Is the Argument from Morality just an instance of the Argument from Effect?

[John Sambrook]

As I understand it, the Argument from Morality is that, one should refrain from actions that are immoral, simply because they are immoral.

 

The Argument from Effect, to my knowledge, is that one should refrain from actions because those actions will create negative consequences, either for the actor or for some group of others.

 

But isn't the Argument from Morality an instance, or a form of, the Argument from Effect?

Presumably, the question "Why be moral?" is asked in order to understand the benefits - the consequences - the effects - of being moral.

 

So, is there a real difference between the two?

[dsayers]

What you are representing as arguing from morality couldn't be an argument from effect. Effects come after the behavior which creates the effect and morality is a consideration before the behavior.

[mkaru]

As I understand it, the Argument from Morality is that, one should refrain from actions that are immoral, simply because they are immoral.

 

The Argument from Effect, to my knowledge, is that one should refrain from actions because those actions will create negative consequences, either for the actor or for some group of others.

 

But isn't the Argument from Morality an instance, or a form of, the Argument from Effect?

 

Presumably, the question "Why be moral?" is asked in order to understand the benefits - the consequences - the effects - of being moral.

 

So, is there a real difference between the two?

 

What you are describing here are the two types of modern ethics: Deontological Ethics and Utilitarism. I think the differences between those two are fundamental. They are opposed in philosophical ethics and this opposition is visible on many levels of comparison of those two types of ethics. 

For example, deontologists stress the point, that it is not possible to certainly know the possibly relevant effects of an action before the action has been done. This would make moral questions somehow undecidable, because you could never be absolutely sure if what you are planning to do is the right thing (in the sense of morality). 

 

Also, a deontologist would claim that the answer to the question "Why be moral?" is not the benefits/effects of being moral, but that being moral is to be understood as a end in itself. The answer would be "Because it's the right thing to be moral." (it looks like a circular answer; but not necessarily a bad circle..). The question "Why be moral?" is more like a meta-question. Probably even an Utilitarist would not give a utilitaristic answer. Because that would be circular as well, and maybe so in a bad way. 

[jpahmad]

As I understand it, the Argument from Morality is that, one should refrain from actions that are immoral, simply because they are immoral.

 

The Argument from Effect, to my knowledge, is that one should refrain from actions because those actions will create negative consequences, either for the actor or for some group of others.

 

But isn't the Argument from Morality an instance, or a form of, the Argument from Effect?

 

Presumably, the question "Why be moral?" is asked in order to understand the benefits - the consequences - the effects - of being moral.

 

So, is there a real difference between the two?

 

The argument from effect is impossible to make even if you wanted to because it is impossible to know what the effect will ultimately be.  

[Jot]

As I understand it, the Argument from Morality is that, one should refrain from actions that are immoral, simply because they are immoral.

 

No. There are no "shoulds", there is no principle that says that you "should" act morally.

 

All UPB is about is what can be universalized and what can not. Things that can be universalized are either neutral or moral and those actions that cannot are immoral.

 

There is no link to the effects or potential effects of those actions, just the laws of identity and non-contradiction. 

[Matthew Ed Moran]

An argument about morality is "x is the initiation of force, and therefore x is immoral" 

 

An argument about effect is "x will lead to y"

 

In either case, you have to actually prove the premises lead to the conclusion before the arguments can be considered valid or invalid.

[jpahmad]

There is one "should" in morality.  If you want to be "moral", then the examined behavior should be able to be applied universally without contradiction.

[Will Torbald]

No. There are no "shoulds", there is no principle that says that you "should" act morally.

 

All UPB is about is what can be universalized and what can not. Things that can be universalized are either neutral or moral and those actions that cannot are immoral.

 

There is no link to the effects or potential effects of those actions, just the laws of identity and non-contradiction. 

 

If you are correcting him, you are asking he should conform to a universal standard of truth and change his mind. That his behavior must change in order to accept a universal truth. That should is also implied in UPB, as trying to say that UPB doesn't say you should act morally is already making use of a universal standard. So no, UPB does say you should act morally because when you say you don't have to, you contradict yourself.

