How can I argue this?

[EclecticIdealist]

Let's understand "truth" to mean "true proposition". (Someone might instead mean "facts" by it. I think it makes no difference here because true propositions would be propositions about certain facts, and they would be true propositions only when those facts persist. I think it is better to take "truth" to mean "true proposition/sentence".)

 

I think there is difference between

a) truths about facts in empirical nature (e.g. "It is raining now" or "The speed of light is c. 300 000 km/s" etc.).  

b) truths about logical or mathematical facts (e.g. the tertium non datur 

c) truths about moral/ethical facts (e.g. "All men possess a right named liberty", "pacta sunt servanda")

d) philosophical truths (e.g. "there are objective truths" or "there are no objective truths")

Truth is the accurate conception of reality, including the accurate conception of physical phenomena and of abstracted laws, principles, and relationships (this includes what you refer to as philosophical truths).

If there are moral facts (facts about morality) then (I think) it is necessarily possible to prove that there are moral facts/truths. And it should be impossible then to prove that there are no such truths/facts. But if there are no moral facts, it should be possible to prove this and not to prove that there are.

This is certainly a rational proposition. To identify whether or not "moral facts/truths" exist, one must first determine precisely what a "moral fact" or "moral truth" is. Truths are the conceptions of objective facts. Morals on the other hand are the collective subjective preferences for or alternatively aversion or abhorrence towards particular behavior pertaining to human interaction as well as other behavior generally considered to be virtuous or vicious held by a society. The fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them objective. Thus, it is an objective fact or in other words, true, that all societies abhor rape and murder, but this is not the same as suggesting that rape and murder are objectively abhorrent. The former is the statement of fact about the prevalence of a particular moral position on rape and murder, the latter is the assertion of an inherent moral judgment (i.e., subjective and imputed quality) to a behavior. It is impossible for that which is subjective to simultaneously be objective, as the two are mutually exclusive. That is like suggesting that something can be simultaneously be correct and incorrect, right and wrong, entirely black and entirely white, A and Not A. It is a rational contradiction, a violation of the law of identity, an axiomatic impossibility.

[AnAmericanComposer]

There is a glorious debate between David Silverman and Frank Turek. A bit long, but Silverman destroys Turek on the discussion of objective morality. He makes some stellar points. I suggest you watch the debate. His discussion of the morality of God in the story of Adam and Eve is the best.

 

[mkaru]

This is certainly a rational proposition. To identify whether or not "moral facts/truths" exist, one must first determine precisely what a "moral fact" or "moral truth" is. Truths are the conceptions of objective facts. Morals on the other hand are the collective subjective preferences for or against particular behavior pertaining to human interaction as well as other behavior generally considered to be virtuous or vicious held by a society. The fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them objective. 

This is a relativistic or social contructivist position and I don't think it is consistent in the end. Yes, people have beliefs about what is right and wrong and people within a culture share values and their beliefs about what is right and wrong. But from this does not follow that those beliefs can not also be true or false. 

 

"The fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them objective." - of course not. But the fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them merely subjective either. You would need a strong argument for this "nothing but subjective"-claim. The fact that an individual's moral beliefs are shaped by education, socialisation etc. says nothing about whether there is something like objective moral facts that makes those beliefs true or false. In fact, if there are objective moral facts then those moral facts need of course be "anchored" as moral truths (or moral beliefs, conceptions) within the individual.  

[Jot]

Let's understand "truth" to mean "true proposition". (Someone might instead mean "facts" by it. I think it makes no difference here because true propositions would be propositions about certain facts, and they would be true propositions only when those facts persist. I think it is better to take "truth" to mean "true proposition/sentence".)

 

I think there is difference between

a) truths about facts in empirical nature (e.g. "It is raining now" or "The speed of light is c. 300 000 km/s" etc.).  

b) truths about logical or mathematical facts (e.g. the tertium non datur 

c) truths about moral/ethical facts (e.g. "All men possess a right named liberty", "pacta sunt servanda")

d) philosophical truths (e.g. "there are objective truths" or "there are no objective truths") 

 

That is not to say that there actually are truths of each of these classes. I believe my argument shows that there is at least truth of the type d). I think it is also possible to show that there are truths of the type b). But this does not prove that there are truths of type c). One would need an argument for that. 

I think it can be shown that there also are objective truths about moral facts. But it probably is harder than to show that for logical and philosophical truths. One more thought to consider when thinking about such an argument: If there are moral facts (facts about morality) then (I think) it is necessarily possible to prove that there are moral facts/truths. And it should be impossible then to prove that there are no such truths/facts. But if there are no moral facts, it should be possible to prove this and not to prove that there are.. 

(I hope this is understandable, English is not my first language.)

 

Why "should" it be harder to prove truths of type c) than b),d)?

[mkaru]

Why "should" it be harder to prove truths of type c) than b),d)?

 

Sorry, probably not the correct expression. As I said, English is not my first language. What I wanted to say is that I think it would be harder to prove that there are truths of type c) than to prove that there are truths of the other types. Note also, that I did not speak of proving certain specific truths of e.g. type d) but of proving that there are truths of these types.  Such an argument might work without actually stating any of these truths. (Only in case d) it is clear that when you prove that there are philosophical truths then you also have shown one specific philosophical truth, namely the philosophical truth that there are philosophical truths; even if you "prove" that there are no philosophical truths, you would actually have given a specific philosophical truth, which would somehow be paradox (self contradictory). That is why I said that it is probably easiest to show in case of philosophical truths that there are some.)

