UPB - A Scientific Approach to Evaluating Moral Propositions

[EclecticIdealist]

I have a number of issues with UPB, some of which have been mentioned by others before.  Having read a number of the threads, I have been only partially satisfied with the responses, and so I wish to elicit a response from others as to whether I misunderstand what Stefan has intended, or whether these are in fact legitimate criticisms which need to be addressed with respect to UPB.
 
Stefan acknowledges the Humean distinction between "is" and "ought", and yet despite this acknowledgement, UPB on the face of it seems to be an attempt to derive an objective "ought" from a subjective "is", or put another way, to transform that which is inherently subjective, aesthetics and ethics, into that which is objective, facts, and truths.
 
I believe Stefan makes a gravely fatal misstep in his attempt to define "a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical, and true".
 
The Universal Prevalence of a belief does not make it true. Consensus does not change that which is subjective (beliefs, perceptions, and preferences) into that which is objective (facts, relationships, and truths). It was once a nearly universal belief that the sun, moon, and stars moved around a fixed and immovable earth, and yet the universal prevalence of such a belief did not make it true.
 
This is not to suggest that I believe there is little to no value in UPB. To the contrary, I believe the scientific approach to evaluating moral propositions is very useful and can in fact be used to illuminate either the general irrationality in various moral systems, or the revelation of underlying, potentially suspect ideals or values which inform a moral system.
 
Another short-coming in UPB is the lack of explanation as to why some cultures view certain UPB as enforceable whereas others do not and how we can know whether they should be enforceably prohibited, such as the behaviors of adultery, homosexuality, fornication, incest, and various other sexual prohibitions. From the standpoint of UPB, the aforementioned behaviors fall within the realm of aesthetically evil, bad or wrong; however, from the standpoint of Islam ancient Judaism, and other cultures, these are all enforceable moral evils, often punishable by death. UPB does not address why its standard of avoidability is necessarily the correct standard for distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable universal preferences, rather than, for example, the adherence to the will of the majority (e.g., the majority consider rape evil and wrong, but don't think the prohibition should be enforced rendering rape aesthetically evil in the same way that insulting and verbally demeaning a person is aesthetically evil).
 
I am interested in any comments as to where I might have misunderstood UPB or where my critique may be based on factual inaccuracies.

[Koroviev]

I agree with Mike that you calling in would be the best course of action and I always find those calls extremely enlightening, but here's my 2 cents worth.

 

Stefan acknowledges the Humean distinction between "is" and "ought", and yet despite this acknowledgement, UPB on the face of it seems to be an attempt to derive an objective "ought" from a subjective "is", or put another way, to transform that which is inherently subjective, aesthetics and ethics, into that which is objective, facts, and truths.

 

If I recall correctly Stef actually mentions in a recent call-in show (I don't remember which at the moment) that part of the point of UPB was to show that you can indeed derive an is from an ought and that the argument you cannot get an is from an ought may not hold entirely true (If I'm misquoting I apologize it's not intended).

 

 

I believe Stefan makes a gravely fatal misstep in his attempt to define "a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical, and true".

 

Not sure if this is meant to be an argument but, just in case, it's not.

 

 

The Universal Prevalence of a belief does not make it true. Consensus does not change that which is subjective (beliefs, perceptions, and preferences) into that which is objective (facts, relationships, and truths). It was once a nearly universal belief that the sun, moon, and stars moved around a fixed and immovable earth, and yet the universal prevalence of such a belief did not make it true.

 

This is a misrepresentation, and I think a common misunderstanding, of the argument. By it's very definition a moral must be universalizable. It is not that it is moral because it is universal. If you want to say that something is immoral it must be able to be immoral for everyone otherwise you are saying that some people should not do x which would make that a preference. Therefor if it cannot be universalizable it cannot be a moral. 

 

 

Another short-coming in UPB is the lack of explanation as to why some cultures view certain UPB as enforceable whereas others do not and how we can know whether they should be enforceably prohibited, such as the behaviors of adultery, homosexuality, fornication, incest, and various other sexual prohibitions. From the standpoint of UPB, the aforementioned behaviors fall within the realm of aesthetically evil, bad or wrong; however, from the standpoint of Islam ancient Judaism, and other cultures, these are all enforceable moral evils, often punishable by death. UPB does not address why its standard of avoidability is necessarily the correct standard for distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable universal preferences, rather than, for example, the adherence to the will of the majority (e.g., the majority consider rape evil and wrong, but don't think the prohibition should be enforced rendering rape aesthetically evil in the same way that insulting and verbally demeaning a person is aesthetically evil).

