Schopenhauer, the ultimate red pill?

[Jakethehuman]

The topic isn't about computers. Could you explicate what you think this proves?

I'm not trying to prove anything explicitly, just expanding the discussion.

Yes, if it was programmed to evaluate the same conditions we would in making our choice, and was programmed to weigh these conditions in terms of a number value. Technically, it doesn't predict anything, all it does is move 1's and 0's around according to a program, and it's just a representation of logic, but close enough, yes.

If our brain is just a highly advanced computer, then all of our decisions are the result of detectable and traceable stimuli, I don't think there is any argument about that.

(I just had a thought that I would love to see what Logic looks like in the brain)

 

Is there such a thing as a decision that does not have a logical answer? Take a persons favourite fruit for instance. If someone has developed an attachment to a particular fruit there are probably a few factors involved, firstly they may have been exposed more to that fruit than any other growing up, secondly their taste buds might be more receptive to the flavours, maybe they like messy fruit, maybe they saw an ad that said it was a really healthy fruit. There wasn't a single choice here. Every step of the way the environment impacted the person physically to the point where if a detector was placed in the brain of a person while they ate a variety of fruits, it could tell us what their favourite fruit is, before they said it, perhaps even before they recognise it themselves.

 

Now you can "choose" to say some other fruit is actually your favourite, but if it isn't then you are either so lacking in self knowledge that you can't make such a simple statement about yourself, or you are being totally random.

 

So does free will only give us the choice between logic and randomness?

[Kevin Beal]

If our brain is just a highly advanced computer, then all of our decisions are the result of detectable and traceable stimuli, I don't think there is any argument about that.

(I just had a thought that I would love to see what Logic looks like in the brain)

The brain is not a highly advanced computer. A computer is as a convenient analogy, but a brain is very different. A computer is dumb. It only moves 1's and 0's around like a river moving in the direction of least resistance against a stream shaped by a program. Everything we say a computer does is actually analogized.

 

It doesn't literally process, calculate, predict or model. We just describe it in those terms out of convenience, and as a representation / simulation of those things, the distinction between doing the thing itself and being a representation of that thing is unimportant. Whether or not it actually calculates something, we still have the answer to some algorithm by the end.

 

This distinction between the thing itself and representation becomes important when we're talking about things that are specifically subjective. When we talk about mental states (thoughts, feelings, desires, perceptions, etc), we're talking about something more than simple neuron firings. Consciousness is real and irreducible. It is an emergent phenomenon in and of itself. It has it's own causal relationships that the neurons which make it up don't have (neurons don't think, feel, desire, etc). In the same way, water molecules don't splash or quench thirsts, but the state water molecules are in allows for an emergent phenomenon called "liquidity" to occur.

 

When people talk about brains being computers and humans being flesh robots, it can only be because they don't actually understand computers and robots. A computer can represent in 1's and 0's accurate models, calculations, predictions, etc, and this is obviously useful, but it's not literally the analogy.

 

People have got it backwards. Computer analogies don't describe people, people analogies describe computers. Describing what computers actually do without these analogies makes computers very difficult to understand. Humans calculate, process, predict, model, etc, not computers.

 

Free will involves these functions we say a computer has, and because a computer is clearly deterministic, in the sense that it has no choice, then we conclude that therefore humans are deterministic in the same sense. This is false.

[dsayers]

I'm not trying to prove anything explicitly, just expanding the discussion.

In what way? The topic isn't about computers. If I started talking about how the local sports team was faring, I suppose one could say I was expanding the discussion. It just wouldn't be topical.

 

Is there such a thing as a decision that does not have a logical answer?

Do I answer this question or do I not?

[labmath2]

Reading the recent exchange, i think the deyerminists are not doing a very good job making the best version of the argument. Here is my shot at it.

Take any person and ask how do they choose? They use their brains. What does it mean to use their brains? As far as we know, the brain function is determined by the biology of the person and the environment they lived in and currently live in. The question is where does free will intercept.

 

Lets try Sam Harris thought experiment, choose a city, any city,

First there are thousands of city names that you could not have picked because you simply don't know them. Now there are city names you are familiar with that just didn't occur to you like Cairo, Madrid, or Paris. In what sense were you free to choose those cities? Of the cities that did occur to you, you choose one, clearly there is the free will. What if i had written a short story before the question that probed the reader to choose New York. Where does free will come in? Think of the Asch experiment and those whose perception actually conformed to the group, in what sense were they free to choose the right answer? The problem with the free will position is no matter how much can be explained without free will, it rears its ugly head where our understanding stops. In the same way magic and mysticism is used to explain things for which there are no immediate scientific explanations. Just like our lack of understanding about the world does not mean magic and mysticism is right, our lack of understanding about human decision making does not mean free will is present.

 

While I am not a determinist, I am curious to know how much we know and can know about human decision making. Psychologists and illusionists would certainly have something to say about how our minds work. Maybe soon the neuroscientists will disposses us of this notion of free will.

[Kevin Beal]

The question is where does free will intercept.

It's that experience you subjectively have where you must consciously decide to act, not to act, and if acting, which action – especially when it involves acting according to a rational standard, despite desires / inertia pushing you in another direction. It's not magic that stops the gears of the universe and pulls that lever that turns the train track in another direction, allowing the universe to continue moving forward again.

 

If free will exists, it means that our experience of choice is not an illusion – that we work causally the way we experience it (more or less). It's that thing we experience all the time. We're not talking about quantum phenomena, or magic. It's infinitely more simple a proposition than all of that. It's just saying that this thing we experience is not an illusion. It's biological like all of our other functions.

