How can I argue this?

[dzc4627]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

 

[dsayers]

Objective morality is easy. Theft is using one's property to deny another the use of their property. Assault and rape are using one's body to deprive another the use of their body. Murder is using one's life to deprive another the use of their life. There is no escaping that these four behaviors are objectively internally inconsistent. The person engaging in theft, assault, rape, and murder are simultaneously accepting and rejecting property rights. The consistency of matter and energy tells us that something cannot be itself and the opposite of itself at the same time.

 

It is true that value is subjective. Anybody that thinks morality is subjective does so because religions and governments have co-opted the word in an attempt to manipulate people into doing what they want. To those entities, morality is subjective. But such a morality would be meaningless.

[EclecticIdealist]

Objectively morality is an illusion every bit as much as absolute subjective truths. The two simply do not exist materially or rationally. What does exist is rationally consistent moral systems (such as the one proposed by Stefan in UPB). Nevertheless, rational consistency is not the same thing as objectively true.

 

The best that one can hope to accomplish is the definition and promotion of a rational moral system that is universally applicable (egalitarian), universally (or nearly so) held or preferred, and supports one's highest ideals and virtues (such as universal liberty and the respect for private property). While the ideal of universal liberty is by no means an objective truth, the implementation and practice of such a moral system by a significant majority of members of a society can nevertheless be shown to offer the greatest opportunity for the greatest number of people to enjoy happy and productive lives. Such opportunity and adherence can be rationally and empirically shown to be the system most likely to lead to the greatest happiness, greatest productivity, and greatest increases in objectively measurable standards of quality of life. If these moral ideals and the resultant consequences of their being followed appeals to you and everyone else, then such a system is the best one for you and everyone else to follow. If not, then you can rest assured that you will find yourself in conflict with the members of society whose ideals you do not share, and if you are not sufficiently strong or clever, you will succumb to the will of those who are.

 

 

[regevdl]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

 

I think start by always defining terms.  They gave you a description of what morality isn't but they need to give their definition of morality.  Are they actually saying that morality is defined as 'no fixed poles or right or wrong..." etc?  or is that to suggest they don't see morality existing at all? 

 

If they admit morality exists then they must give their clear definition of morality and you can go forward more easily from there.  Sometimes taking a step back helps move the conversation forward so you can make your rational arguments rather than stepping into people's hardened mid-thought, if that makes sense.  

 

If you can get their definition of morality, share it here and maybe we can help you from that point with the case you want to make against it.  

[Jot]

Theft using one's property to deny another the use of their property. Assault and rape are using one's body to deprive another the use of their body. Murder is using one's life to deprive another the use of their life. There is no escaping that these four behaviors are objectively internally inconsistent. The person engaging in theft, assault, rape, and murder are simultaneously accepting and rejecting property rights. The consistency of matter and energy tells us that something cannot be itself and the opposite of itself at the same time.

 

 

Why is using one's property to deny another the use of their property internally inconsistent?

[ValueOfBrevity]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

'Universally Preferable Behavior' describes a pragmatic morality based on the non-initiation of force.

In short, by accepting that reality is objective and that truth can be arrived at through debate, we accept debate as the preferable path to truth. 

 

I have always found NAP itself quite simple; I wonder what you find difficult to classify morally?

 

[Des]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

I start from my starting point: I want to be alive. There are other people who also want to be alive. I'm willing to make treaty with other people to restrict my actions in return for them restricting theirs. Why? So I am not robbed to death or assaulted to death or defrauded to death or murdered at least by these [good] people. So I reduce my costs of defence, because I can identify the dangerous people as those who have no treaty with me.

 

Given the starting point of a preference for life, it can be objectively computed that a treaty permitting theft, assault, fraud or murder is as bad as no treaty at all (for whichever dumb signatory [untermensch] would sign up a permission slip for his own demise at the hands of other people, whilst he has a preference for life {not necessarily bad for the [ubermenschen] who may rob but not be robbed in the terms of the treaty}).

 

The preference for life is not a singular world view's values. It is scientifically observable, and the exceptions do not affect the conclusion because in the realm of biological science, a horse with 5 legs does not disprove that horses have 4 legs, and a suicidal man does not disprove that men have a preference for life. Each one is an instance of a biological defect or oddity.