 

I think it is harder to show that there are objective moral facts than to show that there are physical, logical or philosophical facts. Maybe it only looks harder prima facie. But in the case of physical/empirical truths we at least have a strong concept of what those truths would be about. That is, we somehow seem to know what we mean by the concept of "empirical facts".

True, in the case of logical truths we don't really understand what a "logical fact" might be, but there is a strong indication that there "must" somehow be logical facts because we have insight into some logical truths that we understand to be necessarily true, and those truths seem to be truths about logical facts. 

In the case of objective moral facts we do not have an idea what a "moral fact" would be (ontologically; that is: where would it exist? What "stuff" would it be made of? etc.). And we don't know of any moral truths that are necessarily true. We don't know if there is something like objective moral facts which would be needed to turn our moral beliefs into true or false beliefs. If there are no facts there is no measure for the truth or falsehood of our beliefs.

 

Again, I think it can be shown that there are objective truths/facts. I think so because as far as I can see, the position that there are no such truths/facts can not even be formulated consistently. So far this shows nothing about moral truths/facts; but in my opinion: if there are any objective truths (logical, physical etc.) then it is probable that there are also objective moral truths/facts.

[EclecticIdealist]

This is a relativistic or social constructivist position and I don't think it is consistent in the end. Yes, people have beliefs about what is right and wrong and people within a culture share values and their beliefs about what is right and wrong. But from this does not follow that those beliefs cannot also be true or false.

It doesn't follow from their beliefs about what is right and wrong, but the fact that their beliefs are ultimately sentiments or preferences which are inherently subjective, not beliefs which are either objectively true or objectively false (conforming to an objective fact). Physical phenomena are objective facts. Laws, Principles, and Relationships are rational facts. Moral judgments and Preferences are subjective sentiments, only their existence may be considered a rational fact.

 

"The fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them objective." - of course not. But the fact that the preferences are held collectively does not make them merely subjective either. You would need a strong argument for this "nothing but subjective"-claim. The fact that an individual's moral beliefs are shaped by education, socialisation etc. says nothing about whether there is something like objective moral facts that makes those beliefs true or false. In fact, if there are objective moral facts then those moral facts need of course be "anchored" as moral truths (or moral beliefs, conceptions) within the individual.

Actually, one would need a strong argument for collectively held preferences to be anything other than subjective, since the only thing that is self-evident is that moral judgements and preferences are subjective sentiments. The claim that there exists such a thing as moral facts upon which to base moral truths is a warrantless assertion, entirely lacking in any substantive support. Such a claim is as valid as the notion that there are aesthetic facts upon which the truth may be ascertained as to the best tasting flavor of ice cream, the best shade of green, the best color to paint a sports car, and the best way to eat an Oreo cookie. In short, it is the warrantless assertion of a factual ideal state of existence. 

 

If one asserts the existence of something (moral facts) which is not self-evident, one has the burden of proving the assertion. One who asserts the non-existence of something for which there is no evidence of existence has no such burden of proof.

[mkaru]

It doesn't follow from their beliefs about what is right and wrong, but the fact that their beliefs are ultimately sentiments or preferences which are inherently subjective, not beliefs which are either objectively true or objectively false (conforming to an objective fact). Physical phenomena are objective facts. Laws, Principles, and Relationships are rational facts. Moral judgments and Preferences are subjective sentiments, only their existence may be considered a rational fact.

This looks like a petitio principii to me. Or I don't see the argument for the claim that moral judgments are nothing more than "subjective sentiments". If I understand the reasons you have for stating this correctly, then I can not see why you wouldn't say the same about statments about the physical world. Beliefs about the physical world are also "only in the head". How can you claim that there is something like physical facts out there? See Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and so many others on this. 

 

 

Actually, one would need a strong argument for collectively held preferences to be anything other than subjective, since the only thing that is self-evident is that moral judgements and preferences are subjective sentiments. The claim that there exists such a thing as moral facts upon which to base moral truths is a warrantless assertion, entirely lacking in any substantive support. Such a claim is as valid as the notion that there are aesthetic facts upon which the truth may be ascertained as to the best tasting flavor of ice cream, the best shade of green, the best color to paint a sports car, and the best way to eat an Oreo cookie. In short, it is the warrantless assertion of a factual ideal state of existence. 

 

This is not self-evident at all. Au contraire. Any true moral judgment purports to be objective. You seem to be confusing two thing, namely you seem to think that statements of the following types have the same semantic contect. Which is obviously not true:

a) It is morally bad to murder someone.

b) I find it bad to murder someone.

A standard moral judgment does not have the (implicit) logical form "I find ..." or "I feel ...", but the form "It is ...". There lies the objective purport in every moral judgment. This does not mean that there actually are objective moral facts. It only shows that it is not at all "self-evident" that there are no facts. Anyone knows that there is a dfiference between "I like this piece of art" and "This piece of art is beautiful". (By the way, I don't think that it is correct to model moral judgments in terms of aesthetic or emotional judgments. This would also be a petitio principii. You would have to show that Moral Judgments are structurally the same as Judgments about one's own feelings. You have the burden of proof here, because it is "self-evident" that "This is good" and "I like this" are clearly not the same semantic contents and therefore your identity-thesis is strongly counter-intuitive.)

