FDR vs Epistemology

[Jot]

If there is one thing that I never "came to terms with" in regards to Stefan's views on the major areas of philosophy is his take on epistemology.

 

I could not identify from the very beginning what exactly was bothering me when he would argue epistemological problems but after a while, I think I identified the source of my distress, that is the synthetic-analytic distinction.

 

I do not actually remember him ever specifically addressing this issue but by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction (I have also read that Ayn Rand rejected this distinction too and since Stefan said that his views on epistemology mostly come from her, I would not be surprised if he does indeed reject this as well).

 

The synthetic-analytic distinction basically puts propositions in 2 categories:

 

-analytic propositions: those propositions "which are true by virtue of their meaning"

Ex. There are no married bachelors.

 

-synthetic propositions: those propositions which "are true by how their meaning relates to the world"

Ex. Gases expand when heated.

 

What I am arguing is that there is a fundamental difference of certainty we can have in relation to those 2 categories. The difference is that we can prove (100% certainty) whether an analytic statement is true or false, in other words, we have knowledge regarding those but we cannot prove whether a synthetic proposition is true or false since we must rely on external observation and experimentation and not on the laws of logic. How could we prove for example that we are not a brain in a vat?

 

However, my impression is that Stefan does not believe in this distinction (is my impression wrong?) for him "gases expand when heated" and "there are no square circles" are equally "provable". How come? Did he ever give any arguments for this?

 

Ultimately, what is your take on this subject?

[Kevin Beal]

He talks about it in this podcast:

 

FDR237 The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy - How Confusion Serves Power

http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_237_Analytic_Synthetic.mp3

[Libertus]

I agree that synthetic vs analytic propositions are very different animals. One might argue that once you understand the words used in an analytic argument, the argument itself becomes redundant. If you know the respective definitions of the words "humans" and "mammals", the conclusion that all humans are mammals will not surprise you one bit.

[Jot]

He talks about it in this podcast:

 

FDR237 The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy - How Confusion Serves Power

http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_237_Analytic_Synthetic.mp3

 

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

 

I think that this argument relies on the core premise that matter (atoms) has, is and will always have the same properties and behave the same way, in other words atmos cannot ever change their behavior, they are fixed from the very beginning of time and cannot ever be other way than they are now. My challenge is the following: How do we know that this is the case? 

 

And the second challenge that I have is: How does Stefan or any other man know that he is not a brain in a vat while making that argument? Or, how does he solve the hard problem of solipsism? (Metaphysical solipsism) 

[Will Torbald]

If you find a gas that doesn't expand when heated you either didn't heat it, or it isn't a gas - which would give a synthetic solution to the analytical problem. My take is, why is this concerning? Is anyone dying from it?

[Jot]

I agree that synthetic vs analytic propositions are very different animals. One might argue that once you understand the words used in an analytic argument, the argument itself becomes redundant. If you know the respective definitions of the words "humans" and "mammals", the conclusion that all humans are mammals will not surprise you one bit.

 

My interest is not the level of usefulness of analytic propositions, it is the level of certainty that we have regarding them compared to synthetic propositions. 

 

Kevin posted the link to one of Stefan's podcasts where he talks exactly about this subject. Stefan disagrees with this dichotomy as I expected, since you hold the opposite view I would like to hear your attempt at rebutting the argument he gave against it (the argument starts @16th min of the podcast)

If you find a gas that doesn't expand when heated you either didn't heat it, ir it isn't a gas - which would give a synthetic solution to the analytical problem. My take is, why is this concerning? Is anyone dying from it?

 

If you find a gas that doesn't expand when heated you either didn't heat it, or it isn't a gas - : CLAIM. Substantiate it.

 

which would give a synthetic solution to the analytical problem : I am not seeing the reason you could be giving for why the problem is analytical...to me it looks like it is purely a synthetic problem all along. What did you mean?

 

My take is, why is this concerning? Is anyone dying from it? : My most important value is truth. I think it is pretty easy to see why this problem could be of interest to me. Just think about the implications if it is indeed the case that there is a distinction between these two and such we cannot have in fact knowledge of the external world.

[Will Torbald]

If you find a gas that doesn't expand when heated you either didn't heat it, or it isn't a gas - : CLAIM. Substantiate it.

 

which would give a synthetic solution to the analytical problem : I am not seeing the reason you could be giving for why the problem is analytical...to me it looks like it is purely a synthetic problem all along. What did you mean?