 

Besides, I argue that the suicidal man's preference (if hypothetically it were a true preference, not a mere temporary insanity), means that he will either take me with him to death, or not, and morality is irrelevant because he prefers to die. If I estimate I should kill him to save myself, then why shouldn't I kill him?

 

A non-aggression treaty between two trustworthy men objectively increases the security of each man with respect to attacks by the other. The only perspective needed to project that onto reality is the perspective of the non-suicidal man, and there are lots of those, nothing singular about them at all.

[dsayers]

Why is using one's property to deny another the use of their property internally inconsistent?

It is saying "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without a fundamental difference between the two that would put them in different, opposing moral categories

 

Objectively morality is an illusion.

This is an assertion. One that was made immediately after it was outlined, but without any acknowledgement of that burden of proof you take on with your assertion. That is intellectual sloth.

[EclecticIdealist]

This is an assertion. One that was made immediately after it was outlined, but without any acknowledgement of that burden of proof you take on with your assertion. That is intellectual sloth.

Actually, the assertion that must be proven is that Objective morality is anything but an illusion. Stefan attempted to prove the existence of an objective morality with UPB, but failed (in my opinion). Any morality that is based on preference is inherently subjective because preference is subjective, even if such a preference is nearly universally held by everyone and shown to be rationally (internally) and empirically (externally) consistent with observed behavior. The preference for Vanilla Ice Cream, while in the majority is by no means proof that Vanilla is objectively the best flavor of Ice Cream, it is only objectively the most preferred. Facts are objective truths, preferences are subjective opinion. Anyone who says differently is mistaken.

[dsayers]

Actually, the assertion that must be proven is that Objective morality is anything but an illusion.

As I had JUST stated, my initial post outlines the ways in which objective morality is not illusory. To post after that, without addressing that, is still intellectual sloth and at this point bias confirmation.

 

Stefan attempted to prove the existence of an objective morality with UPB, but failed (in my opinion). Any morality that is based on preference is inherently subjective because preference is subjective, even if such a preference is nearly universally held by everyone and shown to be rationally (internally) and empirically (externally) consistent with observed behavior. The preference for Vanilla Ice Cream, while in the majority is by no means proof that Vanilla is objectively the best flavor of Ice Cream, it is only objectively the most preferred. Facts are objective truths, preferences are subjective opinion.

Preference/value IS subjective. Nobody argued otherwise. (Not) liking vanilla has no bearing on the fact that theft is internally inconsistent.

 

I'm not a UPB guy. But I think another mistake you are making is conflating preferABLE with preference. They are not the same. But for simplicity's sake, let's leave the complex stuff aside and address the simple truths. Like theft is internally inconsistent. When you can prove otherwise, you can then claim that objective morality is illusory without it being an assertion.

[EclecticIdealist]

As I had JUST stated, my initial post outlines the ways in which objective morality is not illusory. To post after that, without addressing that, is still intellectual sloth.

 

Preference/value IS subjective. Nobody argued otherwise. (Not) liking vanilla has no bearing on the fact that theft is internally inconsistent.

Internal consistency, i.e., rationality, in a moral system does not make morality objective; it only makes it objectively rational. Morality is the expression of a preference for one behavior which is deemed moral over another behavior which is deemed immoral and is by its very nature or essence subjective, despite how rational its positions may be.

 

I'm not a UPB guy. But I think another mistake you are making is conflating preferABLE with preference. They are not the same.

You’ll have to explain what you mean here, as preferable directly implies a preference that is held by someone, i.e. “preferable to me”, or “preferable to the majority”. While it's true that they are not the same word, their meanings are inherently tied together, the one being an adjective describing a behavior whereas the other is a noun identifying the aforementioned behavior either specifically or generally.

 

But for simplicity's sake, let's leave the complex stuff aside and address the simple truths. Like theft is internally inconsistent. When you can prove otherwise, you can then claim that objective morality is illusory without it being an assertion.