 

It's not a god of the gaps situation because you literally cannot avoid experiencing it. It's the exact opposite of a god of the gaps.

 

The debate is just "is this an illusion, or isn't it?" If any considerations need be made, they must have something to do with this question. The fact that we live in a rational, causal universe, doesn't do anything to answer this question. And if it does, then the determinist must show that it does and not simply assert it in different words ad nauseum, as happens in nearly every Determinist / free will debate.

 

Rationality is only possible if we already accept free will, so any suggestion that rationality implies Determinism is a logical contradiction.

[Jakethehuman]

 

The brain is not a highly advanced computer. A computer is as a convenient analogy, but a brain is very different. A computer is dumb. It only moves 1's and 0's around like a river moving in the direction of least resistance against a stream shaped by a program. Everything we say a computer does is actually analogized.

 

So computers of the future could never be modelled on a brain? Seeing with eyes or with 1s and 0s is essentially the same thing, and with the right programming a robot could "feel" the same sense of awe at a beautiful sunrise as a human would, they could compare it to previous experience and use it as reference in the future, it could track it's own experience and the reason it makes decisions much better than we do.

 

We take input in shuffle it around according to a few things (history, genetics, emotion, logic) and spit out a response. Of course I understand there is more to us than this simplification but at the heart of it, what is conciousness actually deciding? It doesn't have time to create new ideas for every problem it faces, it borrows and then claims it as its own. This is observed at macro levels too.

 

I'm not a hard determinist at all I'm not sure what I am in this debate, all I'm saying is that people have too much respect for consciousness most of the time, especially when we consider the state the world is in, of course people are accountable for their actions, but if someone would make a different choice if their IQ was higher and they had more information, do they really have freewill, or are they just exercising their feels?

[Kevin Beal]

So computers of the future could never be modelled on a brain?

It could be modelled on a brain, for sure. But a simulation of a thing is not the thing itself. That distinction isn't always important, but in some cases it is.

 

If you changed a computer so much that it actually had consciousness, at that point, it wouldn't be a computer, but something else. It's not a matter of programming or processing power or anything like that. It's an entirely new thing. We don't know for sure, but it appears that consciousness is a whole new class of biological phenomena, and not simply an aggregate of neuron firings – the way a program's execution is the sum of its component parts. New properties and functions emerge with consciousness that are separate from neurons (in the sense that atoms aren't solid, but the things they make up can be).

 

The proof that it's not a matter of programming or processing power is what is called the "chinese room" thought experiment. Look it up if you want.

 

Consciousness is completely underrated, actually. It's the most amazing phenomenon in the universe.

 

More on the importance of consciousness here:

 

[labmath2]

It's that experience you subjectively have where you must consciously decide to act, not to act, and if acting, which action – especially when it involves acting according to a rational standard, despite desires / inertia pushing you in another direction. It's not magic that stops the gears of the universe and pulls that lever that turns the train track in another direction, allowing the universe to continue moving forward again.

 

If free will exists, it means that our experience of choice is not an illusion – that we work causally the way we experience it (more or less). It's that thing we experience all the time. We're not talking about quantum phenomena, or magic. It's infinitely more simple a proposition than all of that. It's just saying that this thing we experience is not an illusion. It's biological like all of our other functions.

 

It's not a god of the gaps situation because you literally cannot avoid experiencing it. It's the exact opposite of a god of the gaps.

 

The debate is just "is this an illusion, or isn't it?" If any considerations need be made, they must have something to do with this question. The fact that we live in a rational, causal universe, doesn't do anything to answer this question. And if it does, then the determinist must show that it does and not simply assert it in different words ad nauseum, as happens in nearly every Determinist / free will debate.

 

Rationality is only possible if we already accept free will, so any suggestion that rationality implies Determinism is a logical contradiction.

The problem with this position is that you seem to substituting experience with free will. While that is essentially my answer as well, i restrain it to the sense of our experience and not to the experience itself. By sense of experience, I mean I can live my life as if i was free to choose every step of the way, even if there was someone who knew (or could calculate) all the decisions i will make before i made them. This is why illusions are quite interesting. If our minds did not work in some predictable manner, then the illusionist would randomly fool people. The question now is can we decipher the mechanism of decision making that allows us to predict and control someone's life decisions. The determinist thinks yes it is possible.

[rosencrantz]

When you argue that the brain is not a computer, you run into a conceptual problem.

In it's most simple form, the Turing machine, a computer simply means that you have a set of routines and simple actions. These are discrete and can be simulated. It doesn't matter if you simulate a turing machine using a modern personal computer or an ingenious set of valves and pipes. 

When you claim that the brain is not a computer you have to show that there is more to the brain than to a computer. Namely, that there functions that can't be broken down to simple functions that can be simulated. If you can show what those functions and or actions are, you have proven your point. Until then, the null hypothesis is that the brain is a computer. 

The Chinese Room argument uses a fallacious argumentation that is hard to see. 

In short, Searle argues that if you simulate something that has a certain property, you cannot conclude that the person or entity that does the simulation also has the property of the 'original'. 

However, the reverse is also true. If a person or an entity doesn't have a property, that doesn't entail that the entity that is simulated also doesn't have that property. 

Just because the guy who 'translates' Chinese doesn't understand Chinese doesn't mean that the AI also doesn't understand Chinese. 