 

My take is, why is this concerning? Is anyone dying from it? : My most important value is truth. I think it is pretty easy to see why this problem could be of interest to me. Just think about the implications if it is indeed the case that there is a distinction between these two and such we cannot have in fact knowledge of the external world.

 

It's true by definition, not by "substantiation". If I say dogs are mammals, and you say you found a dog that isn't a mammal, then what you found isn't a dog. It simply belongs in a different category apart from dog. Call it a deg if you want. A gas that doesn't expand when heated isn't in the category of gas, it would be something else. Call it a ges is if you want.

 

There is no external world because there is no internal world. There is only the world. Your perceptions and imaginations are part of it, not separate. Your brain isn't in a different realm from the rest of the things.

 

And even if it were true that you can't "absolute perfect 100% super duper extreeeeme" knowledge of the world - why care? It doesn't change anything. No one will stop working, the lights won't go off, fried chicken will still taste delicious, and nothing will move in any different direction. No one will stop trying to change the world or make it a better place if they think they can't have """""knowledge""""" that they are not in a jar controlled by a demon.

[dsayers]

I think that this argument relies on the core premise that matter (atoms) has, is and will always have the same properties and behave the same way, in other words atmos cannot ever change their behavior, they are fixed from the very beginning of time and cannot ever be other way than they are now. My challenge is the following: How do we know that this is the case? 

I think you poison the well when you say "atoms cannot ever change." Have never changed I believe is the observation. Hence the phrase the consistency of matter. If we wake up tomorrow and gravity now repels, then yes, we're right back to the drawing board on a grate many (more pressing) issues. The safe money is on gravity behaving tomorrow as it always has.

[labmath2]

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

 

I think that this argument relies on the core premise that matter (atoms) has, is and will always have the same properties and behave the same way, in other words atmos cannot ever change their behavior, they are fixed from the very beginning of time and cannot ever be other way than they are now. My challenge is the following: How do we know that this is the case?

 

And the second challenge that I have is: How does Stefan or any other man know that he is not a brain in a vat while making that argument? Or, how does he solve the hard problem of solipsism? (Metaphysical solipsism)

There is a second problem. Not all concepts are derived from empirical reality. Take law of identity as an example, it is not derived from empirical data.

 

As an aside. Law of identity is really interesting when thinking about philosophy of language. Many people use identity as reference, but they are different. If X is A, then all instances of A can be replaced with X without changing the proposition. But there is a unique case where reference changes idenity. Russels paradox asks if you create a set of all sets that do not contain themselves, would that set contain istelf. That is a case where reference affects identity. This problem reveals that identity was not defined. If i asked what is a pig, it would not be sufficient to say a pig is itself or a pig is a pig or if you really want to be clever say a pig is a swine. Those would all conform to law of identity, but wouldn't really be useful.

[Libertus]

My interest is not the level of usefulness of analytic propositions, it is the level of certainty that we have regarding them compared to synthetic propositions. 

 

Kevin posted the link to one of Stefan's podcasts where he talks exactly about this subject. Stefan disagrees with this dichotomy as I expected, since you hold the opposite view I would like to hear your attempt at rebutting the argument he gave against it (the argument starts @16th min of the podcast)

 

Sorry, I don't have time to listen to a podcast and decipher an argument right now - but since you're the one interested in it, why don't you write it down and present it here, in your own words?

[Jot]

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

 

Sorry, I don't have time to listen to a podcast and decipher an argument right now - but since you're the one interested in it, why don't you write it down and present it here, in your own words?

 

It's true by definition, not by "substantiation". If I say dogs are mammals, and you say you found a dog that isn't a mammal, then what you found isn't a dog. It simply belongs in a different category apart from dog. Call it a deg if you want. A gas that doesn't expand when heated isn't in the category of gas, it would be something else. Call it a ges is if you want.

 

If you define gases:"an airlike fluid substance which expands when heated" (or something along these lines) then you are correct. 

 

However, I have never heard someone define a gas like this...the most common definition you will find I think is gas:a substance possessing perfect molecular mobility and the property of indefinite expansion, as opposed to a solid or liquid.

 

Using the second definition the problem is now a purely analytical one, expansion when heated is an observation not part of the definition itself.

 

 

There is no external world because there is no internal world. There is only the world. Your perceptions and imaginations are part of it, not separate. Your brain isn't in a different realm from the rest of the things.

 

So you are saying that there is no difference between the physical world and the conceptual/abstract/world created in the mind, how is something like daltonism possible under this premise?