 

 

 

[EclecticIdealist]

This looks like a petitio principii to me. Or I don't see the argument for the claim that moral judgments are nothing more than "subjective sentiments". If I understand the reasons you have for stating this correctly, then I can not see why you wouldn't say the same about statements about the physical world. Beliefs about the physical world are also "only in the head". How can you claim that there is something like physical facts out there? See Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and so many others on this.

We discern facts about the physical world (empirical truths) through our senses. Our conceptions of the physical world come largely as a consequence of the perceptions of our senses, but they are also formed on the basis of laws, principles and relationships which we have abstracted rationally from previous observations. These abstractions are what we refer to as rational or sometimes philosophical truths. Lastly, there are Sentiments. Sentiments are also a product of the mind (the brain, and perhaps other parts of the body, perhaps more). Sentiments are akin to emotions in that they are in response to our mental evaluations (conceptions) or experiences (perceptions).

 

This is not self-evident at all.

 When it comes to moral judgements, we either learn them by rote from our elders and peers, inductively infer them by their similarity to situations moral judgements we are already familiar with, or we arrive at ethical judgements as a consequence of evaluating a situation and paying attention to our feelings or sentiments about the situation as a consequence of empathy and sympathy (or the lack thereof) for the parties involved.

 

However, If we attempt to discern the source of all moral judgments, we are compelled to disregard any source we are unable to validate and verify, which eliminates any customs or traditions of objective moral judgments having a supernatural origin. This leaves us with only two possible origins: observations of physical phenomena and their resultant truths, (Objective, empirical truths, or their abstracted, objective, rational truths), or individual emotion and sentiment (Subjective preferences). So again, if we are ever to find any objective moral truths, we must look to see if we can identify any objective moral facts, i.e. moral facts which are derived from observation of empirical moral phenomena; or, we must identify moral facts derived from such observations of empirical phenomena in the sense of laws, principles, and relationships. Absent the evidence for any such moral facts or derivative abstracted moral laws, principles, and relationships, we must conclude that such moral facts do not in fact exist.

 

This leaves only subjective moral sentiment, which is why I say that it is the only self-evident source of moral judgments. This does not exclude the possibility of moral facts, but absent any evidence that such facts exist, any claims to their existence can be disregarded as unsupported and warrantless assertions.

 

If we were to presume the proposition "murder is wrong" is a derivative or abstracted moral truth, then we ought to be able to point to the moral fact or facts from which the moral truth is abstracted from, just as when we can abstract the law of universal gravitation from the observations of falling bodies and orbiting planets, or the principles of mathematics from the grouping of various objects. If "murder is wrong" is an abstracted moral truth, where are the moral facts providing the empirical moral observations this abstraction is based upon? What would they even look like?

 

I refer you back to Hume, you cannot get an ought from an is through reason alone. That moral judgements come from individual subjective sentiment is self-evidently true. That they come from anywhere else is not. In absence of the evidence that something exists, one may conclude until such evidence comes forth that it does not. The burden of proof is always on the affirmative claim of existence.

 

Any true moral judgment purports to be objective. You seem to be confusing two thing, namely you seem to think that statements of the following types have the same semantic context. Which is obviously not true:

a) It is morally bad to murder someone.

b) I find it bad to murder someone.

A standard moral judgment does not have the (implicit) logical form "I find ..." or "I feel ...", but the form "It is ...". There lies the objective purport in every moral judgment.

The fact that moral judgments are usually universalized does not make them objective truths. That moral judgements are purported to be objective truths is a custom or tradition causing them to appear to have greater weight in the minds of those who hear them. The reason moral judgments are purported to be objective truths is because objective truths must be obeyed. A rock must fall to the ground (because of gravity). An sufficiently light airplane moving through the air must fly (because of Bernoulli's principle). Therefore, you must not Murder (because murder is wrong).

 

Anyone knows that there is a difference between "I like this piece of art" and "This piece of art is beautiful". (By the way, I don't think that it is correct to model moral judgments in terms of aesthetic or emotional judgments. This would also be a petitio principii. You would have to show that Moral Judgments are structurally the same as Judgments about one's own feelings. You have the burden of proof here, because it is "self-evident" that "This is good" and "I like this" are clearly not the same semantic contents and therefore your identity-thesis is strongly counter-intuitive.)

While there is a difference between the expression of admiration or enjoyment "I like...", and the statement of aesthetic judgement "... is (beautiful/ugly...)", such wording of moral judgements does not prove the existence of an objective moral fact any more than the aesthetic judgement is proof of the existence of an objective aesthetic fact (such as beauty). Moral judgments are more closely related to aesthetic judgments than to expressions of enjoyment. There is an old and common expression that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. The same can be said of morality, or as the bard proclaimed, "Nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so."