 

I agree that the proposition “theft is good” (like the other propositions for murder, rape, etc.) is rationally inconsistent in an egalitarian moral system (i.e. one where the morals are universally applicable to all members of society), but that still only speaks to a rational moral system, not an “objectively correct” or “objectively true” moral system which is the problem which the OP is wrestling with. 

 

Objective morality is easy. Theft is using one's property to deny another the use of their property. Assault and rape are using one's body to deprive another the use of their body. Murder is using one's life to deprive another the use of their life. There is no escaping that these four behaviors are objectively internally inconsistent. The person engaging in theft, assault, rape, and murder are simultaneously accepting and rejecting property rights.

 

Again, this is not saying anything about the morality being objectively correct or true, it is only saying that a moral system that condemns these behaviors may be objectively rational, which is not the same thing as what the OP is dealing with. There are objectively rational moral systems which are not egalitarian, but rather patriarchal in nature which neither you or I would agree with, but our disagreement with them would not make them any less objectively rational, i.e., internally consistent. It has everything to do with the ideals you are promoting.

 

It is true that value is subjective. Anybody that thinks morality is subjective does so because religions and governments have co-opted the word in an attempt to manipulate people into doing what they want. To those entities, morality is subjective. But such a morality would be meaningless.

 

No. All morality is subjective and only ever has the meaning imputed to it by its adherents or detractors, not just the morality of religions and governments which attempt to dictate morality in an dictatorial or oligarchical manner. The morality you prefer is a rationally consistent libertarian morality which values universal liberty, private property, and egalitarianism. Unfortunately, not everyone in America appears to value such ideals more than the values taught to them by their religious and political institutions (not to mention, the media).

[dsayers]

Internal consistency, i.e., rationality, in a moral system does not make morality objective; it only makes it objectively rational. Morality is the expression of a preference for one behavior which is deemed moral over another behavior which is deemed immoral and is by its very nature or essence subjective, despite how rational its positions may be.

So we disagree in the definition of terms. Here, you say "Morality is the expression of..." when you mean SUBJECTIVE morality. As in the things that religions, nations, and other manipulators utilize. But as pointed out, no amount of preference will change the fact that theft is internally inconsistent. As this true statement is provable independent of individual consciousness, it is objective as opposed to subjective. Saying objectively rational in place of objective seems like a distinction without a difference. Kind of like self-sovereignty vs self-ownership

 

You’ll have to explain what you mean here

Actually, I don't. The definition of the suffix -able is well established. If you have a cell-phone that has a user replaceABLE battery, this does nothing to indicate whether or not the battery has actually been replaced.

 

I agree that the proposition “theft is good”

I've made no such proposition, so it is not me that you are agreeing with. This serves as evidence that perhaps you're bringing a different conversation to the table instead of participating in the one we are having. The OBSERVATION that I've put forth is that theft is internally inconsistent.

 

No. All morality is subjective

I don't even know how you can make this claim considering we appear to be in accordance that subjective morality is useless. The only reason to reject that theft, assault, rape, and murder are internally inconsistent as a sufficient measure for what we are capable to uphold in others' lives is if a person were interested in dominating another. I don't wish to interact with such a person. Does this describe you?

[AncapFTW]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

Define "right" and "wrong" first.  "Right" is a word generally applied to the correct action to take.  How do you judge what is the correct action, though?  Is there a definition that everyone can agree on for what is correct in any situation?

 

That's like saying that we must scientifically prove that a strawberry is red.  Yes, I could show that the primary wavelength of light reflected by it is within the "red" area of the light spectrum, but if we disagree on what part of the spectrum is the "red" area, we can't agree with each other on the color of the strawberry.

[Mister Mister]

No. All morality is subjective and only ever has the meaning imputed to it by its adherents or detractors, not just the morality of religions and governments which attempt to dictate morality in an dictatorial or oligarchical manner. The morality you prefer is a rationally consistent libertarian morality which values universal liberty, private property, and egalitarianism. Unfortunately, not everyone in America appears to value such ideals more than the values taught to them by their religious and political institutions (not to mention, the media).

 

  I agree with you.  All morality is objective.