 

[Kevin Beal]

When you claim that the brain is not a computer you have to show that there is more to the brain than to a computer. Namely, that there functions that can't be broken down to simple functions that can be simulated. If you can show what those functions and or actions are, you have proven your point. Until then, the null hypothesis is that the brain is a computer.

Consciousness, subjectivity, semantics, rationality, concept formation, pretty much everything we do. Computers don't do anything people do except through representation.

 

However, the reverse is also true. If a person or an entity doesn't have a property, that doesn't entail that the entity that is simulated also doesn't have that property. 

The person in the room never understands the conversation going on, and there is nothing to suggest that would ever happen. Moving faster (computing power) or a better manual (computer program) won't make him understand it.

 

That's like the whole point of the thought experiment. If he also understood chinese then that's a different thought experiment. There's nothing precluding him from knowing chinese, except for the fact that he doesn't.

[rosencrantz]

Consciousness, subjectivity, semantics, rationality, concept formation, pretty much everything we do.

 

So you have those but you can't show how exactly they work in the brain or how they can be reduced to discrete functions that can't be simulated. That's like having a magic dragon in your garage that can't be studied or that nobody but you can see. 

 

The person in the room never understands the conversation going on, and there is nothing to suggest that would ever happen. Moving faster (computing power) or a better manual (computer program) won't make him understand it.

 

Perhaps I wasn't clear. It's clear that the guy doesn't understand Chinese. But it doesn't follow that because of that the computer doesn't understand Chinese. 

[Kevin Beal]

So you have those but you can't show how exactly they work in the brain or how they can be reduced to discrete functions that can't be simulated. That's like having a magic dragon in your garage that can't be studied or that nobody but you can see. 

They can be simulated and are simulated in video games all the time. Computers simulate logic and calculations quadrillions of times per second across the world.

 

A simulation is not the thing itself. I don't know why I have to repeat that so often...

 

Perhaps I wasn't clear. It's clear that the guy doesn't understand Chinese. But it doesn't follow that because of that the computer doesn't understand Chinese. 

The guy is the computer in the analogy. Would you like me to explain it? He carries out the program.

Just because the "CPU + program + memory" doesn't understand chinese, doesn't mean the computer doesn't understand chinese? Are you talking about the case those sit in? Does the case understand chinese?

[labmath2]

Searle is an interesting guy. I am listening to philisophy of language lectures and its fantastic stuff (sometimes it goes over my head). Here, Searle makes one big blunder, he presupposes that intentionality is anything more than just a series of mental processes. Or to put it another way, how do you know if someone understands chinese as opposed to simulating the ability to understand chinese. This question is particularly applicable to chess bots. How do we know a chess bot isn't performing functions identical to what goes on in a human chess players mind? There are well made chess bots that even adapt to a players style if they play the same person repeatedly. Isn't the difference between simulation of a thing and the thing istelf a matter of perspective?

[Kevin Beal]

How do we know a chess bot isn't performing functions identical to what goes on in a human chess players mind?

"In" is a reference to the inside of a mind for the human, and also inside the representation of certain conditions programmed into a computer. They are "in" two different things.

 

He knows there is a difference because he has a mind, can safely assume that you and I have minds as well, and that computers haven't suddenly become conscious when nobody was looking.

 

It's not a big blunder to make completely safe assumptions, which make perfect sense to anyone who thinks about it for a bit.

The question now is can we decipher the mechanism of decision making that allows us to predict and control someone's life decisions. The determinist thinks yes it is possible.

We can do that to some extent already. Psychological journals are full of studies which attempt to do just this. It's not just Determinists who think this is possible, but anyone who thinks psychology is an objective discipline.

 

Again, this makes no comment on whether or not our decision making is an illusion or not.

[labmath2]

"In" is a reference to the inside of a mind for the human, and also inside the representation of certain conditions programmed into a computer. They are "in" two different things.

 

He knows there is a difference because he has a mind, can safely assume that you and I have minds as well, and that computers haven't suddenly become conscious when nobody was looking.

 

It's not a big blunder to make completely safe assumptions, which make perfect sense to anyone who thinks about it for a bit.

We can do that to some extent already. Psychological journals are full of studies which attempt to do just this. It's not just Determinists who think this is possible, but anyone who thinks psychology is an objective discipline.

 

Again, this makes no comment on whether or not our decision making is an illusion or not.

 

Again you assume what is going on in your mind is somehow unique unto itself. I do not think computers have minds. At the same time i don't think minds are anything more than another system of decision making. Is the way your mind operating when solving a chess problem comparable to the way a chess bot does it? In the sense that you have an input, the chess problem, you run it through some decision process, and out comes an answer and that is your decision. In this sense your mind is only unique in the sense that no two different chess bots solve the same chess problem in the exact same way. The process in your mind is different from the process in someone else mind and that is different from the way one chess bot does it and that is different from the way another chess bot does it.

 

If your decision making scheme could be deciphered and we test it against the last 1000 decisions you made and it perfectly predicted your exact decisions well in advance of you making them, in what sense were you freely choosing. This is not to be confused with your personal experience of making decision which will always appear to be free will. From the perspective of the guy with your decision scheme, are you exercising free will?

 

If understanding/intentionality isn't the middle man between input and output, then what is it?

[Kevin Beal]

Again you assume what is going on in your mind is somehow unique unto itself. [...] The process in your mind is different from the process in someone else mind and that is different from the way one chess bot does it and that is different from the way another chess bot does it.

