Can physical objects be "concepts?"

[AnCap AllCaps]

Just looking for some insight here. I was in a discussion, and said something to the effect of "you have a concept of chocolate, or a concept of a car or some physical object."

 

My interlocutor objected to this usage of concept, he thought that concepts only describe "how things work," the concept of gravity for example.

 

I had never been challenged on this idea. What is your take on this? Can we have a concept of a physical object that either exists or doesn't?

 

Thanks.

[Will Torbald]

I don't know what you're trying to know here. There are physical objects, and then there's the concept that describes the object - but concepts are just ideas, not the objects themselves.

[aviet]

I'd go for 'no', no matter how hard conceptual artists may try to prove otherwise.

http://metro.co.uk/2015/10/25/cleaners-throw-away-modern-art-thinking-it-was-mess-from-a-party-this-weekend-5460989/

Agree with WIll T.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

Concepts can and must describe physical things before they can describe anything else. You can't have a concept of gravity without the necessary concepts to describe the objects gravity is acting upon. This isn't necessarily controversial in my opinion, and that there was a dispute over this means your interlocutor hasn't read his Aristotle.

 

I would suggest 'An Introduction To Reality' as a basic but very sufficient explanation of metaphysics and epistemology.

[dsayers]

Can we have a concept of a physical object that either exists or doesn't?

Not only can we, but we MUST. If I talk to you about a specific couch, you can only understand me because a conceptual representation of that couch is present in your mind. If we're working together to move that couch through a narrow doorway, your mind must first conceptualize everything about the maneuver before beginning to execute it. Does that make sense?

[EclecticIdealist]

Just looking for some insight here. I was in a discussion, and said something to the effect of "you have a concept of chocolate, or a concept of a car or some physical object."

 

My interlocutor objected to this usage of concept, he thought that concepts only describe "how things work," the concept of gravity for example.

Your interlocutor is mistaken. A concept is the mental idea of any object, phenomenon, or relationship of objects, relationship of phenomena, or relationship of object to phenomena, or abstraction of any of these into hypothesis, principles, theorems, or laws that one is able to imagine. In short, a concept is a thought or mental construct about anything.

 

Can we have a concept of a physical object that either exists or doesn't?

We can only perceive that which exists. We cannot perceive that which does not exist. However, we can nevertheless imagine or conceive of something that may or may not exist, as well as things that certainly do not exist, or at the very least, probably do not exist, as well as things that cannot possibly exist (although these we can only conceptualize imperfectly).

[ValueOfBrevity]

Concepts don't exist in physical reality, but are descriptions of physically real things. 

For example, you can have 9 oranges, but you cannot hold the number nine. 

A related idea would be Plato's Theory of Forms

 

[neeeel]

Concepts don't exist in physical reality, but are descriptions of physically real things. 

For example, you can have 9 oranges, but you cannot hold the number nine. 

 

A related idea would be Plato's Theory of Forms

 

 

 

 

they arent always descriptions of physically real things, eg santa claus, god, are concepts that arent physically real

[Cuffy_Meigs]

I agree with most of the replies already posted but if you want to read more then I recommend Ayn Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". It's not as daunting as its title suggests and deals with concepts and how they are formed. It's worth reading and she takes a good swipe at nihilists, relativists and subjectivists in the process.

[Matthew Ed Moran]

they arent always descriptions of physically real things, eg santa claus, god, are concepts that arent physically real

 

If Santa is just someone who goes around droppin' in chimneys, eating some cookies, lettin' off some farts from warm milk, then it is a valid concept and Santa could exist (fingers crossed). But if Santa is a man who lives in eternal obesity but never has heart problems, has some flying deer one of which has a giant luminous pimple on its nose, only produces midgets when he has sex with his wife, and has other properties which violate basic principles of science, then the concept could not exist in objective form like a chair or gravity do. The distinction, correct me if I'm wrong, is between objective and subjective concepts. Subjective concepts are dependent on a mind, where as objective concepts are dependent on a mind and something in reality. And that's a distinction that is worth making, I think!! At least to the extent we're talking about objective reality, subjective concepts do not exist.