 

I'm not entirely sure I understand what you are saying here, but I think it may be another misunderstanding of the argument. It is not whether or not cultures choose to enforce something that makes it fall under the category of enforceable, but whether or not it is possible to enforce the moral commandment. For instance to say that it is immoral to think about purple rabbits would be invalid according to the UPB framework because you cannot stop people from thinking about purple rabbits, in fact if you say purple rabbits enough people can't even stop themselves from thinking about purple rabbits. Thus thinking about purple rabbits cannot be deemed immoral because it is not possible to enforce people to not think about them. As opposed to the initiation of the use of force which can be stopped through ostracism, and other measures.

 

Hope this helps!

[Mister Mister]

Stefan acknowledges the Humean distinction between "is" and "ought", and yet despite this acknowledgement, UPB on the face of it seems to be an attempt to derive an objective "ought" from a subjective "is", or put another way, to transform that which is inherently subjective, aesthetics and ethics, into that which is objective, facts, and truths.

  Any time you are using the word "seems" in a philosophical context, pause and reflect, you may be on shaky grounds.  The foundation of UPB, as I understand, is that, though it is true that morality does not refer to anything in reality: "should" statements don't compel matter in the same way gravity or electricity does, "rights" are not a property of human beings the way hair-color or warm-bloodedness is, in order to make "is" statements, you must refer to certain "oughts".  Furthermore, in order to engage in a rational debate, you are assuming particular "oughts".  Hume's very argument implies an ought, in that he is saying "oughts don't exist in reality, therefore you OUGHT not to apply them to human behavior!!!!". 

[ObserveandReport]

Is from ought....Hume points out that in laying the groundwork for a moral schema, people often list a number of facts ("is" statements) but will then begin speaking about how things should be ("ought" statements) and he sees no reason why they can do this without explanation. Hume may have though that this means there are no principles which bridge this gap. I did my senior thesis on this exact subject. One philosopher, (I forget his name) suggests that most modern theories themselves contain either explicit or implicit bridge principles. These theories include Utilitarianism, Deontolgy, and strong Pareto principles (think Stefan's two guys in a room). Others (Charles Pidgen) suggest that such principles are either nonexistent or trivial. If I am recalling correctly he asserts that deonotological requirements (universality) are not what bridge "is" and "ought" but are necessary conditions of morality if it is coherent. 

[EclecticIdealist]

Previously I wrote: "The Universal Prevalence of a belief does not make it true. Consensus does not change that which is subjective (beliefs, perceptions, and preferences) into that which is objective (facts, relationships, and truths). ..."

This is a misrepresentation, and I think a common misunderstanding, of the argument. By its very definition a moral must be universalizable. It is not that it is moral because it is universal. If you want to say that something is immoral it must be able to be immoral for everyone otherwise you are saying that some people should not do x which would make that a preference. Therefor if it cannot be universalizable it cannot be a moral.

I fully understand the premise of universal applicability as one of the conditions of UPB. Universal applicability is what puts the lie to the illusory, rationally inconsistent reversal of morals in the "null zone" so common in governments violating the NAP, for example. However, for something to be UPB, it must not only be universally applicable, that is to say, applicable to all members of society; but for something to be deemed, UPB, it must also be a universally held (or rather a nearly universally held) preference of behavior. If the behavior is not preferred by all, or nearly all people, it cannot properly be deemed a universally preferred behavior or UPB, and presumably, it cannot be deemed either a moral prescription or moral prohibition. Instead, it falls within the realm of a commonly held, but not universal personal preference. There are a number of things which fall into the category of common, but not universally common preferable behavior. Among such behaviors are the prohibitions against drinking, smoking, obtaining body piercings and tattoos, gambling, and so on.

I wrote: "Another short-coming in UPB is the lack of explanation as to why some cultures view certain UPB as enforceable whereas others do not and how we can know whether they should be enforceably prohibited..."

It is not whether or not cultures choose to enforce something that makes it fall under the category of enforceable, but whether or not it is possible to enforce the moral commandment.

Again, I understand what you're saying here, You're speaking to the internal consistency and nature of the moral proposition pertaining to a particular behavior. However, I am attempting to point out that there are certain behaviors which some cultures deem unavoidable and therefore enforceable, and which other cultures deem either avoidable or not Universally prohibited. I am attempting to obtain clarification how UPB explains the lack of universal agreement as to which behaviors are avoidable and which are not (and therefore enforceable) or whether such is purely an example of a corrupt moral system.
 