You assume it too. This conversation is only happening because you already grant there is a difference. Perhaps you really are insane, or maybe you are just being obtuse, but you aren't having this conversation with a chess bot. We both accept there is a huge difference, so let's stop pretending there is any debate about it. I find it very annoying.

 

You say that the chess bot has schemes, logic, decisions, etc, but it doesn't. I already explained that above in post #72. The bot does none of these things. It does a single dumb process which represents these things.

 

Anything humans do can be represented or simulated, theoretically. Suggesting that because you can represent a human performing an action in the same terms you describe a bot doing the same thing only means that they can be described using the same terms, and nothing else. A completely fictional character in a book can have a thought process be represented that way, and yet we don't suggest that he has free will, or that his sense of free will is an illusion. It's just a description!

 

A representation and the thing it represents are two different things. You understand this, right? Please don't make me repeat this.

 

If you are going to present a challenge for free will, you have to show direct, explicit implications for free will being an illusion. Nobody has done this so far, beyond simply asserting that it has implications for free will. That makes me very confident that Determinism is horse sh*t.

 

If you accept that free will is magic from the get go, then your circular reasoning will lead you again back to free will being an illusion. But that's just mental masturbation, and has nothing to do with philosophy.

[labmath2]

You assume it too. This conversation is only happening because you already grant there is a difference. Perhaps you really are insane, or maybe you are just being obtuse, but you aren't having this conversation with a chess bot. We both accept there is a huge difference, so let's stop pretending there is any debate about it. I find it very annoying.

 

You say that the chess bot has schemes, logic, decisions, etc, but it doesn't. I already explained that above in post #72. The bot does none of these things. It does a single dumb process which represents these things.

 

Anything humans do can be represented or simulated, theoretically. Suggesting that because you can represent a human performing an action in the same terms you describe a bot doing the same thing only means that they can be described using the same terms, and nothing else. A completely fictional character in a book can have a thought process be represented that way, and yet we don't suggest that he has free will, or that his sense of free will is an illusion. It's just a description!

 

A representation and the thing it represents are two different things. You understand this, right? Please don't make me repeat this.

 

If you are going to present a challenge for free will, you have to show direct, explicit implications for free will being an illusion. Nobody has done this so far, beyond simply asserting that it has implications for free will. That makes me very confident that Determinism is horse sh*t.

 

If you accept that free will is magic from the get go, then your circular reasoning will lead you again back to free will being an illusion. But that's just mental masturbation, and has nothing to do with philosophy.

I think i may have missed something. My position is that its a distinction that is predicated on the knowledge that there is a distinction. There is no real time distinction. Have you heard of the turk? It was a chess automaton that was popular until the creator revealed it wasn't really an automaton (there was a person operating it). Prior to the knowledge of the human in the turk, the turk was an unthinking machine in the sense in which you refer to chess bots. After it was revealed, people retroactively gave the turk human characteristics. Right until people knew, the turk was doing "a single dumb process." A mere imitation. If the reverse were to happen, would people instantly recognize that its not a human playing, but in fact a robot?

 

On that note, its very possible that what we do is unique unto itself. But if we could replicate it, the entirety of human decision making on a computer and unless someone tells us which is which, we couldn't tell the difference, in what sense is it now unique? Unless we actually know how we do what we do in a physical sense (understanding how brain creates thought), are we not only assuming the difference?

 

Would this conversation be less meaningful if you were a robot? No, not to me it wouldn't.

[Kevin Beal]

On that note, its very possible that what we do is unique unto itself. But if we could replicate it, the entirety of human decision making on a computer and unless someone tells us which is which, we couldn't tell the difference, in what sense is it now unique? Unless we actually know how we do what we do in a physical sense (understanding how brain creates thought), are we not only assuming the difference?

 

Would this conversation be less meaningful if you were a robot? No, not to me it wouldn't.

The chinese room argument is about this.

 

The turing test is what we used to say would mark the beginning of artificial intelligence. If a program can trick a person into thinking it's a person with it's own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions on the other end, then it's as good as the real thing. And in a sense, it is. If the result you are looking for is simply a conversation, or a prediction or something else that human intelligence offers, but offered by a computer, then there is no meaningful difference.

 

The only problem that I have is in assuming that this is the same thing as intelligence, or that the representation of it is any kind of proof that the original operates in the same way. In other words, that because the computer has no choice, neither do humans.

 

There is no subjective experience occurring for these artificially intelligent machines. They are not conscious. If this distinction were never important and the existence of consciousness is completely superfluous, meaningless fluff that could be entirely replaced by a non-conscious program in the brain, then why would it exist in the first place?

 

In order to have conscious awareness, we use a ton of vital resources that could be used elsewhere. If it is unnecessary, adds nothing significant, but is a huge waste of resources in our bodies, then that makes no sense. My contention is that it is incredibly important, and while it can be reproduced in a certain capacity, the thing itself is of unique value. The effect perceptions, thoughts and desires have on our consciousness are causal on a subjective level that can only be simulated on a machine and cannot be literally reproduced. That has value in ways which are countless, immediate, and completely surrounding us.

[labmath2]

The chinese room argument is about this.

 

The turing test is what we used to say would mark the beginning of artificial intelligence. If a program can trick a person into thinking it's a person with it's own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions on the other end, then it's as good as the real thing. And in a sense, it is. If the result you are looking for is simply a conversation, or a prediction or something else that human intelligence offers, but offered by a computer, then there is no meaningful difference.