[Jot]

If you are correcting him, you are asking he should conform to a universal standard of truth and change his mind. That his behavior must change in order to accept a universal truth. That should is also implied in UPB, as trying to say that UPB doesn't say you should act morally is already making use of a universal standard. So no, UPB does say you should act morally because when you say you don't have to, you contradict yourself.

 

There is a difference between "should" and "IF X then you should".

 

When you use "should" without the conditional IF then should = It is moral to X /It is immoral not to X.

Example: You should be moral. I am arguing that there is no logical principle by which you can sustain that the use of this type of "should" is logical/reasonable/valid.

 

The other type of should, "IF X then you should " This is the one you are talking about which is different from the one I was arguing against.

Example: If you WANT to be moral then you should conform to a universal standard of truth => change your mind => behavior must change in order to accept a universal truth.

 

This is the way I see this, I welcome counter arguments.

In either case, you have to actually prove the premises lead to the conclusion before the arguments can be considered valid or invalid.

 

Why? Aren't arguments meant to be deductive?

[Matthew Ed Moran]

Why? Aren't arguments meant to be deductive?

 

Yes, I was trying to point out that neither statements in the form I gave were actually arguments. They were assertions. An argument needs to have premises that lead to the conclusion for it to be considered valid. I cannot just say the initiation of force is immoral unless I'm making an assertion. I also cannot just provide a tautology.

[Jot]

Yes, I was trying to point out that neither statements in the form I gave were actually arguments. They were assertions. An argument needs to have premises that lead to the conclusion for it to be considered valid. I cannot just say the initiation of force is immoral unless I'm making an assertion. I also cannot just provide a tautology.

 

I do not think this is right, UPB works on axioms, not assertions, otherwise, we should consider it a science.

 

Tautologies and syllogisms are not the same thing.

[dsayers]

There is a difference between "should" and "IF X then you should".

Not in the context of human behavior. Because we all exist in the same moral category, ANY attempt at a "should" in terms of human behavior is assuming "if you wish to live consistently."

[Jot]

Not in the context of human behavior. Because we all exist in the same moral category, ANY attempt at a "should" in terms of human behavior is assuming "if you wish to live consistently."

 

Why is it necessarily implied?

 

You could mean should as in unchosen positive obligations, that is the difference I was talking about.

[Des]

deontologists stress the point, that it is not possible to certainly know the possibly relevant effects of an action before the action has been done.

certainly is an unrealistic standard. I don't certainly know what happens if I skip work vs attend work, I make my decision without needing that standard of foreknowledge to be met, as do all of us, with all our decisions.

[EclecticIdealist]

As I understand it, the Argument from Morality is that, one should refrain from actions that are immoral, simply because they are immoral.

 

The Argument from Effect, to my knowledge, is that one should refrain from actions because those actions will create negative consequences, either for the actor or for some group of others.

 

But isn't the Argument from Morality an instance, or a form of, the Argument from Effect?

No. The argument from morality does not concern itself with consequence of action or "effect", it is only concerned with the characteristic of action (moral or immoral). As others have mentioned, an argument from morality is nothing more than question begging, as morality concerns itself with answering the question as to why one should do something. Consequently, it seeks to end the question without answering the question by implying that the morality should be adhered to for its own sake and not for any effect it might have.

 

Presumably, the question "Why be moral?" is asked in order to understand the benefits - the consequences - the effects - of being moral.

 

So, is there a real difference between the two?

Why be moral seeks to understand the benefits of moral action which may not include the direct consequences of the action itself which is what arguing from effect addresses. In essence, one might ask, "Why should one push other peoples' cars out of ditches?" The answer to such a question arguing from effect would be, "because the cars would remain in ditches if one did not", or, "in order engender favor with the drivers, passengers, and owners of the vehicles and ditches", or even, "in order to build strong muscles."  The argument from morality would be, "because it's good to help others."