"... in order to make "is" statements, you must refer to certain "oughts".  Furthermore, in order to engage in a rational debate, you are assuming particular "oughts".  Hume's very argument implies an ought, in that he is saying "oughts don't exist in reality, therefore you OUGHT not to apply them to human behavior!!!!".

Actually, that is not what Hume was saying at all. Hume was saying that one cannot get an "ought" solely from what "is", using reason or rationality alone, that one must also appeal to non-rational sentiment (as I believe Stefan is doing with UPB).  
 

One philosopher, (I forget his name) suggests that most modern theories themselves contain either explicit or implicit bridge principles. These theories include Utilitarianism, Deontolgy, and strong Pareto principles (think Stefan's two guys in a room). Others (Charles Pidgen) suggest that such principles are either nonexistent or trivial. If I am recalling correctly he asserts that deonotological requirements (universality) are not what bridge "is" and "ought" but are necessary conditions of morality if it is coherent.

I would say I completely concur with your assessment as stated above.

[Koroviev]

Previously I wrote: "The Universal Prevalence of a belief does not make it true. Consensus does not change that which is subjective (beliefs, perceptions, and preferences) into that which is objective (facts, relationships, and truths). ..."

I fully understand the premise of universal applicability as one of the conditions of UPB. Universal applicability is what puts the lie to the illusory, rationally inconsistent reversal of morals in the "null zone" so common in governments violating the NAP, for example. However, for something to be UPB, it must not only be universally applicable, that is to say, applicable to all members of society; but for something to be deemed, UPB, it must also be a universally held (or rather a nearly universally held) preference of behavior. If the behavior is not preferred by all, or nearly all people, it cannot properly be deemed a universally preferred behavior or UPB, and presumably, it cannot be deemed either a moral prescription or moral prohibition. Instead, it falls within the realm of a commonly held, but not universal personal preference. There are a number of things which fall into the category of common, but not universally common preferable behavior. Among such behaviors are the prohibitions against drinking, smoking, obtaining body piercings and tattoos, gambling, and so on.

 

If what you are saying is correct then murder would fail universality as well. The question is not if something is universally preferred it is if it is possible for said action to be universally preferred.

 

I wrote: "Another short-coming in UPB is the lack of explanation as to why some cultures view certain UPB as enforceable whereas others do not and how we can know whether they should be enforceably prohibited..."

Again, I understand what you're saying here, You're speaking to the internal consistency and nature of the moral proposition pertaining to a particular behavior. However, I am attempting to point out that there are certain behaviors which some cultures deem unavoidable and therefore enforceable, and which other cultures deem either avoidable or not Universally prohibited. I am attempting to obtain clarification how UPB explains the lack of universal agreement as to which behaviors are avoidable and which are not (and therefore enforceable) or whether such is purely an example of a corrupt moral system.

 

See above. If a moral changed based on a culture then it would be subjective.

[jpahmad]

 but for something to be deemed, UPB, it must also be a universally held (or rather a nearly universally held) preference of behavior. If the behavior is not preferred by all, or nearly all people, it cannot properly be deemed a universally preferred behavior or UPB, and presumably, it cannot be deemed either a moral prescription or moral prohibition.

 

 

I thinK you're fundamentally misunderstanding the concept.  For something to be UPB, it certainly doesn't have to be accepted or followed by everyone.  A moral behavior must be able to be universalized without logical contradiction.  This leaves only a handful of negative moral obligations that can be considered candidates for moral rules, such as, DON'T MURDER or DON'T STEAL.  

[EclecticIdealist]

The question is ... if it is possible for said action to be universally preferred.

By this, I am inferring that you mean if it is possible for a particular action to be preferable by multiple individuals simultaneously as a proof of the rational consistency of the proposition of a universally held prohibition (or prescription). Referring to the mental exercise of two men in a room.  Two men in a room cannot both hold that murder is good without likewise holding that to be murdered is also good; but this is in fact a possibility. If both propositions are true, then there is rational consistency. To kill another without justification is perfectly acceptable and good from the standpoint of a murderer, as well as a "good way to die" for a victim. Resisting such a virtuous act could also be good; however not resisting or embracing the virtuous act of murder could also be considered unvirtuous if surrender, eschewing violence, self-sacrifice and suicide are considered immoral acts.

 

My point is, that there can be rational consistency without empirical consistency, and even if a moral proposition passes the test of universal consistency, it may nevertheless fail the test of empirical consistency (does it happen in material reality?)

 

If a moral changed based on a culture then it would be subjective.