 

The only problem that I have is in assuming that this is the same thing as intelligence, or that the representation of it is any kind of proof that the original operates in the same way. In other words, that because the computer has no choice, neither do humans.

 

There is no subjective experience occurring for these artificially intelligent machines. They are not conscious. If this distinction were never important and the existence of consciousness is completely superfluous, meaningless fluff that could be entirely replaced by a non-conscious program in the brain, then why would it exist in the first place?

 

In order to have conscious awareness, we use a ton of vital resources that could be used elsewhere. If it is unnecessary, adds nothing significant, but is a huge waste of resources in our bodies, then that makes no sense. My contention is that it is incredibly important, and while it can be reproduced in a certain capacity, the thing itself is of unique value. The effect perceptions, thoughts and desires have on our consciousness are causal on a subjective level that can only be simulated on a machine and cannot be literally reproduced. That has value in ways which are countless, immediate, and completely surrounding us.

I have read your response 4 times so far and it is so fascinating and i really don't know of there is a good response to it. I think it resolves the argument quite well.

[neeeel]

The chinese room argument is about this.

 

The turing test is what we used to say would mark the beginning of artificial intelligence. If a program can trick a person into thinking it's a person with it's own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions on the other end, then it's as good as the real thing. And in a sense, it is. If the result you are looking for is simply a conversation, or a prediction or something else that human intelligence offers, but offered by a computer, then there is no meaningful difference.

 

The only problem that I have is in assuming that this is the same thing as intelligence, or that the representation of it is any kind of proof that the original operates in the same way. In other words, that because the computer has no choice, neither do humans.

 

There is no subjective experience occurring for these artificially intelligent machines. They are not conscious. If this distinction were never important and the existence of consciousness is completely superfluous, meaningless fluff that could be entirely replaced by a non-conscious program in the brain, then why would it exist in the first place?

 

In order to have conscious awareness, we use a ton of vital resources that could be used elsewhere. If it is unnecessary, adds nothing significant, but is a huge waste of resources in our bodies, then that makes no sense. My contention is that it is incredibly important, and while it can be reproduced in a certain capacity, the thing itself is of unique value. The effect perceptions, thoughts and desires have on our consciousness are causal on a subjective level that can only be simulated on a machine and cannot be literally reproduced. That has value in ways which are countless, immediate, and completely surrounding us.

 

I dont think that determinism says that consciousness is meaningless fluff, or has no value, but its a system, a process, and part of the deterministic universe. None of what you said disproves that consciousness is deterministic. Something can have immense value, and still be deterministic.

 

Further, its not clear to me what consciousness does. Its clear to me what it doesnt do, that is, think, choose, act. These things happen in consciousness, but consciousness isnt "doing" them ( perhaps that doesnt make sense, but its the best way I can think of to express it)

[Kevin Beal]

I dont think that determinism says that consciousness is meaningless fluff [...] Further, its not clear to me what consciousness does. Its clear to me what it doesnt do, that is, think, choose, act. These things happen in consciousness, but consciousness isnt "doing" them

Can you see why I might be confused? It's not meaningless fluff, but it doesn't do what we think it does, and maybe it doesn't even do anything. This is what I mean by meaningless fluff. Maybe you have a different definition of meaningless fluff...?

 

This is, like, the whole debate, as far as I'm concerned. If you can make the case that consciousness doesn't do these things, then I consider my arguments defeated. For free will to exist, it requires that we use our consciousness to volitionally create outcomes according to our reason, and our desires. If our consciousness doesn't do these things, then there is no choice and free will is an illusion, as far as I can make sense of it.

 

You seem very confident that consciousness doesn't do these things, so I look forward to your reasoning!

 

I didn't say I disproved Determinism, either. I fully concede that I could be a biological flesh robot who is only kidding himself that he can choose. I'm providing challenges to the Determinist position, because often it is taken simply as granted that Determinism is true. I don't think it is, and I provided my reasoning as to why. If only we were so lucky as to have proof either way! :,(

 

Evidence and rational arguments will have to do in the meantime, with your blessing, that is.

 

 

P.S. I wish that people would only quote the relevant bits of the posts they are responding to. That way I know for sure what they take issue with. I pack my posts pretty densely with propositions and logic.

[Kevin Beal]

I dont think that determinism says that consciousness is meaningless fluff, or has no value, but its a system, a process, and part of the deterministic universe.

Also, it depends on what flavor of determinism you're talking about. Functionalism, Epiphenomenalism, Behaviorism and others all say that consciousness is not important, adds nothing, is an illusion. Daniel Dennett, the popular academic pseudo-philosopher says that consciousness is not only meaningless, but that it doesn't exist at all.

 

The video I shared above (in post #77) gives a brief outline of popular determinist positions on consciousness.

 

It is incredibly common for Determinists to think that consciousness doesn't matter. And it must be that consciousness is at least partly meaningless if there is only ever one outcome possible, and that consciousness includes choosing different outcomes. If determinism is true, then it has to be somewhat useless. There's no way around that. And it need only be useless in the one respect for my arguments to work. It can burn calories or something and have utility that way, but obviously we're talking about something specific here.

[neeeel]

Can you see why I might be confused? It's not meaningless fluff, but it doesn't do what we think it does, and maybe it doesn't even do anything. This is what I mean by meaningless fluff. Maybe you have a different definition of meaningless fluff...?

 

This is, like, the whole debate, as far as I'm concerned. If you can make the case that consciousness doesn't do these things, then I consider my arguments defeated. For free will to exist, it requires that we use our consciousness to volitionally create outcomes according to our reason, and our desires. If our consciousness doesn't do these things, then there is no choice and free will is an illusion, as far as I can make sense of it.