 

 

And even if it were true that you can't "absolute perfect 100% super duper extreeeeme" knowledge of the world - why care? It doesn't change anything. No one will stop working, the lights won't go off, fried chicken will still taste delicious, and nothing will move in any different direction. No one will stop trying to change the world or make it a better place if they think they can't have """""knowledge""""" that they are not in a jar controlled by a demon.

 

What is the reason for you becoming increasingly sarcastic?

 

The exact same argument could be made about morality...it does not matter whether there is objective morality because people of good conscience would still act as they acted before "morally" and bad people would still act "immorally" yet I do not see you complaining about Stefan having put so much effort in coming up with UPB.

 

The interest is personal.

I think you poison the well when you say "atoms cannot ever change." Have never changed I believe is the observation. Hence the phrase the consistency of matter. If we wake up tomorrow and gravity now repels, then yes, we're right back to the drawing board on a grate many (more pressing) issues. The safe money is on gravity behaving tomorrow as it always has.

 

That is right. But if there is no guarantee that it wont change in the future then how can we know it has always been the same way in the past?

[Will Torbald]

 

If you define gases:"an airlike fluid substance which expands when heated" (or something along these lines) then you are correct. 

 

However, I have never heard someone define a gas like this...the most common definition you will find I think is gas:a substance possessing perfect molecular mobility and the property of indefinite expansion, as opposed to a solid or liquid.

 

Using the second definition the problem is now a purely analytical one, expansion when heated is an observation not part of the definition itself.

 

 

 

So you are saying that there is no difference between the physical world and the conceptual/abstract/world created in the mind, how is something like daltonism possible under this premise?

 

 

 

What is the reason for you becoming increasingly sarcastic?

 

The exact same argument could be made about morality...it does not matter whether there is objective morality because people of good conscience would still act as they acted before "morally" and bad people would still act "immorally" yet I do not see you complaining about Stefan having put so much effort in coming up with UPB.

 

The interest is personal.

 

That is right. But if there is no guarantee that it wont change in the future then how can we know it has always been the same way in the past?

 

About the gas: Indefinite expansion includes in itself the property of expanding when heated. Same thing. I won't dwell much on this, it's frankly a non issue.

 

The mind is not another "world". Consciousness is not another "world". Concepts and abstractions are just happening in your brain.

 

Stefan makes the same argument in UPB and podcasts about the futility of moral theories. The ultimate value of a moral theory is that it exists and it is a sword and shield against the morally corrupt who will try to persuade the morally inclined. If you know your theory correctly, you won't be conned. But that's what my argument is, I don't know about Stef.

 

If you're really interested in atoms and the laws of physics, study physics. You won't get the answers with philosophy. But this is my argument as to why worrying about the future of the laws of physics doesn't matter: If they change, you'll be killed instantly. The world as it is now works in a razor edge balance between all the forces and particles. If one were to suddenly change or shift or become weaker or stronger, everything would deatomize. We depend on the values, strenghts, and properties of nature to be the way they are to even exist in this form. That is actually one of the ways some physicists have theoriezed the world could end - if the strength of the Higgs Field (the field that enables the Higgs Boson) where to suddenly change, the entire universe would be destroyed because the effect of the Higgs keeps particles together inside atoms and other forces as well. So why worry if they will change? They can't change without us dying anyway.

[EclecticIdealist]

I do not actually remember him ever specifically addressing this issue but by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction (I have also read that Ayn Rand rejected this distinction too and since Stefan said that his views on epistemology mostly come from her, I would not be surprised if he does indeed reject this as well).

Actually, that's an example of inductive reasoning, where a likely conclusion is drawn from multiple facts but an alternative conclusion cannot be completely ruled out.

The synthetic-analytic distinction basically puts propositions in 2 categories:

 

 

-analytic propositions: those propositions "which are true by virtue of their meaning"

Ex. There are no married bachelors.

 

-synthetic propositions: those propositions which "are true by how their meaning relates to the world"

Ex. Gases expand when heated.

More precislely, analytic propositions are those whose truth value is arrived at deductively; whereas synthetic propositions are those whose truth value is arrived at inductively.

What I am arguing is that there is a fundamental difference of certainty we can have in relation to those 2 categories. The difference is that we can prove (100% certainty) whether an analytic statement is true or false, in other words, we have knowledge regarding those but we cannot prove whether a synthetic proposition is true or false since we must rely on external observation and experimentation and not on the laws of logic. How could we prove for example that we are not a brain in a vat?