That is exactly what I'm getting at. All morals are subjective--the collective, subjective ethics of a given society. The only thing we can really discern is whether they are consistent and rational, or inconsistent and non-rational or possibly even irrational.

[EclecticIdealist]

I thinK you're fundamentally misunderstanding the concept.  For something to be UPB, it certainly doesn't have to be accepted or followed by everyone.  A moral behavior must be able to be universalized without logical contradiction.  This leaves only a handful of negative moral obligations that can be considered candidates for moral rules, such as, DON'T MURDER or DON'T STEAL.  

According to UPB, in two of his five proofs in his book, the term universal indicates ubiquity of preference. And while it is not necessary for absolutely everyone to hold such a belief, nearly everyone should for behavior to be properly termed "universal" in the sense of being ubiquitous.  So while I don't disagree with what you're stating about the proposition necessarily needing to be rationally universally applicable, I am suggesting that such is necessary, but insufficient for it to be UPB and a moral. There are other propositions which can be rationally universally applicable, but because they are not ubiquitously prevalent in some societies, they are merely personal preference; whereas in others they are at least aesthetically taboo, and in some cases deemed to be inherently harmful to society (unavoidable) and therefore immoral.  Some of these propositions include the prohibitions against the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, fornication, homosexuality, and gambling to name some of the most common depending upon what society one lives in.

If what you are saying is correct then murder would fail universality as well. The question is not if something is universally preferred it is if it is possible for said action to be universally preferred.

 

It would fail complete universal prevalence, yes. But that does not seem to be a problem for UPB according to Stefan. If something is nearly universally regarded as preferable, that is sufficient to be regarded as UPB. It need not be absolutely universally prevalent.

 

If a moral changed based on a culture then it would be subjective.

Yes, that is exactly my point. Empirically speaking, that is precisely what the evidence indicates as well. Depending upon the culture, something may be immoral or aesthetically taboo, and in another culture a matter of personal preference or in some cases, an aesthetic good, or even a moral good (such as the ritual killing of animals).

[ObserveandReport]

 

Any thoughts on the is/ought problem?

[Des]

I am interested in any comments as to where I might have misunderstood UPB

If there are atheists who say "Government is good" and "Those who oppose the institution of government are evil", how can you test those statements, so you know if they are true or false?

 

My take on UPB is that there is only one universal preference, which is the preference to stay alive. If a person does not have that, then, like a horse which does not have 4 legs, we don't count that as a disproof of the biological universality of 4-legged horses or the biological universality of the will-to-live, but as an instance of defect.

 

It is the will-to-live that drives our preference for not having our bodies killed, assaulted, or deprived (e.g. by theft) of the goods needed to sustain life.

 

I estimate that the best way to conceptualise morality is to ask what rules you could sign up to if they applied to you and all other signatories - specifically to ask what rules must be included, for you to have a deal that is compatible with your preference for life. If the aggressions [Murder, assault, theft] are not prohibited for all signatories, then you have a deal in which you could lose your life, negating all possible benefits.

 

UPB (plus Hoppe's covenant community proposal) informed the above paragraph, and the above paragraph succinctly describes the test you would apply, to determine what actions objectively are evil, and distinguish them from those which can be considered evil by a particular group of signatories. So, that is a neater-than-UPB way to wrap up the complexities of evil, is it not?

[EclecticIdealist]

If there are atheists who say "Government is good" and "Those who oppose the institution of government are evil", how can you test those statements, so you know if they are true or false?

These statements are neither objectively true or false, except in relation to a particular individual's moral judgement, or the collective moral judgement of society, both of which are subjective.

 

I estimate that the best way to conceptualize morality is to ask what rules you could sign up to if they applied to you and all other signatories - specifically to ask what rules must be included, for you to have a deal that is compatible with your preference for life. If the aggressions [Murder, assault, theft] are not prohibited for all signatories, then you have a deal in which you could lose your life, negating all possible benefits.

This is certainly a good rule of thumb for determining what morals (and laws based upon those morals) may be deemed proper and acceptable. The trouble lies in conflicts of interest... for example. Would you sign on to a rule that says any member of society unable to provide for themselves has to be supported by the society, or Is it moral for society to allow the weak to perish from starvation, thirst, lack of shelter, and so on? What obligations, if any, exist towards those members of society who are unable to care for themselves? How are those obligations to be met if certain members of society refuse to give of their substance to support the weak and incapable? How does one reconcile these positive obligations (if they even exist) with the moral prohibitions against theft (for example)?