[uranium-nitride32]

This seems to be the problem that Kant was dealing with. There are things in the way that we perceive and things in themselves. This seems to be applicable to your question. The concept of a tree, isn't what the trees are in themselves. This is a problem with epistemology, because we can't know the object in itself. We only have the concept of the tree that we have gained through empiricism.  

[Matthew Ed Moran]

This seems to be the problem that Kant was dealing with. There are things in the way that we perceive and things in themselves. This seems to be applicable to your question. The concept of a tree, isn't what the trees are in themselves. This is a problem with epistemology, because we can't know the object in itself. We only have the concept of the tree that we have gained through empiricism.  

 

And I believe Kant got this from Plato's "realm of forms." I love this stuff

 

I think Aristotle explains it by saying that what a concept delineates is the "essence" of something. Concepts are derived imperfectly from reality, but there is usually something (or a group of characteristics) which, if you subtracted it, would no longer be recognizable as the same thing. So to say "object in itself" is begging the question in my opinion. If a concept is valid and describes something that does or could exist in reality, and we acknowledge it is imperfect and meant to point out relative differences, then what an "object in itself" is, is not clear to me.

 

And I wonder why would that be a useful way to think about things? Suppose we have a unique concept for every single object in the universe - would that be a more correct understanding of reality? Would it facilitate or falter the gathering of knowledge if everything were considered completely unique in itself?

 

Because technically every thing is unique in its place in space and time at any moment does not mean concepts are any less useful or any less about reality. A way I think about knowledge is to put like with like and subtract the differences.

 

There is a thought experiment discussed on the show about the concept of a baby. If you saw a baby, you would be able to identify it no problem. If you saw a blue baby, you would say "what the heck! a blue baby!," and then if it had three arms you would call it a "three armed blue baby." Eventually as you kept adding characteristics to it, at some point, you would no longer even recognize it as a baby. You would say "oh my god... that.. thing! what is it?" 

 

I think this is supposed to show that the concept of a baby can go so far while adding characteristics to it, before it becomes something that is completely different from a baby altogether and you would need a new concept for it.

 

It's in the "Introduction to Reality" video probably explained way better than I ever can.

 

This is definitely not intended to be conclusive, but just some thoughts and arguments I wanted to put forward.

[Apollonian_Germ]

Concepts don't exist in physical reality, but are descriptions of physically real things. 

For example, you can have 9 oranges, but you cannot hold the number nine.

 

 

I agree with this, however, taken to its farthest ends, this line of understanding leads to some conclusions that seem difficult for many modern intellectuals.

 

Take for example, Ayn Rand's famous statement: Existence exists.  Existence is a concept, the term denotes an abstraction, not a 'physically real thing' like an orange or an apple.

 

The same goes for the term 'energy'. It is all too common for people to say things like, "energy exists..." or "electromagnetism exists" or "gravity exists" as if they were physical things with physical form, existing in reality like the apples and oranges. In reality, gravity, energy, electromagnetism, etc. are concepts no less than numbers are. They do not exist in the same sense as an orange exists... such terms denote relations between things in reality only-- and to imagine that gravity, or spacetime, or any other abstraction of mathematical physics exists allows for people to utilize them as if they were physical mechanisms or causal entities in phenomena between objects. This is, I think, why Quantum physics and mathematical physics in general has become so completely irrational and unimaginable. Concepts have been subtly converted into physical mechanisms.

[willbarber]

I've recently found Rudolph Steiner's idea of duality surrounding reality to be pretty fascinating.

Essentially, the real physical world gives us phenomena. That phenomena becomes memory and when thinking is applied, you form the concept. The physical and conceptual worlds are two different domains of the same reality. As it isn't possible to know the essence of an object (Spinoza) all we can work with is the mode, the relation of it to the rest of the reality, which is a conceptual relation that only exists within the thought of the individual. So the phenomenological reality informs the conceptual, and the two go hand in hand, neither are primary. Our conceptual view of the world is an ideal relation to it, where our thoughts more or less contextualize the phenomena we experience by supplying the understanding of relations.