 

 

 

 

Good catch, I see what you mean. It is confusing. I could say a number of things, but I dont think they are convincing to anyone, including me, at the moment. I will have to think on it. 

 

 

 

You seem very confident that consciousness doesn't do these things, so I look forward to your reasoning! 

 

 

 

Ok, here goes

 

My reasoning is from observation of thought.

Thoughts appear and disappear. There is no selection process, they are there, and then they arent. There is no point at which we can see consciousness intervene and go "ok, we will think that thought". There are thoughts about thoughts, but these are thoughts like any other, and with these, there is also no selection process, they are there, then they arent, and there is no point at which we can see consciousness intervene and go "ok, we will think that thought". 

 

Its not possible to predict the next thought. Any prediction of the next thought IS a thought, and  you didnt predict it.

 

Its not possible to think a random thought. To go into RAM , as it were, and select a thought at a certain location. If you observe the process of selecting a random thought, theres usually a stream of thoughts, with thoughts about those thoughts, commenting on whether they are random enough. Or else, the mind goes blank and waits for inspiration. Or there is a set of stock "random thoughts" that obviously arent random,

 

Thoughts appear in consciousness. In that sense, they appear similar to sights, sounds and other sensory data. You wouldnt claim that consciousness was doing the sounds, sights etc. 

 

If consciousness was doing thought, then it would be a simple matter to stop thinking about something, or to simply select a different thought. Anyone who has experienced a racing mind, or a persistent train of thoughts, knows that its difficult/impossible( I acknowledge that learning/training is possible, but thats nothing to do with consciousness on its own, but is a mark of the flexibility of the biological system as a whole, it doesnt imply that somehow consciousness stepped in and did something)

 

 

 

For free will to exist, it requires that we use our consciousness to volitionally create outcomes according to our reason, and our desires

 

 

The language you use implies there is something else outside our consciousness that uses the consciousness. "We use our consciousness".  Perhaps thats not what you really meant? Or you meant that consciousness uses consciousness? If you meant the former, what is it that volitionally uses consciousness? If the latter, it sounds like the idea of being able to lift yourself by your own bootlaces.

 

( I use the language too, theres no problem with using it, I just want to be clear that by my using it, it doesnt imply that I believe in free will)

 

Do you agree that there can be no ghost in the machine that somehow inhabits the body, pulls the strings? I know thats likely not your position, I just want to check. 

 

often it is taken simply as granted that Determinism is true. I don't think it is, and I provided my reasoning as to why.

 

 

I want to make sure I understand your reasoning as to why you think determinism is false.

 

your reasons are

 

1) there is no evidence that human intelligence is the same as computer intelligence

2) computers dont have subjective experience, we do 

3) consciousness consumes a large amount of resources.

 

have I understood correctly?

[Kevin Beal]

Thoughts appear and disappear. There is no selection process, they are there, and then they arent. There is no point at which we can see consciousness intervene and go "ok, we will think that thought". [...] Thoughts appear in consciousness. In that sense, they appear similar to sights, sounds and other sensory data. You wouldnt claim that consciousness was doing the sounds, sights etc. 

 

If consciousness was doing thought, then it would be a simple matter to stop thinking about something, or to simply select a different thought.

When I sat down to read your response, I did it with intention, thinking about what I considered was relevant, disregarding the rest, choosing to consider what relevance it has, and determining if it does indeed support the conclusion that consciousness is completely passive (i.e. not doing thought, feeling, etc.).

 

This is an active process. I chose what to think about. I know what you're saying is false because I proved it empirically with my own conscious experience. Thoughts are not perceptions (sensory data, "seeing that," anticipating, etc.). Not everything that occurs in consciousness behaves the same way, or has the same properties. We don't decide to feel hot when it's 90 degrees outside, obviously, but the whole idea of what it means to "decide" is a product of thought. Deciding is a thinking process. Of course, you don't choose what you believe, how you feel or what you perceive, but so what?

 

What, is free will a totally random, yet decisive process which makes you believe what you don't believe, and perceive what you don't perceive? You act according to your will, in response to your desires and your thinking. It's not random. It's not deciding what is true, or what you believe is true, or deciding to have preferences that you don't have already.

 

I fail to see the relevance here.

 

 

The language you use implies there is something else outside our consciousness that uses the consciousness. "We use our consciousness".  Perhaps thats not what you really meant? Or you meant that consciousness uses consciousness? If you meant the former, what is it that volitionally uses consciousness? If the latter, it sounds like the idea of being able to lift yourself by your own bootlaces.

I mean the latter. Thoughts in response to other thoughts, being self generated, responding to itself, and all that jazz. It may sound like something illogical, but that doesn't make it illogical, obviously.

 

Or maybe the self is something larger, but includes consciousness. I don't know, and I'm not sure why it's relevant.

 

 

Do you agree that there can be no ghost in the machine that somehow inhabits the body, pulls the strings? I know thats likely not your position, I just want to check. 

 

I want to make sure I understand your reasoning as to why you think determinism is false.

 

your reasons are

 

1) there is no evidence that human intelligence is the same as computer intelligence

2) computers dont have subjective experience, we do 

3) consciousness consumes a large amount of resources.

 

have I understood correctly?

I'm not with Descartes. There is no ghost in the machine.