Any thoughts on the is/ought problem?

I agree with Hume.  One cannot get to ought from an is through rational means alone, and one cannot derive a moral prescription or moral prohibition for society without first assuming specific preferences. In the case of UPB as set forth by Stefan, the unspoken, underlying preference is for Universal Liberty. For a society based on Islam, the underlying value would be submission to the will of Allah as defined by his prophet in the Koran. For the Christian, it would be a society based on the Holy Bible. None of these systems are the true morality any more than Chocolate is the true superior flavor. Nevertheless, various moral propositions can be tested to determine whether they rationally support the ideals they are intended to support or not.

[ObserveandReport]

 

I agree with Hume.  One cannot get to ought from an is through rational means alone, and one cannot derive a moral prescription or moral prohibition for society without first assuming specific preferences. In the case of UPB as set forth by Stefan, the unspoken, underlying preference is for Universal Liberty. For a society based on Islam, the underlying value would be submission to the will of Allah as defined by his prophet in the Koran. For the Christian, it would be a society based on the Holy Bible. None of these systems are the true morality any more than Chocolate is the true superior flavor. Nevertheless, various moral propositions can be tested to determine whether they rationally support the ideals they are intended to support or not.

The trick is, whether or not certain principles can bridge the gap between moral and nonmoral statements i.e, "That which gives the most pleasure to the greatest number of people is best." or "That behavior which respects property and the NAP will always be good". In other words, we know there are moral statements "unjustified killing is wrong" and non moral statements "knives cut things", but might their be quasi-moral statements which bridge these realms and are neither one nor the other?

[Will Torbald]

I have a number of issues with UPB, some of which have been mentioned by others before.  Having read a number of the threads, I have been only partially satisfied with the responses, and so I wish to elicit a response from others as to whether I misunderstand what Stefan has intended, or whether these are in fact legitimate criticisms which need to be addressed with respect to UPB.

 

Stefan acknowledges the Humean distinction between "is" and "ought", and yet despite this acknowledgement, UPB on the face of it seems to be an attempt to derive an objective "ought" from a subjective "is", or put another way, to transform that which is inherently subjective, aesthetics and ethics, into that which is objective, facts, and truths.

 

I believe Stefan makes a gravely fatal misstep in his attempt to define "a methodology for validating moral theories that is objective, consistent, clear, rational, empirical, and true".

 

The Universal Prevalence of a belief does not make it true. Consensus does not change that which is subjective (beliefs, perceptions, and preferences) into that which is objective (facts, relationships, and truths). It was once a nearly universal belief that the sun, moon, and stars moved around a fixed and immovable earth, and yet the universal prevalence of such a belief did not make it true.

 

This is not to suggest that I believe there is little to no value in UPB. To the contrary, I believe the scientific approach to evaluating moral propositions is very useful and can in fact be used to illuminate either the general irrationality in various moral systems, or the revelation of underlying, potentially suspect ideals or values which inform a moral system.

 

Another short-coming in UPB is the lack of explanation as to why some cultures view certain UPB as enforceable whereas others do not and how we can know whether they should be enforceably prohibited, such as the behaviors of adultery, homosexuality, fornication, incest, and various other sexual prohibitions. From the standpoint of UPB, the aforementioned behaviors fall within the realm of aesthetically evil, bad or wrong; however, from the standpoint of Islam ancient Judaism, and other cultures, these are all enforceable moral evils, often punishable by death. UPB does not address why its standard of avoidability is necessarily the correct standard for distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable universal preferences, rather than, for example, the adherence to the will of the majority (e.g., the majority consider rape evil and wrong, but don't think the prohibition should be enforced rendering rape aesthetically evil in the same way that insulting and verbally demeaning a person is aesthetically evil).

 

I am interested in any comments as to where I might have misunderstood UPB or where my critique may be based on factual inaccuracies.

 

UPB argues that if you try to evaluate the propotition "you ought to initiate force to be moral" you would not be able to make it a universal moral rule, but "you ought not initiate force" is perfectly universal and rationally consistent (empirically possible and logically accurate). Which doesn't mean it is universally believed, nor that it has to be believed universally for it to still be a valid statement.

 

On the second topic of why different cultures have different moralities, it's not UPB's fault. It's the fault of their own lack of rational consistency. Those cultures formed on the base of opinion, not on the base of rigurous philosophical argumentation. It is their opinion to enforce or tolerate certain morals, but so what?

[EclecticIdealist]

The trick is, whether or not certain principles can bridge the gap between moral and nonmoral statements ... but might there be quasi-moral statements which bridge these realms and are neither one nor the other?

