and consistently identify universally preferable human behaviours, just as physics is a set of rules claiming to accurately and consistently identify the universal behaviour of matter.   -  page 40

 

The Seven Categories  

To help us separate aesthetics from ethics, let us start by widening these categories to encompass any behaviour that can be subjected to an ethical analysis. 

- page 64

 

In UPB aesthetics is used to definitionally remove the vast majority of action from the realm of morality. This foil reduces the falsify-ability of UPB to nearly zero. It's dishonest to use the page 40 definition while maintaining the page 64 limits. Carl Sagan has a pet dragon. Just look at all the ways you can't test if the dragon is real, therefore it must exist.

 

I'm not arguing that UPB isn't real. But like the dragon it does not predict. And otherwise valid tests are made invalid by removing them from UPB under the label of 'aesthetics.'

 

The second criticism

 

 

Thus we can reasonably say that where choice is absent, or inapplicable, morality is also absent, or inapplicable.    -page 67

 

Under the rules of proposed by UPB no single agent can possibly be moral. An imaginary person possessing every conceivable excellence requires at minimum the most vile personage to validate their status as a moral actor. 

 

This problem is easily fixed. Properly ascribe morality to those things upon which moral action is dependent instead of to the action itself.

 

The third criticism

 

UPB  (the negative actions defined as moral)  and UPB (the subjective view defined by the book as aesthetic) are used incredibly sloppily and interchangeably.  Definitional slip are inexcusable if we are to esteem UPB with the seriousness of a physical theory, or indeed as a proof.  

 

The fourth criticism

 

UPB doesn't account for mental illness except to assert that to hold a view contrary to UPB is to be ill.  This is only true internal to UPB and thus reveals the definition error. Aquinas dealt with this so I'm not going into detail here. 

 

The fifth criticism

 

While defining moral action as a negative is common it has been shown by others to be incomplete. Very tersely,  "thou shalt not murder" and its inverse is insufficient and not testable.  "Thou shalt murder when X" is testable and superior.  

 

 

 

A summary

 

UPB is in its own words by its own definitions "necessary but not sufficient" in defining morality. The moral actions defined by UPB are at best a sub-set of the set of all moral action. Attempting to reconcile reality to UPB without correcting UPB may lead to error. My opinion is that the most egregious error is that of removing moral culpability from a moral agent. And a non critical look at UPB might lead one to just that conclusion. Thank you for your time reading this, for your responses if any, and your (down?) votes if any.  

 

 

 

 

[jpahmad]

 

 

 My opinion is that the most egregious error is that of removing moral culpability from a moral agent.  

 

Could you give me an example of how UPB does this?

[csekavec]

.... second criticism

[jpahmad]

.... second criticism

 

Yes, please extrapolate a little bit.  Are you saying that no one has a choice and therefore no one can be a moral agent?  Could you use a concrete example?

[csekavec]

Are you saying that no one has a choice and therefore no one can be a moral agent? 

 

There are many concrete examples in the book. I'd rather not repeat them since this isn't my argument. UPB posits that there are circumstances where your statement is true. I'm saying the exact opposite.  

[jpahmad]

. UPB posits that there are circumstances where your statement is true. I'm saying the exact opposite.  

 

So what your saying is that if  person literally has a gun pointed to their head, they are still a moral agent.  Correct?

[csekavec]

Agency and life qua man are inseverable.

[Kevin Beal]

Proof is a high standard. The book righteously compares its effort to physics. In physics true data that contradicts old data results in a revision of the theory. But first that theory must be known, in order to test the new data against it. UPB doesn't state upon what foundation it is built.  It is true that these foundation principles may be inferred by testing the set of all principles against UPB. This is awkward. Foundation, then structure.  UPB does it backwards.

I am no expert on physics, but I believe you have mischaracterized progress in physics, and indeed in ethics. Einsteinian physics has a foundation in mathematics, folk physics, first principles, etc. It's not as if it was Newtonian physics 2.0. It's foundation is reason and evidence.