 

There are no objective aesthetic standards of politeness or beauty (or any other aesthetic value), and there are no objective moral standards of good or evil. And yet, despite the lack of an objective standard for either of these, there exists a pronounced commonality from one person to the next on certain basic characteristics for various aesthetics, such as symmetry and the golden ratio or proportion, which are almost universally shared preferences pertaining to beauty. The fact that there is a strong correlation of agreement between aesthetic judgments of beauty from one person to the next, and of moral goodness from one person to the next suggests that aesthetics and morals are not wholly arbitrary, but largely informed by a common source. Nevertheless, many studies upon the aesthetic of beauty indicate a variation of aesthetic ideal from individual to individual and even strong cultural aesthetic preferences with respect to skin color, tone, hair color and style, body size and shape, and so on when it comes to physical beauty of people. Such aesthetics, it has been hypothesized, may exist because of their ability to help us identify the most advantageous mate for reproduction.

 

Likewise, there are similar preferences for beauty in other areas unrelated to that of the human form or fashion; and, while there are aesthetic preferences for various non-moral behaviors across many cultures, there are also various differences in preferences between cultures that are nevertheless shared by most members of a culture.  It seems likely that the commonality of natural aesthetic and moral judgments in addition to those which appear to be learned from our culture help us to be better members of a community, perhaps making it more likely for ourselves and our offspring to survive and pass on our genes to future generations.

  

You would have to show that Moral Judgments are structurally the same as Judgments about one's own feelings. You have the burden of proof here, because it is "self-evident" that "This is good" and "I like this" are clearly not the same semantic contents and therefore your identity-thesis is strongly counter-intuitive.)

No, I do not have to show any such thing as I have not asserted that moral judgements are the same or markedly similar to judgements about one's own feelings in the manner you have suggested. What I have shown is that individuals appear to be almost universally disposed to make natural or instinctual aesthetic and moral judgements, but that aesthetic judgments and moral judgements also appear to be largely informed by the society or culture in which a person resides or identifies with.

 

You, on the other hand, if you wish to assert that there exists some objective moral truth or objective moral standard of behavior do have the burden of proving that such a thing(s) actually exists. We know that such a standard would necessarily be an objective truth analogous to the objective empirical truths about reality which are based on existential, physical phenomena as the Platonists might have us believe; or these objective truths must be analogous to the objective rational truths which are abstracted from the physical truths, akin to the Laws of Physics or the Principles of Mathematics or Logic. If you are unable to demonstrate the existence of such empirical moral facts which these truths are necessarily derived from, your assertion must be considered to be warrantless and gratuitous, and any furtherance of an argument defending such a position which does not address this glaring absence must properly be regarded as sophistry.

[mkaru]

We discern facts about the physical world (empirical truths) through our senses. Our conceptions of the physical world come largely as a consequence of the perceptions of our senses, but they are also formed on the basis of laws, principles and relationships which we have abstracted rationally from previous observations. These abstractions are what we refer to as rational or sometimes philosophical truths. Lastly, there are Sentiments. Sentiments are also a product of the mind (the brain, and perhaps other parts of the body, perhaps more). Sentiments are akin to emotions in that they are in response to our mental evaluations (conceptions) or experiences (perceptions).

 

 

I wonder why you think you can simply suppose that your senses give you any information about the physical world? Is there an argument for that or do you think that is „self-evident“ again? To me this looks like pure dogmatism, or so called „naive realism“, but in this case dogmatism because you seem not to see that those same arguments that you want to invoke against a position of moral objectivism, also speak against your epistemological empiricism.

 

Those „abstractions“ should in my opinion not called „philosophical truths“ but general empirical laws. Philosophical truths can not be gained by abstracting or inducing from sense data („observations“). Even the most radical empiricists say this (which is why they often say there is no philosophy). 

 

 

When it comes to moral judgements, we either learn them by rote from our elders and peers, inductively infer them by their similarity to situations moral judgements we are already familiar with, 

Isn’t that how you learn mathematics and rational thinking as well? It is, and for me, this does not show that mathematics is not objective but that your argument does not work against objectivism.

 

 

or we arrive at ethical judgements as a consequence of evaluating a situation and paying attention to our feelings or sentiments about the situation as a consequence of empathy and sympathy (or the lack thereof) for the parties involved.

Again, isn’t this the case with mathematics? Don’t we look at 1+1 = 2 and „feel“ that this is a correct equation?

 

 

However, If we attempt to discern the source of all moral judgments, we are compelled to disregard any source we are unable to validate and verify, which eliminates any customs or traditions of objective moral judgments having a supernatural origin. This leaves us with only two possible origins: observations of physical phenomena and their resultant truths, (Objective, empirical truths, or their abstracted, objective, rational truths), or individual emotion and sentiment (Subjective preferences). 

Both of these options are not viable as basis for morality. You left out a third option, which would actually be the only correct answer to the question: Reason (Vernunft). It is exactly what you rely on when putting forwar arguments in a debate or deciding whether an argument is sound or not. Because, if this also were only a matter of what you learned from your elders or your peers, or what you „feel“ to be a good argument - then it would make probably no sense at all to get into an exchange of arugments with other people. In this case we should stop right here. This only makes sense if we both ultimately appeal to a common source of rationality/reason, which means a source of some objective normativity which allows us to decide what is objectively a valid argument vs. an invalid argument (or fallacy etc.). This is a kind of objective normativity which is not the same as normativity of objective morality but probably something analogous in many aspect.