Bridging statements cannot remove the inherent subjectivity of preference. All they can do is shift it from preference for an action to preference for an ideal which the action rationally supports. The judgements of "best" and "good" always come down to a matter of preference for one thing or another. Two road lead from the city to the beach. The longer one takes me on a scenic route, the other is shorter, more direct, and crowded with traffic. Which route is best? If my preference is speed, it may depend on prevailing traffic conditions, but is probably the shorter route. If my preference is for a route that is less stressful and calming, it may be the longer, scenic route.

 

"That which gives the most pleasure to the greatest number of people is best," expresses a preference for pleasure and egalitarianism or universalism.

"That behavior which respects property and the NAP will always be good," expresses a preference for individual liberty and property rights.

 

The quest for quasi-moral statements which bridge the two realms of course exist as you have just demonstrated, but these statements do not and cannot unite the two realms. You cannot change the identity of that which is inherently subjective to that which is objective. Morals, no matter how well they are tied to reason (which happens to be my preference as well as Stefan's) can never be made objective; they will always remain subjective by their very nature of being preferences, regardless of their being universally believed, applied, or attached to virtuous ideals or their vicious antithesis.

 

UPB argues that if you try to evaluate the proposition "you ought to initiate force to be moral" you would not be able to make it a universal moral rule, but "you ought not initiate force" is perfectly universal and rationally consistent (empirically possible and logically accurate). Which doesn't mean it is universally believed, nor that it has to be believed universally for it to still be a valid statement.

I don't disagree with anything you've said here. Essentially, you demonstrated what Stefan has in his book, that a moral principle can be proven to rationally comply with specific ideals. The morality which Stefan proposes under UPB assumes a preference for Individual Liberty, Equity, Universality, and Rationality (these ideals or values I happen to hold as well). UPB evaluates moral propositions based upon these ideals to determine whether they conform to these ideals or not, and proves that the most common moral values do rationally flow from preferences for these ideals.

 

Nevertheless, and the point i think you were trying to make is that Universal in UPB applies to the applicability of a moral proposition to all persons, and while that is true, it is not the only way Stefan uses the term Universal. He also uses the term in the sense of believed, shared, or held by all (or nearly all) in what seems to me to be an attempt to move from subjectivity to objectivity. I might be mistaken on this point, but that is what I have gleaned from reading and rereading, and analyzing the relevant passages on the subject in his book. 

 

On the second topic of why different cultures have different moralities, it's not UPB's fault. It's the fault of their own lack of rational consistency. Those cultures formed on the base of opinion, not on the base of rigorous philosophical argumentation. It is their opinion to enforce or tolerate certain morals, but so what?

In looking back, I did not express my concern particularly well in this regard. What I am attempting to say is this: Stefan regards the moral instinct or empirical sense of morality rather highly, as do I. I believe that instinct largely, but not exclusively, informs the culture which defines the societal morals in the different societies around the world. Various different societies consider various different moral propositions differently and consider certain questions which UPB does not seem to consider, such as, "is this good for the whole, not just the individual?" I am pondering whether a moral system I would adhere to and advocate others should adhere to should consider the needs of the community or society as a whole, or whether it should only focus on the needs of the individual. I know which way I lean, but I am somewhat pulled in a different direction.

[ObserveandReport]

Bridging statements cannot remove the inherent subjectivity of preference. All they can do is shift it from preference for an action to preference for an ideal which the action rationally supports. The judgements of "best" and "good" always come down to a matter of preference for one thing or another. Two road lead from the city to the beach. The longer one takes me on a scenic route, the other is shorter, more direct, and crowded with traffic. Which route is best? If my preference is speed, it may depend on prevailing traffic conditions, but is probably the shorter route. If my preference is for a route that is less stressful and calming, it may be the longer, scenic route.

 

"That which gives the most pleasure to the greatest number of people is best," expresses a preference for pleasure and egalitarianism or universalism.

"That behavior which respects property and the NAP will always be good," expresses a preference for individual liberty and property rights.

 

The quest for quasi-moral statements which bridge the two realms of course exist as you have just demonstrated, but these statements do not and cannot unite the two realms. You cannot change the identity of that which is inherently subjective to that which is objective. Morals, no matter how well they are tied to reason (which happens to be my preference as well as Stefan's) can never be made objective; they will always remain subjective by their very nature of being preferences, regardless of their being universally believed, applied, or attached to virtuous ideals or their vicious antithesis.