[EclecticIdealist]

Here, you say "Morality is the expression of..." when you mean SUBJECTIVE morality…

 

No. ALL MORALITY IS SUBJECTIVE. Not Some, not most, ALL Morality is inherently Subjective. It cannot be anything other than subjective. It can be based on objectively rational principles, but it is inherently subjective because all morality is nothing more or less than preference, and preference is inherently subjective.

 

In an attempt to support your erroneous assertion that there exists an objective morality, you offer the assertion that theft is internally inconsistent. What you fail to realize or understand is that theft is only internally inconsistent if one maintains that such a prohibition is universal; that all moral laws apply to everyone equally. But that is another preference, the preference for egalitarianism; which again is inherently subjective.

 

What all morality comes down to is, “If you want X, you must Y”. If you prefer rationality, egalitarianism, and Universal liberty and property rights, then the universal prohibition against theft is rationally consistent. If you you don’t prefer egalitarianism, then a universal prohibition against theft is not rationally consistent. If you don’t want a rationally consistent universal prohibition against theft, then you must not have an egalitarian moral system.

 

Actually, I don't. The definition of the suffix -able is well established. If you have a cell-phone that has a user replaceABLE battery, this does nothing to indicate whether or not the battery has actually been replaced.

 

You have just demonstrated why you do. The definition you use is not the common, dictionary definition of the word “preferable” which is “desirable or suitable”; instead the definition you suggest with your example is “capable of being preferred”. 

 

It is true that value is subjective. Anybody that thinks morality is subjective does so because religions and governments have co-opted the word in an attempt to manipulate people into doing what they want. To those entities, morality is subjective. But such a morality would be meaningless.

 

No. Anybody that thinks morality is subjective does so because they have either been taught that it is, or reasoned out that it is. The only ones that believe it is objective are those who believe what statists, religionists, mistaken philosophers, and sophists will tell you. Morality has meaning. It is the set of prescriptions and proscriptions which are intended to support the collectively held ideals and values of a society. When the moral system is rational, it succeeds in supporting those ideals and values; when it is irrational, it often does not.

 

The only reason to reject that theft, assault, rape, and murder are internally inconsistent as a sufficient measure for what we are capable to uphold in others' lives is if a person were interested in dominating another. I don't wish to interact with such a person. Does this describe you?

 

So even though this is a shared subjective preference, you see no meaning or benefit for it because it is subjective?

[dsayers]

Nuh uh!

 

 If you prefer rationality, egalitarianism, and Universal liberty and property rights, then the universal prohibition against theft is rationally consistent.

Nobody is talking about prohibition. To prohibit somebody's behavior, you would first have to own them. Which is impossible.

 

Also, it's not about what *I* prefer. If it were, it would be subjective and meaningless to everybody but me. The person engaging in theft is telling you by way of their very behavior that they "prefer" property rights. To wit, the problem comes in specifically because their behavior is both accepting and rejecting property rights simultaneously. The consistency of matter and energy tells us that something cannot be valid and invalid simultaneously.

 

Morality has meaning. It is the set of prescriptions and proscriptions which are intended to support the collectively held ideals and values of a society.

You're referring to unchosen positive obligations, which is unethical. Another way we would know that what you're describing is useless.

 

I've already identified that we disagree on definitions. You're describing an ideological weapon while I'm describing a tool by which to measure the internal consistency of behaviors that are binding upon others. So when you pretend to disagree with me, you're not even having the same conversation as me. The objective claims I've made are true. I'm not sorry this is problematic for you.

[Will Torbald]

What all morality comes down to is, “If you want X, you must Y”. If you prefer rationality, egalitarianism, and Universal liberty and property rights, then the universal prohibition against theft is rationally consistent. If you you don’t prefer egalitarianism, then a universal prohibition against theft is not rationally consistent. If you don’t want a rationally consistent universal prohibition against theft, then you must not have an egalitarian moral system.

 

Reason doesn't bend to preference. 2+2=4 isn't a preference, it's a fact. Moral rules can only be moral if they are universal, otherwise they are opinions. All opinions are subjective, but such ideas cannot be called morality.

[EclecticIdealist]

Nobody is talking about prohibition. To prohibit somebody's behavior, you would first have to own them. Which is impossible.