 

 

Absent the evidence for any such moral facts or derivative abstracted moral laws, principles, and relationships, we must conclude that such moral facts do not in fact exist. This leaves only subjective moral sentiment, which is why I say that it is the only self-evident source of moral judgments. This does not exclude the possibility of moral facts, but absent any evidence that such facts exist, any claims to their existence can be disregarded as unsupported and warrantless assertions.

You seem to be confusing jurisprudential reasoning with philosophical/scientific reasoning. It is true that in court when you have no evidence for something you have to treat it as if it doesn’t exist/didn’t happen („we must conclude…“). But not so in scientific/philosophical matters, not at all…

 

I refer you back to Hume, you cannot get an ought from an is through reason alone. 

Exactly. That is why there either is no true morality at all or there is some other, non-empirical source of morality.

 

 

 

The burden of proof is always on the affirmative claim of existence.

Of course it is, because you can not even prove the non-existence of anything empirical (except for some logical inconsistences like threesided square etc.). 

 

I myself am not in the position to prove the existence of anything like that (although I believe it can be proved). I do not want to claim here that there is an objective morality. My point is that your arguments against an objective morality are weak. They do not show what you want them to show. And if they did, you would be commited to also stop believing in the existence of objective empirical/physical facts, for the same reasons that you want to believe in the nonexistence of objective morality.

  

What I have shown is that individuals appear to be almost universally disposed to make aesthetic and moral judgements, but that these aesthetic judgments and moral judgements also appear to be largely informed by the society or culture in which a person resides or identifies with.

This is not the question. Anyone knows this, it is not even a philosophical point. You can read that observation („different cultures have different ethics“) in texts that are 2500 years old. Let sociology, ethnology etc. make those observations and categorize the various cultural systems of norms. We are asking whether it is possible to decide whether any one and which of those culturally shaped normative systems is true, or right etc.

The fact that people learn what is right and wrong from their culture says nothing about whether one can evaluate whether their beliefs are correct or not. You seem to want to give a psychological answer to a philosophical question. That does not work.

 

You, on the other hand, if you wish to assert that there exists some objective moral truth or objective moral standard of behavior do have the burden of proving that such a thing(s) actually exists. 

I do have this burden, yes. That is why I do not want to make this strong claim here. Maybe I made it in an earlier post. But right now my point is, that your argument against is simply not strong enough. Or too strong because, as said above, it destroys even your physical truths (if it were a sound argument). And you actually need those physical truths to tell your story about moral judgments are shaped by the social context of individuals. So your argument is self-defeating, I think.

 

I understand very well your concerns with simply supposing some metaphysical mystical objective source of morality. True, one can not simply claim that there is „something“ objective but not give any further description or plausible argument for it.  So I do not want to make this claim here now. But I think you are a bit too quick on this..

 

[EclecticIdealist]

I wonder why you think you can simply suppose that your senses give you any information about the physical world?

No you don’t.

 

Is there an argument for that or do you think that is “self-evident“ again?

It is not only self-evident, not to mention pragmatic given my 40+ years of successfully continuing to exist by doing so, but no one can even question it without relying upon the senses you have relied upon for years but now ridiculously call into question as a source of information about the physical world. Furthermore, in absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is the most rational and probable scenario. I admit other unlikely alternatives exist, but these are largely irrelevant to me as they are unprovable and provide no material benefit to my life or well-being.

 

I agree that what I termed “Rational Truths” might better be termed “Empirical Laws” (which are general abstractions from the observation of physical phenomena); the term is better as it is more accurately descriptive. What I meant by “sometimes philosophical truths” is truths such as the principles of logic and reason, objectivity and subjectivity, and so on.

 

You seem to be confusing jurisprudential reasoning with philosophical/scientific reasoning. It is true that in court when you have no evidence for something you have to treat it as if it doesn’t exist/didn’t happen ("we must conclude…“). But not so in scientific/philosophical matters, not at all…

On the contrary, if we do not make this presumption, then in order to be thorough in our scientific and philosophical explorations and proofs, we must not only explore the known and established observable reality and philosophical truths, but we must also explore the infinite alternative explanations for which there is no evidence in order to conclusively rule them out as well. We might as well suggest that Dinosaurs are the source of moral truth and Love is what makes the Sun shine since we can’t even treat these premise with the credulity they deserve if we go by your standard that the absence of evidence does not allow us to reasonably rule it out as a possibility.

 

You left out a third option (as basis for morality), which would actually be the only correct answer to the question: Reason (Vernunft).

The problem with relying upon reason alone has already been explored by countless philosophers who have gone before, notably including Hume, as I mentioned, to whom is attributed the maxim, one cannot derive an ought (moral imperative) from an is (reality) by reason alone.

 

That is why there either is no true morality at all or there is some other, non-empirical source of morality.

That sounds like dogmatism to me. Who are you to define what “true morality” is and isn’t, can or can’t be? As for a non-empirical source of morality, You are responding to a post that posits such a source.

 

Of course it is, because you can not even prove the non-existence of anything empirical (except for some logical inconsistences like threesided square etc.)