 

Those are 3 of a dozen reasons or so, yes. Some more include:

• If thought is not active but passive, then reason is impossible, and arguing for Determinism by appealing to reason is thus contradictory
• Acting consistently with the knowledge of Determinism leads to negative results in one's life
• A rational universe doesn't preclude multiple outcomes
• We live a life where we act on our free will all the time
• We cannot live without assuming the validity of free will
• Determinists constantly misrepresent the free will position and thus cannot be trusted to conclude anything meaningful about it
• and more

[neeeel]

This is an active process. I chose what to think about. I know what you're saying is false because I proved it empirically with my own conscious experience. Thoughts are not perceptions (sensory data, "seeing that," anticipating, etc.). Not everything that occurs in consciousness behaves the same way, or has the same properties. We don't decide to feel hot when it's 90 degrees outside, obviously, but the whole idea of what it means to "decide" is a product of thought. Deciding is a thinking process. Of course, you don't choose what you believe, how you feel or what you perceive, but so what?

who or what chooses what to think about? Sure, there were thoughts about what you considered was relevant, disregarding the rest, etc. You assume that you chose it, the voice in your head saying "Look! I just chose that!" , but, that voice in your head is a thought too, and you didnt choose that thought either.

 

We are at an impasse. I know that what I am saying about thought is true, because I proved it empirically with my own conscious experience ( edit to add, as in, by looking at my own experience, I can see that it's true) Im not sure how we can get past that.

[Kevin Beal]

I decided that I'm going to think about a white elephant. A thought about a white elephant is now in my head.

 

Did I not decide that? Was it not of a white elephant? Is it not a thought?

 

Just because the literal language content of a thought is rarely chosen, doesn't mean we don't choose our thoughts. Some thoughts are not chosen, but others just are.

 

There was an infinity of other possible thoughts you could have had, but you chose to direct your conscious awareness at a particular topic, with a particular intention and think about this. If you didn't, then we have nothing to talk about because you are just a bunch of random thoughts bouncing off of a subject.

 

I'm not going to talk to you if you have no control over your thoughts. That would be a complete waste of time.

[labmath2]

who or what chooses what to think about? Sure, there were thoughts about what you considered was relevant, disregarding the rest, etc. You assume that you chose it, the voice in your head saying "Look! I just chose that!" , but, that voice in your head is a thought too, and you didnt choose that thought either.

 

We are at an impasse. I know that what I am saying about thought is true, because I proved it empirically with my own conscious experience ( edit to add, as in, by looking at my own experience, I can see that it's true) Im not sure how we can get past that.

What is subjective experience?

I can add numbers and a calculator can add numbers, but there is sonething different about the two. There is a subjective experience of adding numbers that is true for me (and you) that simply cannot exist for the calculator. You would have to believe your subjective experience of adding could be objectively represented or transferred which i don't think the most staunch determinist believes. As Kevin pointed out, the alternative is to say subjective experience is meaningless fluff, which i also don't think determinists accept.

[neeeel]

I decided that I'm going to think about a white elephant. A thought about a white elephant is now in my head.

 

Did I not decide that? Was it not of a white elephant? Is it not a thought?

 

No, you didnt decide that. Your thought about a white elephant was brought up in response to reading my post. Even the white elephant thing is a giveaway, as its a common thing to be told not to think about. Your brain read the post, and in response, with no input from you, produced the thought about a white elephant. Then there were further thoughts about how this thought of a white elephant was proof that you had decided to think about a white elephant. I would guess that you also missed the subtle chain of thoughts where the brain cast about for something to think about.

 

If you can explain to me the mechanism by which you decided to think about a white elephant, so that I can observe the same mechanism in myself, then you have shown me something. But just asserting, "I had the thought, therefore I chose the thought" means nothing. I have pointed you to where to look to see that you arent actually choosing or thinking your thoughts, but I dont think you have looked.

 

You are assuming your conclusion in your premises. "I decided to think the thought", without even challenging it.

 

 

Some thoughts are not chosen

 

right, and this is another indication that I am correct. How is it that some are not chosen, and some ( according to you) are? What is it that steps in , how does it step in, and suddenly starts choosing? 

Isnt it more likely that ALL thoughts are unchosen?

 

The voice in your head , that you think of as you, is a thought. Thoughts dont think other thoughts, thoughts dont choose other thoughts. 

[Kevin Beal]

I don't know how consciousness works. It could all be passive, including the experience of it being active. That may all be true. The reason I think I am actively thinking is because that is my direct first hand experience.

 

I think starting from the default that I am not deluded, and that my consciousness works the way I experience it working, is the way to go. My invitation is to you to prove that it is an illusion. If we start with "it's an illusion" as the default, then I'm not sure what I'd be responding to. I have to respond to the specific respect in which it is an illusion, or else there is way to know if I've successfully defended the proposition.

 

The specific respect in which you claim that my experience of choosing my thoughts is supported by arguments which do not actually make that case, as far as I can tell. I may be a moron, but I don't see what significance there is in having to choose the thought in every respect in order to choose it in any respect. This strikes me as obviously false, and yet you persist in saying it.

 

I don't know what I'm supposed to do with this. It seems painfully obvious that I choose my thoughts. This whole conversation is only possible because we assume we choose our thoughts. Maybe we don't choose our thoughts, but I don't have anything I can work with to decide this for myself, for the reasons I already stated.

 

I can't tell if I'm being unclear, I'm wrong, or you're being obtuse. It's a very strange position to be in to argue that I have any amount of control over my own thoughts. Can you understand why I'd be confused?