 

When you establish the study of any new domain, you must provide an account of the it's metaphysics and epistemology. That is to say, you must say what it is specifically that we are studying and how we determine come to have knowledge of these things we're studying. If the people who've come before have got their metaphysics and epistemology wrong and yours is right, then it is incumbent upon you to provide a superior metaphysics and epistemology. That's how philosophy and science progress.

 

UPB doesn't do it backward. That is a misunderstanding on your part.

 

 

In UPB aesthetics is used to definitionally remove the vast majority of action from the realm of morality. This foil reduces the falsify-ability of UPB to nearly zero. It's dishonest to use the page 40 definition while maintaining the page 64 limits. Carl Sagan has a pet dragon. Just look at all the ways you can't test if the dragon is real, therefore it must exist.

UPB is the framework, not a synonym for "morality". It includes aesthetics and is perhaps exactly as falsifiable as you perceived it to be before you came across the distinction between morality and aesthetics.

 

And I don't know what "nearly zero falsifiability" means. Whether or not this is a failure of the theory or just the nature of the domain we're studying is not clear – nor is it explained why it would make something more or less falsifiable simply because it describes fewer behaviors. Without further explanation, all I know is what you've concluded about it, and maybe you have no idea what you're talking about. You don't seem to be aware that UPB evaluates aesthetic arguments as well as moral ones, so I'm inclined to think this is a failure in your thinking rather than a failure in the theory.

 

 

Under the rules of proposed by UPB no single agent can possibly be moral. An imaginary person possessing every conceivable excellence requires at minimum the most vile personage to validate their status as a moral actor. 

 

This problem is easily fixed. Properly ascribe morality to those things upon which moral action is dependent instead of to the action itself.

No, you've misunderstood. To the degree a person has choice, they are morally responsible for those choices. This is consistent with every other theory of ethics that I'm aware of. This should not be controversial.

 

UPB evaluates moral arguments, fundamentally, not people or even behavior. If robots executed otherwise immoral behavior, it would not be immoral. Human action is a volitional, intentional process and embedded in actions are propositions, logic. People do what they do for a reason, and if they don't, then it's not a choice and they aren't morally culpable.

 

UPB is used to evaluate that aspect of behavior, specifically.

 

 

UPB  (the negative actions defined as moral)  and UPB (the subjective view defined by the book as aesthetic) are used incredibly sloppily and interchangeably.  Definitional slip are inexcusable if we are to esteem UPB with the seriousness of a physical theory, or indeed as a proof.  

This isn't a criticism, it's just an adjective. Point out what errors result from this supposed sloppiness and then you will have a criticism.

 

 

UPB doesn't account for mental illness except to assert that to hold a view contrary to UPB is to be ill.  This is only true internal to UPB and thus reveals the definition error. Aquinas dealt with this so I'm not going into detail here. 

[citation needed]

 

 

While defining moral action as a negative is common it has been shown by others to be incomplete. Very tersely,  "thou shalt not murder" and its inverse is insufficient and not testable.  "Thou shalt murder when X" is testable and superior.  

This isn't a criticism. It's saying that a criticism exists elsewhere. Explain how this negative action is insufficient or not testable.

 

 

UPB is in its own words by its own definitions "necessary but not sufficient" in defining morality. The moral actions defined by UPB are at best a sub-set of the set of all moral action. Attempting to reconcile reality to UPB without correcting UPB may lead to error. My opinion is that the most egregious error is that of removing moral culpability from a moral agent. 

[citation needed]

[jpahmad]

Agency and life qua man are inseverable.

 

I don't understand what you mean.  Could you rephrase that please?

[Cuffy_Meigs]

An opinion.

 

In physics true data that contradicts old data results in a revision of the theory. But first that theory must be known, in order to test the new data against it. 

 

Forgive me picking up on one sentence but I think the above statement demands a convincing supporting argument. Although to be fair you do title the paragraph "An opinion".