Absolutely correct. The truth value of analytic propositions can be known with certainty becasue they are arrived at through deduction. The truth value of synthetic propositions cannot be known with certainty because they are arrived at through induction.

However, my impression is that Stefan does not believe in this distinction (is my impression wrong?) for him "gases expand when heated" and "there are no square circles" are equally "provable". How come? Did he ever give any arguments for this?

I cannot speak for Stefan in this regard, but I would suspect from what I have read that it is a matter of "close enough". In other words, the relative certainty that one may have with respect to conclusions carefully drawn from inductive reasoning serve to be close enough to merit confidence when making even life-altering decisions.

[Jot]

Actually, that's an example of inductive reasoning, where a likely conclusion is drawn from multiple facts but an alternative conclusion cannot be completely ruled out.

 

This is what I said: "by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction" 

 

I heard him making statements/arguments that are logically incompatible with this distinction, things like, I am paraphrasing "a tree is a tree, it does not magically turn into something else" , "objects always fall down" and more statements of this sort.

 

I can deduct that he does not accept this dichotomy since he claims absolute certainty over things like these.

 

 

 

More precislely, analytic propositions are those whose truth value is arrived at deductively; whereas synthetic propositions are those whose truth value is arrived at inductively.

 

Yeah, you can put it like this.

 

 

Absolutely correct. The truth value of analytic propositions can be known with certainty becasue they are arrived at through deduction. The truth value of synthetic propositions cannot be known with certainty because they are arrived at through induction.

 

As I presumed Stefan does not agree with this, he said that this dichotomy is quite non-sensical.

 

 

I cannot speak for Stefan in this regard, but I would suspect from what I have read that it is a matter of "close enough". In other words, the relative certainty that one may have with respect to conclusions carefully drawn from inductive reasoning serve to be close enough to merit confidence when making even life-altering decisions.

 

 

He talks about it in this podcast:

 

FDR237 The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy - How Confusion Serves Power

http://media.freedomainradio.com/feed/FDR_237_Analytic_Synthetic.mp3

 

He talks about this here. His actual argument against it between the minutes 16-20 approximately.

 

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

[dsayers]

That is right. But if there is no guarantee that it wont change in the future then how can we know it has always been the same way in the past?

The momentum of the known universe is a pretty good sign. But what difference would it make? How would you life change right now if there was a time when gravity repelled, but for as long as we've known, you've known, your life span, gravity attracts?

[Jot]

About the gas: Indefinite expansion includes in itself the property of expanding when heated. Same thing. I won't dwell much on this, it's frankly a non issue.

 

It is not a logical deduction. It is implied but you can not make the leap to absolute certainty unless you prove that synthetic-analytic distinction is bollocks.

 

 

The mind is not another "world". Consciousness is not another "world". Concepts and abstractions are just happening in your brain.

 

Schizophrenic people often have hallucinations. They can hear or see things that are not there in the external world. They only exist in their brains. So the way they perceive things is not necessarily the way things are in the exteranl world. The "reality" in their heads is not congruent with reality itself.

 

 

Stefan makes the same argument in UPB and podcasts about the futility of moral theories. The ultimate value of a moral theory is that it exists and it is a sword and shield against the morally corrupt who will try to persuade the morally inclined. If you know your theory correctly, you won't be conned. But that's what my argument is, I don't know about Stef.

 

This is a big part of my motivation too.

 

As I said, to me truth is the most important value, so I do not believe it is hard to see why something as big as the very foundation of epistemology itself would be of importance to me. It is not like this topic is about some little insignificant detail.

 

 

If you're really interested in atoms and the laws of physics, study physics. You won't get the answers with philosophy. But this is my argument as to why worrying about the future of the laws of physics doesn't matter: If they change, you'll be killed instantly. The world as it is now works in a razor edge balance between all the forces and particles. If one were to suddenly change or shift or become weaker or stronger, everything would deatomize. We depend on the values, strenghts, and properties of nature to be the way they are to even exist in this form. That is actually one of the ways some physicists have theoriezed the world could end - if the strength of the Higgs Field (the field that enables the Higgs Boson) where to suddenly change, the entire universe would be destroyed because the effect of the Higgs keeps particles together inside atoms and other forces as well. So why worry if they will change? They can't change without us dying anyway.

 

The hard problem of solipsism is a problem of philosophy, not physics.

[EclecticIdealist]

How would you life change right now if there was a time when gravity repelled, but for as long as we've known, you've known, your life span, gravity attracts?