I see. No such thing as crime or immorality then, unless we own the criminal committing the crime or engaging in immoral acts against us, right? Cause we can only prohibit things like theft, rape, assault, and murder if we own the perpetrator of these actions, right?  

Also, it's not about what *I* prefer. If it were, it would be subjective and meaningless to everybody but me. The person engaging in theft is telling you by way of their very behavior that they "prefer" property rights. To wit, the problem comes in specifically because their behavior is both accepting and rejecting property rights simultaneously. The consistency of matter and energy tells us that something cannot be valid and invalid simultaneously.

No. Subjectivity doesn't mean it is only meaningful to a single person.  No, the person engaging in theft is not telling you they believe contradictory ideas about property rights, they are telling you they don't want you to have something, and they MIGHT be saying that they want to have it, but they might want someone else to have it, or they might not want anyone to have it, but they are not the slightest bit concerned about anyone's property rights. They are only concerned about the ability to control property, not the right to control it. They are not accepting property rights, they are not attempting to assert their right to the property belonging to another. They are engaging in behavior that is considered immoral by those who share the moral sentiments of society which prohibits theft; but they are not concerned about such morality. Such an idea never even enters their mind in all likelihood. The theif is unconcerned with the morality of theivery, at best, they are only concerned about not getting caught.

You're referring to unchosen positive obligations, which is unethical. Another way we would know that what you're describing is useless.

No. Morality is, by its nature, chosen. The positive obligations under a common moral system are chosen unless one is in opposition to the morals of the society one is living in.

I've already identified that we disagree on definitions. You're describing an ideological weapon while I'm describing a tool by which to measure the internal consistency of behaviors that are binding upon others. So when you pretend to disagree with me, you're not even having the same conversation as me. The objective claims I've made are true. I'm not sorry this is problematic for you.

We most certainly disagree on definitions; especially if you continue to argue for the existence of rationally impossible things including objective preferences such as "Objective Morality". You demonstrate that you don't understand on a fundamental level what it is you think you know about morality. You don't even seem to understand the fundamental characteristics or nature of the rational moral system you are espousing. You are nevertheless correct that the moral system you are arguing for is objectively rational. It just isn't "objectively moral" or objectively true. That you seem unable to grasp the significance or even the ability to make these distinctions is indicative of how little you understand about morality.

Reason doesn't bend to preference. 2+2=4 isn't a preference, it's a fact. Moral rules can only be moral if they are universal, otherwise they are opinions. All opinions are subjective, but such ideas cannot be called morality.

I completely agree that abstract truths such as 2+2=4 are not preferences, they are abstract facts.  Moral rules, on the other hand, are preferences. They are morals because they are preferences shared by the majority or whole of society or they are dictated by the leaders of society and obligatory upon the members of society to uphold. If they weren't held by the majority of society or obligatory upon the members of society, they wouldn't be morals, they would at best be considered potential morals, aesthetics, or individual ethics, etc.

 

By requiring that moral rules be universal, you are expressing a preference for egalitarian morals; i.e. morals which are universally obligatory upon all members of society. This is not the only type of moral system, but it is the type of morals most people in the West who believe in the idea that "all men are created equal" almost universally espouse. A non-egalitarian moral system is what is commonly practiced in totalitarian governments, and many nuclear families where there are different moral standards for different members of the society... one for the ruled, and a different one for the rulers. A common example of this is Sharia Law - a moral system which has different moral standards for men and women, and for believers vs non-believers.

 

All morals are subjective because all morals are preferences which one can choose to uphold or be obliged to uphold (and be deemed moral), or one can choose to violate (and be deemed immoral) and incur the consequences (if any) of such violation. The search for objective morals is a vain and futile endeavor, as vain and futile as searching for any other objective opinions, preferences, or ideals. The best that one can do is promote the ideals, values, and rationally derived morals which one prefers and deems best for oneself and society.

[dsayers]

I see. No such thing as crime or immorality then, unless we own the criminal committing the crime or engaging in immoral acts against us, right? Cause we can only prohibit things like theft, rape, assault, and murder if we own the perpetrator of these actions, right?