[rosencrantz]

and to imagine that gravity, or spacetime, or any other abstraction of mathematical physics exists allows for people to utilize them as if they were physical mechanisms

 

They are 'physical mechanisms' though. Electromagnetism and gravity are two of the four forces in nature. It doesn't get more elemental than that. 

 

This is, I think, why Quantum physics and mathematical physics in general has become so completely irrational and unimaginable.

 

Is there some non-mathematical physics that I am unaware of? Also, QM at its core is unimaginable and counterintuitive. Basic experiments with polarizing filters will show you that. 

[WasatchMan]

 

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition. By organizing his perceptual material into concepts, and his concepts into wider and still wider concepts, man is able to grasp and retain, to identify and integrate an unlimited amount of knowledge, a knowledge extending beyond the immediate concretes of any given, immediate moment.

 

In any given moment, concepts enable man to hold in the focus of his conscious awareness much more than his purely perceptual capacity would permit. The range of man’s perceptual awareness—the number of percepts he can deal with at any one time—is limited. He may be able to visualize four or five units—as, for instance, five trees. He cannot visualize a hundred trees or a distance of ten light-years. It is only his conceptual faculty that makes it possible for him to deal with knowledge of that kind.

 

Man retains his concepts by means of language. With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. A concept is like a mathematical series of specifically defined units, going off in both directions, open at both ends and including all units of that particular kind. For instance, the concept “man” includes all men who live at present, who have ever lived or will ever live—a number of men so great that one would not be able to perceive them all visually, let alone to study them or discover anything about them. - Ayn Rand

[Apollonian_Germ]

They are 'physical mechanisms' though. Electromagnetism and gravity are two of the four forces in nature. It doesn't get more elemental than that. 

 

But wait, we all just agreed that concepts do not literally exist. "Force" is a concept-- not an object. "Force" is just a term which describes the phenomena that objects are pulled toward or pushed away from each other.

 

Even Issac Newton said, "That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left open to the consideration of my readers."

 

The "immaterial agent" that Newton was alluding to was God, but we rational scientists understand that such a supernatural mediator is impossible, so the question becomes, "What physical thing mediates the action/force of gravity?

 

It is circular and unscientific to say "a force mediates the force..." There must be some mechanism conveying the force, as Newton said ^^. The correct configuration of the mechanism responsible is the big question. But this is getting a bit off topic. The point is that 'force' is a concept, not a physical object, and that this question of whether concepts exist is really quite essential in our understanding of even Physics.

[dsayers]

They are 'physical mechanisms' though. Electromagnetism and gravity are two of the four forces in nature. It doesn't get more elemental than that. 

Pardon my off-topicness, but what are the other two?

[Apollonian_Germ]

I think he's referring to the strong and weak nuclear forces.

[rosencrantz]

But wait, we all just agreed that concepts do not literally exist. "Force" is a concept-- not an object. "Force" is just a term which describes the phenomena that objects are pulled toward or pushed away from each other.

 

Force is neither a concpet nor an object. It's an interaction between two objects. That interaction is objective and measurable. We give that interaction a name. That doesn't mean however, that the term itself makes it abstract. 

 

Lets say you have two persons, Peter and Paul. Peter is 170 cm tall, Paul 190. In your case, you would say that 'Paul is taller than Peter' is an abstract statement and a concept. Rather, Peter and Paul are physical objects with attributes that can be compared. Without these attributes there couldn't be a comparison. The comparison is made in abstract terms. That doesn't mean though that it isn't based in physical attributes. 

 

The problem with introducing the term 'existence' into a philosophical debate is that it does contribute new information. Since Aristotle most empirical philosophers say that existence is not a predicate. Compare the two statements:

 

a) There is a red apple on my desk.

 

b) There is a red apple on my desk and it exists.

 

If you claim that existence is a predicate you have to show how b) contains more information than a).