If such a time occurred in the near future, in all probability, your life and the life of everyone else in the universe would come to an immediate and abrupt end as the gasses of the stars suddenly and violently dispersed, and the rotational inertia of the rotating planets cause their respective masses to go flying off into space in parallel to the plane of rotation about the axis.

 

Just saying.

[Jot]

The momentum of the known universe is a pretty good sign. But what difference would it make? How would you life change right now if there was a time when gravity repelled, but for as long as we've known, you've known, your life span, gravity attracts?

 

It might save me some frustration over the fact that I can not disprove the usual claims of woo-peddlers.

 

Also, truth is my most important value so sometimes I am pretty big on the foundations of knowledge itself.

If such a time occurred in the near future, in all probability, your life and the life of everyone else in the universe would come to an immediate and abrupt end as the gasses of the stars suddenly and violently dispersed, and the rotational inertia of the rotating planets cause their respective masses to go flying off into space in parallel to the plane of rotation about the axis.

 

Just saying.

 

So answer his question...how could your life change right now if that was the case?

[Kevin Beal]

I think that this argument relies on the core premise that matter (atoms) has, is and will always have the same properties and behave the same way, in other words atmos cannot ever change their behavior, they are fixed from the very beginning of time and cannot ever be other way than they are now. My challenge is the following: How do we know that this is the case? 

Let's just say that atoms can change in their fundamental properties. How is this a challenge to the theory? So what if they change?

[dsayers]

If such a time occurred in the near future, in all probability, your life and the life of everyone else in the universe would come to an immediate and abrupt end as the gasses of the stars suddenly and violently dispersed, and the rotational inertia of the rotating planets cause their respective masses to go flying off into space in parallel to the plane of rotation about the axis.

 

Just saying.

Not only that, but humans have evolved for survival in an environment with the physical laws/properties that we have now. A sudden shift would likely lead to the inability to survive. Not to mention the effects of stability and reliability on our psychology. That's why I think questions that are essentially "what if gravity reversed tomorrow?" are worth little more than deepity points in a 70's Show weed circle.

[mkaru]

 

The synthetic-analytic distinction basically puts propositions in 2 categories:

 

-analytic propositions: those propositions "which are true by virtue of their meaning"

Ex. There are no married bachelors.

 

-synthetic propositions: those propositions which "are true by how their meaning relates to the world"

Ex. Gases expand when heated.

This is one way to construe the distinction, if I recall correctly, it is how WvO Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism) and many others in analytical philosophy do it. I'm not sure if it is how one could reconstruct it in Hume (I think he didn't use the analytic/synthetic terminology) but Kant (the locus classicus for this) has different definitions of analytic and synthetic judgments. Kant's distinction is made from an epistemological point of view -- I'm not sure about this, but I would say he doesn't even use the word "truth" when introducing the analytic/synthetic distinction (see chapt. IV in the Introduction-chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason). 

I think Quine's argument against the analytic-syntetic dichotomy is correct but it only is an argument against his understanding of the dichotomy. I think it shows nothing as regards the analytic/syntetic distinction of Kant. 

 

What I am arguing is that there is a fundamental difference of certainty we can have in relation to those 2 categories. The difference is that we can prove (100% certainty) whether an analytic statement is true or false, in other words, we have knowledge regarding those but we cannot prove whether a synthetic proposition is true or false since we must rely on external observation and experimentation and not on the laws of logic. How could we prove for example that we are not a brain in a vat?

 

However, my impression is that Stefan does not believe in this distinction (is my impression wrong?) for him "gases expand when heated" and "there are no square circles" are equally "provable". How come? Did he ever give any arguments for this?

 

Ultimately, what is your take on this subject?

 

I think that is correct. But radical empiricsts would say that there is no 100% certainty, and that even mathematics and logic are not certain. Now I do not know what exactly Stefan's position is and how it is founded, and only had a quick look/listen into the podcast linked above. But I think two points can be made:

 

1. The synthetic-analytic distinction is not so important. What seems to be the real issue, is the a priori/a posteriori-distinction. Empiricists hold that there are no a priori truths. When they argue against the analytic/synthetic distinction, they actually want to say that there are not analytic truths (but strictly spoken they seem to think so because they think there are no a priori truths).