[mkaru]

certainly is an unrealistic standard. I don't certainly know what happens if I skip work vs attend work, I make my decision without needing that standard of foreknowledge to be met, as do all of us, with all our decisions.

It is not an unrealistic standard for moral questions; at least that is what deontologists say. It is, of course, unrealistic for  everyday action in a pragmatic or technical sense (for example, if I follow this recipe for baking a cake, I do not know for sure if I achieve something edible, something tasting well etc.; or if I take the car to drive somewhere, I do not know for sure what will happen, if I reach my destination etc.). We act anyways, because we believe that the possibly worst outcomes are not really that bad (or chances for them to happen not very high; e.g. dying in a car crash). When the possible outcome is very bad and/or chances for it to happen are very high, we probably wouldn't act (e.g. playing russian roulette). 

 

We do not know for sure what will happen when we act. That is because there are many contingent factors that we do not control but that strongly influence the output. We do not know for sure what will turn out. We only know it AFTER we have acted. That is, we have to ACT to know it. But this makes no sense as regards ethical questions. Because in ethics we want to know whether we are morally ALLOWED to act (or not). If someone says: Just act and you will see whether the consequences of your actions are good, then he didn't even understand the ethical question. Ethics is not about experimenting. I would have to commit a morally bad action just to know that it is morally bad.

 

That is the reason why many ethical theories say that the (possible) consequences of an action are not relevant for deciding whether an action is morally good or not. 

[John Sambrook]

No. The argument from morality does not concern itself with consequence of action or "effect", it is only concerned with the characteristic of action (moral or immoral). As others have mentioned, an argument from morality is nothing more than question begging, as morality concerns itself with answering the question as to why one should do something. Consequently, it seeks to end the question without answering the question by implying that the morality should be adhered to for its own sake and not for any effect it might have.

Yes, this is my conclusion after a bit more reading and thinking.

 

I would say this - if we just talk about "the argument from morality" we are not specifying the identity of the morality we are using.

 

For example, my morality remains largely based on the Objectivist Ethics. I'm not going to debate the rightness or wrongness of that at this time.

 

But if someone else is assuming a duty-based (deontological, as I've now learned) morality in their application of the argument from morality on me, I can see how we are going to be talking past each other.

 

Finally, I currently see UPB as a morality based on the idea that logical consistency is a duty, similar, to Kant's view that people had a duty to observe his CI.

 

I advocate logical consistency, of course, but not as an end-in-itself, but as a means to another end, which is my own happiness in the time I have left before I'm no longer able to maintain homeostasis.

 

I'm grateful for the many contributions on this thread.

Why be moral seeks to understand the benefits of moral action which may not include the direct consequences of the action itself which is what arguing from effect addresses. In essence, one might ask, "Why should one push other peoples' cars out of ditches?" The answer to such a question arguing from effect would be, "because the cars would remain in ditches if one did not", or, "in order engender favor with the drivers, passengers, and owners of the vehicles and ditches", or even, "in order to build strong muscles."  The argument from morality would be, "because it's good to help others."

 

I can see that, in the past, when someone has asked the question "Why be moral?" my ultimate answer was "Because being moral serves my life."

[Des]

It is not an unrealistic standard for moral questions; at least that is what deontologists say. It is, of course, unrealistic for  everyday action in a pragmatic or technical sense

I can get value from other people restricting themselves to moral actions (avoiding aggression), and I am willing to trade with trustworthy people, my non-aggression for theirs.

 

That is the use I have for the computation of what is moral.

 

If something in my posession is highly radioactive and you decide not to steal it (with each of us not having any knowledge of it's danger), then you have decided to do the moral action and I am dead.

 

The computation that the action of not stealing is moral, uses the reasonable assumption that things I possess are not about to cause my death, that stealing them could lead to my (earlier) death. Prediction is entangled with morality and can't be untangled from it (if I am wrong about that, please explain).

 

Initiating an interaction by whacking me over the head with a baton, is immoral because it is far more likely to lead to my death, than to lead away from my death (by say dislodging a thrombus that is about to kill me).