 

[EclecticIdealist]

I agree with this, however, taken to its farthest ends, this line of understanding leads to some conclusions that seem difficult for many modern intellectuals.

 

Take for example, Ayn Rand's famous statement: Existence exists.  Existence is a concept, the term denotes an abstraction, not a 'physically real thing' like an orange or an apple.

Obviously we can't know precisely what she might have been thinking along this line, but I would speculate that when she states "Existence exists", she is really stating "Something (as contrasted by Nothing) Exists. That we think, indicates at the very least, that that which thinks exists. While we cannot know with absolute certainty WHAT that which thinks is, we can know with absolute certainty that SOMETHING which thinks exists... this "SOMETHING" we may loosely categorize as KNOWN existence. Everything we might conceptualize as a result of what we believe to be the perception of our senses is presumed to exist (and not simply a delusion of the mind) and is also categorized as existence. The term "existence" in the statement "Existence exists" might also be termed "the Universe" provided one does not presume anything about the meaning of the term such as space, stars, planets, etc.

 

The same goes for the term 'energy'. It is all too common for people to say things like, "energy exists..." or "electromagnetism exists" or "gravity exists" as if they were physical things with physical form, existing in reality like the apples and oranges. In reality, gravity, energy, electromagnetism, etc. are concepts no less than numbers are. They do not exist in the same sense as an orange exists... such terms denote relations between things in reality only-- and to imagine that gravity, or spacetime, or any other abstraction of mathematical physics exists allows for people to utilize them as if they were physical mechanisms or causal entities in phenomena between objects. This is, I think, why Quantum physics and mathematical physics in general has become so completely irrational and unimaginable. Concepts have been subtly converted into physical mechanisms.

I believe you're correct, especially with regard to the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The probability equations are perceived by some to be almost like magical incantations rather than mere probability descriptions of observed or predicted physical phenomena.

[dsayers]

Force is neither a concpet nor an object.

In what way is it not a concept? Wouldn't you agree that anything we can communicate about is a concept? If we couldn't conceptualize something, how could we process thoughts of it and then communicate those thoughts? As with the titular question, just because it describes an interaction doesn't preclude it from also being a concept.

 

Also, I don't know if you saw my last question, but I was genuinely curious.

[rosencrantz]

Also, I don't know if you saw my last question, but I was genuinely curious.

 

 

The weak and the strong nuclear force

 

In what way is it not a concept? Wouldn't you agree that anything we can communicate about is a concept? 

 

I see the point of contention now. It helps to see the world as consisting of three layers.

 

Layer 1 is the an actual phenomenon. Say a magnetic field or something emitting light. This is governed by

 

Layer 2, the physical laws. They determine how layer 1 works. They are described in 

 

Layer 3, the conceptualisation of beings which is a fancy word for physics and the rest of science. 

 

Layer 1 and Layer 2 are independent of beings. If there was no life at all in the universe they would still be around, but not as concepts. 

It is at layer 3 that we can talk about layer 2 (or layer 1).

Needless to say that our concepts of layer 2 may be wrong. The heliocentric worldview is based on a wrong interpretation of layer 1 (the sun rises and goes around) which leads to a faulty cosmology (layer 2) where the earth is at the centre of the universe and all other planets and starts revolve around it. 

[Donnadogsoth]

Just looking for some insight here. I was in a discussion, and said something to the effect of "you have a concept of chocolate, or a concept of a car or some physical object."

 

My interlocutor objected to this usage of concept, he thought that concepts only describe "how things work," the concept of gravity for example.

 

I had never been challenged on this idea. What is your take on this? Can we have a concept of a physical object that either exists or doesn't?

 

Thanks.

 

Concept = mental picture.  If you can mentally picture a bar of chocolate, you have conceptualised it.

[Apollonian_Germ]

I'd like to make a few points about the definition of this crucial term: concept.

"Concept = mental picture.  If you can mentally picture a bar of chocolate, you have conceptualised it."