 

No, the person engaging in theft is not telling you they believe contradictory ideas about property rights

It wasn't a question. The person engaging in theft is telling you that they get to benefit from the fruits of their labor and you don't.

 

The positive obligations under a common moral system are chosen unless one is in opposition to the morals of the society one is living in.

Obfuscation. A positive obligation is chosen where consent is present. Consent cannot be implied. "Society one is living in" is not measurable.

 

We most certainly disagree on definitions; especially if you continue to argue for the existence of rationally impossible things including objective preferences

More strawman. Here, you reveal you're more interested in one-upmanship than having a discussion. You're claiming I'm making self-contradictory claims based on your definitions when I've already made the definition I'm speaking from clear.

[EclecticIdealist]

If you wish to engage in a rational debate of ideas, you don't get to claim I'm making a strawman argument when I'm simply illustrating the absurdity of your claim that one must own another person in order to prohibit a specific behavior. If you didn't express your idea clearly, that's on you. Strawman my eye.

 

Obfuscation. A positive obligation is chosen where consent is present. Consent cannot be implied. 

Consent to positive obligations is inherent when someone agrees to a moral system or aesthetics which have positive obligations. There's no "implied consent" here. It's no different from the positive obligation of adhering to logic and reason when engaging in a rational debate.

 

"Society one is living in" is not measurable.

As to 'the society one is living in", this is a matter of scale, much like truth and accuracy. One society one lives in is the household one lives in. That is certainly measurable. Another larger slightly larger society might be the building one lives in (if living in a multi-family building), or the street one lives on. The next might be the neighborhood one lives in, possibly the congregation of the Church one attends, etc. The next might be the town, township, borough, or local community. The next might be the county or group of counties, or possibly the state, province, or territory, the next might by the nation or country, the hemisphere, and finally the world as a whole. There are obvious subdivisions than can be made, and some that might not be so obvious. Most societies can be defined by their common geography, attitudes, beliefs and mores or morals, although some may not be defined or constrained by geographical boundaries such as on-line communities, corporations with diverse locations, religious institutions with sites around a nation or the world, etc. These are all measurable as evidenced by the plethora of data that can be accumulated and referenced for various different communities and societies.

 

More strawman. Here, you reveal you're more interested in one-upmanship than having a discussion. You're claiming I'm making self-contradictory claims based on your definitions when I've already made the definition I'm speaking from clear.

Not quite.  I'm claiming that your definitions are inherently self-contradictory. You're claiming the existence of objective morality on the basis of rational consistency. That's the same thing as asserting that it is objectively true that one should drive from San Francisco to New York City on Interstate 80 because one can drive from San Francisco to New York City on I-80. You can't derive an ought solely from an is. The rational consistency of a moral system does not make such a moral system inherently objective or true. If the only thing you are claiming is that your moral system is rationally consistent, and not that your moral system is an objectively true fact, then you are left with the burden of why one should adhere to your moral system rather than reject as nothing more than subjective preference for a rational moral system.

[dsayers]

If you wish to engage in a rational debate of ideas, you don't get to claim I'm making a strawman

You're right. If I wish to engage in a rational discussion and somebody says that I said something I didn't say, I get to claim you're making a strawman.

 

Definitions do not appear to be your strong suit.

 

Consent to positive obligations is inherent

Consent is a choice and therefore cannot be inherent in anything. It must be created by choice or else it's not consent at all. Do you know what inherent means?

[neeeel]

It is saying "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without a fundamental difference between the two that would put them in different, opposing moral categories

 

 

Its perfectly possible to say "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without needing to put anyone in different opposing moral categories.

[Jot]

Its perfectly possible to say "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without needing to put anyone in different opposing moral categories.

 

Are you gonna explain it too or just leave it at this?

[neeeel]

Are you gonna explain it too or just leave it at this?

 

the explanation would be "I want to make use of my property, but I dont want you to make use of your property" I dont think this puts anyone in separate moral categories. You would certainly not be saying you were better, or that the other person was worse. So, personal preference. 

[EclecticIdealist]

You're right. If I wish to engage in a rational discussion and somebody says that I said something I didn't say, I get to claim you're making a strawman.

Of course... but when you do claim it, which you did...