 

Personally I am inclined to Popper's view (more recently and perhaps more accessibly reiterated by David Deutsch) that scientific knowledge advances not by an inductive process but by all competing theories being rigorously tested against each other and then selecting the "best" one, i.e. it must be better at describing and explaining physical reality, be universal, contain no wild assertions etc. Furthermore it should have stability in the sense that any change to the theory should be disastrous. So a tiny change to one of the constants involved in, say, General Relativity utterly destroys it; whereas the theory that "god did it" can just as easily be restated as "a magic octopus did it" with no loss of predictive power.

[csekavec]

 

 

 If the people who've come before have got their metaphysics and epistemology wrong and yours is right, then it is incumbent upon you to provide a superior metaphysics and epistemology.

I agree.

 

You bring up Einstein. Have you read Einstein's book on relativity written for the general populace? You will find a well ordered precept upon precept construction, where each part is clearly and concisely stated and may be tested individually and as a whole.

 

Compare that to UPB where it begins with a hodgepodge of accepting and rejecting ideas from contradictory metaphysical and epistemology systems without integrating them into a cohesive whole.  Then a masturbatory attempt at romantic fiction. And the 'truths' section is this mix of asserted values with unsupported metaphysics with the only validation the epistemology of instinct.  It all might be true but that it is true is not established by the book. 

 

Far better to argue from reality. Which eventually UPB somewhat does, but mostly in the second half. Putting metaphysics many pages after chapters called 'proof' is what I'm talking about. There might be a good reason to do all this that I miss, and since it only alters the readability not the content of the book I put this under "opinion."  After all this is a philosophy book for a general audience. Maybe it wasn't intended to be rigidly digested and if so everything else I say is superfluous. 

 

 

 

Whether or not this is a failure of the theory or just the nature of the domain we're studying is not clear

Yes, exactly. This is my complaint. UPB asserts but without sound foundation makes no case.

 

 

 

This isn't a criticism, it's just an adjective. Point out what errors result from this supposed sloppiness and then you will have a criticism.

[citation needed]

[citation needed] 

 

I am wondering a thing. Are you not aware that a criticism is not an argument, nor is it a pejorative?  If you chose to ignore my statement of deficiency because you don't like the descriptor I use please don't hope to make it seem incumbent upon me to cite or persuade you. A modest suggestion to you or anyone else evaluating a criticism is this. Perhaps read the criticism and determine its predicates and implications. Then one could read applicable parts of UPB in full context testing the criticism against the framework.  

 

 

 

UPB evaluates moral arguments, fundamentally, not people or even behavior. If robots executed otherwise immoral behavior, it would not be immoral. Human action is a volitional, intentional process and embedded in actions are propositions, logic. People do what they do for a reason, and if they don't, then it's not a choice and they aren't morally culpable.

 

UPB is used to evaluate that aspect of behavior, specifically.

 

Agency and life qua man are inseverable.

 

I don't understand what you mean.  Could you rephrase that please?

 

Ok I'll unpack this a bit, and make an argument.

 

Identity axiom might be stated: A thing is what it is. Or as UPB puts it when it finally discusses metaphysics at the back of the book, "opinions don't change reality." To be a thing is to be a specific thing, else nothing. 

 

Now if we use epistemology to slice up the concept 'person' the abstract attribute is that of 'reason.'  A thing without agency can't properly be called an animal; a thing without reason can't be called a person. 

 

Now integrating the concept 'person' with the axiom of identity we find (among other things) that wearing an army uniform, being under duress/coercion, being intoxicated, choosing not to think, or indeed any thing save actual loss of mind does not alter what it is to be a person.  

 

The declaration of independence uses the word inalienable instead of epistemological abstract. 

 

But all this and more can be derived from my OP.

 

Personally I am inclined to Popper's view (more recently and perhaps more accessibly reiterated by David Deutsch) 

I haven't read those. I don't disagree with anything you wrote.  I have added those authors to my reading list. If you have a specific work to recommend, I'd find it helpful.