 

 

 

But concepts like 'love' and 'justice' have no picture available, in the sense that we can picture a bar of chocolate. "Picturing" is more akin to "imagining" -- not conceptualizing. A concept requires a minimum of TWO objects to establish a relation. When mentally picturing an object like a chocolate bar, you are imagining, not conceptualizing.

 

That is because a bar of chocolate is an object-- it has form. We can only 'picture' something with shape. Love & justice have no shape/boundary/form that can be illustrated or imagined, they can only be conceived of and understood.

 

A bar of chocolate is an object, whether real or imagined-- whether it exists or is only imagined.

So, the term concept cannot be defined as 'mental picture'.

 

Moving on to Rosencrantz' statement: "Force is neither a concpet nor an object. It's an interaction between two objects."

 

This statement is very confusing for me, since my definition of the term is this: concept: relation between objects (relation here is meant in its very broadest sense, not in any technical or mathematical sense)

 

So, force would be a concept, since an interaction is a type of relation between objects, and therefore a type of concept.

 

Rosencrantz then moves on to provide three "layers of the World" as he puts it. These are not literal layers, of course, but metaphorical ones. He isn't talking about the Atmosphere, the Crust and the Mantle, of the world...

 

However, in a rational and rigorous discussion, we cannot rely on such poetry. Literal, straightforward terminology should replace metaphors.

 

But let's examine these statements to see what sense can be made of them:

 

"Layer 1 is the an actual phenomenon. Say a magnetic field or something emitting light. This is governed by

 

Layer 2, the physical laws. They determine how layer 1 works. They are described in"

 

 

 

Here you have concepts governing concepts. Physical 'laws' are, as any scientist would tell you, descriptions in and of themselves. They are abstract recognitions of patterns of motion and interaction between the real physical objects in the world (which you seem to have forgotten about in your layers, placing phenomena on the list without any objects! How does phenomena occur if not by and through objects?)

 

In reality, any action or interaction (even abstract types like 'governance') are mediated by and through physical objects. This has always been one of Stef's biggest points-- the State *does not literally exist* and it is not laws which literally act upon people-- it is just other people. Only physical objects can act upon other physical objects.

 

If the Earth pulls on the Moon, keeping it flying around in orbit, there must be some physical mediator *between them* which causes the act to occur... "the law of gravity" does not qualify itself as a physical mediator-- it is merely a precise description of how that interaction occurs and what we can expect from it, but it does not reveal the underlying reality.

"Layer 3, the conceptualisation of beings which is a fancy word for physics and the rest of science."

 

 

 

So your layer three is indistinguishable from layer two-- the "laws" of gravity, electromagnetism, etc. are all descriptions of how things interact... but they are *not* explanations of the underlying mechanism responsible. It's more like super-advanced pattern recognition than the discovery of the invisible mechanisms that cause the patterns in the first place.

 

But let's take a step back here... you used the term "being" a couple of times in statements such as "Layer 1 and Layer 2 are independent of beings."

 

How do *you* define "being" because I have never heard the term used in such a way before. To my mind, being is synonymous with object/entity/thing.  Phenomena and our descriptions of phenomena are not 'beings' in the literal sense (and again, in the context of reality, we really ought to drop the poetry and speak literally). In order to be a being/object/entity/thing, the referent of your term must have shape, at bare minimum. This is why a heart is an object (has shape) while love is a concept (no shape). A car has shape (qualifies as an object)... driving is a relation between the car and other things and does not have its own literal shape (qualifies as a concept).

 

So, in language, all terms fall under one of those two categories: concept or object. Your three "layers" are confused, as I explained above, and they leave out the crucial category of 'objects'. Objects are that which has shape, and concepts are relations between objects. As far as I understand it, it's really that simple.

[dsayers]

But concepts like 'love' and 'justice' have no picture available, in the sense that we can picture a bar of chocolate.

Saying that to picture something is to conceptualize it is not the same as saying that in order to conceptualize something, you must be able to picture it.

 

A concept requires a minimum of TWO objects to establish a relation.

This is begging the question. In order to contemplate a chocolate bar, you must first have a conceptualization of it in your mind. That one object.