 

2. The position that there are no analytic or a priori truths is inconsistent. It contradicts itself because when this theoretic position wants to articulate itself (that is, formulate the theory, make an argument, give reasons for it, try to convince others etc.) it already has to PRESUPPOSE that there are analytic and/or apriori truths. It necessarily invokes exactly those types of truths that it claims don't exist. The laws of reasoning and argumentation are not syntethic a posteriori, they CAN NOT be that. (Same for the method of induction. Relying on induction presupposes that the validity and reliability of the method of induction has not been proven only inductively. And for Deduction: The forms/laws of correct deduction (or abstraction etc.) can not themselves be derived/deduced (abstracted) from observatoin.).

 

The epistemology put forward in this podcast sounds very inconsistent and circular to me. The premise seems to be that the world consists of atoms, concepts refer to configurations of atoms etc. This statement/knowledge (the world consists of atoms etc.) can not be itself synthetic/aposteriori. If it were not a priori (be it analytic or synthetic apriori), it couldn't function to explain how our cognition relates to the world. Even if this position were consistent (which I doubt), it would at least be circular and I think this would be a bad circle.

[Jot]

Let's just say that atoms can change in their fundamental properties. How is this a challenge to the theory? So what if they change?

 

Then we have to admit that the synthetic-analytic dichotomy is valid and that analytic knowledge (100% certainty) is impossible.

 

In other words knowledge of the physical world is impossible. 

[Will Torbald]

Then we have to admit that the synthetic-analytic dichotomy is valid and that analytic knowledge (100% certainty) is impossible.

 

In other words knowledge of the physical world is impossible.

Solipsistic matrixes are unfalsifiable, and the worry of unfalsifiable constructs is the realm of mysticism and theology. Or neurosis. What if there is a spider you can't touch or see or detect inside of you? What if you have a secret stalker trying to kill you? You can't know if you have one because he is very good at hiding himself. What if we live in a simulation on the actual real world? The only answer to that is that it doesn't matter what we can't know, only what we can trust. You don't know if the floor is going to turn into lava when you step out of bed, but you must trust it won't.

 

That is to be that even if the empirical knowledge of the world were imperfect, it is perfectly useful for the world.

[EclecticIdealist]

This is what I said: "by deduction from his viewpoints on epistemology, in general, it seems to me that he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction" 

 

I heard him making statements/arguments that are logically incompatible with this distinction, things like, I am paraphrasing "a tree is a tree, it does not magically turn into something else" , "objects always fall down" and more statements of this sort.

 

I can deduct that he does not accept this dichotomy since he claims absolute certainty over things like these.

 

Actually, that was an inductive argument you just made, not a deductive one. If you wanted to make a deductive argument, you would say something like:

 

"If a person accepts the synthetic/analytic distinction, they will not openly reject or discount it.

Stefan openly refutes or discounts this distinction in his podcast on the subject.

Therefore, Stefan rejects the synthetic/analytic distinction.

 

I realize I'm just quibbling here, but if you're going to talk about these distinctions, then you should be clear about whether you're making an inductive or deductive argument.

 

His argument, as I understood it is that since concepts are derived from the observation of empirical reality which is made out of atoms that behave in a consistent manner you cannot say that purely abstract concepts hold more validity than observations made by the senses since the very tools of creating the concepts in the first place are the senses and in order for the concepts to be able to be created it requires that matter behaves consistently.

Yes, it is quite evident that Stefan is a radical empiricist. He denies the obvious differences between rational truths and the empirical truths from which they are abstracted are of any significance or importance in the grand scheme of things. While he is probably correct that our understanding of the principles of logic are the result of inductive abstractions from empirical observation of the consistency of physical phenomena, it doesn't change the fact that there is a significant difference between the truth claims based on inductive reasoning and empiricism (which are relative probabilities) and the absolute truth claims based on deductive reasoning and abstracted laws, principles and relationships.

 

This is especially the case when it comes to discussing things like ethics and aesthetics; since if one does not know and cannot rationally prove the source of ethics, one may be led to making erroneous statements like "there are objective moral truths."

 

So answer his question...how could your life change right now if that was the case?

If it were true in the past (who's to say it wasn't when the Big Bang that is said to have occurred at the beginning of time took place?) it wouldn't change anything in my life at all.  I'm more concerned about things that are likely to happen, especially in the immediate or near future, that may affect my life and the lives of those around me, especially those I love and care about; and those that have influence for good or ill in my life.

[Jot]

Solipsistic matrixes are unfalsifiable, and the worry of unfalsifiable constructs is the realm of mysticism and theology. Or neurosis. What if there is a spider you can't touch or see or detect inside of you? What if you have a secret stalker trying to kill you? You can't know if you have one because he is very good at hiding himself. What if we live in a simulation on the actual real world? The only answer to that is that it doesn't matter what we can't know, only what we can trust. You don't know if the floor is going to turn into lava when you step out of bed, but you must trust it won't.