 

Knowledge allowing better prediction, changes the character of the act. In each above case, if you knew it would very likely save me, then you were my lifesaver, not my attacker (even it the act fails and I die).

 

I maintain that certainty is unrealistic, even for morality.

[mkaru]

If something in my posession is highly radioactive and you decide not to steal it (with each of us not having any knowledge of it's danger), then you have decided to do the moral action and I am dead.

Yes, but this consequence would not be my fault, it could not be attributable to me, it wasn't my intention. It would be a case of bad luck (for you). Bad luck is something that happens all the time, it's a necessary (and sad) feature of the world. 

The point you are raising is exactly what Kant discusses in his short text "On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns". Maybe this is of interest for you.. 

 

The computation that the action of not stealing is moral, uses the reasonable assumption that things I possess are not about to cause my death, that stealing them could lead to my (earlier) death. Prediction is entangled with morality and can't be untangled from it (if I am wrong about that, please explain).

 

 

I don't think that stealing would be legitimate in cases where I steal something that would otherwise cause the death of the person I steal it from. Taking away something from someone that would (against his own will) cause his death, i. e. saving someones life, is of course a good thing. But we shouldn't call that "stealing".  

 

Stealing is morally bad because it is a violation of a right (the name of this right is "property"). I need not predict anything about the future outcome (which I can not do, because humans can not predict the future; they can only expect possible outcomes to a certain degree of probability). When it comes to moral questions I need not predict the future because I do exactly know at the present what I am intending to do. I know what type of action I am planning to do - is it stealing? is it saving someone's life? I can now that for sure, because my intention (or "my will") is something that I definitely know. Deontologists say that we can define Types of Action that are absolutely immoral and forbidden. Again, see Kant. I do not want to claim that Kant's position is the right one. It just seems that you didn't see that there are alternative conceptions of morality that do not focus on the consequences of actions, and that e.g. Kant has some strong arguments 

 

 

Initiating an interaction by whacking me over the head with a baton, is immoral because it is far more likely to lead to my death, than to lead away from my death (by say dislodging a thrombus that is about to kill me).

 

 

 

Again, I would say that it is immoral because it is immoral to intend to kill someone. Or cause him pain against his will, etc. 

 

How should I know whether an action is allowed if I can not know the consequences with certainty? If instead of talking about certainty we switch to talking about probabilites, the problem only occurs again: How can I know with certainty that my calculation of the probabilities is correct?

We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.

 

 

Knowledge allowing better prediction, changes the character of the act. In each above case, if you knew it would very likely save me, then you were my lifesaver, not my attacker (even it the act fails and I die).

 

I maintain that certainty is unrealistic, even for morality.

 

I understand your point. Yes, it would definitely be unrealistic if the morality of an act (or actor) depended on the consequences of the act (or him forseeing those consequences). But we need not give up certainty in ethics. We also have the other option of giving up that specific understanding of ethics (called "consequentialism"). That's the point I wanted to make here..

 

[Des]

 

 

Yes, but this consequence would not be my fault, it could not be attributable to me, it wasn't my intention. It would be a case of bad luck (for you). Bad luck is something that happens all the time, it's a necessary (and sad) feature of the world. 

The point you are raising is exactly what Kant discusses in his short text "On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns". Maybe this is of interest for you.. 

 

I don't think that stealing would be legitimate in cases where I steal something that would otherwise cause the death of the person I steal it from. Taking away something from someone that would (against his own will) cause his death, i. e. saving someones life, is of course a good thing. But we shouldn't call that "stealing".  