Nobody is talking about prohibition. To prohibit somebody's behavior, you would first have to own them. Which is impossible.

... then you don't get to go accusing someone of playing the strawman and claiming you didn't claim what you did.

 

Definitions do not appear to be your strong suit.

What was that slang definition for the word "own" again? Apply to the situation above where you falsely accused me of engaging in a straw man argument against what you actually wrote and then denied writing.

  

Consent is a choice and therefore cannot be inherent in anything. It must be created by choice or else it's not consent at all. Do you know what inherent means?

Completing reading a sentence another person wrote and reading comprehension don't seem to be your strong suits. Either that or you are intentionally taking my claims out of context, which again is a violation of the implicit positive obligations of rational debate. Since you seem to not know what the definition or usage of the word inherent is and are asking me to inform you, I will do so.

 

Inherent - existing in someone or something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute (from dictionary.com)

 

As to how this applies to the discussion at hand, I asserted that consent to positive obligations is inherent in any agreement to adhere to a moral or aesthetic system where such positive obligations exist. Or to rephrase, Any agreement to adhere to a moral or aesthetic system which includes positive obligations includes a permanent or inseparable agreement to adhere to the individual positive obligations which make up that moral system. In short, if you agree to a contract, you agree to all the terms of the contract, including those which have a performance or positive obligation. I hope that helps you understand the definition or meaning of the term inherent as it applies to agreeing to moral and aesthetic systems with positive obligations in them.

[dsayers]

Its perfectly possible to say "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without needing to put anyone in different opposing moral categories.

I didn't say it was impossible to say. I said that they are telling you with their actions that they "prefer" property rights.

[Will Torbald]

I didn't say it was impossible to say. I said that they are telling you with their actions that they "prefer" property rights.

 

With all due respect, this is nonsense. A thief is specifically disregarding property rights when they take something. What you are doing is an interpretative argument of an action and inserting your narrative into it. "They are telling you" is a magic trick of words because actions don't tell stories. Objectively a thief has violated, disregarded, and broken property rights. You might argue back that he's affirming those rights for himself, but that is also another interpretative magical sophism of this argument. They are being selfish and egoistic like Stirner in the sense that they can claim that it is their thing because they are now in posession and control of that which they stole, but such philosophies are in direct opposition of rationalistic property rights in the first place.

[neeeel]

I didn't say it was impossible to say. I said that they are telling you with their actions that they "prefer" property rights.

 

 

Yes, they prefer property rights for themselves, but not others.

[dsayers]

With all due respect, this is nonsense. A thief is specifically disregarding property rights when they take something. What you are doing is an interpretative argument of an action and inserting your narrative into it. "They are telling you" is a magic trick of words because actions don't tell stories. Objectively a thief has violated, disregarded, and broken property rights. You might argue back that he's affirming those rights for himself, but that is also another interpretative magical sophism of this argument. They are being selfish and egoistic like Stirner in the sense that they can claim that it is their thing because they are now in posession and control of that which they stole, but such philosophies are in direct opposition of rationalistic property rights in the first place.

I never thought I'd read a whole paragraph to say that 2+2=4 is "interpretive magical sophism."

 

Yes, they prefer property rights for themselves, but not others.

You're not following the conversation at all. Also, you said I said something I didn't say and when I point it out, move on as if you never engaged in such lack of integrity. What happened, neeeel? Your posts used to be philosophically sound and curious.

[Will Torbald]

I never thought I'd read a whole paragraph to say that 2+2=4 is "interpretive magical sophism."

 

This is literally not an argument. Your interpretation is wrong, your 2+2 is wrong.

[neeeel]

Also, you said I said something I didn't say and when I point it out, move on as if you never engaged in such lack of integrity. What happened, neeeel? Your posts used to be philosophically sound and curious.