So I guess you’ve changed your mind now about the Dinosaurs possibly being the source of morality? That was fast. Now if you will only apply that same reasoning to your notion objective moral facts and truths.

 

I myself am not in the position to prove the existence of anything like that (although I believe it can be proved). I do not want to claim here that there is an objective morality. My point is that your arguments against an objective morality are weak. They do not show what you want them to show. And if they did, you would be committed to also stop believing in the existence of objective empirical/physical facts, for the same reasons that you want to believe in the nonexistence of objective morality.

I’m sorry but that just isn’t going to fly. Your devotion to something you cannot prove sounds to me like nothing more than dogmatic religious belief; and it’s your arguments which are weak and do not show what you want them to show.

  

You seem to want to give a psychological answer to a philosophical question.

You seem to want to give an objective empirically existential answer that you admit you’re unable to provide.

 

I do have this burden, yes. That is why I do not want to make this strong claim here. Maybe I made it in an earlier post. But right now my point is, that your argument against is simply not strong enough. Or too strong because, as said above, it destroys even your physical truths (if it were a sound argument). And you actually need those physical truths to tell your story about moral judgments are shaped by the social context of individuals. So your argument is self-defeating, I think.

Now you’re just grasping at straw. Your claim is that my argument is either not strong enough or too strong because I shouldn’t be able to arrive at the conclusion I have since it contradicts your dogmatic belief in something you cannot prove.

[mkaru]

> I wonder why you think you can simply suppose that your senses give you any information about the physical world?

No you don’t.

 

 

Not anymore, to be honest.

 

 

 

What I meant by “sometimes philosophical truths” is truths such as the principles of logic and reason, objectivity and subjectivity, and so on.

Exactly. So why do you not see that those principles need reasonable justification and that this justification can not appeal to empirical observation?

 

 

 

The problem with relying upon reason alone has already been explored by countless philosophers who have gone before, notably including Hume, as I mentioned, to whom is attributed the maxim, one cannot derive an ought (moral imperative) from an is (reality) by reason alone.

Yes, and how do you think, did Hume reach this conclusion? By reason, and reason alone, right? 

 

If you were to answer „No, also by using his senses“: Then what good reason is there (or did Hume give) for trusting the senses in scientific or philosophical questions, i.e. for thinking that the senses can and do give logically reliable reasons?

 

Now, if your answer really is (and from what you wrote it seems like it is) that it’s somehow ok to suppose that, because your senses have most of your life been reliable, and because you have successfully survived 40+ years thanks to using your senses, and (most ridiculously) because it is „self-evident“: Then be it so, believe that if you want to; but that is not philosophy. It is dogmaticism, nothing else. Do you even know what philosophy is? It is definitely not decreeing the validity of principles that have been (at least) in question for centuries now.  

Whenever someone claims something to be „self-evident“, you simply know he’s to lazy to really think about it, or too afraid to really investigate it critically. You’re coming up with „self-evidence“ quite often.

The core and basic principle of rational philosophical and scientific thinking is: There is nothing that is "self-evident". Nothing. This is the essence of western rational thought of the last 2500 years.

 

 

>You seem to want to give a psychological answer to a philosophical question.

You seem to want to give an objective empirically existential answer that you admit you’re unable to provide.

Why would I be speaking of anyhting „empirically existential“ here? Hume has clearly shown that you can not derive an ought from an is. If there is an objective morality then it has to be derived in a non-empirical, apriori, philosophical way.

 

 

Now you’re just grasping at straw. Your claim is that my argument is either not strong enough or too strong because I shouldn’t be able to arrive at the conclusion I have since it contradicts your dogmatic belief in something you cannot prove. 

 

 

To correct this, this is what I actually meant (as I said, English is not my first language): Your argument is not strong enough to show that normativity (morality in this case; but any other forms of normativity as well) is nothing more than socially aquired beliefs (that is: no objective morality). But IF it were strong enough to show this, it would at the same time consequently show that there is no objective physical truth.

 

I'm stopping here because in my opinion this discussion can not be continued at the moment. In your last reply to me I already felt some kind of aggressivity that I don't want to fall into as well (though I probably already did). But the main point is that you are actually not willing to discuss exactly those points that I am putting to question. You are simply brushing them aside by stating that it's "self-evident". That is exactly where rational discussion has to end then, until you are willing to critically investigate those supposed "self-evidences". 

[EclecticIdealist]

Exactly. So why do you not see that those principles need reasonable justification and that this justification can not appeal to empirical observation?

The principles of logic and reason (as well as other philosophical truths) have reasonable justification for their trustworthiness not only from empirical observation and comparison, but internal consistency as well. It seems to me to be special pleading to suggest they cannot be justified by an appeal to empirical observation.

 

Yes, and how do you think, did Hume reach this conclusion? By reason, and reason alone, right?

Probably. I cannot say with certainty as i never met Hume or asked him specifically how he reached his conclusion. Nevertheless, one can use reason alone to identify the fact that aesthetic and ethical judgments are products of a function of the mind different from the conception of individual or abstracted empirical truths, from empirical facts. It is a question of analysis--"What precisely does the term 'moral' refer to? What are its inherent characteristics and qualities? From whence do morals arise?" and so on.