 

Stealing is morally bad because it is a violation of a right (the name of this right is "property"). I need not predict anything about the future outcome (which I can not do, because humans can not predict the future; they can only expect possible outcomes to a certain degree of probability). When it comes to moral questions I need not predict the future because I do exactly know at the present what I am intending to do. I know what type of action I am planning to do - is it stealing? is it saving someone's life? I can now that for sure, because my intention (or "my will") is something that I definitely know. Deontologists say that we can define Types of Action that are absolutely immoral and forbidden. Again, see Kant. I do not want to claim that Kant's position is the right one. It just seems that you didn't see that there are alternative conceptions of morality that do not focus on the consequences of actions, and that e.g. Kant has some strong arguments 

 

 

 

Again, I would say that it is immoral because it is immoral to intend to kill someone. Or cause him pain against his will, etc. 

 

How should I know whether an action is allowed if I can not know the consequences with certainty? If instead of talking about certainty we switch to talking about probabilites, the problem only occurs again: How can I know with certainty that my calculation of the probabilities is correct?

We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.

 

 

I understand your point. Yes, it would definitely be unrealistic if the morality of an act (or actor) depended on the consequences of the act (or him forseeing those consequences). But we need not give up certainty in ethics. We also have the other option of giving up that specific understanding of ethics (called "consequentialism"). That's the point I wanted to make here..

 

 

[Des]

 

 

Yes, but this consequence would not be my fault, it could not be attributable to me, it wasn't my intention. It would be a case of bad luck (for you). Bad luck is something that happens all the time, it's a necessary (and sad) feature of the world. 

The point you are raising is exactly what Kant discusses in his short text "On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns". Maybe this is of interest for you.. 

 

I don't think that stealing would be legitimate in cases where I steal something that would otherwise cause the death of the person I steal it from. Taking away something from someone that would (against his own will) cause his death, i. e. saving someones life, is of course a good thing. But we shouldn't call that "stealing".  

 

Stealing is morally bad because it is a violation of a right (the name of this right is "property"). I need not predict anything about the future outcome (which I can not do, because humans can not predict the future; they can only expect possible outcomes to a certain degree of probability). When it comes to moral questions I need not predict the future because I do exactly know at the present what I am intending to do. I know what type of action I am planning to do - is it stealing? is it saving someone's life? I can now that for sure, because my intention (or "my will") is something that I definitely know. Deontologists say that we can define Types of Action that are absolutely immoral and forbidden. Again, see Kant. I do not want to claim that Kant's position is the right one. It just seems that you didn't see that there are alternative conceptions of morality that do not focus on the consequences of actions, and that e.g. Kant has some strong arguments 

 

 

 

Again, I would say that it is immoral because it is immoral to intend to kill someone. Or cause him pain against his will, etc. 

 

How should I know whether an action is allowed if I can not know the consequences with certainty? If instead of talking about certainty we switch to talking about probabilites, the problem only occurs again: How can I know with certainty that my calculation of the probabilities is correct?

We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.

 

 

I understand your point. Yes, it would definitely be unrealistic if the morality of an act (or actor) depended on the consequences of the act (or him forseeing those consequences). But we need not give up certainty in ethics. We also have the other option of giving up that specific understanding of ethics (called "consequentialism"). That's the point I wanted to make here..

 

 

 

I want to try output here the links in my mind, and I admit possibly altered by your input above:

 

Yes, the intent is what determines whether or not the action is moral.

Okay, I admit intent can provide a line which is a line of certainty (intent to save life, on one side, intent to enrich self whilst disregarding harm to another, on the other side [those are mere examples from the set of all possible good or evil intents]). There can be a certain line there, even if no-one can see it clearly (not even the actor, because his self-knowledge may have distortion).

 

To fulfil his intent, the actor must make a prediction.

 

Theft, assault, fraud and murder are simple names for the actions motivated by that which has the simple name: evil intent.

 

All of these derive from the victim's preference to be alive. Clearly, a rational actor with the usual preference for being alive, would prefer to exchange with you, a treaty in which you each agree to restrict yourselves from murdering the other, compared to risking death at your hand.  This extends to theft, assault and fraud because of the reasonable prediction that such acts, if not restricted by the same treaty, could cause his death without meeting the definition of murder.