[dsayers]

right, and this is another indication that I am correct.

No it isn't. It's indicative that there are different levels of the brain. In your automatic transmission automobile, you can choose when and how much to press the accelerator, you cannot explicitly choose when it will shift gears. This doesn't indicate that a person has no choice, but that there are different levels of control in concert with one another.

[neeeel]

I don't know how consciousness works. It could all be passive, including the experience of it being active. That may all be true. The reason I think I am actively thinking is because that is my direct first hand experience.

 

I think starting from the default that I am not deluded, and that my consciousness works the way I experience it working, is the way to go. My invitation is to you to prove that it is an illusion. If we start with "it's an illusion" as the default, then I'm not sure what I'd be responding to. I have to respond to the specific respect in which it is an illusion, or else there is way to know if I've successfully defended the proposition.

 

I have pointed a number of times at where you can look and see that what I am saying is true. 

 

The specific respect in which you claim that my experience of choosing my thoughts is supported by arguments which do not actually make that case, as far as I can tell. I may be a moron, but I don't see what significance there is in having to choose the thought in every respect in order to choose it in any respect. This strikes me as obviously false, and yet you persist in saying it.

 

I don't know what I'm supposed to do with this. It seems painfully obvious that I choose my thoughts. This whole conversation is only possible because we assume we choose our thoughts. Maybe we don't choose our thoughts, but I don't have anything I can work with to decide this for myself, for the reasons I already stated.

 

 

Except where you acknowledge that you dont always choose your thoughts. Doesnt this intrigue you at all? Some thoughts are unchosen, and yet we believe that we choose thoughts. Even the ones that arent chosen, we think, well, I must have chosen it. There is NO difference between a thought that we believe we chose, and a thought that we acknowledge was unchosen. Other than another thought saying "I chose that". 

 

We are going round in circles, so perhaps we should leave it there.

 

 

No it isn't. It's indicative that there are different levels of the brain. In your automatic transmission automobile, you can choose when and how much to press the accelerator, you cannot explicitly choose when it will shift gears. This doesn't indicate that a person has no choice, but that there are different levels of control in concert with one another.

 

 

This analogy isnt applicable.  With thoughts, what kevin is saying is that thoughts can be unchosen, but we can step in at any time and start choosing them. In your analogy, this would be analogous to the car driving itself, staying on the road, dodging other cars, going to your destination, and , at some point, you step in and take control, and start driving.

[John Sambrook]

I expect that the thoughts that "come up" are those that survive an unconscious selection process, based on the various factors known to the individual.

For example, if I tell someone he is going to be hung at dawn, and the threat is credible, it's likely that the thoughts that come up for him will be in some way related to the threat of his being hung at dawn. (Hence the saying, "Nothing focuses the mind like a hanging." [1])

It may be that there are many thoughts competing for attention at an unconscious level and that some kind of filtering process beyond our conscious control ultimately decides what thoughts appear in consciousness.

 

Sam Harris has material, including a book and a YouTube video on "The Illusion of Free Will." [2]  One of my friends has also written an essay on Sam's arguments on the topic of free will. [3]

[1]  http://thinkexist.com/quotation/nothing-focuses-the-mind-like-a-hanging/761668.html

 

[2] 

 

[3]  https://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Response-Sam-Harris-ebook/dp/B00869S35Q#nav-subnav

[Kevin Beal]

No, you didnt decide that. Your thought about a white elephant was brought up in response to reading my post. [...] You are assuming your conclusion in your premises. "I decided to think the thought", without even challenging it.

This is ironic.

 

I "didn't decide it" is assuming your conclusion up front. Projection much?

 

The only way I can make sense of your posts is to already assume your conclusion, Mr "you didn't decide that"!

We are going round in circles, so perhaps we should leave it there.

Yes, this is a rational decision to make. <- See what I did there..?

I have pointed a number of times at where you can look and see that what I am saying is true. 

Yes, and I pointed out that to say something is true in one respect is not to say that it's true in every respect. That's why I immediately followed my statements with that point.

 

Saying something is true in one respect, therefore it's true in every respect, is a really bad argument – especially considering how inescapable it is that we have to assume it is not true in at least one respect, in order for this conversation not to be completely freakin' meaningless.

Sam Harris has material, including a book and a YouTube video on "The Illusion of Free Will."

His definition of free will, being that thing which pauses all of the causal events in order to magically change things, is indeed an illusion.

 

If you define a thing as magic up front, then it doesn't matter what the logic is in between the definition and the conclusion, it's still going to be magic by the end.

 

The problem with his arguments (and every other determinist) is to assume that a rational universe necessitates a single outcome and that no conscious process can, of it's own volition, create another outcome.

 

He's a neuroscientist and not a philosopher. His theory of ethics has problems too. I'm inclined to think he should stick to neuroscience.

[dsayers]

This analogy isnt applicable.

So you are free to choose to disregard the point the analogy was meant to illustrate, but would that be helpful? If the car is running and in gear, it WILL "drive itself," at which point, you can chase it down, hope in, and drive. That wasn't the point though.

[neeeel]

This is ironic.

 

I "didn't decide it" is assuming your conclusion up front. Projection much?

 

Except that thats not what I did. Your argument was "Look, I decided it, therefore I decided it". your first sentence was literally "I decided that I'm going to think about a white elephant." and then you used that as proof that you decided.

 

I am not saying, I didnt decide, therefore I didnt decide. I am pointing out various different things about thought that dont add up.