[Cuffy_Meigs]

Hi csekavec,

David Deutsch has only published two books but I thoroughly recommend them both:

http://www.daviddeutsch.org.uk/books/

 

I doubt you'll agree with everything he says - I didn't - and some basic level of scientific background would be helpful but for anybody attracted to this forum, I'd expect them to be thinking deeply about almost every page.

 

Popper was the first philosopher I read which made me realise that the whole subject wasn't complete BS. As he put it himself, he tries to answer questions which are important in the real world rather than ones which are important in philosophy. "The logic of scientific discovery" may be a good place to start.

[Kevin Beal]

Compare that to UPB where it begins with a hodgepodge of accepting and rejecting ideas from contradictory metaphysical and epistemology systems without integrating them into a cohesive whole.  Then a masturbatory attempt at romantic fiction. And the 'truths' section is this mix of asserted values with unsupported metaphysics with the only validation the epistemology of instinct.  It all might be true but that it is true is not established by the book. 

I'm genuinely confused. It seems like you and I read two different books. This is not my memory of the book at all. Citation needed?

 

 

Far better to argue from reality. Which eventually UPB somewhat does, but mostly in the second half. Putting metaphysics many pages after chapters called 'proof' is what I'm talking about. There might be a good reason to do all this that I miss, and since it only alters the readability not the content of the book I put this under "opinion."  After all this is a philosophy book for a general audience. Maybe it wasn't intended to be rigidly digested and if so everything else I say is superfluous. 

That is your incorrect "opinion". You have to start from the logic before you bring in the evidence. If the logic is wrong, then no amount of evidence matters. This is basic philosophy.

 

 

Yes, exactly. This is my complaint. UPB asserts but without sound foundation makes no case.

No, it's not "exactly". You totally blew past the part where you asserted several nonsense things without any evidence and I pointed that out. How is falsifiability affected by the distinction between aesthetics and morality? Put up or shut up.

 

 

I am wondering a thing. Are you not aware that a criticism is not an argument, nor is it a pejorative?  If you chose to ignore my statement of deficiency because you don't like the descriptor I use please don't hope to make it seem incumbent upon me to cite or persuade you. A modest suggestion to you or anyone else evaluating a criticism is this. Perhaps read the criticism and determine its predicates and implications. Then one could read applicable parts of UPB in full context testing the criticism against the framework.  

Criticism (noun): "the analysis and judgment of the merits and faults of a literary or artistic work."

 

When criticising a philosophical work, it is the philosophy itself that you are expected to criticize. That means pointing out errors in logic or factually incorrect statements. It would make no sense, for example, to point out how the book makes you feel, it's story arc, it's characters, etc.

 

You already accept this because you say your criticisms should be tested against the framework. Test what? The word "sloppy"?

 

Give us something to test. That's all I was saying.

 

 

Ok I'll unpack this a bit, and make an argument.

 

Identity axiom might be stated: A thing is what it is. Or as UPB puts it when it finally discusses metaphysics at the back of the book, "opinions don't change reality." To be a thing is to be a specific thing, else nothing. 

 

Now if we use epistemology to slice up the concept 'person' the abstract attribute is that of 'reason.'  A thing without agency can't properly be called an animal; a thing without reason can't be called a person. 

 

Now integrating the concept 'person' with the axiom of identity we find (among other things) that wearing an army uniform, being under duress/coercion, being intoxicated, choosing not to think, or indeed any thing save actual loss of mind does not alter what it is to be a person.  

 

The declaration of independence uses the word inalienable instead of epistemological abstract. 

 

But all this and more can be derived from my OP.

You don't "use" epistemology, and you don't "integrate" axioms, there are no such things as "epistemological abstracts", you don't even know that the metaphysics in the beginning of UPB is of human choice. You have no idea what you are talking about and you just make shit up as you go along.