 

If you were to answer "No, also by using his senses“: Then what good reason is there (or did Hume give) for trusting the senses in scientific or philosophical questions, i.e. for thinking that the senses can and do give logically reliable reasons?

If I were to answer, "No", then we start dropping further down the proverbial rabbit hole of epistemology and reason. Nevertheless, Your question is actually self-defeating. How can I provide you an answer to such a question which does not rely upon your senses to receive it? How can you evaluate the validity of my answer without relying upon reason? If you don't accept that their reliability has already been proven based on past experience, or must at least be taken as a priori assumptions, then you cannot use the sense or reason to judge any answer I might provide; you can't be sure of anything at all!

 

Now, if your answer really is (and from what you wrote it seems like it is) that it’s somehow ok to suppose that, because your senses have most of your life been reliable, and because you have successfully survived 40+ years thanks to using your senses, and (most ridiculously) because it is "self-evident“: Then be it so, believe that if you want to; but that is not philosophy.

I note that you completely left out the part where I explained why it was self-evident (although I didn't say that's what I was doing), that it is impossible to do otherwise than trust that the senses and reason are reliable. You cannot even retreat into solipsism because you cannot trust reason itself. It seems for you, philosophy is nothing more than mental masturbation, since you're attempting to study the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence while simultaneously maintaining the belief or position that you cannot ever come to a knowledge about anything, much less the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality or existence. In order to know or do anything, you must rely upon these unreliable faculties of the senses and reason. To deny this is to demonstrate you are irrational. 

 

How about you demonstrate precisely why I cannot and should not trust my senses or reason; but you must do so without either you or I using the sense or reason, since, if what you claim is true, then I cannot reasonably be expected by you to accept any answer you might provide using either my senses or reason, so you'll have to convince me using some other method. Good luck with that.

 

It is dogmatism, nothing else. Do you even know what philosophy is? It is definitely not decreeing the validity of principles that have been (at least) in question for centuries now.

No, it is not dogmatism, it is at worst pragmatism, and at best reason which ought to be common sense, but it seems to be a bit uncommon if you are lacking in it.

 

Whenever someone claims something to be "self-evident", you simply know he’s to lazy to really think about it, or too afraid to really investigate it critically. You’re coming up with "self-evidence“ quite often.

The core and basic principle of rational philosophical and scientific thinking is: There is nothing that is "self-evident". Nothing. This is the essence of western rational thought of the last 2500 years.

You know whenever a person starts creating strawman arguments about what the other person is claiming, they're coming up short on their end of the debate.

 

The actual core and basic principle of rational philosophical and scientific thinking since the time of Aristotle has been: Things are what they are. And if they are what they are, then it should be self-evident to the senses and to reason that they are what they are. It is dogmatic mysticism which teaches that nothing is self-evident, that all things must be revealed by teachers endowed with special knowledge with which they have been uniquely or divinely inspired.

 

Why would I be speaking of anything "empirically existential“ here? Hume has clearly shown that you can not derive an ought from an is. If there is an objective morality then it has to be derived in a non-empirical, apriori, philosophical way.

So now you're suggesting that an objective morality exists that proceeds from non-objective facts? Can you show ANYTHING AT ALL in the way of objective truths which proceed from non-objective facts? I'll settle for just one. If you cannot, then you are still engaging in sophistry, and it's getting very tiring.

 

To correct this, this is what I actually meant (as I said, English is not my first language): Your argument is not strong enough to show that normativity (morality in this case; but any other forms of normativity as well) is nothing more than socially aquired beliefs (that is: no objective morality). But IF it were strong enough to show this, it would at the same time consequently show that there is no objective physical truth.

I understand that you are either incapable or unwilling to accept the fact that I am not obligated to accept your specious claim of objective morality when there isn't a shred of evidence for it; and that one is thus compelled rationally to conclude based on the only evidence that does exist that aesthetic and ethical norms are not objective truths, but subjective judgments. I also understand that you dogmatically maintain the position that for moral norms to not be objective truths, there can be no objective physical truths which again is patently absurd and based upon nothing but your irrational commitment to your dogmatic assertion that morality is necessarily objective based on objective moral facts which you likewise have no evidence of, not a commitment to discovering the true nature of morality (that it is the collective ethical judgments of a society).

 

I'm stopping here because in my opinion this discussion can not be continued at the moment. In your last reply to me I already felt some kind of aggression that I don't want to fall into as well (though I probably already did). But the main point is that you are actually not willing to discuss exactly those points that I am putting to question. You are simply brushing them aside by stating that it's "self-evident". That is exactly where rational discussion has to end then, until you are willing to critically investigate those supposed "self-evidences".

No, we're stopping here because you can rationally go no further. I am willing to discuss any rational points you make, but when you start arguing that one cannot trust the senses and reason as a basis for knowledge, then there's no point moving forward because your argument is intellectually and philosophically unworkable as you've removed all common ground, means of communication, acquiring knowledge, and reason itself.

[mkaru]

No, we're stopping here because you can rationally go no further. I am willing to discuss any rational points you make, but when you start arguing that one cannot trust the senses and reason as a basis for knowledge,

I did never said that one "cannot trust the senses and reason". My own philosophical position is exactly the opposite. But I said that one has to rationall show this trustworthiness because there are some serious sceptical arguments.