 

If there are bridging principles, then there is no problem going from statements about what is to what ought to be. There's no need to invoke the "inherent subjectivity of preference." You are throwing around the word "preference" a bit, no? Those bridging principles themselves don't show preferences for anything. You are just restating the moral segments using different words and slapping "preference for..." in front of it. "Adding properly requires the sum of the involved numbers." This is an evaluative statement, but it doesn't show a preference.

[EclecticIdealist]

If there are bridging principles, then there is no problem going from statements about what is to what ought to be.

There's no problem if you're not claiming an objective standard of morality. If on the other hand, you are claiming an objective moral standard, then bridging principles will not remove the subjectivity from inherently subjective preferences, and so the problem remains.

 

There's no need to invoke the "inherent subjectivity of preference." You are throwing around the word "preference" a bit, no?

I'm not making any invocations, I am merely pointing out what seems not to be obvious.

 

Those bridging principles themselves don't show preferences for anything. You are just restating the moral segments using different words and slapping "preference for..." in front of it.

No, I am pointing out that the proposed bridging statements are nothing more than moral propositions which assume certain preferences for ideals or values.

 

One can evaluate the proposition and determine whether or not it is a behavior that is held as preferable (or deplorable) by nearly everyone; or merely a personal preference or aversion, whether or not it can be rationally universally applicable, and whether or not the behavior itself is sufficiently avoidable to be considered an aesthetic, or whether it is inherently an unavoidable use of force and therefore a moral rule according to UPB.

 

The UPB framework is essentially a means of evaluating moral propositions to determine, not if they are part of an objective moral standard, but rather, if they conform to a rational moral standard which exclusively idealizes Universal Individual Liberty, Proportional Response. While this is a moral standard (or at least part of a moral standard) that I and most libertarians consider to be superior or "the best" for mankind to live under, it is not the only possible moral standard. It is also not an objectively true moral standard as all moral standards are inherently subjective preferences for one hierarchy of ideals or another, no matter how prevalent or even universal the preference for that moral standard might be.

 

One could, for example conceive of a moral standard that is not based on the Ideals of Universal Liberty and Proportionate Response, but instead upon the Ideals of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or any other Religious Ideology. Alternatively, one could conceive of a moral standard based on the ideals proposed by Karl Marx, or Medieval Feudalism, or some other socio-political ideal. Such moral standards might not be as rationally consistent as UPB, but tests could be devised to determine whether and how various moral propositions would fit into such standards. 

 

"Adding properly requires the sum of the involved numbers." This is an evaluative statement, but it doesn't show a preference.

No, "Adding properly requires the sum of the involved numbers." is not an preferentially evaluative statement, it is a descriptive or declarative statement. The term "properly" indicates, not a preferred method, but rather, a correct method (as opposed to an incorrect method), or in short, an objective fact rather than an objective falsehood.

 

 

[ObserveandReport]

There's no problem if you're not claiming an objective standard of morality. If on the other hand, you are claiming an objective moral standard, then bridging principles will not remove the subjectivity from inherently subjective preferences, and so the problem remains.

 

I'm not making any invocations, I am merely pointing out what seems not to be obvious.

 

No, I am pointing out that the proposed bridging statements are nothing more than moral propositions which assume certain preferences for ideals or values.

 

One can evaluate the proposition and determine whether or not it is a behavior that is held as preferable (or deplorable) by nearly everyone; or merely a personal preference or aversion, whether or not it can be rationally universally applicable, and whether or not the behavior itself is sufficiently avoidable to be considered an aesthetic, or whether it is inherently an unavoidable use of force and therefore a moral rule according to UPB.

 

The UPB framework is essentially a means of evaluating moral propositions to determine, not if they are part of an objective moral standard, but rather, if they conform to a rational moral standard which exclusively idealizes Universal Individual Liberty, Proportional Response. While this is a moral standard (or at least part of a moral standard) that I and most libertarians consider to be superior or "the best" for mankind to live under, it is not the only possible moral standard. It is also not an objectively true moral standard as all moral standards are inherently subjective preferences for one hierarchy of ideals or another, no matter how prevalent or even universal the preference for that moral standard might be.

 

One could, for example conceive of a moral standard that is not based on the Ideals of Universal Liberty and Proportionate Response, but instead upon the Ideals of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or any other Religious Ideology. Alternatively, one could conceive of a moral standard based on the ideals proposed by Karl Marx, or Medieval Feudalism, or some other socio-political ideal. Such moral standards might not be as rationally consistent as UPB, but tests could be devised to determine whether and how various moral propositions would fit into such standards. 