 

And this isn't an argument. And it is not all implied by the OP.

[jpahmad]

What's the difference between "not being a moral agent" and doing something immoral but no one caring about it?  It is a matter of semantics.  If someone has a gun to my wife's head and orders me to steal a candy bar, I'm quite positive that no one will prosecute me for stealing a candy bar.  I don't think there is one person on earth who will accuse me of doing something "immoral" in that situation.  The easiest way to organize this scenario into a larger ethical theory is to simply say that I was "not a moral agent" in that moment. 

[csekavec]

What's the difference between "not being a moral agent" and doing something immoral but no one caring about it?  It is a matter of semantics.  If someone has a gun to my wife's head and orders me to steal a candy bar, I'm quite positive that no one will prosecute me for stealing a candy bar.  I don't think there is one person on earth who will accuse me of doing something "immoral" in that situation.  The easiest way to organize this scenario into a larger ethical theory is to simply say that I was "not a moral agent" in that moment. 

A thing is what it is. Opinion doesn't alter reality. Morality based on opinion isn't objective. Subjective + subjective =/= objective. 

 

I doubt I'm alone in saying that to steal the candy is immoral. But also accurate to say stealing the candy is preferred.  But in that its proper to address values, not ethics.  

 

This all ties back to each criticism. Without being comprehensive, I humbly suggest the statement: "only steal when doing so preserves a 'higher' moral value"   or the general case: "Only act when the cost of action is less than the result of action." 

 

A separate discussion of this topic are those contained in the legal and ethical arguments surrounding the invalidity of the Nuremberg defense. My American Law Encyclopedia has hundreds of pages on this so I really can't succinctly put it all down. Suffice it to say that the legal system generally agrees with the values precept I outlined. Doesn't mean it's true, of course.

[csekavec]

 

 

 

You wrote that instead of starting with reality one should start from logic. Do you then think that logic is separate from reality? Or 'above' reality? Or any other nonsense?

 

You wrote that I don't bring evidence. The evidence is in UPB.  But as you wrote, somehow my UPB book is different from yours? Perhaps reread the book in light of these criticisms instead relying on your emotional memory. 

 

You appear to ignore my plain categorical complaint. Again: In UPB no single agent can possibly be moral. Just because the book makes attempt to define away the problem (p. 64+)  doesn't actually address the problem. 

 

You attack my understanding of metaphysics and epistemology. I haven't got perfect knowledge of those subjects. Clearly neither do you else you would have grasped my point regarding concept formation. Integrate and  abstract are indeed intermediate-level epistemological terms with relevant meanings. 

 

It is for these reasons that I think this shall be my last response to you. My experience of reading your replies has been that you aren't comprehending my sentences. You saying I'm 'making shit up' by which I understand that you are offended because you think I'm putting forth falsehoods and you want me to 'shut up' as a result.  All this, I think,  because you lack curiosity and want me to persuade you. I'm not responsible for whether your view of reality is accurate, neither you mine. Good day.

[Kevin Beal]

You wrote that instead of starting with reality one should start from logic. Do you then think that logic is separate from reality? Or 'above' reality? Or any other nonsense?

I don't think that logic is separate from reality, and evidence clearly trumps internally consistent logic. I'm just saying that you focus on the logic first because if the logic is wrong, then evidence doesn't matter. Evidence doesn't make errors in logic magically become not-errors.

 

If you say or suggest that there are errors in UPB but don't elaborate on what they are, and resist elaborating, and make me out to be presumptive or entitled to your time and effort for asking for elaboration, then there just aren't any errors. You are making it up.

 

It's not reasonable to ask me to reread UPB with all your adjectives and vague implications in mind simply to verify your assertions. I guarantee I've read it many more times than you have, remember the quotations you provided in context and have a far deeper understanding of the theory than you do. I could be wrong and you could be right, but without providing arguments, I'm just not going to do your work for you.

 

But clearly we aren't making progress here, so discontinuing is wise on your part.