 

Anyways, this discussion must end here. I respect your position, but we clearly have to fundamentally different understandings of rationality and philosophy. I understand your position of pragmatism and common sense-philosophy here.

 

But I want to think about and discuss those questions that lie way down inside the "rabbit hole", as you called it (correctly). That's what - for me - is a very important and indispensable part of philosophy. If I understand you correctly (maybe not), you see one point of philosophy in preventing us falling into that hole.. 

[EclecticIdealist]

I never said that one "cannot trust the senses and reason". My own philosophical position is exactly the opposite. But I said that one has to rationally show this trustworthiness because there are some serious sceptical arguments.

 

Anyways, this discussion must end here. I respect your position, but we clearly have two fundamentally different understandings of rationality and philosophy. I understand your position of pragmatism and common sense-philosophy here.

 

But I want to think about and discuss those questions that lie way down inside the "rabbit hole", as you called it (correctly). That's what - for me - is a very important and indispensable part of philosophy. If I understand you correctly (maybe not), you see one point of philosophy in preventing us falling into that hole.. 

That's fair. As to the "serious skeptical arguments", there really is only one significant epistemological hurdle regarding knowledge and certainty--solipsism, and that question simply cannot be conclusively resolved. One cannot ever know whether everything one experiences is manufactured by one's own imagination, or imposed upon one in some sort of matrix-like fashion, or actually the result of sensory input in the manner that appears self-evident. One can only reason and act according to the perceptions we have and the subsequent conceptions we form about reality.

 

We cannot be absolutely certain that what we remember ever actually occurred, we only have our memory of the past which might only be our imagination in the present moment. We cannot be absolutely certain about anything but the definitions we create in our mind, and even these we cannot be absolutely certain of from one moment to the next. The best we can do is to choose to act pragmatically--to "act as if". 

 

Now we do know that our senses are not perfect, and we know that our reasoning may at times be flawed. That is why it is useful to check our observations and reasoning against the observations and reasoning of others in an attempt to eliminate the potential errors of subjectivity that may create an erroneous conception of reality. We know that at best, we can only hope to eliminate the subjectivity of our perceptions and subsequent conceptions and reasoning to a reasonably strong cogent certainty, but never to an absolute certainty. Most of the time, this lack of absolute certainty isn't even recognized as such; we simply act as though something is absolutely true because we are reasonably certain that it is. Life would be needlessly anxiety producing if we were to concern ourselves with the uncertainty that remains when we consider the actual degree of certainty we really have about everything in life.

 

In the law, our court system recognizes that we can never be absolutely certain about the innocence or guilt of anyone. Instead we are asked to make decisions on criminal matters only to the degree of certainty that is beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond ALL possible doubt. All possible doubt could allow for all kinds of unreasonable potential circumstances that might exonerate the perpetrator of a crime, such as a doppelganger which there exists no evidence for who impersonated the perpetrator, or a master hypnotist who manipulated peoples memories and expertly altered video evidence, without leaving a trace of evidence, etc.

 

In life we must act with at least a minimum level of pragmatism that accepts the fact that we cannot know anything empirically with absolute certainty, nor are we able to predict the future with absolute certainty. We delude ourselves either through ignorance or arrogance into believing otherwise.

[mkaru]

That's fair. As to the "serious skeptical arguments", there really is only one significant epistemological hurdle regarding knowledge and certainty--solipsism, and that question simply cannot be conclusively resolved. One cannot ever know whether everything one experiences is manufactured by one's own imagination, or imposed upon one in some sort of matrix-like fashion, or actually the result of sensory input in the manner that appears self-evident. One can only reason and act according to the perceptions we have and the subsequent conceptions we form about reality.

Maybe so, but there are at least some interesting (to me) attempts to resolve this problem. For example, what some might call "transcendental arguments", which reason not by analyzing perceptions but analyzing the conditions of possibility of perceiving as such. Putnam tries to refute the brain in a vat scenario, not successfully I think, but why shouldn't one try.

 

Now we do know that our senses are not perfect, and we know that our reasoning may at times be flawed.  

Yes, I guess the point I wanted to make was that when using the conept of "flawedness", i.e. when judging something as flawed or not, one needs (invokes, presupposes) certain criteria, some kinde of measure. Anyways, I think this point can be settled here..

 

 

In life we must act with at least a minimum level of pragmatism that accepts the fact that we cannot know anything empirically with absolute certainty, nor are we able to predict the future with absolute certainty. 

 

 

absolutely, I agree here.

[EclecticIdealist]

Putnam tries to refute the brain in a vat scenario, not successfully I think, but why shouldn't one try.

 

There's no objective reason why one should or should not try. I simply contend that there are more worthwhile pursuits.

[mkaru]

 

There's no objective reason why one should or should not try. I simply contend that there are more worthwhile pursuits.

 

Again, I agree. I'm not sure of what the cultural connotations of "worthwhileness" are (as said, no native speaker etc.), but maybe this can conclude with a quote from Aristoteles, Metaphysics:

 

That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake. 

 

And from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason:

We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions—not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition—and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism.