Jot Posted June 9, 2016 Author Posted June 9, 2016 Actually, that was an inductive argument you just made, not a deductive one. If you wanted to make a deductive argument, you would say something like: "If a person accepts the synthetic/analytic distinction, they will not openly reject or discount it. Stefan openly refutes or discounts this distinction in his podcast on the subject. Therefore, Stefan rejects the synthetic/analytic distinction. I realize I'm just quibbling here, but if you're going to talk about these distinctions, then you should be clear about whether you're making an inductive or deductive argument. The law of detachment (also known as affirming the antecedent and Modus ponens) is the first form of deductive reasoning. A single conditional statement is made, and a hypothesis (P) is stated. The conclusion (Q) is then deduced from the statement and the hypothesis. The most basic form is: If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q. 1. If Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim then he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. 2. Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim. 3. Thus, Stefan rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. Am I missing something?
EclecticIdealist Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 The only problem then is knowing whether or not reality is real, which is not something I would debate because to debate it would be to accept it. It would be silly. Actually, the debate would be over whether physicality that is experienced by the senses is an actual separate and objective reality and not a projection of the mind. But as others have previously pointed out, the question is moot and irrelevant as what we can know with a high degree of certainty is the best we can ever hope to come to. Even our perceptions and conceptions are not 100% reliable, but are generally reliable enough.
Jot Posted June 9, 2016 Author Posted June 9, 2016 I did not misunderstand you. Then why did you say "nothing is knowable" instead of nothing analytic is knowable? To return to your counter-argument: "I'm not sure how this is different than saying "if nothing is knowable, then nothing is knowable" It is different because my argument was a Modus ponens which is a valid form of argument, not a tautology as you claimed. Proof: 1. If the laws of matter are not consistent then the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid. 2. The laws of matter are not consistent. (the premise you agreed to accept as true for the sake of the argument) 3. Thus, the analytic-synthetic distinction is valid. Insofar as squares describe the shape of physical objects, qualities of squares also describe that object. Insofar as concepts match up with reality, the functions and properties we ascribe to those concepts also describe reality, a priori. What I tried to argue in the precedent post was that squares, circles and any geometrical shape cannot describe the shape of any physical object because "if you zoom in enough any object in nature that looks like a circle you will find that at some point that thing does not look like a circle anymore and in fact was never a circle to being with because it has imperfections alongside its circumference and even if we did find such a thing, it would still be 3D, would not it? Even atoms occupy space so I do not see how a 2D object is possible in the physical world, only as a concept in the brain." Even the closest physical object to a square in the physical world is not a square but an approximation of the concept of a square. What other quality does the concept of the square have outside of the shape? Out of convenience, you can qualify "insofar as the relevant concepts describe the reality, the proposition can be evaluated" when referring to analytic propositions. The only problem then is knowing whether or not reality is real, which is not something I would debate because to debate it would be to accept it. It would be silly. Indeed but what about a simulation? If you are a brain in a vat you can only know what is simulated, can you really have analytic knowledge of the reality that is outside your brain? I did read the original posting, but I thought I had argued that it really doesn't matter if your brain is in a vat... we have to work with what we have. All we have to go on is what we have observed, whether it is artificial or not. The entire thing strikes me that same way as the "mind/body problem". The only reason it is a "problem" is because our language is such that they appear to be distinct things, but they are not. Consciousness is an effect of processes of the brain. Analytic propositions are word games that are entirely abstract. Synthetic propositions are testable by experiment in objective reality. Statements of any sort can be analyzed via word games. Conclusions can be tested whether or not our brain is in a vat. *If* our brain is in a vat, the two kinds of propositions belong in the same set. If we do exist in an objective reality, they are distinct... but it changes nothing about claims, logical operations, or conclusions. The problem (ahem) is the multiple definitions of the word "problem." It's a puzzle to be solved, not an insurmountable negative difficulty. The way you set it up is that "no puzzles can be solved because we can't tell if the puzzle is real." That's clearly not the case. Word games is not an argument. If we are a brain in a vat we could at best have theories about the simulation we live in, not about the reality itself that is outside of our senses.
shirgall Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 Proposition 4 is wrong. Correction does not require universal preferences. Correction requires minds have the capacity for change. Proposition 6 is ambiguous. What does "better" mean? Proposition 7 is not debatable. What does "best" mean? Proposition 8 is ambiguous unless responsible is a descriptive claim, which makes it self evident. Another way of expressing it would be "you did your actions." Except they are not propositions, they are premises!
rosencrantz Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 If your system only has analytic statements in it, it is true by definition if you deduct everything properly. If your system has synthetic statements in it that can be falsified, the perspective changes. It is not true by definition but open to correction by a contrary evidence.
Jot Posted June 9, 2016 Author Posted June 9, 2016 Except they are not propositions, they are premises! Premises are propositions. And premises can be wrong/false. And you still need to define your terms, "best" is not an appropriate qualifier in your statement. If your system only has analytic statements in it, it is true by definition if you deduct everything properly. If your system has synthetic statements in it that can be falsified, the perspective changes. It is not true by definition but open to correction by a contrary evidence. You are confusing analytic with synthetic, it is the other way around. Ignoring that, Stefan disagrees with this, I would like to hear your counter-argument to his argument, http://www.fdrpodcasts.com/#/237/the-analyticsynthetic-dichotomy-how-confusion-serves-power(@16-20 mins)
shirgall Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 Premises are propositions. And premises can be wrong/false. And you still need to define your terms, "best" is not an appropriate qualifier in your statement. I invite you to read UPB (the book), since that's where those are from (as I had said), with context as to why those are the standard premises for the rest of the book.
EclecticIdealist Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 1. If Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim then he rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. 2. Stefan claims knowledge over at least one analytic claim. 3. Thus, Stefan rejects the synthetic-analytic distinction. Am I missing something? Analytic claims are the only thing one can rightly claim absolute certainty over since they are definitive, that is to say, they rationally define and divide ideas deductively. One cannot claim certain knowledge of propositions that are inductively rationalized because synthetic propositions are inherently probabilistic, not definitive; instead, at best one may have relative or approximate certainty. Now Stefan claims there is no real distinction or dichotomy between analytic and synthetic because we would not have analytical concepts and propositions without first relying upon empirical synthetic propositions and concepts. I think this is an imprecise way of regarding knowledge and truth, because it essentially dissolves the distinction between empirical concepts based on precepts and rational concepts which laws, principles, relationships and entities that have been abstracted from empirical concepts. I believe the reason why he denies the distinction is because the distinction has been used historically to create moral justification contrary to the anarchist ideology he professes.
rosencrantz Posted June 9, 2016 Posted June 9, 2016 I am pretty sure you are mistaken, Ferssitar http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
Jot Posted June 9, 2016 Author Posted June 9, 2016 I am pretty sure you are mistaken, Ferssitar http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ Crap...you are right. What is funny is that in my original post I did not make this confusion...and this is not the first time I make this confusion, for some reason based on how these words sound to me my mind finds it more natural to be the other way around.
Libertus Posted June 10, 2016 Posted June 10, 2016 Remember, analytic claims you can prove just by analyzing the terms. 1
Jot Posted June 10, 2016 Author Posted June 10, 2016 Analytic claims are the only thing one can rightly claim absolute certainty over since they are definitive, that is to say, they rationally define and divide ideas deductively. One cannot claim certain knowledge of propositions that are inductively rationalized because synthetic propositions are inherently probabilistic, not definitive; instead, at best one may have relative or approximate certainty. Now Stefan claims there is no real distinction or dichotomy between analytic and synthetic because we would not have analytical concepts and propositions without first relying upon empirical synthetic propositions and concepts. I think this is an imprecise way of regarding knowledge and truth, because it essentially dissolves the distinction between empirical concepts based on precepts and rational concepts which laws, principles, relationships and entities that have been abstracted from empirical concepts. I believe the reason why he denies the distinction is because the distinction has been used historically to create moral justification contrary to the anarchist ideology he professes. I meant synthetic not analytic, in my OP I defined them correctly but for whatever reason I always confuse them, meaning synthetic when I write analytic and the other way around... You claimed 2 times in a row that my argument was inductive not deductive, I offered a rebuttal, what is your response to it? Am I wrong that it is a deductive argument? Remember, analytics claims you can prove just by analyzing the terms. Thanks, this really helps.
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