 

No, "Adding properly requires the sum of the involved numbers." is not an preferentially evaluative statement, it is a descriptive or declarative statement. The term "properly" indicates, not a preferred method, but rather, a correct method (as opposed to an incorrect method), or in short, an objective fact rather than an objective falsehood.

 

 

Multiple methods of achieving the "good" wouldn't necessarily require a single answer, yet saying that doesn't plunge one into moral relativism. Sam Harris, in his book "A Moral Landscape," describes absolute senses of peaks and valleys, yet there being multiple peaks and multiple valleys. There is nothing subjective about a continuum of ideas and possibilities. So I'll grant you that being certain that one's specific principles are the only diviners of what is "right" may be overreaching. Again, that doesn't mean everything is subjective when it comes to morality. Imagine "the good" is an actual mountain. There are are right ways to get to the peak and wrong ways and some ways which are more productive than others. That doesn't make scaling the mountain subjective. Mind you, this is not the attitude of UPB or anyone here as I have yet seen. 

[EclecticIdealist]

Multiple methods of achieving the "good" wouldn't necessarily require a single answer, yet saying that doesn't plunge one into moral relativism. Sam Harris, in his book "A Moral Landscape," describes absolute senses of peaks and valleys, yet there being multiple peaks and multiple valleys. There is nothing subjective about a continuum of ideas and possibilities. So I'll grant you that being certain that one's specific principles are the only diviners of what is "right" may be overreaching. Again, that doesn't mean everything is subjective when it comes to morality. Imagine "the good" is an actual mountain. There are are right ways to get to the peak and wrong ways and some ways which are more productive than others. That doesn't make scaling the mountain subjective.

In speaking of "the good", one is speaking of an ideal state of being. Referring to "the good" as though it is an objective truth is making an error similar to stating that objective facts such as the law of identity or the facts of existence are merely subjective preferences which are "only true if you want them to be true." Ideals, preferences, values, these are all subjective, whether held by an individual, or a group, or virtually all members of society.  This is not to suggest that subjective preferences do not have some basis in objective reality, nor is it to suggest that there is not an objective relationship between ideals and the moral principles which rationally achieve, or maintain them.

 

I believe our preferences and ideals have their foundation in biology and evolution, specifically in our instincts and drives which cause us to avoid pain and pursue pleasure, pursue social relationships for mutual benefit and promote the survival of our species in general and our particular genetic contribution in particular. I do not, however, suggest as the Randian Objectivists that our existence and drive to survive deterministically makes "that which is best for man's survival" an objective good. An objective good presupposes a good apart from any and all subjective preferences; and the continuance of man cannot be said to be a preference to anyone but man and those desirous of man's continued existence (or their own continued existence if such is dependent upon the existence of man).

 

As to Sam Harris' theory on morality, I would say that what he is really talking about is not morality, but virtues and ideals. By that, I mean that a moral framework establishes a specific hierarchical preference for various moral virtues and principles which objectively promote ideals such as the further existence, well-being, and happiness of those who adhere to them and those who are directly and indirectly affected by such behavior. The subjectivity comes from the preferential ordering or hierarchy of these virtues.

 

Mankind's continued existence, physical and psychological well-being, and happiness and other such ideals can be referenced as measurements of elevation on a graph. Which ideal or virtue you prefer most, second most, third most, and so on determines your individual moral standard. What a society collectively prefers determines its moral standard, and so on. Some moral systems are inherently better than others at maximizing the longevity, or well-being, or happiness of some or all members of society or some other particular ideal or ideals. A way might be discerned to judge the relative merits of various different moral systems. What cannot be determined, however, is whether there exists a system which is objectively the best unless it can be determined that a particular moral system maximizes all virtues better than any other system maximizes any single virtue or set of virtues (which seems unlikely, but not out of the realm of possibility). Even this might not be considered the best by some if certain ideals or virtues are maximized more than others.

 

Nevertheless, speaking of "The Good" as if such an ambiguous, abstract, subjective concept is actually a discrete tangible or rational fact is every bit as much an error as speaking of "The Truth" as it if is merely a subjective opinion, perspective, or preference rather than the description or mental equivalent of an objective tangible or rational fact. Yes, truth can be absolute, or approximate or describe a causal, spatial, or temporal relationship which in some cases may appear at first glance to be subjective; however, when it comes to the truth, the subjective can be removed without destroying the facts, the subjective cannot be removed from the ideal, preference, or value without destroying the ideal, preference, or value.