 

That is to be that even if the empirical knowledge of the world were imperfect, it is perfectly useful for the world.

This thread was never about utilitarianism.

[Kevin Beal]

Then we have to admit that the synthetic-analytic dichotomy is valid and that analytic knowledge (100% certainty) is impossible.

 

In other words knowledge of the physical world is impossible. 

How does it do that? I don't follow...

[shirgall]

In other words knowledge of the physical world is impossible. 

 

We don't have any knowledge of any other worlds, so we have to work with what we've got.

 

I have knowledge of the world that I sense. I can interact with it. I observe other actors in the real world. When these actors and I converse, they often have knowledge I don't have but can confirm. Thus, I conclude that there is an objective reality containing real objects I can see, smell, taste, hear, and feel that follow physical rules I can discern or learn, and that there are other people like me in it.

 

If you deny objective reality, and refuse knowledge of it, you are very alone and likely to become tiger food.

[Jot]

We don't have any knowledge of any other worlds, so we have to work with what we've got.

 

Did you read my OP? I argued that knowledge of any world requires that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is invalid/false.

 

If you cannot prove that this distinction is wrong then you have to admit that we cannot know whether analytical propositions are true or false.

 

 

I have knowledge of the world that I sense. I can interact with it. I observe other actors in the real world. When these actors and I converse, they often have knowledge I don't have but can confirm. Thus, I conclude that there is an objective reality containing real objects I can see, smell, taste, hear, and feel that follow physical rules I can discern or learn, and that there are other people like me in it.

 

If you deny objective reality, and refuse knowledge of it, you are very alone and likely to become tiger food.

 

 How do you solve the hard problem of solipsism? (How do you know you are not a brain in a vat?)

How does it do that? I don't follow...

 

In fact, I think you are correct, even if they could change that would not mean that you cannot make knowledge claims for the present moment, instead of "unchangeable" I should have said consistent (that is, across the whole physical reality they behave the same).

 

 

Analytic propositions such as "Gases always expand when heated" can only be a certainty only if we know that the properties of matter are consistent. 

 

If the laws of matter are not consistent then the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid since we cannot make claims such as "Gases always expand when heated" for example or any other analytical claim. Thus, knowledge of analytical truths/external world is impossible.

[shirgall]

Did you read my OP? I argued that knowledge of any world requires that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is invalid/false.

 

If you cannot prove that this distinction is wrong then you have to admit that we cannot know whether analytical propositions are true or false.

 

How do you solve the hard problem of solipsism? (How do you know you are not a brain in a vat?)

 

 

I did read the original posting, but I thought I had argued that it really doesn't matter if your brain is in a vat... we have to work with what we have. All we have to go on is what we have observed, whether it is artificial or not.

 

The entire thing strikes me that same way as the "mind/body problem". The only reason it is a "problem" is because our language is such that they appear to be distinct things, but they are not. Consciousness is an effect of processes of the brain.

 

Analytic propositions are word games that are entirely abstract. Synthetic propositions are testable by experiment in objective reality. Statements of any sort can be analyzed via word games. Conclusions can be tested whether or not our brain is in a vat. *If* our brain is in a vat, the two kinds of propositions belong in the same set. If we do exist in an objective reality, they are distinct... but it changes nothing about claims, logical operations, or conclusions.

 

The problem (ahem) is the multiple definitions of the word "problem." It's a puzzle to be solved, not an insurmountable negative difficulty. The way you set it up is that "no puzzles can be solved because we can't tell if the puzzle is real." That's clearly not the case.

[rosencrantz]

Analytic propositions are word games that are entirely abstract. Synthetic propositions are testable by experiment in objective reality.

 

What about UPB? If it's analytical, it's a silly word game. If it's synthetic it can be falsified, it defies the claim of universality. If it's a transcendental deduction, you are deep into Kantian territory. 

[shirgall]

What about UPB? If it's analytical, it's a silly word game. If it's synthetic it can be falsified, it defies the claim of universality. If it's a transcendental deduction, you are deep into Kantian territory. 

 

Look at the ground rule premises for UPB.

 

1. We both exist.
2. Senses have a capacity for accuracy.
3. Language has a capacity for meaning.
4. Correction requires universal preferences.
5. You can objectively separate truth from falsehood.
6. Truth is better than falsehood.
7. Peaceful debates are the best way to resolve disputes.
8. Individuals are responsible for their actions.