 

We determine that these four categories of action are immoral, by predicting the consequence to the victim. The consequence is death. The immoral actor has intent to disregard the (however slightly) increased possibility of death his victim suffers from say: being defrauded of some resource that could possibly be the one resource to keep him alive at some point.

 

I'm saying that with no prediction of consequence, there can be no determination that there is a set of actions, with intent included in the definitions of the actions, that are immoral actions.

 

Without objectively predictable consequences, we would be back to aesthetics. To define an objective morality, we require the process of rational prediction of consequence.

[mkaru]

I'm saying that with no prediction of consequence, there can be no determination that there is a set of actions, with intent included in the definitions of the actions, that are immoral actions.

 

Without objectively predictable consequences, we would be back to aesthetics. To define an objective morality, we require the process of rational prediction of consequence.

 

I don't think consequences need to be "objectively predictable", it's enough that they are rationally predictable, i.e. subjectively predictable (probability, not objective certainty). To be more precise: I think an actor indeed needs to be able to form an opinion about the future, for him to be able to act (or even to have intentions). But the morality/immorality itself of his actions does not stem from his opinion about the future. 

 

I am not sure if morality is only about the intentions/will (as Kant says) but there is at least one type of action that can be classified as immoral by only talking about the intention:  treating the other not as an end in itself but only as a means to my own ends. That is, intending to use persons as objects/instruments. Apart from their consequences, "Theft, assault, fraud and murder" can probably all be shown to fall under that type of actions: the acting person is not respecting the other as an end in itself ("person", "rational being" in the sense of kant), but is only concerned with his own ends, using the other as a means only.

[Des]

I don't think consequences need to be "objectively predictable", it's enough that they are rationally predictable, i.e. subjectively predictable (probability, not objective certainty). To be more precise: I think an actor indeed needs to be able to form an opinion about the future, for him to be able to act (or even to have intentions). But the morality/immorality itself of his actions does not stem from his opinion about the future. 

 

I am not sure if morality is only about the intentions/will (as Kant says) but there is at least one type of action that can be classified as immoral by only talking about the intention:  treating the other not as an end in itself but only as a means to my own ends. That is, intending to use persons as objects/instruments. Apart from their consequences, "Theft, assault, fraud and murder" can probably all be shown to fall under that type of actions: the acting person is not respecting the other as an end in itself ("person", "rational being" in the sense of kant), but is only concerned with his own ends, using the other as a means only.

Thanks, have digested that, will see if some new insight emerges in my mind, later, from that.

[John Sambrook]

...

 

Again, I would say that it is immoral because it is immoral to intend to kill someone. Or cause him pain against his will, etc. 

 

How should I know whether an action is allowed if I can not know the consequences with certainty? If instead of talking about certainty we switch to talking about probabilities, the problem only occurs again: How can I know with certainty that my calculation of the probabilities is correct?

 

We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.

 

...

 

Is thinking an action?

 

I would say that it is.

 

How do we know that Kant's advice, "The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.", is correct?

 

He was human and therefore also fallible. So how do we know with certainty that his advice actually came out correct, even if he started with the intention of producing something perfect?

[Des]

We simply can not build an ethics on this kind of uncertainty. Only if ethics is nothing but a game. If we take it seriously and want to be truly moral actors, we want to know for sure whether we are allowed to do something or not. We can know this with certainty if ethics is about types of action and not about the consequences of actions. Kant says: The will (the intention) of an actor is what decides whether it's moral or not.

The purpose of the institution of ethics/morality is to allow for reasonable resolution of conflicts (so that I do not die in a physical conflict which could have been reasonably resolved by application of the ethic/morality). If you plan out in detail how to murder me, with full intention of doing it, but all the planning is in your mind and none of it on paper or shared with anyone in any way: then what does it matter to the purpose of the institution of morality, that you have done all that thinking? Until your thought is transcribed onto the internet, or paper, or (by speech?) into another mind, there is no conflict to be resolved, so it is not necessary (to the purpose of morality) to determine whether or not that action (of thinking) is immoral.

 

https://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/46328-why-be-moral/?p=434830