 

 

 

My post was in response to yours. Its possible I misunderstood what you were saying, but I am not moving on, I am continuing the conversation ( at least, I thought I was, if you think I have missed something, or moved on without addressing something, please let me know, and since its not clear to me what it is I have missed, please be clear about what you think I have missed out)

 

 

In answer to this post by fersitar

 

Why is using one's property to deny another the use of their property internally inconsistent

 

 

 

you answered 

 

It is saying "I am free to make use of my property as I see fit, but you are not" without a fundamental difference between the two that would put them in different, opposing moral categories

 

 

So what you are saying is that 

 

"I am free to make use of my property as I see fit" 

 

and 

 

"you are not ( free to do the same)"

 

are internally inconsistent ( ie you cant logically say both in the same sentence, have I understood you correctly?)

my point is, that you CAN say both in the same sentence, and still be logically consistent.

[mkaru]

I find myself compelled to objective morality but I can't seem to prove it in arguments, or even to myself.  I specifically have had someone tell me this:

 

"There are no fixed poles or right or wrong that can be scientifically proven or observed and every value judgement is just that -- a projection of a singular world view's values onto something, and a product of their perspective."

 

So, how can I justify an objective morality?  Is it possible?  Is this what UPB tries to do?  

 

I think one can reason like this: If there are any objective truths then it might be plausible that there could also be objective moral truths. Which would of course have to be shown. But one could start with the question about objective truths in general. So, are there objective truths in philosophy, logic, mathematics, physics etc.? 

 

Yes, there must be at least one objective truth. Take the following to claims:

 

a) There are objective truths.

b) There are no objective truths.

 

Now, a) and b) can obviously not both be true. But one of them must be true (tertium non datur). What is important here is that a) and b) both are objective truths (or necessarily claim to be objective).

So even the one who denies that there are objective truths (one who claims that b) is true) actually asserts a proposition that claims objectivity. If there were no objectivity, you couldn't even assert that there isn't. 

[NocPat]

The morality of an action is objective.

 

The reaction to a moral action is subjective.

 

If you commit murder, it is always an objective immoral action. The fact that is immoral is meaningless by itself. The way you and others react to someone who has committed an immoral action is subjective and useful.

 

Whether an action is good/neutral/evil is objective and also meaningless by itself. Reacting to a good/neutral/evil action is subjective, and gives the action meaning.

 

This is my take on morality as far as I know at the moment. Does it sound correct?

[Jot]

I think one can reason like this: If there are any objective truths then it might be plausible that there could also be objective moral truths. Which would of course have to be shown. But one could start with the question about objective truths in general. So, are there objective truths in philosophy, logic, mathematics, physics etc.? 

 

Yes, there must be at least one objective truth. Take the following to claims:

 

a) There are objective truths.

b) There are no objective truths.

 

Now, a) and b) can obviously not both be true. But one of them must be true (tertium non datur). What is important here is that a) and b) both are objective truths (or necessarily claim to be objective).

So even the one who denies that there are objective truths (one who claims that b) is true) actually asserts a proposition that claims objectivity. If there were no objectivity, you couldn't even assert that there isn't. 

 

How is a "truth" different from "moral truth?"

[mkaru]

How is a "truth" different from "moral truth?"

 

Let's understand "truth" to mean "true proposition". (Someone might instead mean "facts" by it. I think it makes no difference here because true propositions would be propositions about certain facts, and they would be true propositions only when those facts persist. I think it is better to take "truth" to mean "true proposition/sentence".)

 

I think there is difference between

a) truths about facts in empirical nature (e.g. "It is raining now" or "The speed of light is c. 300 000 km/s" etc.).  

b) truths about logical or mathematical facts (e.g. the tertium non datur 

c) truths about moral/ethical facts (e.g. "All men possess a right named liberty", "pacta sunt servanda")

d) philosophical truths (e.g. "there are objective truths" or "there are no objective truths") 

 

That is not to say that there actually are truths of each of these classes. I believe my argument shows that there is at least truth of the type d). I think it is also possible to show that there are truths of the type b). But this does not prove that there are truths of type c). One would need an argument for that. 

I think it can be shown that there also are objective truths about moral facts. But it probably is harder than to show that for logical and philosophical truths. One more thought to consider when thinking about such an argument: If there are moral facts (facts about morality) then (I think) it is necessarily possible to prove that there are moral facts/truths. And it should be impossible then to prove that there are no such truths/facts. But if there are no moral facts, it should be possible to prove this and not to prove that there are.. 

(I hope this is understandable, English is not my first language.)