 

the term concept cannot be defined as 'mental picture'.

I don't think anybody tried to define it as such. But rather to compare it.

[EclecticIdealist]

 

I'd like to make a few points about the definition of this crucial term: concept.

 

But concepts like 'love' and 'justice' have no picture available, in the sense that we can picture a bar of chocolate. "Picturing" is more akin to "imagining" -- not conceptualizing. A concept requires a minimum of TWO objects to establish a relation. When mentally picturing an object like a chocolate bar, you are imagining, not conceptualizing.

 

That is because a bar of chocolate is an object-- it has form. We can only 'picture' something with shape. Love & justice have no shape/boundary/form that can be illustrated or imagined, they can only be conceived of and understood.

Objects are things which exist, which are perceived by the senses. Percepts of objects are the mental "pictures" or sensory data formulated by our brain of what our stimulates our senses. Concepts of objects are the abstractions our brains make of the perceptions from our senses. Concepts of relationship are also abstractions of the perceived interactions our senses convey to us from empirical "observation" as well as the perceived relationships we learn via transfer of concepts using language, drawings, and various other models demonstrating discrete and abstract concepts.

 

In short, concepts are another word for ideas. They're what our brain makes of direct empirical observations of objects and phenomena (like gravity, magnetism, transference of momentum, etc.) and what our brain reasons out from ideas or concepts including those we learn from language and models of concepts, such as diagrams, drawings, pictures, audio and video recordings, simulations, and so on.

[Donnadogsoth]

 

I'd like to make a few points about the definition of this crucial term: concept.

 

 

"Concept = mental picture.  If you can mentally picture a bar of chocolate, you have conceptualised it."

 

But concepts like 'love' and 'justice' have no picture available, in the sense that we can picture a bar of chocolate. "Picturing" is more akin to "imagining" -- not conceptualizing. A concept requires a minimum of TWO objects to establish a relation. When mentally picturing an object like a chocolate bar, you are imagining, not conceptualizing.

 

That is because a bar of chocolate is an object-- it has form. We can only 'picture' something with shape. Love & justice have no shape/boundary/form that can be illustrated or imagined, they can only be conceived of and understood.

 

A bar of chocolate is an object, whether real or imagined-- whether it exists or is only imagined.

So, the term concept cannot be defined as 'mental picture'.

 

I have mental pictures of love and justice.  They're not transcribable pictures that I can draw out clearly for you, but they're there.  Search around in your mind when you hold before you "love" and you'll probably find you have some mental furniture associated with it, that it's not just an invisible blank in place of anything.

 

Indeed, consider what it means when your "mind goes blank".  No concepts left, no?

[rosencrantz]

If the Earth pulls on the Moon, keeping it flying around in orbit, there must be some physical mediator *between them* which causes the act to occur

 

You wot mate? 

 

So your layer three is indistinguishable from layer two-- the "laws" of gravity, electromagnetism, etc. are all descriptions of how things interact... but they are *not* explanations of the underlying mechanism responsible.

 

No, they are not. There are no underlying mechanism except for the natural forces.

[barebones]

A Concept is a description of something that may embody many instantiations and other concepts.
An instantiation is a particular realization of a concept.

Examples:
Concept - Recording Tool. A device used to create a semi-permanent mnemonic for future reference.
Instantiations - A piece of coal. A camera.

Concept - Government. A device that may coerce behavior(s) on other device(s}.
Instantiations - Engine speed regulator on a lawnmower. Mom.
Contained Concept - Neofeudalism.


To answer the question:
 "Just looking for some insight here. I was in a discussion, and said something to the effect of 'you have a concept of chocolate, or a concept of a car or some physical object'."

Chocolate as well as referring to "some physical object" are instantiations and not concepts. Car, on the other hand, can take any number of forms and is a concept.

Just my musings. Hope it helps.
 

[rosencrantz]

In reality, any action or interaction (even abstract types like 'governance') are mediated by and through physical objects. 

 

I would like to see some reference for that.