 

Most of the evaluation of actions is analytic here, except where it is required that one evaluates the physical effects of an action. However, those physical effects are easily tested. What physical effects are being falsified that you think change the conclusions you have reached evaluating actions with UPB?

[Kevin Beal]

If the laws of matter are not consistent then the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid since we cannot make claims such as "Gases always expand when heated" for example or any other analytical claim. Thus, knowledge of analytical truths/external world is impossible.

I'm not sure how this is different than saying "if nothing is knowable, then nothing is knowable". If matter and energy are so variable and random that no objects can be defined, then we have far bigger problems than debating how accurate concepts can be.

[labmath2]

Look at the ground rule premises for UPB.

 

• We both exist.
• Senses have a capacity for accuracy.
• Language has a capacity for meaning.
• Correction requires universal preferences.
• You can objectively separate truth from falsehood.
• Truth is better than falsehood.
• Peaceful debates are the best way to resolve disputes.
• Individuals are responsible for their actions.

Most of the evaluation of actions is analytic here, except where it is required that one evaluates the physical effects of an action. However, those physical effects are easily tested. What physical effects are being falsified that you think change the conclusions you have reached evaluating actions with UPB?

Proposition 4 is wrong. Correction does not require universal preferences. Correction requires minds have the capacity for change.

 

Proposition 6 is ambiguous. What does "better" mean?

 

Proposition 7 is not debatable. What does "best" mean?

 

Proposition 8 is ambiguous unless responsible is a descriptive claim, which makes it self evident. Another way of expressing it would be "you did your actions."

[Jot]

I'm not sure how this is different than saying "if nothing is knowable, then nothing is knowable". If matter and energy are so variable and random that no objects can be defined, then we have far bigger problems than debating how accurate concepts can be.

 

Notice that never in this thread I said "nothing is knowable", otherwise this would have been a thread about nihilism.

 

What I tried to argue is that nothing of the physical reality is knowable (analytical claims cannot be proved) given that there is such a thing as analytic/synthetic distinction (if it is a valid dichotomy). Synthetic claims are provable in any kind of solipsistic universe.

 

 

"If matter and energy are so variable and random that no objects can be defined, then we have far bigger problems than debating how accurate concepts can be"

This is something I tried to wrap my mind around way long before I found out FDR. And I am still not able to get too far with this.

 

First off, I am not sure from which premises got you to no objects can be defined if matter and energy are variable. Are you exclusively talking about physical objects?

 

If we take the example of the square circle for example, how could matter and energy ever change in a way in which this would be possible? Would not this concept be impossible no matter what properties the physical roam has? (As a sidenote, how did we arrive at the concept of the square and circle or any other geometrical form to begin with? After all, there is nothing in nature that is a square or a circle...if you zoom in enough any object in nature that looks like a circle you will find that at some point that thing does not look like a circle anymore and in fact was never a circle to being with because it has imperfections alongside its circumference and even if we did find such a thing, it would still be 3D, would not it? Even atoms occupy space so I do not see how a 2D object is possible in the physical world, only as a concept in the brain.

 

 

Once a concept is defined it does not matter what happens to its physical correspondent in reality, does it? If we witness a man that is a bachelor and we create the concept of an unmarried bachelor in our heads, no matter what happens to physical reality this concept will never lose its validity, would it?

 

I am also curious if is possible for someone who was born without senses to come up with any concepts...would such a person ever be able to come up with the laws of non-contradiction or identity? Or with any mathematical concepts? What could stop him from being able to do so?

[Kevin Beal]

Notice that never in this thread I said "nothing is knowable" [...] What I tried to argue is that nothing of the physical reality is knowable [...]Are you exclusively talking about physical objects?

Yes. I was talking about physical objects. I did not misunderstand you.

 

 

If we take the example of the square circle for example, how could matter and energy ever change in a way in which this would be possible? [...] Once a concept is defined it does not matter what happens to its physical correspondent in reality, does it?

It can't and you're right that it does not matter.

 

Insofar as squares describe the shape of physical objects, qualities of squares also describe that object. Insofar as concepts match up with reality, the functions and properties we ascribe to those concepts also describe reality, a priori.

 

Out of convenience, you can qualify "insofar as the relevant concepts describe the reality, the proposition can be evaluated" when referring to analytic propositions. The only problem then is knowing whether or not reality is real, which is not something I would debate because to debate it would be to accept it. It would be silly.